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“Tim Bartik has written a thoughtful book on the value of a local approach to financing and creating early interventions to foster child development. The economic case
for supplementing the early environments of disadvantaged children is compelling.
Annual rates of return of 7–10 percent per annum have been estimated—higher than
the return on stocks over the period 1945–2008. Yet there are substantial barriers to
the adoption of these programs, which Bartik documents. Bartik makes a valuable
argument for engaging governments and private organizations at the local level to
design and finance these programs. He presents evidence that there are substantial
benefits from early childhood programs that accrue to localities. This book shows
that a decentralized approach to early childhood development will encourage experimentation and will adapt the programs to local needs. In an era of stringent federal
budgets, Bartik offers a plan for raising the support needed to put effective programs
into place.”
—James Heckman, Nobel Prize–winning economist, University of Chicago
“Timothy Bartik takes us on an expertly narrated tour of that middle ground between
what theory says ought to happen and what the real world actually presents. His disciplined fidelity to the evidence makes this, like every Bartik book, a guidepost for
policy.”
—John D. Donahue, Harvard Kennedy School; former Assistant Secretary of Labor
“Building a strong workforce—one that will drive the economic growth and prosperity of the future—requires the strong foundation that quality preschool provides. Tim
Bartik delivers an important message—one that both employers and policymakers
should heed. Our Chamber continues to advocate that local and state economies are
strengthened by investments in both quality pre-K programs and business incentives.
It cannot be a matter of choosing one over the other.”
—Dave Adkisson, President and CEO, Kentucky Chamber of Commerce
“Tim Bartik’s book makes an excellent case that increasing our investment in a continuum of early childhood programs pays off when examined from a business and
economic perspective. This work includes an important contribution by quantifying
how specific improvements in program design of early childhood programs will increase economic benefits. It’s past the time to expand our early childhood program
investments within the context of a commitment to quality and accountability. This
would be a good book for business leaders and others who should focus on an economic rationale for public investment in early childhood learning.”
—Harriet Dichter, former Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare
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“Bartik’s new book is a comprehensive and compelling argument for a one-two economic development punch: how state and local governments need to combine both
tax incentives for businesses and investments in early childhood education. Once
again, Bartik shows why he is the ‘go-to guy’ on the economics of local economic
development.”
—Michael Mandel, former Chief Economist at BusinessWeek
“When oxygen is literally being sucked out of state and federal budgets, we can’t
afford to assume that what we’re doing with taxpayer dollars works, in spite of the
growing evidence that it doesn’t. State and local economic development officials need
new strategies, ones backed by fact and evidence. Tim Bartik provides exactly this
in his powerfully researched book that documents the link between economic development and investing in young children in ways never done before. Now business
leaders and development officials have a sober, fact-based framework for increasing personal incomes, local and state workforce competitiveness, and national fiscal
strength. This is a framework for getting our country back on its feet and keeping it
there.”
—Robert Dugger, founder and Managing Partner, Hanover Investment Group; Chairman of the Advisory Board, Partnership for America’s Economic Success
“Whenever a new book, report, or article appears with Tim Bartik as the author, I
take notice and make time for reading. I know that it will be lucidly written and ably
argued. Tim has a knack for picking a real problem on which to work and a good feel
for what’s the level of rigor that is needed. Many economists do not. Lastly, Tim understands that an economy grows on the basis of lots of forces and events. Not all of
them are narrowly economic. Tim’s work on investments in early childhood development is an excellent example.”
—William Schweke, Senior Fellow, Corporation for Enterprise Development
“The case for treating early childhood development as economic development is long
overdue. Timothy Bartik’s book is the first to take a comprehensive and in-depth
look at this issue. Examining both economic development and early childhood development from a local perspective, Bartik makes a convincing argument that early
childhood investments are an important but often overlooked form of economic development. Indeed, he also makes a strong case that from a national perspective we
are underinvesting in our children, especially in our most at-risk children. Bartik’s
book has much to offer those working in the field of economic development and gives
much-needed support to early childhood educators and their profession.”
—Arthur Rolnick, former Senior Vice President and Director of Research, Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

§

§

§

§

§

§

“States will continue to need to make harder choices as fiscal realities change. The
good news is that those choices will increasingly be based on evidence of what works,
a change that is long overdue. The other good news is that children should finally
come out on top—the evidence is on their side. I have pushed for years to invest more
in our youngest citizens, and I am delighted to have new ammunition for that fight in
the form of this new book from Tim Bartik.”
—Barbara O’Brien, Lieutenant Governor, State of Colorado
“The disastrous consequences of short-term decision making in economics and policy
are more evident today than ever. Timothy Bartik is an exponent of the view that there
is no short term. His latest book is a must read for everyone concerned with setting
priorities for government spending and our children’s futures.”
—W. Steven Barnett, Codirector, National Institute for Early Education Research
“For too long, supports for young children have been seen as a feel-good issue that
mainly concerns families, and not one that affects all of us as a nation. In this book,
Tim Bartik uses solid economic evidence of benefits not just from “hothouse” early
childhood programs but from a large-scale Chicago program currently in existence to
demonstrate the critical need for policymakers to pay attention. Leaders in the early
childhood community are delighted to have this new tool, and we hope it helps put to
rest any lingering doubts that our collective future depends on investing wisely in our
children and in their futures.”
—William H. Bentley, President and CEO, Voices for America’s Children
“Timothy Bartik is that rare economist who is deeply committed to making his work
accessible to policymakers while maintaining the highest technical standards and letting empirical research drive his recommendations. Here he has created an invaluable
framework for comparing the cost-effectiveness of business incentives and strategic
investments in human capital as alternative strategies for promoting the economic
well-being of states and their residents. This book should be required reading for
every governor’s chief policy advisor and every state legislator who serves on a tax,
economic development, or education committee.”
—Michael Mazerov, Senior Fellow, State Fiscal Project, Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities
“The future of America is no longer dependent on our natural resources or geographic
location; it is our people. More importantly it is our ability to produce bright, intuitive
lifelong learners. Bartik has crafted a must read for those who truly care about community and economic sustainability.”
—Ron Kitchens, CEO, Southwest Michigan First
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1
Introduction
This book presents arguments for the following propositions: Local1
economic development strategies in the United States should include
extensive investments in high-quality early childhood programs, such
as prekindergarten (pre-K) education,2 child care, and parenting assistance. Economic development policies should also include reforms in
business tax incentives. But economic development benefits—higher
earnings per capita in the local community—can be better achieved if
business incentives are complemented by early childhood programs.
Economic development benefits can play an important role in motivating a grassroots movement for investing in our kids.
I first became involved with early childhood policy in May of 2005,
when I was contacted by a vice president for the Committee for Economic Development (CED). CED is a national organization of business
executives and university presidents that sponsors research and takes
positions on policy issues. CED tends to take “centrist” positions.
As I was to discover later, CED’s work on early childhood issues
was largely funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, a large national foundation headquartered in Philadelphia. Pew had decided to get involved
in promoting the greater availability of high-quality pre-K education
in the fall of 2001. Pew soon moved into a national leadership role in
promoting pre-K expansion. As David Kirp, professor of public policy
at the University of California, Berkeley, says in his book The Sandbox Investment, “Ever since the Pew Charitable Trusts made preschool
a priority, the foundation has largely masterminded the national early
education agenda” (Kirp 2007, pp. 174–175). Pew has provided much
of the funding for the National Institute for Early Education Research at
Rutgers University, and for the advocacy group Pre-K Now. After several years of focusing its efforts on pre-K education, Pew has expanded
to encompass a broader set of early childhood programs.
According to Pew staff, political support for early childhood programs is enhanced by evidence that these programs provide business
or economic benefits: “One very successful part of the early education
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message that resonates with a variety of important audiences,” say Pew
staff Urahn and Watson (2006), “has been the macroeconomic benefits
prekindergarten offers to the communities and states that invest in early
education. This message has generated substantial interest from advocates, policymakers, and business leaders, helping them understand the
value of early education in a new light.” Therefore, Pew has funded
research that explores different ways of measuring the economic or
business return to pre-K education. In the past several years, Pew has
also funded research on the economic returns to other early childhood
programs. This Pew research funding includes my 2005–2006 research
on the economic development effects of universal pre-K education,
my 2007–2008 research on the economic development effects of other
early childhood programs, and now this book, which summarizes and
expands on this earlier work.3
When I was contacted in 2005, CED’s request was to “compare
the net benefits/rate of return to prekindergarten programs with alternative state and local economic development investments (such as sports
stadiums, business parks, facilities relocation, and the like).” The committee mentioned that it had contacted me because “much of your work
focuses on economic development.” My previous work in this area
includes a 1991 book on the distributional effects of economic development programs, and research publications on the effects of taxes and
public services on business location decisions, and on how to evaluate
local economic development programs.
As I reflected on CED’s request, I decided it made more sense if
modified. This research seeks to be relevant to the concerns of political and business leaders interested in local economic development. To
achieve this relevance, we need to consider effects of prekindergarten
programs that are similar in character to the effects of economic development programs. For example, one of the most important benefits of
some high-quality pre-K programs is the resulting reduction in crime
when the children get older. Crime reduction is of interest to police
chiefs and to voters in general. But crime reduction is not the primary
goal of economic development programs. Rather, these programs seek
to create jobs and earnings for local residents. If there is any case to be
made for pre-K programs as “economic development programs,” then
pre-K programs need to provide “economic development benefits.”
These benefits are increased jobs or earnings for local residents.

Introduction 3

Ironically, my modification of the CED/Pew request was inspired by
a research publication that focused on crime reduction. In 1996 (updated
in 1998), the RAND Corporation published Diverting Children from a
Life of Crime (Greenwood et al. 1998). This publication compared the
anticrime effects of California’s “three strikes” law, which mandates
long prison sentences for repeat offenders, with the anticrime effects of
four social programs. These four social programs include 1) home visits,
2) parenting training and therapy, 3) high school graduation incentives,
and 4) early supervision of delinquent high school youth. Greenwood et
al. compared these four social programs with the “three strikes” law in
terms of the serious crimes averted per million dollars spent.
I admired this RAND publication because it directly addressed concerns about crime. The publication says that if your goal is reduced
crime, here is what various programs can do for you. RAND accepted
the legitimacy of concerns about crime rather than belittling those concerns. RAND tried to provide objective evidence on what is the best
means of achieving anticrime goals.
My thought was that something similar could be done for economic
development goals. As is developed further in this book, there are good
reasons to think that economic development goals are important. But
what is the best strategy for achieving those goals? Could pre-K play
an important role in achieving economic development goals? These
are questions that could benefit, it seemed to me, from some objective
investigation.

CLARIFYING PREVIOUS THINKING
My 2005 research was not the first research on what early childhood programs can do for local economies. Much of the recent interest
in the economic development benefits of pre-K education was sparked
by a March 2003 article by Rolnick and Grunewald, “Early Childhood
Development: Economic Development with a High Public Return.” Art
Rolnick was director of research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis until 2010. Rolnick is a well-known participant in debates related
to Minnesota and Twin Cities economic development. Rob Grunewald
is a regional economic analyst at the Minneapolis Fed. This article was
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quickly shared within the early childhood community. The article was
also quickly used to advocate for more funding for high-quality pre-K
education. As Rolnick (2008) said, because of this article, “our phones
have been ringing off the hook.”
In this article, Rolnick and Grunewald (2003) argue for pre-K
because “we estimate the real internal rate of return for the Perry School
program at 16 percent . . . about 80 percent of the benefits went to the
general public (students were less disruptive in class and went on to
commit fewer crimes), yielding over a 12 percent internal rate of return
for society in general . . . The returns to [early childhood development
programs] are especially high when placed next to other spending by
governments made in the name of economic development. Yet [early
childhood development] is rarely considered as an economic development measure.” (For those unfamiliar with the research on pre-K, the
Perry Preschool program of the 1960s is the pre-K program with the
best research evidence for long-term benefits after age 25. Participants
in Perry Preschool have been compared with a randomly chosen control
group up through age 40.4 This comparison includes employment, earnings, education, welfare receipt, and involvement with crime.)
My concern about the Rolnick/Grunewald argument is that the
authors treat “economic development benefits” as being the same as
“economic benefits.” But “economic development benefits” form a category of economic benefits that has a special importance. In arguing
for the superiority of early childhood development over business incentives, Rolnick and Grunewald include all benefits. For the Perry Preschool program, they include the benefits from crime reduction, which
are at least half of the benefits of this program.5 However, reduced crime
is not the same as better employment opportunities. Economic development practitioners are trying to improve employment opportunities
for local residents. Are early childhood programs a good “economic
development investment” if we only consider effects on employment
opportunities for local residents?
An emphasis on “economic development benefits” only makes
sense if such benefits are especially important. As this book will argue,
improved employment opportunities for local residents do have special
importance. There is something different about local jobs for local residents as an economic good. There is also a special political importance
attached to these kinds of economic development benefits.
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Prior to my 2005 research, there also existed research on what early
childhood programs provide in “economic multiplier” benefits. Key
contributors to this research have been Professor Mildred Warner at
Cornell, and the Insight Center for Community Economic Development. This research estimates the economic impacts of more government spending on early childhood programs. The extra spending will
lead to multiplier effects: early childhood programs will buy local supplies; pre-K teachers or other employees of early childhood programs
will buy local goods and services.
Multiplier effects have a political appeal: the economic benefits are
immediate. However, a state or local government that expands spending on early childhood programs must also raise taxes, unless federal
or other outside funding is available. As is developed in this book, once
one accounts for both taxes and spending, multiplier effects of early
childhood programs are modest.
The most important economic development benefit of early childhood programs comes from their effects on their child participants. When
they become adults, these former child participants have improved job
skills and job attitudes. Quality has improved for their labor supply.
Better local labor supply will increase local earnings. (There also are
some effects on the labor supply of the parents. But for most programs,
parental effects are smaller than effects on former child participants.)
Obviously, pre-K programs for four-year-olds are not sending kids
into the workforce at age five. The economic development benefits of
early childhood programs are mostly long-term. These economic development benefits do not begin to take off until former child participants
enter the labor force, and they are not fully realized until these former child participants enter their prime earnings years. The long-term
nature of economic development benefits of early childhood programs
is a political handicap, because politicians often have a short-term perspective. Advocates for early childhood programs must consider how to
make these long-term benefits more salient. Policy analysts must also
consider that the “local” economic development benefits of early childhood programs will depend on how many former childhood participants
stay in the local economy.
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A BALANCED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY:
BOTH LABOR DEMAND AND LABOR SUPPLY POLICIES
Local economic development practitioners in the United States have
traditionally relied on business incentives. By “business incentives,” I
mean policies that provide discretionary tax breaks or special services
to individual employers. These discretionary tax breaks or services may
be for varied purposes: encouraging new branch plants, business expansions, and new small businesses; or discouraging business closings or
contractions. The bulk of these incentives are in the form of special tax
breaks for new or expanding businesses, or to save and retain jobs in
existing businesses. A good example of a business incentive is a property tax abatement for a new manufacturing branch plant, under which
the new plant’s property taxes are reduced.
Some advocates for early childhood programs are categorically
opposed to business incentives for local economic development. For
example, Rolnick and Grunewald (2003) argue that business incentives
to encourage economic development are “fundamentally flawed.”6
The position taken in this book is not as unfavorable to business
incentives. Both business incentives and early childhood programs can
promote economic development. Economic development benefits—
higher earnings per capita for the residents of a state or local area—can
be produced by boosts to the quantity and quality of local labor supply
or labor demand. More and better jobs can result from early childhood
programs that boost the quality of the local labor supply. This boost to
labor supply will indirectly entice employers to create more and better
jobs. But more and better jobs can also result from business incentive
programs that boost the quantity or quality of local labor demand. Tax
breaks or special services to individual employers may cause them to
boost the number or quality of jobs.
Hence, both early childhood programs and business incentive programs may boost state or local earnings per capita. For both early childhood programs and business incentive programs, the issue is “bang for
the buck.” Per dollar of resources, what boost to state or local earnings per capita is provided? How does this vary with different designs
of early childhood programs, or of business incentive programs? How
does this vary in different local circumstances?
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THE ADVANTAGES OF THINKING AND ACTING LOCALLY
Focusing on local economic development benefits is not simply a
strategy for gaining support for early childhood programs from state
and local business leaders and policymakers. Early childhood programs
are a policy area in which it makes sense to have state and local governments take a strong role. As this book will show, many of the economic
development benefits of early childhood programs are local. State and
local early childhood programs may also be more innovative, effective,
and flexible than a top-down federal program. The federal government
should support state and local initiatives to improve early childhood
program quality, data, and accountability. Well-run early childhood programs serve not only local interests, but also the national interest, so
some federal financial support for early childhood programs is justified.
But any federal intervention should be designed to allow for considerable local flexibility.
Conversely, some federal restrictions may be needed in order to
ensure that business incentives advance national interests. As this book
will show, for some business incentives, a state’s pursuit of its own
interests may take jobs away from other states and sizably damage
the national interest. However, other business incentives may provide
a greater boost to economic productivity and thus serve the national
interest.

WHY CONSIDER EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS AND
BUSINESS INCENTIVES TOGETHER?
This book is addressed to two audiences: 1) the early childhood
policy and research community, and 2) the economic development policy and research community. Both communities, I would argue, need to
understand the other community’s problems and programs. The book is
designed so that a reader could read only the early childhood sections
or only the business incentive sections. But I think readers in both the
early childhood and the economic development communities will benefit from both topics.
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The economic development community needs to understand the
drawbacks of traditional business incentives. There are several drawbacks: the benefits of such incentives are sensitive to good design,
the possible benefits of incentives are uncertain, the incentives do not
have a particularly favorable effect on income distribution, the incentives have much lower benefits in local economies that already have
enough job growth, and the benefits of many incentives are lower from
a national perspective. But beyond that, economic development policymakers also need to understand the economic development case for
early childhood programs: early childhood programs can complement
business incentives by offering more benefits for lower income groups
and more clear-cut national benefits.
The other side of the coin is that the early childhood community,
too, needs to understand the economic development case for early
childhood programs. Proponents of early childhood programs must
understand this case to effectively argue for their programs to the business community and state and local policymakers. To understand the
economic development case, the early childhood community needs to
understand why the economic development benefits of more local job
opportunities are so valuable. Moreover, the early childhood community needs to appreciate how well-designed business incentive programs
may make sense from a local perspective and even a national perspective. Advocating for a balanced economic development strategy, which
includes both early childhood programs and reformed business incentives, makes more sense than trying to abolish business incentives and
replace them with early childhood programs.
Business incentives and early childhood programs should be considered together because they complement each other in a balanced
economic development strategy. Programs to directly create jobs via
business incentives should be complemented by helping local residents
obtain the skills needed for those jobs, via policies such as early childhood programs. Some local economies may need more of a boost to
labor demand, whereas other local economies may need more of a boost
to labor supply. But most local and national economies will benefit considerably from strengthening both labor demand and supply.
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A ROAD MAP FOR THIS BOOK7
Chapter 2 explains why the benefits of local economic development
are so important. Chapter 3 presents estimates that well-designed business incentive programs may, for each dollar invested, produce more
than a $3 increase in state earnings per capita.
Chapter 4 considers the economic development benefits of pre-K
education, high-quality child care and early education, and nurse homevisitation programs for disadvantaged first-time mothers. The chapter
presents estimates that such high-quality early childhood programs
may, for each dollar invested, produce a $2 to $3 increase in state earnings per capita.
Chapter 5 considers what constitutes “good design” for business
incentives and early childhood programs. How do various features
affect these programs’ economic development benefits? For both business incentives and early childhood programs, the cost-effectiveness of
these programs varies greatly with program design. Chapter 6 considers
the implications of uncertainty: we don’t know for certain the benefits
of either a new business incentive or an early childhood program. How
can we reconcile the need for more research with the potential benefits
from near-term expansions and reforms of early childhood programs
and business incentives?
Chapter 7 considers the political problem posed because the benefits of early childhood programs are mostly long-term, whereas elections occur every two years. How can the benefits of early childhood
programs be made more relevant to policymakers with a short-term
perspective?
Chapter 8 considers the effects of business incentives and early
childhood programs on families at different income levels. Will early
childhood programs have greater social benefits and political attractiveness if they are targeted at low-income families, or made accessible
universally? Based on current evidence, the chapter concludes that universally accessible pre-K education, compared to pre-K education targeted at low-income families, offers greater economic as well as political benefits.
Chapter 9 shows that the benefits of business incentives and early
childhood programs differ greatly across local economies of different
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sizes and different previous growth trends. Chapter 10 considers how
the national perspective on a state’s business incentives and early childhood programs may differ from the state’s perspective. Under what circumstances do the spillover effects of one state’s programs on other
states justify federal intervention? The national perspective points to
the need to regulate business incentives and promote early childhood
programs.
Chapter 11 analyzes the ethical issues raised by business incentive
programs and early childhood programs. Do these programs’ interventions with individual businesses and families violate ethical principles?
Chapter 12 shows how the approach used in this book to analyze early
childhood programs can be used to estimate the economic development
benefits of other human capital improvements. These other human capital improvements include better school test scores, increases in educational attainment, improved public health, and crime reduction.
Chapter 13 explains why the book’s arguments and evidence make
a case for a broad grassroots movement to improve early childhood
programs. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the United
States, local economic development benefits were frequently invoked
as arguments for creating graded common schools for all students and
creating high schools that all students were expected to attend. History
and research suggest that local economic development benefits can help
support a new grassroots movement for early childhood programs.
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Notes
1. In referring to “local economic development,” I sometimes use that term as shorthand for “state and local economic development.” States are one type of location
that can experience local economic development.
2. In this book, I refer to part-time or full-time programs for three- and four-yearolds that have a predominantly educational focus as “pre-K programs” or “pre-K
education,” where “pre-K” is short for “prekindergarten.” Some of the quotations
I use refer to such programs as “pre-K” programs, whereas other quotations refer
to such programs as “preschool.” I avoid “preschool” because it seems a strange
way to refer to a program that is predominantly educational in focus, and that in
many cases is run by the public school system.
3. In writing this book, I have double-checked the numbers and simulations, and
updated some numbers. Therefore, some of these new and improved detailed
numbers differ modestly from results presented in my previous reports (Bartik
2006, 2008). However, these differences are modest enough that none of the previous qualitative findings of these reports must be altered. Even so, the numbers in
this book should be regarded as more up-to-date and definitive estimates.
4. The Perry study has followed the lives of 123 high-risk children from African
American families who lived near the Perry Elementary School in Ypsilanti,
Michigan, in the 1960s.
5. In the benefit-cost analysis of the Perry Preschool program by Schweinhart et al.
(2005, Table 7.8, errata-corrected version), 48 percent of the public benefits from
the program are due to crime reduction. The percentage of the benefits from crime
reduction would be even greater if nonmonetary costs to victims of crime were
included.
6. From interviews with Art Rolnick, it is clear that his involvement in early childhood programs originally grew out of his opposition to business incentives.
Opposing business incentives leads to the logical question of whether there is any
alternative. When asked “How does a person in your position . . . come to focus
on children?” Rolnick (2008) replied as follows: “It was an accident . . . Much of
my work over the last dozen years has raised questions about . . . local economic
development initiatives . . . We argued that these types of economic development
programs do not create jobs, they just move them around . . . The work we were
doing on the economic bidding war led us to ask the question, ‘What would be the
best way to promote local economic development?’”
7. In addition to the book text, there are appendices that provide additional theoretical and empirical detail on this book’s arguments and estimates. These appendices are available on-line from the Upjohn Institute at http://www.upjohn.org/
investinginkids/appendices.html, or via e-mail from the author. On request, a
hard-copy version of these appendices is also available.

2
The Nature and Importance
of Local Economic Development
Benefits, and How They Are
Affected by Labor Demand
and Labor Supply
What is local economic development in the United States? Should
we care about local economic development? Why? What are local economic development’s benefits? Which of these benefits is most important? What public policies best provide these benefits? By addressing
these questions, this chapter provides a conceptual framework used
throughout this book.
To analyze local economic development, we must first define it. In
the United States, state and local policymakers often define economic
development as growth of employment, output, or population.1
For reasons I will give in a moment, a better definition of local
economic development is growth in local per capita income. Most such
growth is due to growth in local earnings per capita. The increase in
local earnings per capita will be this book’s definition of local economic
development benefits.
Growth in local earnings per capita depends upon using local
labor more productively. Unemployed labor can become employed, or
employed labor can become employed in better jobs.
Why focus on per capita income or earnings rather than total income
or earnings? This focus makes sense because increases in per capita
income or earnings are more reliable than increases in total income or
earnings in delivering a variety of economic and social benefits. First,
increases in per capita income or earnings correspond to some persons
gaining income. Increases in total income or earnings that are due to
population growth alone, with no per capita income or earnings growth,
do not necessarily correspond to any individual person gaining income.
A society that has per capita income growth is more likely to be a soci-
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ety that offers expanded economic opportunity to a wide variety of its
members.
Second, increases in per capita income are more likely than increases in total income to improve the fiscal situation of state and local
governments. The evidence suggests that most state and local public
services are, in the long run, produced and delivered at the same average costs per person regardless of local population, beyond some minimum population (Fisher 1996; Inman 1979). Increasing population by
itself provides few long-run fiscal benefits to state and local governments. Increasing per capita income allows an improvement in the state
and local fiscal situation. The same public services can be financed with
a lower ratio of state and local taxes to income, or higher levels of public services can be financed with the same ratio of state and local taxes
to income. As will be discussed later in this chapter, fiscal benefits are
not the largest benefit from improving local economic development.
But they are a benefit.
Third, increases in per capita income are more likely than increases
in population alone to improve the quality of life in a local community.
Higher-population communities are different from lower-population
communities. Whether they are better is a matter of opinion. Higher
per capita income is a more reliable way of improving the amenities of
a local community. Crime is likely to be lower. Private as well as public services are likely to be better. Problems such as homelessness and
poverty will be alleviated.
Fourth, growth in per capita income is likely to improve the quality of political life in a community. As argued by Harvard economist
Benjamin Friedman (2005), a community or nation with better growth
in per capita income is more likely to be tolerant of different groups. Per
capita income growth encourages more generosity toward the disadvantaged. It also encourages more support of environmental protection.
Finally, growth in per capita income may encourage greater support for
the democratic process.
For all these reasons, increases in per capita income or earnings
are a far better measure of economic success than increases in overall
income or earnings. Such increases in per capita income and earnings
can be accomplished by increases in the productivity with which local
resources are used.
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Of course, increases in local job growth may cause increases in
per capita income or earnings, since increases in local job growth may
raise local employment-to-population ratios (local employment rates)
or raise local wages. These possibilities are explored further later in this
chapter.

WHAT IS LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY?
If local economic development is increasing local per capita income
or increasing the productivity with which local resources are used,
almost any local policy affects economic development.
But what is usually called local economic development policy is a
narrower set of policies. These policies are carried out by state or local
economic development organizations. Such organizations are sometimes government agencies, but in many cases are quasipublic or even
private organizations. Private economic development organizations
often have some government funding.
These economic development organizations typically provide
“business incentives.” The goal of these business incentives is to affect
business job growth or the types of jobs provided by business. The
rationale is that such job growth will boost local standards of living and
the local fiscal situation.
These business incentives take the form of assistance to individual businesses that is provided on a somewhat discretionary basis. The
assistance is targeted at a particular type of business or customized
to the particular business. This assistance may be in the form of a tax
abatement or tax incentive that forgives all or a portion of the normal
taxes paid by the business. Business incentives also include services
that are customized to the needs of individual businesses.
Chapter 3 will review the various types of business incentives in
more detail. For this chapter, a good example of a tax incentive to keep
in mind is property tax abatements. Under property tax abatements, a
new branch plant, or a plant expansion, pays lower than normal property tax rates on the new or expanded plant. The abatement is typically
approved by some unit of local government, under rules decided by
the state government. Property tax abatements may be targeted by the
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local government toward business expansions that are thought to offer
particularly large economic development benefits—for example, businesses that pay higher wages. Other tax incentives include various discretionary state corporate income tax credits, tax increment financing,
and enterprise zones.
A good example of a business incentive that is a customized business service is customized job training. Under customized job training,
state or local governments pay for the training provided to workers at
a specific business. The training is adapted to the business’s specific
training needs. The training may be tied to the business locating a new
facility in the state or expanding its operations. Training is typically
provided by local community colleges. Other customized business services include subsidized or free infrastructure or land, industrial extension services, entrepreneurial training, small business advice, business
incubators, research and development grants, help in dealing with state
and local business regulations, and help in finding a site for a new or
expanded business.
In dollar magnitude, more business incentives take the form of tax
incentives than customized services. Among all tax incentives, property
tax abatements are probably the largest.
It is difficult to draw a definite line between business incentives
on the one hand and more general tax breaks for business or services
to business on the other. For example, a property tax abatement for
expanding manufacturers is similar to providing a credit under the state
corporate income tax to offset additional property taxes for expanding
manufacturers. If community colleges design training programs to meet
the needs of local businesses, and these training programs are heavily
subsidized by the state, this is quite similar to a generous program of
customized training grants.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
The budget resources devoted to business incentives are a small
part of state and local government. For example, it has been estimated
that business incentives amount to $30 billion per year (Bartik 2001, p.
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251). From many perspectives, $30 billion is a lot of money. However,
it is less than 2 percent of the $1.9 trillion in annual own-source state
and local government revenue (U.S. Census Bureau [2007]; figures
come from the 2007 Census of Governments.) Economic development
programs are larger if we include tax breaks for businesses that are written into state and tax law as entitlements, such as investment tax credits.
With such tax breaks included, the total resources devoted to state and
local economic development might be over $50 billion per year (Fisher
and Peters 2004; Thomas 2000). This amount is still small compared to
total state and local revenue or expenditure. Other state and local government functions, such as education, are far larger. For example, state
and local governments spend about $535 billion annually on elementary and secondary education, and $205 billion on higher education.2
However, state and local economic development is an overriding
goal of state and local government. It affects whether the local community survives and thrives. Local economic development efforts to
keep local productivity high are critical for a community’s future. If
local productivity is low, then the community will lose jobs and people.
If the productivity is too low, then the community will not survive. In
contrast, if local productivity grows, then the community survives and
living standards improve.
Economic development is an overriding goal in that other goals of
state and local government must be reconcilable to the economic development goal. State and local governments provide education, public
safety, transportation and other infrastructure, and so on. Each of these
programs has specific goals. But if a local community is to survive and
thrive, these other goals must be pursued in a way that either helps economic development, or at least does not hurt too much. Taxes must be
raised to support these programs. But the tax structure must minimize
adverse effects on local economic development.
This argument is not unique to me. For example, political scientist
Paul Peterson, in his classic 1981 book City Limits, argues the following:
In sum, cities, like private firms, compete with one another so as
to maximize their economic position. To achieve this objective,
the city must use the resources its land area provides by attracting
as much capital and as high a quality labor force as is possible.
Like a private firm, the city must entice labor and capital resources
by offering appropriate inducements. Unlike the nation-state, the
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American city does not have regulatory powers to control labor
and capital flows. The lack thereof sharply limits what cities can
do to control their economic development, but at the same time
the attempt by cities to maximize their interests within these limits
shapes policy choices . . .
Local government leaders are likely to be sensitive to the economic interests of their communities. First, economic prosperity
is necessary for protecting the fiscal base of a local government
. . . Second, good government is good politics . . . Few policies
are more popular than economic growth and prosperity. Third, and
most important, local officials usually have a sense of community
responsibility. They know that, unless the economic well-being of
the community can be maintained, local business will suffer, workers will lose employment opportunities, cultural life will decline,
and city land values will fall. To avoid such a dismal future, public
officials try to develop policies that assist the prosperity of their
community—or, at the very least, that do not seriously detract
from it . . . It is quite reasonable to posit that local governments
are primarily interested in maintaining the economic vitality of the
area for which they are responsible. (Peterson 1981, p. 29)

This obsession of state and local governments with local economic
development can be given a negative spin. Some local economic development policies might primarily benefit a few wealthy local residents
with political influence. Few other residents might benefit. Sociologist
Harvey Molotch’s classic article “The City as a Growth Machine” stated
in its abstract summarizing this article the following:
A city and, more generally, any locality, is conceived [in this article] as the areal expression of the interests of some land-based
elite. Such an elite is seen to profit through the increasing intensification of the land use of the area in which its members hold a
common interest. An elite competes with other land-based elites
in an effort to have growth-inducing resources invested within its
own area as opposed to that of another. Governmental authority,
at the local and nonlocal levels, is utilized to assist in achieving
this growth at the expense of competing localities. Conditions
of community life are largely a consequence of the social, economic, and political forces embodied in this growth machine.
(Molotch 1976, p. 309)
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Molotch goes on to say in the body of the article that
I speculate that the political and economic essence of virtually any
given locality, in the present American context, is growth. I further argue that the desire for growth provides the key operative
motivation toward consensus for members of politically mobilized
local elites, however split they might be on other issues, and that a
common interest in growth is the overriding commonality among
important people in a given locale—at least insofar as they have
any important local goals at all. Further, this growth imperative
is the most important constraint upon available options for local
initiative in social and economic reform. It is thus that I argue that
the very essence of a locality is its operation as a growth machine.
(Molotch 1976, pp. 309–310)

The concern of state and local leaders with local economic development goes back to the beginning of the American republic. Many
American cities and towns were developed by local boosters. Success
often depended upon finding some magnet for local growth: a canal, a
rail line, a state university, the state capital.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?
ABSOLUTELY NOTHING ExCEPT LAND VALUES?
However, there are powerful arguments that economic development, when it focuses on local job growth, only benefits landowners. I
will argue that the evidence refutes these arguments. The argument and
refutation are worth going into for several reasons. First, there are many
policy analysts who accept these arguments against economic development. Second, the refutation helps further reveal the nature of economic
development benefits and how they are obtained. A better understanding of the goals of economic development helps make better policy.
The argument that local job growth only affects land values goes
as follows: There is a large volume of migration of people among local
economies. For example, during a typical year, 4 percent of persons
move into or out of a typical metropolitan area.3 Even a sizable shift
in job growth in a metropolitan area can be offset with modest shifts
in labor migration. We would expect such shifts in migration if an
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area’s growth makes it more desirable. Such migration would continue
until local unemployment, wages, and prices have adjusted to offset
any initial advantages from higher local wages or better employment
opportunities. The most likely adjustment would be a return to the original unemployment rate, an increase in local nominal wages, and an
increase in local land prices sufficient that increased local housing prices
offset the increase in nominal wages. Real wages (wages controlling
for local prices) would be unchanged. Land prices would be expected
to increase because of the in-migration of businesses and households,
which increases local land demand relative to local land supply.4 Only
landowners would benefit from the increase in local growth. Workers
would not benefit from these adjustments except to the extent that they
were also landowners. Given the ease in shifting migration, one would
expect these local adjustments to take place relatively quickly.
This argument can be described as the “capitalization argument.”
Any benefit temporarily offered to workers by local job growth will
be quickly offset by migration. This migration offsets the initial labor
market advantages by increasing local land prices. This argument has
been advanced by academics on both the right and the left. Among
conservatives, economist Steven Marston has argued that “workers
move rationally enough to take advantage of and so eliminate gains in
migration between areas of the United States” (Marston 1985, p. 75).
In Marston’s view, the ease of migration eliminates the prime justification for “programs that ‘target’ government funds to ‘depressed areas’
with the intention of reducing unemployment there” (p. 58). On the left,
Molotch’s “Growth Machine” article and his subsequent work (Logan
and Molotch 1987) argue that local growth mainly benefits landowning elites, and not the general public. Specifically, because of worker
migration, Molotch (1976) argues that job creation does not benefit
local workers or the local unemployed much: “As jobs develop in a
fast-growing area, the unemployed will be attracted from other areas in
sufficient numbers not only to fill those developing vacancies but also
to form a work-force sector that is continuously unemployed. Thus,
just as local growth does not affect aggregate employment, it likely has
very little long-term impact upon the local rate of unemployment” (pp.
320–321).
Of course, land value increases are still benefits. Even if local job
growth does not benefit workers, it still benefits landowners. If the costs
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of the economic development policy were less than the resulting land
value increases, then the policy would have benefits greater than costs.
However, the benefits of this policy would be regressive. The value of
land owned by households increases with household income. It increases
sufficiently that the ratio of the value of land owned to household income
increases with household income. Therefore, upper-income households
would on average get a greater percentage boost to income from land
value increases than would lower-income households. Furthermore, if
all the benefits of local job growth accrue to landowners, shouldn’t the
costs of local economic development policies be borne by landowners?
Why should economic development programs be paid for by workers?

Hysteresis: an argument for wHy local job
growtH development migHt Help workers
One argument for why local job growth might help workers is that
job experience provides benefits in a world with imperfect mobility. I
advanced this argument in my 1991 book (Bartik 1991a). This argument
is based in part on previous writings of Nobel Prize–winning economist
Edmund Phelps. The argument is that in the short run, local job growth
may provide residents with employment opportunities they otherwise
would not have obtained. The resulting extra employment experience
increases their long-run equilibrium employment rates and wage rates.
Such labor market effects are labeled “hysteresis effects.” The “hysteresis” term is borrowed from physics and engineering. “Hysteresis” refers
to a system whose equilibrium depends upon the history of the system.
In this case, the equilibrium of local employment rates and wage rates
depends on the history of employment shocks to that local economy.
This theory was eloquently advanced by Phelps in 1972:
Of [the changes caused by a boom], job experience, with its opportunities for learning by doing and on-the-job training, is possibly
the most important. When people are engaged in sustained work of
a kind with which they have not had any similar experience, they
become different for it in a number of ways that are relevant for
the equilibrium unemployment rate. Getting to work on time is just

22 Bartik
about the most important habit a worker can have in nearly every
kind of job . . . For many of the people who comprise the hardcore, most frequently unemployed group, getting to be “reliable”
and learning to work with other people are necessary attributes for
continuation in the job.
For other people, the opportunity to acquire skills at more demanding jobs in the skill hierarchy than they could ordinarily qualify for
under normal always-equilibrium aggregate demand behavior may
be the more important aspect . . . The upgrading of many workers
that results from a disequilibrating rise of aggregate demand may
gradually lead to a true upgrading in the average quality of the
labor force. (Phelps 1972, p. 79)

Here is how Phelps’s theory can be applied to local labor markets.
Workers are not instantly mobile. If local job opportunities increase, the
current residents have some advantage in obtaining those jobs. Obtaining a job, compared to being unemployed, provides extra job experience. Obtaining a better job, compared to working at a worse job, provides better job experience. More or better job experience increases the
individual’s job skills. It may also improve the individual’s self-concept.
Finally, more or better job experience may improve a worker’s reputation with employers. All of these effects may result in a worker with
permanently higher employment rates and wage rates. The temporary
advantages of the local economy’s new and better jobs become longlasting advantages for some of the local economy’s original residents.

BUT WHY ARE jOBS SAID TO OFFER “BENEFITS”?
IS THERE “SOMETHING SPECIAL” ABOUT jOBS?
This discussion might seem strange to many economists. Why is
obtaining a job a benefit? Workers provide time in exchange for wages.
The value of their time is a cost of working. In economics jargon, the
value that an individual places on his time is his “reservation wage”—
that is, the lowest wage at which he would agree to accept a job. Suppose the labor market is such that labor supply and labor demand are
always equal. Wages fluctuate to equate labor supply and demand. All
job seekers easily obtain jobs. In such an economy, an increase in labor
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demand results in hiring some additional workers who were not previously working. These workers chose not to work because their reservation wage was more than the previous wage rate. The additional labor
demand increases the wage rate enough that now they are willing to
work. These workers do gain slightly. Their gain is equal to the difference between the new market wage and their reservation wage. But we
would expect the increase in wages to be slight, so the gain per worker
hired should not be great. The “benefit” from the additional employment should be far less than the wages paid.
This common view among economists probably seems strange to
most noneconomists. As noted by economist Paul Courant, “Economists view labor as a cost . . . Mayors, undergraduates, presidents,
union officials, and (other?) folks in bars say that they view labor (or, at
least, jobs) as benefits. They count as benefits of public programs (and
location-specific capital subsidies) the added employment, sometimes
as jobs, sometimes as increased payroll” (Courant 1994, p. 875). As
Courant muses, there does seem to be “something special about jobs”
to the public.
One way to reconcile the public’s view with the economist’s view
is to assume some involuntary unemployment. Wages might be such
that labor supply exceeds labor demand. This also implies that there are
many people who are willing to work at reservation wages that are quite
a bit less than the market wage.
What economic model might explain persistent involuntary unemployment? One such model would be “efficiency wage” models of the
labor market.5 In efficiency wage models, it is assumed that individual
employers find that increasing wages above the market-clearing level
is in the employer’s interest. The higher wage may increase worker
productivity enough to justify the wage increase. Productivity may
increase because at the market-clearing wage, workers have no incentive to avoid shirking on the job, since they can easily get another job.
Productivity may also increase because firms find that at the marketclearing wage there is too much employee turnover, which increases a
firm’s costs for hiring and training new workers. Finally, workers may
have some notion of a “fair wage.” When the economy is booming, and
unemployment is so low that we can think of the labor market as “clearing,” workers may have a notion of a fair wage that exceeds that marketclearing wage. A perceived “unfair wage” may reduce worker morale
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and productivity. For all of these reasons, an individual employer may
find it in the firm’s interest to increase its wages above the marketclearing wage. And if one employer finds it in its interest, so will others.
As many employers increase wages, unemployment will increase. The
higher unemployment will reduce shirking and worker turnover, and
restrain demands for a fair wage. This higher unemployment substitutes
for the impossible desire of all employers to pay more than the market
wage. A new equilibrium is reached when higher wages have induced
enough unemployment that all employers are willing to pay the same
market wage. This new equilibrium market wage exceeds the marketclearing wage. The new equilibrium includes an equilibrium level of
involuntary unemployment.
With involuntary unemployment, and wages exceeding reservation
wages, there may be significant benefits to the increase in jobs resulting from local economic development. The gap between a newly hired
worker’s wage and his or her “reservation wage” may be large. We
would expect this gap to be higher in local labor markets with high
unemployment.
This argument also helps explain why there can be gains from
worker upgrading to better jobs. When an economy booms, individuals
are able to obtain better jobs than they otherwise would have obtained.
Often, these upwardly mobile individuals are quite productive in the
new jobs. This raises the question of why employers didn’t hire these
individuals before at lower wages. An efficiency wage model might
explain this. Employers in some industries or occupations may find that
it increases productivity to set wages higher than the next best alternative for some qualified job seekers. This can explain why market wages
might allow similar individuals to get different-quality jobs.
An even more radical notion of why jobs are “special” is the social
meaning of jobs and wages. My reservation wage may exaggerate
my true cost of obtaining a job. I may place a great value on being
employed. But part of the value of being employed is receiving a wage
that I regard as a “fair wage.” If I become employed in a job at the
minimum fair wage at which my self-respect would allow me to take
the job, I may experience a significant gain. By becoming employed, I
become a socially valued member of the community. However, that significant gain does not mean that I would take the job for a lower wage.
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I would perceive that lower wage as damaging to my self-respect and
my happiness.
This argument is consistent with research on how unemployment
affects human happiness. For example, Blanchflower and Oswald have
found that “to ‘compensate’ men exactly for unemployment would take
a rise in income of [approximately] $60,000 per annum [in 1990s dollars]” (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004, p. 1373). This compensation is
derived by measuring how much unemployment affects reported happiness compared to how much income affects reported happiness. This
figure logically implies reservation wages for being employed that are
close to zero or even negative. But no one thinks the unemployed are
willing to take a job for zero wages.
Why are jobs so important to happiness, and why is unemployment
so stigmatizing? A review of the “happiness determinants” literature by
economists Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer concludes the following:
Numerous studies have established . . . that the unemployed are
in worse mental (and physical) health than working people. As a
result, they are subject to a higher death rate, more often commit
suicide and are more prone to consuming large quantities of alcohol. Their personal relationships are also more strained . . . Being
unemployed has a stigma attached to it, particularly in a world in
which one’s work essentially defines one’s position in life . . . An
estimation across Swiss communities shows that the stronger the
social norm to live off one’s own income, the lower the unemployed people’s reported satisfaction with life. (Frey and Stutzer
2002, pp. 420, 421)

The norm of work may be encouraged by modern capitalism. Our
society stresses the connection between an individual’s work and economic and social success. In a society committed to egalitarian values, one’s success is supposed to depend on one’s work, and not on
other unmerited factors (e.g., who one’s parents are). Such a society
may look down on those who do not work. Tocqueville commented on
this over 175 years ago in Democracy in America:
In democratic peoples, where there is no hereditary wealth, everyone works to live or has worked, or was born of people who
worked. The idea of work as a necessary, natural, and honest condition of humanity is therefore offered to the human mind on every
side.

26 Bartik
Not only is work not held in dishonor among these peoples, but
it is held in honor; the prejudice is not against it but for it. In the
United States, a rich man believes that he owes it to public opinion
to devote his leisure to some operation of industry or commerce
or to some public duty. He would deem himself disreputable if
he used his life only for living. It is to escape this obligation of
work that so many rich Americans come to Europe; there they find
the debris of aristocratic societies among whom idleness is still
honored.
Equality not only rehabilitates the idea of work, it uplifts the idea
of working to procure lucre. (Tocqueville 2000, p. 525).

Unemployment thus has a large individual cost to the unemployed.
But unemployment also may have a social cost to the employed. Studies have shown that the happiness of everyone is affected by the overall
unemployment rate as well as by whether one is personally unemployed
(Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2001). The effect of a 1-point rise in
unemployment in reducing life satisfaction is greater per person for the
unemployed than for the employed, by about 15 times as much. But
because there are so many more employed persons than unemployed,
the aggregate “social cost” of a rise in unemployment is much greater
than the loss to the unemployed. Calculations suggest that the social
costs of a rise in unemployment are probably six times the loss to the
unemployed.
Why do the employed suffer a reduction in life satisfaction from
a rise in unemployment? An increase in unemployment increases
the employed’s perceived risk of becoming unemployed. Also, the
employed’s happiness may be affected by the unemployment of friends
and relatives. Finally, the employed may care about the unemployment
of persons they do not know but whom they regard as fellow members
of society.
Therefore, there may be significant social benefits to increasing
employment rates. These social benefits may even exceed the earnings
increase due to these increased employment rates.
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BUT WHY ARE LOCAL jOBS SO IMPORTANT? AFTER
ALL, I COULD GET THOSE SAME jOB OPPORTUNITIES
ELSEWHERE
But why would local jobs present special opportunities for local
residents? Local residents might be able to obtain similar opportunities
elsewhere.
The problem is that these “similar opportunities” are outside the
home community. Leaving the home community involves costs. Some
of these costs are financial moving costs. But the more important costs
are the “psychological moving costs” of weakening ties to familiar
places and people. These ties are valuable in and of themselves; they
are part of what makes life worth living. These ties are also valuable for
instrumental purposes: Familiarity with one’s home can help in obtaining a new job or finding new housing. If one is down on one’s luck,
friends and family can provide assistance. As Paul Courant put it, “Having a place in the local community, and knowing how to function there,
is a valuable asset” (Courant 1994, p. 876).
Another way to put it is that staying in one’s home community
maintains the advantages of “a sense of place.” This sense of place is
a type of social capital. Abandoning it is not without costs. Regional
economist Roger Bolton describes the value of a sense of place:
In some established places there is a sense of community. This
sense of community is also capital. It is intangible, and regional
economists do not talk much about it, but it is capital; it is productive, and residents of a place that has a strong sense of place
certainly know it and appreciate it. Their appreciation of it is evidenced by the one bit of evidence that ought to make economists
notice: people are willing to pay for it.
. . . A “sense of place” [is] a concept widely used by geographers,
architects, and planners. It refers to a complex of intangible characteristics of a place that make it attractive to actual and potential
residents and influence their behavior in observable ways. Both the
“setting” of the place and the social interactions of the community
are important, and setting includes natural, cultural, and historical
characteristics . . .
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. . . Public investments in local economic development . . . are
especially important in declining or stagnant places . . . They are
motivated at times by a felt need to attract new stable employment
opportunities and tax bases, which are essential to prevent the outmigration that would destroy the sense of place . . .
The returns to the sense-of-place asset are a general measure of
security—security of stable expectations, and security of being
able to operate in a familiar environment and to trust other citizens,
merchants, workers, etc. . . . There is also a basic feeling of pleasure at living in a community, or knowing that others live in such a
community, that has been created by a combination of social interactions in a particular setting. (Bolton 1992, pp. 192, 193, 194)

For all these reasons, job opportunities available in one’s home
area are superior to those available in some strange place. Furthermore,
because of local ties, local residents have an advantage in getting access
to additional or better jobs. Therefore, moving up to improved employment opportunities or a better job is easier as well as more desirable in
one’s home community.

OTHER POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF LOCAL jOB GROWTH
So far, I have identified two possible benefits of local job growth: 1)
increased land values, and 2) increased real earnings of local residents.
What are the other possible benefits (or costs) of local job growth?
Local Businesses
Local businesses may benefit because of the increased local demand
brought about by local economic growth. Local businesses may lose
because of the increased wages and local costs brought about by local
economic growth. In addition, the changing scale of the local economy
may have advantages or disadvantages for different types of local businesses. For example, a weekly newspaper or corner hardware store may
do better in a smaller community. A more specialized retailer may do
better in a larger community.
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Whatever the effects on local businesses, we would expect these
benefits and costs to largely be captured in local land values. Capital
is mobile in response to changes in profits. Any temporary increase
in profits will attract capital that will compete and bring profit rates
back down to a normal level. However, if growth causes a net increase
in overall demand for land, then the value of business real estate will
increase along with housing real estate.
State and Local Governments
The effect of local job growth on the state and local fiscal situation is likely positive. As mentioned previously, local population and
employment growth that is not accompanied by increased earnings per
capita will probably on average have neutral effects on the state and
local fiscal situation.6 But local job growth will increase per capita earnings and income. This increased per capita income is likely to positively
affect the state and local fiscal situation. Increased per capita income
may allow lower spending per capita on income support programs.
Higher employment rates and wages may reduce need for welfare and
Medicaid. Higher per capita income will also increase revenue from
state and local income, sales, and property taxes.
In-Migrants
Some of the jobs brought about by local job growth will go to inmigrants to the local economy. By “in-migrants” I mean anyone who
moves into the local economy. This includes those moving in from other
local areas in the United States.
As I have argued in the past (Bartik 1991a), the benefits from local
economic development for in-migrants are slight. In-migrants could
have moved to any one of a number of local economies. From the perspective of in-migrants, this local economy is not unique. Whatever a
local economy offers to in-migrants is available elsewhere.
There is an asymmetry here between the original local residents and
in-migrants. The original local residents view the additional jobs provided in their home as unique: they provide opportunities that preserve
valuable ties to the place. In addition, the original local residents may
obtain superior opportunities here, because of local connections. On the

30 Bartik

other hand, in-migrants must view jobs provided in this place as similar
to jobs provided in other places. It is hard to believe that some extra
jobs provided in, for example, Kalamazoo, make much difference in
the opportunities available to a potential in-migrant located elsewhere
in the United States. If these jobs had not been created in Kalamazoo,
this in-migrant would not have been much worse off. He or she could
have moved elsewhere.
Environmental Effects
Local economic development may produce environmental effects.
The most obvious environmental effects are environmental costs. Pollution of air, water, and land may increase because of more households
and businesses. Congestion may increase. Local economic development may also cause various changes in the character of the community. Some of these changes may be undesirable. For example, growth
may cause a loss of some sense of intimacy. On the other hand, some
changes may be desirable: economic change may shake up the political
power structure and open it to broader participation.

WHERE THE RUBBER HITS THE ROAD: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF INCREASES IN LOCAL
LABOR DEMAND
In sum, increases in local job growth may increase local property
values, increase local real earnings, provide some net benefits to local
government, and have some environmental effects. Which of these
effects is most important? What does empirical evidence show?
Much of my research career has been spent trying to answer that
question. The research is largely based on studies of what has happened
to different metropolitan areas over time.
One recent publication of mine tried to summarize this evidence
(Bartik 2005).7 This summary found that a local labor demand shock
that increased a metropolitan area’s employment would have persistent effects on annual real earnings, property values, and the state and
local government’s fiscal situation. The labor demand shock consid-
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ered would increase the long-run level of employment in the metro area
by 1 percent. The effects on annual real earnings, property values, and
the state and local government’s fiscal situation are stated as a percentage of the metropolitan area’s annual personal income. (A 10 percent
interest rate is used to convert increases in property values into their
equivalent in terms of annual flows of income.)8 These calculations,
based on a variety of previous studies, are for effects in the medium run
(say, five years after the employment increase). (Although these effects
are “medium-run,” they would be expected to persist at much the same
level for some time.) The calculations are as follows:
• Increase in real earnings of original local residents: 0.28 percent
of annual local-area personal income.
• State and local government increase in fiscal surplus: 0.05 percent of annual local-area personal income.
• Annual flow value of increase in local property values (adjusted
for taxes): 0.07 percent of annual local-area personal income.
• Total measured effects (sum of these three effects): 0.40 percent.
These earnings increases are due to local residents’ experiencing
increased employment rates and moving up to better-paying occupations. The empirical evidence suggests that roughly half of the earnings
increase is due to higher employment rates, and roughly half is due
to occupational upgrading. Empirical estimates also suggest that real
wages for a given occupation are not changed because of local employment growth; rather, real wage increases for individuals are due to moving up to better-paying occupations (Bartik 1991a).
These higher employment rates are consistent with estimates that
suggest that only one-fifth of the new jobs created by higher local labor
demand result in increased employment rates for local residents.9 The
remaining jobs are filled by changes in migration.10 In these estimates of
medium-run effects, the increased employment rates of local residents
are entirely due to increases in labor force participation rates. In the
short run, there is also some reduction in local unemployment rates, but
this disappears after three or four years.
Therefore, the conclusion is that most of the local benefits of growth
are increases in the real earnings of the original local residents. State
and local governments also gain more in taxes than they must pay in
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public service expenditures. But fiscal gains are modest compared to
the earnings gains. Property value gains are also modest compared to
the earnings gains.
What is the intuition behind this conclusion? Part of the intuition
is that more businesses and households in a metropolitan area can be
accommodated with relatively modest land price increases. The supply
of developed land is responsive to increases in demand. In addition, to
the extent that there is some fiscal surplus, it is probably due to higher
earnings per capita. The fiscal surplus is thus considerably less than the
earnings gains, as state and local fiscal systems only have modest tax
rates as a percentage of total earnings.
In contrast, the labor earnings associated with new jobs are large
compared to the employment increase. A 1 percent increase in local
employment increases local earnings by about 1 percent. This 1 percent
increase in real earnings includes earnings of new residents as well as
increased earnings of the original residents. A sizable portion of the
increase in total earnings goes to the original residents. About one-fifth
of the new jobs go to increasing the employment rates of the residents.
From this employment rate increase alone, the percentage increase in the
original residents’ earnings will be one-fifth of the 1 percent increase in
employment. Furthermore, the occupational upgrading effects of stronger local labor demand are about as big as the earnings effects of higher
employment rates. It is much easier for local residents to get and keep
jobs in better-paying occupations if local demand conditions are favorable. Therefore, local residents are able to capture close to 40 percent of
the increased earnings that are due to growth.11
As mentioned above, there will also be environmental effects of this
increase in employment. However, the magnitude of such environmental effects is likely to be specific to the local economy and the character
of the growth. Environmental effects may be positive or negative.
These estimated effects are for an average increase in local employment growth in a typical local economy. Effects could vary for many
reasons. For example, effects on the state and local fiscal situation
would depend on whether there was excess capacity in local infrastructure. If there is such excess capacity, then the fiscal effects on state and
local government may be more favorable.
Chapter 9 will consider how effects may vary in local economies of
different sizes or growth rates.12
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Estimated effects may vary with the types of jobs. Estimates suggest that the wage mix of jobs matters. Empirical estimates suggest
that an area that attracts higher-wage industries will have higher earnings per local resident. (By “higher-wage,” I mean wages that are high
compared to worker skills.) Other local industries in such areas will be
forced to pay higher wages by the higher wage mix. In addition, the
higher local wage structure increases local residents’ participation rates
in the labor market. Chapter 5 considers how the wages of new jobs
affect calculations of benefits. The effects are considerable.
Estimated employment-rate effects and earnings effects of labordemand increases may also be greater if efforts are made to improve the
likelihood of good employment matches between these new job openings and local nonemployed residents. This issue will also be addressed
when the design of local economic development policies is discussed
in Chapter 5.
All of these estimates are for effects in the “medium run,” about
five years after the employment increase. However, these effects persist
for much longer. For example, the empirical studies suggest effects on
the employment rates of local residents that do not decline much for at
least 17 years after the initial employment increase. This persistence
is consistent with hysteresis theories of the long-run effects of labor
market experience. Local residents are able to use better job opportunities in the short run to achieve a persistently better position in the labor
market.

NOT EVERYONE AGREES: THE BLANCHARD-KATz
PERSPECTIVE AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Many economists believe that the above discussion is incorrect.
They believe that local labor markets quickly and fully adjust through
migration to some shock to local labor demand. This belief is largely
based on an influential paper by Olivier Blanchard of MIT and Lawrence Katz of Harvard: “Regional Evolutions,” published in 1992 in
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
According to Blanchard and Katz’s (1992) article, “The effects [of
employment shocks] on unemployment and [labor force] participation
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[rates] steadily decline and disappear after five to seven years . . . By
five to seven years, the employment response consists entirely of the
migration of workers” (p. 34). I agree with Blanchard and Katz that
employment shocks yield a large migration response. I also agree that
after five to seven years, the effects on unemployment disappear. But
in contrast to Blanchard and Katz, I conclude that employment shocks
have effects on labor force participation rates that are quite persistent.13
In addition, local labor demand changes have persistent effects on occupational attainment.
Blanchard and Katz’s article has been influential on both scholarship and policy attitudes. The article has been cited more than 300 times
since its publication.14
Former New York Times reporter Peter Passell used Blanchard and
Katz’s research to argue that manufacturing-plant closings or militarybase closings had few persistent effects on local labor markets: “History suggests that local economic shocks—in this case, base and plant
closings—dissipate quickly,” writes Passell (1992). “Lawrence Katz of
Harvard and Olivier Blanchard of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology estimate that, on average, regional differences in unemployment
have been eliminated within five years.” Blanchard and Katz’s results
have been cited by European government bodies interested in the consequences of greater labor mobility in the European Union (Rowthorn
and Glyn 2006).
If Blanchard and Katz’s results are correct, then local economic
development would have few persistent effects on labor markets. The
major beneficiaries of local economic development would not be local
workers, but rather local landowners or local government.
Blanchard and Katz’s model suffers from some econometric problems.15 The intuitive argument is that Blanchard and Katz’s results are
biased by errors in measuring local labor force participation rates and
unemployment rates. Blanchard and Katz base their conclusion in part
on how measured labor force participation rates or unemployment rates
adjust to observed shocks to their past values. Blanchard and Katz’s
estimates are biased because there is so much noise in the available
measures of these local rates. Shocks to statistical noise of course do
quickly dissipate. Measurement error will have little correlation over
time.16 This makes it appear that shocks to employment rates quickly
dissipate.
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Blanchard and Katz’s results also contradict previous literature
on the long-run effects of employment growth (Bartik 1993a). Furthermore, at least three studies since 1992 suggest that Blanchard and
Katz’s results are incorrect. These studies attribute the problems in their
results to measurement error. My 1993 study takes Blanchard and Katz’s
data and reestimates using a model that directly allows for longer-term
effects of employment growth, which corrects for the measurement
error problem. According to this reestimation, the effects of local labor
demand on labor force participation rates persist for at least 17 years
(Bartik 1993a). Rowthorn and Glyn (2006) correct for measurement
error in several different ways and find that shocks to local employment rates (employment-to-population ratios) in the United States tend
to dissipate by 1 percent per year. This implies that it would take on the
order of a century for a shock’s effects on local employment rates to
completely disappear. Partridge and Rickman (2006) use an estimating
framework that relies on variables that are less subject to measurement
error. They also have more flexible assumptions about long-run effects
of local labor demand shocks on migration. Their results are similar
to my 1991 and 1993 results for the short-run and long-run effects
of shocks to local labor demand on local employment-to-population
ratios. In the short run, about three-fifths of the new jobs are reflected in
higher employment-to-population ratios of local residents. In the longrun equilibrium, about one-fifth of the new jobs are reflected in higher
employment-to-population ratios of local residents. This long-run equilibrium is reached in about eight years.
How can the reader who doesn’t specialize in econometrics judge
the merits of this dispute? Consider the following thought experiment.
Jobs created in a local economy must ultimately be reflected in one
of two ways: 1) employment for local residents who would otherwise
be nonemployed and 2) local employment for persons who otherwise
would have lived elsewhere. (Of course, created jobs can immediately
go to local residents who otherwise would have been employed elsewhere in the local economy. However, job-to-job mobility of local residents would then create job openings elsewhere in the local economy.
Ultimately, the chain of job openings can only be filled by local nonemployed people or nonresidents.) Blanchard and Katz’s estimates
agree with the research consensus on job creation’s effects in the short
run. If 1,000 new jobs are created in a local economy, then the short-run
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effect is that at least 600 go to local residents who otherwise would be
nonemployed. Only 400 go to persons who otherwise would have lived
elsewhere. Therefore, 600 local residents gain valuable job experience
that they otherwise would not have obtained. Blanchard and Katz do
not dispute this research consensus.
This job experience builds skills, self-confidence, and reputation
with other local employers. It also means that these 600 local residents
have the advantages of being insiders in the labor market. Their current
employers know their performance. The employers avoid the costs of
hiring and training by retaining these employees. Is it plausible that
none of these 600 local residents is able to use these advantages of
employment experience to remain employed seven years later? The
complete disappearance of these initial advantages is the implication
of Blanchard and Katz’s estimates. On the other hand, the estimates
obtained by me (Bartik 1993a) and by Partridge and Rickman (2006)
imply that perhaps 200 of these 600 local residents are able to use their
extra employment experience to persistently increase their odds of
being employed. This two-thirds dissipation of the initial advantages of
gaining a job seems more plausible than a complete dissipation.

THE zERO-SUM-GAME ARGUMENT: WHY CARE ABOUT
LOCAL BENEFITS WHEN WHAT COUNT ARE NATIONAL
BENEFITS?
Some critics of local economic development policies may find this
entire discussion irrelevant. If local job growth does not raise national
economic development in some way, then local economic development
policies are a zero-sum game. Any gains to attracting jobs to this one
local area are offset by losses to other local areas.
The zero-sum-game argument is not always correct. As discussed
in Chapter 10, there are several conditions under which local economic
development policies might promote the national interest. Local economic competition might promote the national interest if more distressed local areas offer more business incentives. Local economic
competition might also promote the national interest if these business
incentives include services that increase productivity.
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On the other hand, under some conditions, local economic competition may not promote the national interest. Business tax incentives
offered by affluent areas offer few net national social benefits. As discussed in Chapter 10, a social cost of such competition is the resulting
redistribution of income to some business owners.
However, local benefits are still of great importance, for several
reasons. First, local benefits are important to state and local policymakers and voters. These policymakers and voters want to know what local
economic development policy can do for them. This is a legitimate
question that deserves a reasonable answer.
Second, we need to understand the local perspective to decide
how the nation should best intervene in local economic development
policies. We need to know the relationship between local benefits and
national benefits. If local benefits from business incentives exceed
national benefits, then state and local policymakers may overexpand
business incentives. Some national policy to constrain incentives might
be warranted. If local benefits are less than national benefits for early
childhood programs, then state and local policymakers may underinvest
in early childhood programs. Some national policy to encourage more
activity in that area could be justified.
Third, national benefits are ultimately the sum of local benefits.
Therefore, understanding how to measure local benefits is one way to
better measure national benefits.
Fourth, there are better estimates of local effects than of national
effects of business incentives. Estimated effects of local economic
development can rely on observations from many local areas over
many years. Local areas can provide true “laboratories of democracy.”
National benefits in the end have only one laboratory. Policies may
change the national economy over time. But at the national level, it is
difficult to separate out the influence of economic policies from other
forces. Local data provide more extensive information for sorting out
the effects of policy versus other forces.
Fifth, given the great demands on federal resources in the future,
what state and local governments choose to do is likely to be crucial to
many domestic policy areas. This includes the domestic policy areas of
business incentives and early childhood programs. The federal government faces large fiscal demands in such policy areas as Social Security,
health care, and national defense. Whether the federal government has
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the budgetary resources or political will to play the lead role in dealing with many other important domestic policy areas is questionable.
We need to understand how state and local policymakers should view
benefits. Their perceptions of the benefits of local economic development policies are likely to play a key role in shaping many important
domestic policies.

IF GROWTH PROVIDES BENEFITS, WHY WORRY ABOUT
THE DETAILS?
Some economic developers, or state and local policymakers, may
regard this chapter’s analysis as too nitpicky. As long as local economic
growth produces local benefits, what difference does their exact nature
make? Shouldn’t state and local policymakers just care about total local
benefits? Does it really make a difference whether these benefits take
the form of earnings increases, land value increases, or fiscal surpluses?
Perhaps local economic developers should focus on just obtaining
growth. Others can worry about who actually benefits from local economic growth and what to do about it. Figuring out what policies will
work to increase local growth is complicated enough. Adding the extra
goal of increasing the benefits from a given amount of growth complicates policymaking. Perhaps local economic developers would be more
effective if they specialized in promoting growth.
Herbert Rubin’s well-known 1988 article, “Shoot Anything That
Flies; Claim Anything That Falls: Conversations with Economic Developers,” describes the difficulties of local economic development in the
United States, as viewed by economic development practitioners. As
Rubin (1988) describes it, “[The] work environment [of economic
developers] is complex and undefined and involved an uncertain technology . . . Many of the practitioners were frustrated because they and
their fellow citizens had little, if any, control over decisions that affected
their local economies . . . They saw only a weak relationship between
their efforts and resulting changes . . . Even trying to find out whether
tactics are working can prove frustrating” (pp. 237, 239).
One of Rubin’s economic developer interviewees said that the most
frustrating part of his job was “the uncontrollable factors that you work
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with. For example, the downturn in the economy. We couldn’t do anything about it. We lost one of our major manufacturers.” Other economic developers also said that success was frequently outside their
control. “You can be just great because . . . the Illinois Department of
Transportation makes some decision,” one said.
Therefore, local economic developers face great challenges: they
must increase local economic development with only limited tools,
while large forces affect the local economy. If it is hard to affect any
local growth, it is tempting to make the task easier by not worrying
about the type of growth. If it is hard to ever see success, it is tempting
to claim any local growth as a success, regardless of who obtains the
jobs. The title of Rubin’s article comes from a quotation from one local
economic developer, who said, “There is a phrase that many people
won’t admit to, but [they operate by]: ‘Shoot anything that flies; claim
anything that falls.’”
Why then worry about the benefits from growth? First, analyzing
the benefits of local growth suggests that different approaches to local
economic development policy may differ dramatically in benefit-cost
ratios. For example, if the earnings of local residents are the key benefit,
it makes a great deal of difference who gets the jobs and what those jobs
pay. This may affect which jobs should be targeted by local economic
developers. It may also suggest that local economic development should
be linked with local workforce development and placement programs.
This may require redefining the nature of the economic developer’s job.
I will follow up on this discussion in Chapter 5, which considers what
signifies high-quality design in local economic development policies.
Second, if the benefits of business incentives are largely increased
employment rates and higher wage rates of local residents, then a natural question is whether there are alternatives to business incentives for
achieving these benefits. The answer to this question is yes. We can
adopt policies to increase the quality or quantity of local labor supply.
Exploring this alternative is this book’s central task.
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WHAT ARE THE LABOR SUPPLY POLICIES THAT AFFECT
THE QUANTITY OR QUALITY OF LABOR SUPPLY IN A
STATE OR LOCAL AREA?
The labor supply policies analyzed in this book result in two types
of increases in labor supply.17 A single program may yield both types.
First, there are increases in the local area’s labor supply due to increased
labor force participation rates of local residents. Labor force participation rates increase because local residents become more willing and
able to be employed. Second, there are increases in the local area’s
labor supply due to increased skills of local residents. As a result of better skills, local residents become more qualified for better-paying jobs.
Several labor supply policies might increase labor force participation rates or skills of local residents. Such policies include promoting the
following: pre-K education and other early childhood programs, K–12
education, local community colleges or local universities, job training
programs, and welfare-to-work programs. The special focus for most
of this book is on early childhood programs. This focus is in part due
to the greater empirical evidence on early childhood programs. In addition, early childhood programs may have greater effect per additional
dollar spent than some of these other programs. However, Chapter 12
will consider how the analysis can be extended to other programs that
increase the quantity or quality of the labor supply of local residents.

WHAT ARE THE KEY ISSUES IN HOW EARLY CHILDHOOD
AND OTHER LABOR SUPPLY PROGRAMS AFFECT LOCAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS?
As I have discussed, the benefits of stronger labor demand are primarily the increase in employment rates and earnings of local residents.
Policies such as business incentives can deliver these benefits. However, employment rates and earnings can also be increased by labor supply policies that increase local residents’ labor force participation rates
or labor skills. To analyze the effectiveness of these labor supply policies in increasing earnings, I will consider the following four questions:
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1) Should we count the increased earnings and employment rates
of local residents whose labor force participation or labor skills
are increased by a policy, but who then move out of their local
area? How should local policymakers view such benefits?
How should national policymakers view them?
2) Of the local residents who participate in these labor supply
programs, what percentage will stay in the local area? Is there
much reason for a local area to invest in these programs if
everyone moves out?
3) If local participants in labor supply programs stay in the local
economy, what will be the overall effect on local employment
rates and earnings rates? Even if the employment rates and
earnings of local participants increase, will total employment
and earnings in the local economy increase? Suppose that after
the program participants had entered the local labor force, there
was no change in overall local employment rates and earnings
rates. Under that supposition, any gain for local program participants must have been offset by displacing other local residents from jobs and earning opportunities. The magnitude of
such displacement depends in part on how employers respond
to the increase in labor force participation and job skills of
some local residents. Overall employment and earnings must
respond to labor supply programs if these programs are not to
have 100 percent displacement effects.
4) If local participants in labor supply programs move out of the
local area, analogous questions about net impact can be asked
at the national level: Will this increase in the labor force participation and job skills of some persons lead to a net increase in
jobs and earnings in the national economy? Will any increase
for former participants in jobs and earnings be offset by the
displacement of other persons in the national economy from
jobs and earnings opportunities? Or, will employers at the
national level respond by creating additional jobs and higher
earnings opportunities?
Here, in this chapter, I provide some general answers to these questions. Chapter 4 and other chapters provide specific estimates for specific programs.
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An additional overriding question for pre-K or any other early childhood program is whether it successfully raises labor force participation
and skills among participants. This issue will be considered when we
get to specific early childhood programs in Chapter 4.

TWO PERSPECTIVES ON THE BENEFITS TO OUT-MOVERS
Should benefits to “out-movers” be counted? I assume that from a
local policy perspective, these benefits should not be counted. Local
policymakers want to see their policies reflected in increased employment rates and earnings rates in their local economy.
This local perspective seems analogous to the local perspective on
business incentives. The local perspective does not include the losses to
other local areas if business incentives take jobs away from these areas.
On the other hand, I do not count against a program the loss of outmigrants to other areas. If a program leads some individuals to move
elsewhere, I do not consider the loss of their earnings to be a true loss.
The out-mover is presumably no worse off because of the move. The
focus in analyzing the benefits of public policies should be on the gains
or losses to individuals from those policies. The relevant issue is simply
which gains or losses count. I focus on individuals who increase their
employment rates or earnings rates. The question is which individuals
should count in this calculation. From a local perspective, it seems reasonable to only count individuals who remain in the local area.
The earnings gains of those who stay will increase local per-capita
earnings and local per-capita income. As discussed previously in this
chapter, this increase in per-capita income will improve the local community in several ways. These ways include local improvements in fiscal conditions, quality of life, and the political climate.
In Chapter 10, I consider the national perspective. From a national
perspective, I also focus on gains in employment rates and earnings
rates. However, now these gains are counted regardless of where someone lives. This is the same approach used when taking a national perspective on the increased employment rates and earnings rates resulting
from business incentives.
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HOW MOBILE IS THE U.S. POPULATION?
From a local perspective, one argument against labor supply programs is that former program participants will move out of the local
area. But the U.S. population is less mobile than people think.
Of course, many Americans move into or out of a typical state or
local area in a given year. But many more do not. Some of those who
do move are repeated movers. And some of those who move out later
move back.
Figure 2.1 presents an attempt I made with two different data sets
to roughly determine average mobility and how it varies with age. One
line in the figure shows with U.S. census data (the Public Use Microdata Sample, or PUMS, data from the 2000 census) what percentage of
Americans live in their state of birth by age. The other line in the figure
uses data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) to show
what percentage of Americans live in the same state they lived in at
age four. The PSID has the advantage of following the same individuals over time. The PUMS data are inferring behavior over time from
observations on individuals at the same time but of different ages. The
PSID data also examine mobility since age four, which is the age at
which pre-K education investments would be made. The PUMS data
are looking at mobility since birth, which is prior to early-childhood
investments (with the exception of prenatal interventions). However,
the PUMS data have much larger sample sizes. Furthermore, the PUMS
data can provide suggestive estimates of mobility behavior for much
older ages. The PSID data have not been around long enough to follow
individuals for much more than 30 years.
What this figure shows is that a surprisingly high percentage of
Americans stay in their “home state” (birth state or state at age four)
or return to their home state. Overall, it appears that at least three-fifths
of all Americans spend the bulk of their working career in their home
state.
Further explorations show that the percentage staying in their home
state is lower for more educated Americans. However, even among
Americans with a college degree, at least 45 percent probably stay in
their home state for most of their working career (Bartik 2009b). It
is important to recall that even among younger cohorts, most Ameri-
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in Early Childhood
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Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), Geocode version. More information on
these data is available in Bartik (2009b). Note that these percentages do not require
continuous residence in same state. Those who return to a state are also included in
percentages living in same state.

cans do not get a bachelor’s degree. For example, among the age 25–29
cohort, about 70 percent of Americans have not received a bachelor’s
degree.18
The percentage staying in their home metropolitan area is lower
than the percentage staying in their home state. However, at least half
of all Americans appear to spend most of their working career in the
metropolitan area they lived in at age four (Bartik 2009b). I will explore
the implications of a metropolitan-area perspective versus a state perspective in Chapter 9.
The percentage of individuals who remain in their home area probably varies in different local areas. For example, it would be expected
that larger metropolitan areas or faster-growing metropolitan areas
would retain a larger proportion of persons who benefited from early
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childhood investments. Chapter 9 will explore how the economic development benefits from early childhood investments vary with local area
size and growth.
State and local policies that invest in early childhood programs are
not doomed to fail to help local economic development because everyone leaves. This is confirmed by real-world early childhood programs.
For example, in the famous Perry Preschool program, 82 percent of the
former program participants still lived in the state of Michigan as of age
40 (Schweinhart et al. 2005, p. 40).

HOW WILL A STATE OR LOCAL AREA’S EMPLOYERS
RESPOND TO A LOCAL INCREASE IN LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION OR jOB SKILLS?
Suppose every child in Michigan, beginning forty-two years ago,
had enjoyed the same beneficial preschool experience as the fortunate sixty or so in the Ypsilanti study [of the Perry Preschool
program]. Suppose further that the sequence of economic catastrophes visited on Michigan—and especially on its African American
labor force—had been exactly the same: the rising challenge of
Japanese competition in the automobile industry in the 1970s, the
near collapse of the Chrysler Corporation in 1979, the devastating
Rust Belt recessions of the early 1980s. How much would these
economic outcomes have been changed by universal preschool?
Not at all—except to the tiny extent that the spending on preschool
itself created new, publicly funded teaching jobs in the affected
communities.
Under these conditions, what would the Ypsilanti study, capturing
a fair sample of preschoolers, have shown? The answer is clear:
economic outcomes for the African American community would
have been exactly what they actually were. But now every job,
every case of joblessness—and every prison cell—would be filled
by someone who went through preschool . . . [It is] a false inference that because something works for an individual, it will also
change outcomes for the entire population.
—James Galbraith (2008, pp. 155–156)
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Even if former early childhood program participants increase their
education and labor force participation and remain in the same local
area, overall employment rates and wage rates in that area need not
increase. For employment rates and wage rates to change, employers
would have to respond to the change in labor supply by adding more
and different jobs. If employers do not respond, then any additional
jobs or better jobs attained by former program participants will come
from displacing other local residents from jobs. This is the essence of
Galbraith’s argument given above. If overall employment is fixed, then
an expansion of high-quality early childhood programs will only affect
who gets the jobs.
However, most labor economists would probably disagree, believing that in the long run, the quantity of labor demanded will come close
to fully adjusting to changes in the quantity or quality of labor supplied.
This assumption is based on the belief, backed by some empirical evidence, that labor supply does not respond much to wages. If labor supply does not respond much to wages, but labor demand does respond to
wages, then in the long run the quantity of labor demanded must adjust
to match labor supply. A minority of economists would agree with Galbraith that employment is largely set by labor demand. Under these
assumptions, natural or policy-induced changes in labor supply will not
have much effect on the overall quantity of labor demanded.
Which side has the better of this debate? Much less is known about
how local labor markets respond to labor supply shocks than about
how they respond to labor demand shocks. It is easy to find measurable variables that cause large, independent changes in labor demand.19
For example, the national growth of an area’s specialized export-base
industries is strongly associated with local area growth and is a good
proxy for a labor demand shock. In contrast, it is hard to find large
changes in local labor force participation and worker skills that occur
independently of changes in local labor demand.
My empirical estimates suggest a considerable long-run response
of local labor demand to a supply shock.20 However, this response is
less than 100 percent. The detailed results vary depending upon what
labor demand estimates are used. Consider a labor supply shock that
increases some group’s participation rate in the local labor market by an
amount sufficient to equal x percent of the local labor market’s employment. Then the empirical estimates suggest that local employment-to-
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population ratios, or earnings per capita, will increase by somewhere in
the range of 47 to 89 percent of that x percent. The implied displacement effects are 11 percent (100 percent − 89 percent) to 53 percent of
the original labor supply shock.
In other words, displacement effects may be significant, as they can
be as great as one-half. However, in most cases displacement is not as
great as one-half. And even one-half displacement leaves the glass half
full. Local labor demand is responsive enough that local labor supply
increases can make a difference.
Therefore, the truth lies somewhere between the traditional view
of labor economists and the view of more demand-oriented economists
such as Galbraith. There are some displacement effects that result from
increases in labor supply. But this displacement is not close to complete.
For Chapter 4’s baseline calculations of the labor market effects of
early childhood programs, I assume displacement effects of one-third.
If early childhood programs have effects on labor supply of y percent, I
assume that the net local labor market effects on local employment and
earnings are two-thirds of y percent. This assumption is in the range of
plausible estimates of displacement effects and net local labor market
effects of labor supply shocks. I also consider in Chapter 6 the implications of uncertainty about these net labor market effects.
Estimates done by Bound et al. (2004) are roughly consistent with
these displacement effect estimates. They consider the labor market
effects of an increase in a state’s college graduates. Based on their estimates, an increase in a state’s flow of college graduates is associated
with a long-run increase in a state’s stock of college graduates of 30
percent as much as the increase in flow. As mentioned above, slightly
fewer than half of college graduates stay in their home state during their
working life. This suggests that, out of a state’s college graduates who
stay, the net effect on the state’s stock of college graduates is about 60
percent.
These assumptions about displacement are consistent with research
that has been done on the displacement effects of welfare reform. Welfare reform induced an increase in the labor force participation of single mothers. The research literature has not reached a consensus about
whether increased employment of former welfare recipients came at the
expense of other workers. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence does
suggest that overall employment rates did increase in response to wel-
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fare reform, not just the employment rates of single mothers (Bartik
2002). However, there are some signs that this increase in labor supply
did have some short-run and medium-run depressing effects on overall
wages (Bartik 2002), although this finding is disputed (Lerman and Ratcliffe 2001; Lubotsky 2004).

WHAT ABOUT THE RESPONSE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL?
The national responses depend on how national labor supply and
labor demand respond to wages and unemployment. These national
changes in labor supply and demand will not include interstate migration of population or business.
My empirical estimates imply that the net national labor market
response to a labor supply shock of x percent will be 85 percent of x
percent for employment and 68 percent of x percent for earnings.21 In
other words, displacement will plausibly be about 32 percent for earnings, and only 15 percent for employment.
In Chapter 10, which considers the national perspective, I assume
national displacement of one-third for both employment and earnings. I
did not want to inflate the national estimates of the effects of pre-K and
other early childhood programs by assuming lower displacement.
I should note that my displacement assumptions are conservative
assumptions compared to those of most labor economists. Most economic analyses of programs that increase labor force participation or
education levels assume that 100 percent of the increased labor supply
is absorbed by labor demand. In contrast, I make assumptions that scale
back the benefits of early childhood programs by one-third.
Of course, my assumptions are not conservative compared to economists such as Galbraith who assume that labor market outcomes are
demand-determined. However, the empirical evidence suggests that
displacement is not 100 percent.
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CONCLUSION
Providing good jobs for all is a crucial issue. Providing such jobs
is more beneficial if those jobs can be provided locally. More and better local jobs help preserve a valuable sense of place, a type of local
social capital. More and better jobs improve local earnings per capita.
Increased local earnings per capita improve local quality of life, the
local political climate, and the local fiscal situation.
A business incentive policy is one way of providing good jobs for
all. An increase in local earnings is by far the most important benefit
provided by business incentives. Business incentives should be viewed
as a part of local labor market policy. These business incentives improve
the demand side of the local labor market.
But increased local employment rates and earnings rates can also
be provided by increasing local residents’ employability and skills. Programs that do so are working on the labor supply side. This increase in
labor supply will lead to significant increases in the quantity and quality
of local labor demanded.
This chapter has outlined how these different policies affect local
employment and earnings. The estimates provided here, however, are
only general estimates of how labor supply or labor demand affects local
outcomes. Chapters 3 and 4 provide estimated labor market impacts for
specific programs. Subsequent chapters will explore other issues related
to these estimates. These other issues include how effects vary with
program quality, and national effects.

Notes
1. Consider a recent summary for the National Governors Association of governors’
state of the state addresses (Institute for the Study of Knowledge Management
in Education 2008). This summary was for governors’ speeches in 2008, before
the full extent of the recession that started in December 2007 was apparent. The
author of this summary counted a speech as addressing economic development
if it mentioned economic growth. Ninety-three percent of governors’ speeches in
2008 included proposals to boost state economic growth.
2. Dollar figures in this book will generally be stated in 2007 dollars. However, the
dollar figures for government expenditures and revenue for different purposes
are stated in fiscal year 2007 dollars here. The $30 billion figure given by Bartik
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3.

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

(2001) is a rough figure, perhaps best interpreted as late 1990s dollars. State and
local resources today devoted to business incentives are probably still best estimated by a rough estimate of $30 billion in nominal dollars.
Data on this can be derived from published tabulations of the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS), available from the
Census Bureau, in a set of tables labeled Geographic Mobility. The latest statistics,
from 2007–2008, show annual gross in-migration to metropolitan areas of persons
aged one and above of 3.4 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). This is a little
below some past figures. For example, the figure from 1996–1997 for gross metro
in-migration was 4.4 percent (Bartik 2001, p. 64).
The implicit model is a Roback-style model (Roback 1982) with unemployment
added and a wage curve model (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994) added that relates
the level of real wages to the level of unemployment. A model of this sort is presented in Bartik (2001, Appendix 1). All workers and businesses are assumed to
be identical. In long-run equilibrium, worker utility is equalized across local areas,
and business profit rates are equalized across local areas. The employment growth
is assumed to be brought about by a shock to some location-specific amenity
that affects employer profitability, not anything that affects worker mobility. The
new real wage and unemployment rate must be such that worker utility is again
equalized to the national average. In a model with unemployment, the wage curve
relationship between unemployment and the real wage is assumed to mean that
any permanently lower unemployment must raise real wages. Yet we can’t have
permanently lower unemployment and higher real wages, as this would increase
worker utility in the metro area above its national level. Therefore real wages and
unemployment must be restored to their original levels.
There is a vast literature on efficiency wage models of the labor market. See,
for some examples, Akerlof and Yellen (1986); Blanchflower and Oswald (1994);
Davidson (1990); Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991); and Solow (1990).
The neutral fiscal effects of growth by itself apply to the average local area. Of
course, there may be deviations from these averages in different local areas.
For example, if there is underutilized local infrastructure, the required spending
increases from growth may be reduced. This makes a fiscal surplus from growth
more likely. On the other hand, in other local economies the required infrastructure improvements may be quite costly. Growth may cause net fiscal costs.
Appendix 2A (available, as noted in Chapter 1, on-line from the Upjohn Institute
or via e-mail from the author) reproduces the calculations from Bartik (2005).
This 10 percent interest rate is much higher than the appropriate social discount
rates. However, it may be closer to how individuals subjectively value propertyvalue increases versus income increases. If we use some of the recommended
discount rates in Chapter 7, which are based on how people behave in the housing
market, we would get interest rates of between 3 and 10 percent, and the annual
value of property-value increases would be even lower than stated here.
Bartik (2005) explains the derivation of these estimates in some detail. These calculations are reproduced in Appendix 2A. These estimates are derived from estimates of how employment-growth shocks affect employment rates and occupa-
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tional upgrading, from Bartik (1991a). Intuitively, a shock of 1 percent to employment raises employment rates by about one-fifth of 1 percent. This raises earnings
by one-fifth of 1 percent. There is a similar-sized boost to earnings from increases
in occupational attainment—that is, from individuals’ moving to better-paying
occupations. As a result, overall earnings increase by about two-fifths of 1 percent.
The numbers reported in this chapter and in Bartik (2005) for labor market effects
as a percentage of income are lower than 0.4 percent for two reasons. First, the
numbers are reported as a percentage of personal income. Earnings are a little less
than three-fourths of personal income. Second, the numbers are adjusted downward for state and local sales and income taxes. Therefore, we end up with labor
market effects of 0.28 percent of income rather than in the range of 0.4 percent.
Should we add an additional negative cost to business incentives because they
increase in-migration? Business incentives might seem to increase the real costs
of relocation for people. However, this is an incorrect analysis. First, it is not
clear that business incentives increase the overall volume of migration. For example, business incentives in economically distressed areas may reduce the volume
of out-migration. Second, given whatever policies are adopted, the model used
here assumes that migration responses are optimal. The existence of strong ties
to place explains why providing additional job opportunities in my home region
may provide special benefits. However, holding constant whatever pattern of labor
demand exists across locations, the resulting migration decisions that promote the
interests of each individual also promote the overall interests of society.
That is, because one-fifth of the new jobs go to local residents, the earnings per
capita of local residents go up by 20 percent of the total local earnings increases,
simply because of increases in local employment-to-population ratios. Occupational upgrading due to local job growth has about the same effect on local earnings per capita as is caused by higher employment-to-population ratios. Therefore, occupational upgrading effects increase local earnings per capita by about
20 percent of the increase in total local earnings. Combining these two effects,
local earnings per capita increase by about 40 percent of the increase in total local
earnings.
Note that I assume that effects in a metropolitan area are similar to effects for a
state. The reasons for this assumption are discussed in Chapter 9.
Why is there a difference between the long-run effects of job growth on unemployment and its effects on labor force participation? This is a conclusion from
empirical research, so it’s true in practice, but why is it true in theory? One possibility is that unemployment that differs from some equilibrium level may bring
about changes in job growth and labor force participation that bring unemployment back to that equilibrium level. Labor force participation represents a change
in labor supply, so one would not expect the same sort of equilibrating reactions.
To be exact, the Social Sciences Citation Index finds 371 citations to Blanchard
and Katz (1992).
Specifically, the dynamic effects of Blanchard and Katz’s model are derived by
regressing a U.S. state’s unemployment rates and labor force participation rates
on lagged unemployment rates and labor force participation rates as well as on
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state employment growth. Long-run effects will depend upon the coefficients on
the lagged dependent variables. But state unemployment rates and labor force
participation rates for a given year are measured with considerable error. This
will bias the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables toward zero. This bias
toward zero will tend to reduce long-run effects. Furthermore, the model assumes
that the effects of shocks to the lagged dependent variables from all causes will
be the same as shocks to the lagged dependent variables from job growth. These
econometric issues are further discussed in Bartik (1993a) and Rowthorn and
Glyn (2006).
For CPS measures of local unemployment rates and labor force participation rates,
there will be some year-to-year correlation in measurement error because half of
the sampled housing units will be in the survey the same month of adjacent years.
However, measurement error should be uncorrelated over two years.
I do not focus in this book on two other local labor supply policies: 1) policies
to attract or repel foreign immigrants and 2) policies to attract or repel domestic
in-migrants. These policies are potentially important. There is much controversy
about immigration. There have also been some recent suggestions that state and
local policy should attract highly educated and entrepreneurial in-migrants, the
so-called creative class. (See, for example, the series of books and speeches published by Richard Florida, starting with Florida [2002]).
I omit these immigrant and domestic-migrant policies because these policies
probably have quite different local economic development benefits than policies
to increase local residents’ labor force participation or job skills. Immigrants or
in-migrants bring with them considerable additional assets, and this affects local
purchases. Immigrants or in-migrants also stimulate the local housing construction sector. Research by Greenwood and Hunt (1995) has established that these
“demand effects” of immigration are crucial to determining the effects of immigration on local wages. Considering these effects of immigration and domestic
in-migration would overextend this book’s scope.
According to the U.S. Department of Education (2008, Table 8), based on the
March 2008 CPS, only 30.8 percent of persons ages 25 to 29 had obtained a bachelor’s degree.
By “independent,” I mean exogenous to local labor market variables. For instance,
in the past I have used national industry growth shocks to instrument for local job
growth (Bartik 1991a).
In Appendix 2B, I consider what local labor market responses to labor supply
shocks are plausible. This appendix is based on models of how local labor markets work, and on empirical estimates of the responsiveness of labor demand and
supply.
These empirical estimates are also available in Appendix 2B.

3
Estimated Economic Development
Effects of Well-Designed
Business Incentive Programs
This chapter provides estimates of a state’s economic development
benefits from a well-designed business incentive program. The assumptions are detailed later, but here are the results:
• For each dollar invested in this well-designed business incentive
program, the present value of per-capita earnings of the original state residents will increase by $3.14. As explained in the
previous chapter, this increase in state per-capita earnings is this
book’s definition of economic development benefits. The “present value” calculation simply restates these future earnings in
present dollars, so that they can be compared with dollars invested in business incentives.1
• Roughly three-fifths of these economic development benefits occur because of increases in the employment rates of state residents. The other two-fifths occur because of state residents’ moving up to better-paying occupations.2
• These benefits occur because of the new jobs created by the business incentive program. These additional employment opportunities have persistent effects on the economic fortunes of many
local residents. The extra job experience obtained by state residents increases their job skills, self-confidence, and reputation
with employers.
• As discussed in Chapter 2, there are probably some social benefits that accrue to local communities from higher local employment rates. Even those who don’t obtain new jobs or better jobs
value these improvements for fellow community members.
• The business incentive is modeled as if it were a state tax incentive provided to assisted businesses for a 10-year term. The same

53

54 Bartik

dollar amount per job is provided upfront and for each of the next
nine years. The 10-year term of the incentive is assumed because
it corresponds to common state practice. If the incentives come
in the form of services to businesses, the implicit assumption
made in this baseline simulation is that these services have the
same effect on business decisions as tax incentives of the same
costs.
• The business incentive program is assumed to have earnings effects that are scalable with program size. For example, devoting twice as many dollars to business incentives yields twice the
earnings effects.
• In this well-designed program, earnings benefits are greater than
costs from year one. Earnings benefits for state residents in year
one of the program are a little less than twice program costs.
• Suppose this program is designed as a permanent program that
begins at a certain level of activity in year one. This level then
grows over time with the economy. This permanent business incentive program will have earnings benefits that start at a little
less than twice the program costs in year one, decline gradually
to about 1.5 times the program costs over the next 10 years, then
increase gradually to a “permanent” ratio of earnings benefits to
costs of about three and a half times the program costs over the
next 45 years. Figure 3.1 shows how this ratio evolves over time.3
• This is not a typical business incentive program. It is perhaps
best described as representing “current best practice.” It is designed so that the business incentives have no adverse impact
on the quality of public services. The financing and design of
the program are arranged so that the program has no net negative effect on local demand for goods and services. The incentive
is delivered so that incentives can be “clawed back” if assisted
businesses do not deliver the promised increase in jobs. The program is well-targeted at the businesses whose expansion will best
help the economy. Specifically, the program is targeted at exportbased businesses paying an above-average wage premium and
having a healthy local multiplier. Chapter 5 will discuss these
and other ways in which policymakers can improve the design of
business incentive programs.
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Figure 3.1 Ratio of Annual State Economic Development Benefits to Annual Costs, Ongoing Business
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state economic development benefits. (As explained in Chapter 2, increases in state
earnings that don’t increase per capita earnings of the original state residents are not
counted—for example, the earnings of in-migrants to the state are not counted.) These
effects are stated as a ratio to the annual costs of this business incentive program. This
business incentive program is assumed to start in 2011 and remain thereafter on the
same scale relative to the state’s economy.

• Although these estimates are based on the best available evidence, the results are sensitive to different assumptions. Chapter
6 discusses how policymakers might deal with this uncertainty.
Similar issues arise because of uncertainty about the effects of
early childhood programs.
These results are generated from a model of how incentives will
affect a state economy. There are three main components to this model:
1) Empirical estimates of how business incentives affect business
location decisions,
2) Assumptions about how the business incentive program is
designed and financed, and
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3) Estimates of how the jobs generated will affect the state labor
market.
Each of these components will be considered in more detail. First,
however, a little more background on what is meant by “business
incentives.”

TYPES OF BUSINESS INCENTIVES
Many state and local government programs might be said to provide incentives to business. For example, improvements in a state highway system are an incentive for business to expand in that state. In this
book, however, I define business incentives more narrowly. I focus on
assistance to businesses that is to some significant degree customized
to the individual business. Not all businesses will necessarily receive
the same assistance. Even similar businesses in similar circumstances
may receive different assistance. The actual assistance provided to an
individual business is decided with some discretion by an economic
development organization.
Most of the dollars in state and local business incentives are provided through tax incentives. The most important single type of incentive
is property tax abatements. Property tax abatements allow a new branch
plant or a business expansion to pay less than the normal business property tax rate for the new or expanded plant. The business applies for
the abatement to some local government agency or board. Property tax
abatements are not automatically received by right under state law. State
laws differ in whether property tax abatements are permitted, what is
the maximum amount and time period of such abatements, what types
of industries and businesses are eligible for these abatements, what criteria are to be used in awarding the abatements, and what governmental
entities have to approve the award of the abatement.
Other business tax incentives are also important. One increasingly
common tax incentive is business rebates for worker income taxes.
Under this tax incentive, assisted businesses are provided with tax
credits equal to the state income tax payments made by the new workers associated with the business location or expansion decision. The
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logic is to reward the business for the additional personal income tax
revenue generated for the state by the expansion. Businesses apply to a
state agency to be granted this incentive. These tax credits are in some
cases refundable. That is, the amount of these tax credits may exceed
the business’s tax liability under the state’s corporate income tax. If the
tax credit is not refundable, the maximum tax credit cannot exceed the
business’s tax liability under the corporate income tax. If the tax credit
is refundable, then the business may receive a net cash payment from
the state. As with property tax abatements, these tax credits are provided over some considerable time period after the location or expansion decision.
Another important tax-related business incentive is tax increment
financing (TIF). In a TIF project, the increased property taxes from
new development in a particular small geographic area go into a special
fund. This special fund can only be used to promote the development of
that small geographic area. Often this fund pays off bonds used to make
public improvements in the geographic area.
Enterprise zones often provide tax incentives to business. Most
enterprise zone programs are authorized by state government laws
under a variety of names. (In Michigan, for example, they are known as
Renaissance Zones.) The federal government also has had an “Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community” program since 1994. Under
enterprise zones, businesses that locate in or expand in a particular geographic area receive some type of favorable tax treatment. The actual
tax break received varies with a state’s particular program. Some enterprise zone tax incentives are reduced property taxes, others are credits
against state corporate income taxes, and still others are reduced sales
taxes on the business’s purchase of inputs or on the goods and services
it sells. Enterprise zone incentives are typically awarded as a matter of
right to any business that meets the program’s criteria for being located
in the zone. However, there is some government discretion in designating the geographic areas defined as enterprise zones.
Some business incentives are special customized services to business. Customized job training programs provide new or current workers
at a company with training customized to the business’s needs. Businesses or local economic development agencies apply to state governments to receive customized training grants. The training is actually
delivered by local community colleges.
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Customized roads are also common. New plant locations, or major
expansions, can apply to state agencies to pay for new or expanded
roads needed to support the new location or expansion. Such assistance
is awarded on a discretionary basis. It differs from general highway
improvements in that the road project associated with the new business
moves up to the top of the road construction list.
Other customized infrastructure assistance is also provided to new
or expanding businesses. Businesses may be provided with access to
water and sewer and other utilities at reduced costs. Businesses may
also be provided with reduced-price or free land, sometimes in business
parks (or industrial parks, or research parks) where the land is already
available and includes all the needed infrastructure.
Manufacturing plants are often provided with various types of
extension services. These extension services help the business to adopt
or better implement new production technologies or other business
practices to help improve the business’s productivity and profitability.
These extension agencies are operated at the state and local level. However, many of these extension agencies receive at least some funding
through federal assistance from the National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
Small businesses are provided with a variety of information and
training to assist in start-up or expansion. These services are often
provided through Small Business Development Centers. Some of the
funding for such centers comes through the federal Small Business
Administration.
Small business assistance includes entrepreneurial training classes.
Such training helps potential entrepreneurs determine whether their
planned business is viable and develop a business plan for the new
business. Small business assistance also includes advice to existing
small businesses on how to deal with specific problems with marketing, financing, or production. Some new or small businesses are also
assisted through small business incubators. Such incubators typically
combine relatively cheap rents with some shared services (e.g., a receptionist or answering service), and in some cases some on-site business
consulting advice.
Another type of business incentive is assistance in raising capital.
States in some cases directly provide grants, loans, and investments to
support various types of business research and business expansion. In
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other cases, states will guarantee or encourage private financial institutions or capital financing institutions to provide loans or other capital
to businesses.
Finally, state and local agencies provide various types of information and ombudsman assistance to new or existing businesses. New
businesses are helped to find a suitable site. The new business might
also be helped to get the appropriate environmental and other permits
for that site. Existing businesses might be provided with some help in
overcoming problems with state or local agencies that could inhibit the
business’s expansion.
Table 3.1 provides a typical list of business incentive programs. This
list is for the state of Michigan. As the chart shows, overall, Michigan
devotes almost $1 billion a year to business incentives. Of that amount,
about two-thirds is in the form of tax incentives, about half of which are
property tax abatements. Over 90 percent of the funding for these business incentives comes from state and local governments in Michigan.
Among the prominent tax incentives in Michigan are property tax
abatements, the Renaissance Zone program, tax increment financing
zones, and the MEGA program. As mentioned above, Renaissance
Zones are Michigan’s version of enterprise zones. The MEGA program
is a refundable tax credit tied to the income taxes paid by the additional
workers that are claimed to be induced by the program, either in a new
or expanding plant or a retained plant.
The prominent services in Michigan include several funds that give
grants to high-tech businesses or invest capital in these businesses. The
state also pays to develop infrastructure for business development in
nonmetro areas in Michigan, using federal Community Development
Block Grant money.
Finally, considerable sums are spent by state and local economic
development organizations in Michigan on business recruitment and
on working with existing businesses. State and local staff frequently
meet with existing businesses to discuss any problems that might be
impeding their expansion or continued operations in business. Staff
help resolve these problems. State and local staff also seek to market
the state to businesses that are planning to open new facilities. They try
to assist such businesses in finding suitable sites in Michigan, and in
promptly obtaining the proper permits for building on these sites.

Program
Location subsidies
Property tax abatements
Renaissance Zone tax exemptions
Tax increment financing (1/3 of total for TIFs
assumed to go to economic development)
MEGA tax credits
Brownfield tax credits
Renewal/enterprise community tax credits for parts of
Detroit/Flint/Clare County
General business retention and recruitment
State activities (MEDC)
Local activities (local agencies)
Specific economic development services
Customized job training grants
Michigan Manufacturing Technology Center: extension
services to small and medium-sized manufacturers
Small Business & Technology Development Center
network

Level of government

Tax break or Annual dollars
expenditure
(in millions)

Local, with implicit partial
state reimbursement
5/6 local, 1/6 state, although
implicit partial state
reimbursement for local share
Local, with implicit partial
state reimbursement
State
State
Federal

Tax break

330

Tax break

121

Tax break

100

Tax break
Tax break
Tax break

62
29
17

State
Local

Expenditure
Expenditure

27
15

State
36% federal, 31% state,
33% fees
37% federal, 16% state,
47% local

Expenditure
Expenditure

10
7

Expenditure

7

60

Table 3.1 Michigan’s Current Economic Development Budget

Infrastructure
Community development block grants for nonurban
communities for infrastructure to support economic
development
Capital market and applied research grants/loans
21st Century Jobs Fund: commercialization
competition
21st Century Jobs Fund: investment fund
Capital Access Program loans to small businesses
SBA guaranteed loans
Total

Federal

Expenditure

45

State

Expenditure,
loan, or
investment
Investment
Loan
Loan

100

95% state, 5% private
State, with banks
Federal, with banks

120
4
—
994

NOTE: These figures are annual spending or tax revenue forgone as of 2007 for all economic development programs operating in the
state of Michigan, whether financed by the state, local areas, or the federal government. All local tax credits (property tax abatements for
new manufacturing plants and expansions, Renaissance Zone tax exemptions, and TIFs) are implicitly partially reimbursed by the state,
because the state essentially augments local property tax collections for schools up to the foundation grant amount per student. TIFs in
some cases go to downtown development and neighborhood development activities that might be argued to be “community development” rather than “economic development.” That is, the TIF might be redistributing economic activity within the metropolitan area
more than increasing overall metro economic activity. I conservatively estimate that only one-third of TIF resources go to “economic
development,” with the other two-thirds assumed to go to “community development.” MEGA stands for the Michigan Economic Growth
Authority; these credits are refundable tax credits to the business based on the income tax revenue generated by the workers associated
with the business expansion, location, or retention decision. Brownfield tax credits provide special tax credits for businesses locating on
land with environmental problems that has been designated by the state as a brownfield. The dash for SBA guaranteed loans means that
I do not try to calculate an implicit value of these guarantees.
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Each state in the United States has a somewhat different array of
economic development programs. Emphases on particular types of programs differ across states. However, Michigan’s set of programs is not
unusual.
As this discussion shows, businesses have access to a wide variety of incentives. However, these incentives are similar in that they all
provide assistance to individual businesses associated with some location or expansion decision. Some assistance, such as tax incentives or
capital market assistance, has a cash value. Other incentives provide
businesses with services that presumably have some cash-equivalent
value to the business.
My definition of business incentives excludes assistance that is
uniformly provided by law to all eligible businesses. I refer to such
business assistance as “entitlement business assistance.” For example,
consider investment tax credits under the state’s corporate income tax.
Any firm that makes an investment has a legal right to receive the tax
credit. I do not include entitlement business assistance in the category
of business incentives because the magnitude of entitlement business
assistance is difficult to define. Any change in state tax law that reduces
tax revenues from business could be defined as entitlement business
assistance. However, entitlement business assistance may have effects
that are similar to those of business incentives. One issue considered in
this book is whether policymakers should replace business incentives
with entitlement business assistance.
The distinction between discretionary business incentives and entitlement business assistance may not be obvious to businesses or policymakers. This distinction may not make a dramatic difference in what tax
breaks or services are actually provided. There is an old adage in economic development called the “reverse potato chip rule,” in reference
to an old TV commercial: with economic development incentives, you
can’t give out just one. There is political pressure to offer other businesses a similar tax break or service to what you offered one particular
business. Therefore, the discretion in nominally discretionary programs
is, in practice, less than it appears. This suggests that we should either
convert many business incentives to entitlement business assistance, or
restore true discretion to how business incentives are awarded.
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Business incentive effects
What should we assume about the job-creation effects of state business incentives? My assumptions about business incentive effects can
be stated in several ways.4 One useful approach is to examine the likely
effects of typical state and local business incentive programs. (In doing
these calculations, I consider the “present value” of the costs of different business incentives. This present value takes the incentives provided
in future years and discounts them back to their equivalent in today’s
dollars using some discount rate.) The average state and local business
incentive program has the same present value to assisted businesses as
providing a tax incentive, each year for 10 years, of $1,149 per job.5
(All dollar figures given in this book, unless otherwise noted, are in
2007 dollars.) I express the incentive program as a 10-year promise
of tax incentives because most economic development incentives have
terms of some medium length. The model used in my research assumes
that an incentive of this magnitude will successfully induce a business
location or expansion decision 3.6 percent of the time. Suppose 1,000
businesses locating a new branch plant or making a business expansion
were provided a 10-year incentive of $1,149 per job in the new plant
or expansion. In 36 of these 1,000 cases, the branch plant location or
expansion decision would not have occurred but for the incentive. In
the other 964 cases, the incentive had no effect. That is, the plant location or expansion decision would have occurred anyway.
These effects are for a program that provides tax incentives or other
cash assistance. Programs that provide services to assisted businesses
would have an effect equal to their cash equivalent to the businesses.
For the model simulation, I assume that if the business incentive was a
service, its cash value to the business was just equal to the cost of providing this service. In Chapter 5, I discuss the possibility of providing
more productive economic development services. Such services would
provide more than a dollar’s worth of services to businesses per dollar
of cost.
Another way to express the effects of incentives is the ratio of the
present value of the incentives to the jobs created.6 The model used in
my research assumes that the ratio of the present value of incentives to
the number of jobs created is about $200,000 (to be precise, $199,220).
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What this means is that if a program offers incentives that businesses
judge to have a present value per job of $10,000, we would expect the
incentive to be decisive about 5 percent of the time. (This should not
be extrapolated to mean that if a program was crazy enough to offer
$200,000 per job, that it certainly could take credit for completely determining the location decision. I have yet to see an incentive offer whose
present value was even close to $200,000 per job. Newspaper stories
that imply larger figures sometimes simply sum incentive offers over
20 years or value loans as if they were cash grants. The evidence suggests that the largest incentives have a present value of about $31,000
per job.7 These very large incentives might be responsible for tipping
the location decisions of about one-sixth of the businesses they assist.)8
These assumptions about the effectiveness of business incentives
are based on the economics literature on the effects of overall state
and local business taxes on business location. The overall business
tax literature can be used to infer the effects of business incentives if
we assume that business location decisions depend on business costs.
Whether costs are lowered through lower overall state and local business taxes, or through business incentives, the effects of a given cost
reduction should be similar.
Why use the research on the business location effects of overall
business taxes? Why not use research on the business location effects
of specific incentives? The research literature is far more extensive
on overall business taxes than on incentives. Furthermore, measures
of overall business taxes are usually more accurate than measures of
incentives.
I base my assumptions about the effects of state and local business
taxes on a literature review by Michael Wasylenko (1997). He concludes that the “suggested estimate” of the elasticity of business activity with respect to state and local business taxes is −0.2. This elasticity
of −0.2 means that if overall state and local business taxes are lowered
by 10 percent, holding all other factors constant, local business activity in the long run will increase by 2 percent.9 This elasticity is within
the range suggested by my prior research review of −0.1 to −0.6. An
elasticity of −0.2 can be used to derive this book’s estimated ratios of
incentive costs to jobs created.10
The cost-effectiveness of business incentives is quite sensitive to
variations in elasticity estimates. The incentive cost per job created is
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proportional to 1 over this elasticity. Thus, if the elasticity is −0.1 rather
than −0.2, the ratio of costs to jobs created will double. If the elasticity
is −0.6 rather than −0.2, the ratio of costs to jobs created will be onethird of its previous value.
This uncertainty has implications for public policy. The estimated
ratios of earnings effects to costs in this chapter could be off by a factor
of 2 to 3. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of this uncertainty for
public policy.

FINANCING AND DESIGN OF INCENTIVES
The business incentive program modeled here is assumed to be a
well-designed program. It corresponds to current best practice.
I will argue in Chapter 5 that current best practice could be improved
upon in various ways. Chapter 5 also will include quantitative evidence
on how the effectiveness of business incentives will vary with the
financing and design of business incentives. In the current section of
this chapter, I describe the design of best-practice business incentives.
Best-practice business incentives are not financed by cutting public services. Cuts to public services have two types of adverse effects
on local economic development. First, cutting public spending will
cut demand for local goods and services. For example, cutting public
spending will lead to lower employment and wages of public employees
such as teachers, police, etc. Lower earnings of these public employees
reduce demand for other local workers. Cutting public spending also
reduces demand for local suppliers to the government.
Second, cutting public spending may cut the quality of public services that are valued by business. We know that business location decisions are sensitive to the quality of public services such as education
and highways. Several studies have found that cuts in business taxes,
when financed by cutting public services, may actually discourage business location (Bartik 1991a, p. 48).
The current best-practice business incentive program also needs
to avoid adverse demand effects, which may occur if the program is
financed by increases in household taxes. Increased household taxes
reduce household demand for local goods and services.
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How can business incentive programs be financed without adverse
effects on local demand or public service quality? The business incentive program could be part of a budget-neutral reform of business taxation. This budget-neutral program would reduce the tax burden on business expansions by business incentives. The tax burden on businesses
that do not invest or expand would be raised by broadening the business
tax base or increasing average business tax rates for businesses. This
base-broadening and these increased average business tax rates would
be offset for new or expanding business by business incentives.11
Most business incentives fall short of current best practice. For
example, business incentives are typically not part of a budget-neutral
business tax reform. In many cases, business incentives are an ad hoc
add-on to the current business tax system. Typically, business incentives are not subject to a budget constraint. Business incentives frequently expand over time because of political pressures. For example,
a property tax abatement initially intended for manufacturers may be
expanded to wholesale businesses or big box retailers. Rebates to businesses for worker income taxes may initially only provide rebates for
income taxes associated with new employees. But political pressures
may lead to rebates for income taxes associated with retained jobs.
When business incentive programs expand in an ad hoc fashion,
adverse effects from their financing are more likely to occur. The loss of
revenue may reduce public spending and public services, and increase
household taxes.
I assume that the business incentives are equal in effectiveness to
simply giving businesses cash via tax incentives. Chapter 5 discusses
how some customized services to business may have greater effectiveness than cash incentives.
The business incentives are assumed to be provided to assisted
businesses over a 10-year period. This reflects current best practice.
Delaying incentive payments makes it easier to base incentives on the
business’s performance in providing more local jobs. If the business
does not perform, the incentives yet to be paid can be recovered. On
the other hand, providing incentives over 10 years is less effective in
altering business location decisions than providing incentives up front.
Businesses tend to have large discount rates on future cash flows.
The business incentives are assumed to be provided only to exportbased businesses. Export-based businesses are those that either 1)
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export goods and services outside the local economy (a metropolitan
area or state) or 2) substitute for imports of goods and services from
outside the local economy. Incentives to non-export-based businesses
may increase the activity of the assisted businesses. However, much of
the increased activity of the assisted businesses will reduce activity in
other local businesses that serve the same local market. This displacement of other local business activity reduces the effectiveness of business incentives to non-export-based businesses. For example, helping
one local retailer may reduce sales at other local retailers.
This assumption means that the estimates provided here would not
be applicable to business incentives provided to sports teams and sports
stadiums. The estimates provided here would also not be applicable to
incentives provided to so-called destination retailers such as Cabela’s
and Bass Pro Shops. Although sports activities and destination retailers
have an export-based component, a considerable portion of their sales
reduces the sales of other local businesses.
The assisted businesses are assumed to have a healthy multiplier of
1.8.12 This multiplier means that for every 10 jobs created in assisted
businesses, eight jobs are created in other local businesses. These multiplier jobs occur in part in local suppliers to the assisted businesses.
Multiplier jobs also occur in local retailers that sell goods and services
to the workers of the assisted businesses and their local suppliers.
A multiplier as large as 1.8 requires that assisted businesses have
a good network of local suppliers and pay good wages. Multipliers of
this size are more likely for manufacturing than for nonmanufacturing
businesses.
I assume that the assisted businesses and the spinoff businesses
together pay an average wage premium. That is, the average wage of
the total jobs created, with the multiplier, is about equal to what one
would expect, given the skill requirements of those jobs. Because many
service industries pay below-average wages compared to their skill
requirements, this implies that the businesses that actually receive the
incentive pay above-average wages.
If instead the jobs created pay below-average wages, this has
adverse effects on local wage standards. As shown by previous studies,
reduced wage standards in the local economy will reduce local earnings
(Bartik 1993b). This reduction in earnings will occur in part because of
lower wages in the newly created jobs. In addition, these lower wage
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standards will reduce wages and labor force participation rates throughout the local economy.
I assume that nothing special is done to match local workers to
newly created jobs. Matching workers to newly created jobs might
increase the share of jobs that go to local workers who would otherwise
not be employed, as opposed to in-migrants to the local economy.

EFFECTS OF LOCAL jOB GROWTH ON LOCAL WORKERS
For unemployment rate effects of local job growth, I assume effects
that start out at 30 percent of the growth shock. That is, for every 10
jobs created, three of those jobs reduce the local unemployment rate.
These effects on the unemployment rate then steadily decline to zero
over the next five years. This pattern of effects is consistent with the
evidence presented in Bartik (1991a, 1993a) and in Blanchard and Katz
(1992).
Effects on local labor force participation rates are assumed to be
more persistent. This is consistent with evidence (Bartik 1993a) that
the effects of local job growth on labor force participation rates do not
diminish much for at least 17 years. As was discussed in Chapter 2, this
empirical evidence can be rationalized by theories of labor market hysteresis. An increase in local job growth provides valuable labor market
experience. This experience increases the future employment rates of
local residents.
However, we would not expect hysteresis effects to persist indefinitely. Hysteresis effects are due to the long-term effects on local residents of short-term labor market experiences. Such hysteresis effects
will be reduced over time as these local residents die or move to other
local labor markets.
I assume effects on labor force participation rates that start out at
30 percent of the growth shock. These effects then “depreciate” based
on the proportion of the original local residents who will be both still
alive and still working in the local labor market. These migration rates
are based on information on what proportion of a state’s population are
still living in their birth state as of different ages.13 The resulting effects
on labor force participation are consistent with Bartik (1991a, 1993a).
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Figure 3.2 shows the time pattern of effects on unemployment rates
and labor force participation rates.14 The effects on labor force participation rates do not diminish much over the first 10 to 20 years. However, by 60 years after the local job growth shock, these effects on labor
force participation have diminished to close to zero.
Effects on occupational upgrading are assumed to follow the same
time pattern as effects on labor force participation. This is based on the
empirical evidence that occupational upgrading effects are quite persistent. In addition, this assumption is based on the hypothesis that the persistence of occupational upgrading effects is due to hysteresis effects.
Such hysteresis effects would diminish because of mortality and outmigration. Occupational upgrading effects are calibrated so that their
average effects on earnings during the 10 years after the job increase
match the occupational upgrading effects estimated in Bartik (1991a).15, 16
Figure 3.2 Assumed Effects of Increase in State Employment on State
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stated as a proportion of the employment shock. For example, both effects start in year
1 at 0.30. This means that for every 10 jobs created, three reduce local unemployment,
three increase local labor force participation rates, and the remaining four increase
local population. The derivation of these effects is described in the text.
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RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE OBjECTIONS
The argument presented here goes against conventional wisdom.
Among many liberals, and some conservatives, the belief is that business incentives are too small a percentage of costs to matter much. As a
result, business incentives are too expensive per job created.
As examples of the belief that business taxes are too small a percentage of costs to affect location decisions, consider the following
quotations:
Incentives, for all their cost to state and local governments, are
still too small to matter much. Typically, a firm’s wage bill will be
much greater than its tax bill; for the average manufacturing firm
in the U.S., payroll is about 11 times the firm’s state and local taxes
before incentives . . . Thus fairly small geographic differentials
in wages could easily outweigh what appear to be large tax and
incentive differentials. —Fisher and Peters (2004, p. 31)
State and local taxes are not typically a significant cost of doing
business. All state and local taxes combined make up but a small
share of business costs and reduce profits only to a limited extent.
—Lynch (2004, p. vii)
The fact is that the value to a firm of a state’s typical, limited-term
incentive package pales when compared to factors such as overall
tax burdens; a reasonably priced, skilled labor force; the relative
cost of compliance with regulations; efficient transportation facilities; crime rates; utility services and costs; education quality; and
the general quality of life. —Reed (1996, p. 37)

It is certainly true that labor accounts for a greater share of business
costs than state and local business taxes. But labor costs are harder for
state and local governments to change than are state and local business
taxes.
Labor costs adjust across the United States in response to other cost
differentials. There are wide variations in labor costs across the United
States. But much of this variation simply responds to other factors
affecting the relative attractiveness of different locations to businesses
or households. The more limited variation in state and local business
taxes or business incentives is more readily controllable by policymakers than are regional variations in labor costs.
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A similar argument can be made for most other business costs that
vary across state economies. Business tax costs and business incentives
are readily controllable. Cost factors such as the crime rate, the quality
of education, and the local quality of life are more difficult for policymakers to control in the short run.
These cost factors can be affected in the long run. Therefore, these
cost factors should also be considered as part of economic development policy. This book’s main purpose is to argue for considering policies such as pre-K education as economic development policy. But the
importance of long-term cost factors does not deny the importance of
cost factors that are easier to control in the short term.
The argument that state and local taxes make up a modest proportion of costs tells us nothing about how businesses respond to changes
in these tax costs. What is relevant to the effect of business incentives
on location decisions is the closeness of relative profitability across different locations. If, after all factors are considered, profits are relatively
close in one state versus another state, then a small business incentive
may prove decisive, even if business tax costs are modest in size.
Business incentives may lead to changes in labor costs. When business incentives cause increased job growth, that increased job growth
will raise local prices and wages. These increased local costs help limit
the size of the effect of business incentives upon job growth. But these
increased local costs cannot eliminate any effect, because the increased
costs ultimately depend upon a greater local population bidding up the
price of scarce land.
Suppose local costs do not matter much to business location. Then
it is hard to see how state and local policies to improve public services
can make an area more attractive for business location. The argument
against business incentives can be used to argue for the impotence of
almost any state or local economic development policy.
A less extreme view is that business incentives matter, but not
enough. Incentives do not affect a sufficient number of business location decisions. Therefore, the forgone revenue per job created is excessive. Consider the following quotations:
The best case is that incentives work about 10 percent of the time
and are simply a waste of money the other 90 percent.
—Fisher and Peters (2004, p. 32)

72 Bartik
Even with optimistic assumptions, for each private-sector job created by state and local tax cuts, governments may lose between
$39,000 and $78,000 or more in tax revenue annually.
—Lynch (2004, p. viii)

Part of the issue is that my own analysis disagrees somewhat with
the figures used by these authors. I get a somewhat smaller percentage
of location decisions affected by incentives, and a somewhat smaller
cost per job created.17
However, the more important issue is that the benefits per job created are quite high. Jobs created by business incentives may have multiplier effects. Even though not all of these jobs go to local residents,
many do, and for a long period of time. Furthermore, the job creation
also allows for occupational upgrading benefits for state residents that
are persistent. As a result, the state economic development benefits per
job created by business incentives are estimated in this book to have a
present value of almost one-half million dollars per job.
This half-million-dollars-per-job benefit only considers earnings
benefits for state residents who get new or better jobs. As discussed in
Chapter 2, there also would be social benefits to other state residents
who care about their fellow state residents.
Because the benefits of state job creation are so high, policymakers should be willing to pay a great deal to achieve such benefits. Even
affecting only a small percentage of business location decisions may be
a worthwhile policy.
Of course, the benefits of state job creation could be much lower
than is assumed here. A market-clearing model of the labor market
could be used to argue that creating jobs has only slight benefits. As was
discussed in Chapter 2, in such a model, the market wage only slightly
exceeds the “reservation wage” of the newly employed workers.
Such a market-clearing model also implies much smaller benefits
from the many possible policy interventions in the labor market. Programs such as job training, education, and public service jobs would
also have much smaller benefits. Many of the benefits of such programs
come from increasing the employment rates of former participants.
Reservation wages’ being close to market wages implies that only slight
benefits would come from increases in employment rates.
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ConClusion
The research summarized in this chapter suggests that business
incentives can produce sizable benefits for state economies. These
incentives can produce state economic development benefits whose
present value exceeds the incentive costs by a ratio of three to one.
These ratios of benefits to costs are for an incentive policy that
meets standards for best current practice. This requires that the incentives not adversely affect public spending and the quality of public services. Many or even most current business incentive programs would
not meet these best practice standards. Chapter 5 will consider issues
related to the quality of business incentives.
There also is some uncertainty about the magnitude of business
incentive effects. Chapter 6 will consider the implications of this uncertainty for public policy.
Incentives have a high ratio of benefits to costs because of the large
benefits of higher local employment rates and occupational attainment.
These sizable labor market benefits provide a rationale for business
incentive policies that have high costs per job created.
Business incentives are not the only way to increase state employment rates and occupational attainment. The next chapter turns to specific estimates of the state economic development effects of pre-K programs and other early childhood programs.

notes
1. The present value of all benefits and costs is evaluated using a real social discount
rate of 3 percent to further adjust dollar flows that are already expressed in 2007
dollars. The real discount rate adjusts for factors that mean a dollar in real terms
in future years may be worth less than a dollar at the present day—for example,
because per capita income is increasing over time. Chapter 7 discusses the discount rate issue.
2. The precise percentages are as follows: 57.8 percent of the benefits are due to
higher employment rates, and 42.2 percent are due to better occupational
attainment.
3. A table in Appendix 3A gives the numbers behind Figure 3.1. Appendix 3A is
available on-line from the Upjohn Institute, or via e-mail from the author.
4. Appendix 3B shows the mathematics behind the relationship between these various approaches.
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5. This figure is derived from Table 3.7 in Peters and Fisher (2002, pp. 74–75), which
gives the average present value of state and local economic development subsidies across 75 cities in 13 leading industrial states, and including enterprise zone
incentives, at $5,048 in 1994 dollars, where they calculate present value using a
10 percent discount rate. This present value and discount rate correspond to annual
subsidies of $1,149 over 10 years in 2007 dollars. Note that I am not assuming
that a 10 percent discount rate is a valid discount rate; in fact, in later calculations,
I assume that 3 percent is the appropriate social discount rate, while 12 percent is
the discount rate actually used by corporate decision makers. Rather, I use the 10
percent discount rate actually used by Peters and Fisher to translate their present
values into corresponding annual flows, as their present values were actually calculated using the 10 percent discount rate for annual flows; I am merely reversing
the process. My calculation of annual flows will not depend on the discount rate
used by Peters and Fisher, to the extent to which typical economic development
subsidies in fact are flat annual subsidies lasting around 10 years.
6. As explained in Appendix 3B, this is the present value as judged by the business
being offered the incentive. Businesses probably use relatively high discount rates.
According to Poterba and Summers (1995), the discount rate used by businesses in
making investment decisions is 12 percent. Therefore, these present values of tax
incentives provided over time need to be calculated using a 12 percent discount
rate to determine their effectiveness in altering business location decisions. The
social costs of these incentives need to be evaluated using the appropriate social
discount rate, which I assume in this book to be 3 percent. (See Chapter 7.)
7. This is based on Peters and Fisher’s estimate that in 2007 dollars, and evaluated at
a 10 percent discount rate, the largest incentives have a present value of $33,515
per job (Peters and Fisher 2002, Table 3.7, pp. 74–75). If we assume these typical
incentives have a 10-year term, the annual incentive value would be about $4,959.
The present value of such an incentive at a 12 percent discount rate is $31,382.
8. These largest incentives have an annual value of about $5,000 per year for 10
years. That is, they are equivalent to reducing the cost of labor by about $2.50 per
hour for 10 years. It does not seem wildly implausible that such an incentive might
tip the location decision of one out of six businesses receiving the incentive. This
is a substantial reduction in the average cost of labor. In 2007 dollars, average
private industry labor costs per hour of labor were $27.69 (BLS 2008). A $2.50
per hour reduction is almost a 10 percent reduction in labor costs, which we would
expect to have substantial effects upon decisions.
9. Note that holding other facts constant includes holding the quality of public services constant. Thus, the cut in state and local business taxes must be financed in
a way that does not diminish the quality of state and local public services.
10. Appendix 3B provides the details behind this assertion.
11. A second possibility is for the business incentive program to be financed by
increased household taxes, but with offsets to boost local demand. For example, if
the business incentives were in local services such as customized job training, the
increased spending on these services would help boost the local economy.
12. This calculation is based on data on MEGA that were used by the author and col-
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13.

14.
15.

16.

leagues in previous work on Michigan’s economic development programs (Bartik, Eisinger, and Erickcek 2003). The median multiplier reported by the MEGA
program for its subsidized firms is 1.98. This is calculated by the University of
Michigan using the well-respected REMI model (Treyz 1993). Therefore, I suspect that the multiplier figures are reasonable. However, the MEGA program is
much more selective than the typical economic development program, and is
one of the few programs that performs an impact analysis before the incentive
is awarded. In addition, Michigan may have higher multipliers for export-based
businesses than the average state, as Michigan has particularly dense networks of
industrial suppliers. So, I suspect that MEGA multipliers are higher than average
for economic development incentives. For the analysis in this book, the assumed
multiplier of 1.80 is equal to the fortieth percentile of the multipliers reported for
MEGA subsidies.
The proportion still in the state and still living is based on an elaborate calculation.
I use population numbers from the U.S. Census on the number of persons ages 16
to 79 in the U.S. population. I then use employment rates by ages 16 to 79 to determine how employment is allocated across these different persons. I assume that
the employment shock has permanent effects on labor force participation rates that
are divided among different ages based on their share of total employment in the
state at the time of the employment shock. I then used age-specific mortality rates
to determine what proportion of those benefiting from that employment shock
would still be alive in different years. I furthermore used data on what proportion
of Americans living in their birth state at different years would still be living in
that state in later years. (Specifically, the likelihood of whether someone is living
in the state at age A1 if they were living there at age A0 is equal to the ratio of
the proportion of persons living in the birth state at age A1 versus age A0.) The
age-specific mortality rates were taken from life tables published by the National
Center for Health Statistics (2005). The estimated out-migration from the state
was based on the percentage living in their birth state, which I calculated from the
PUMS data from the 2000 U.S. Census.
Appendix 3C provides the numbers behind this figure.
Specifically, it turns out that if the labor force participation rate effects on earnings
are multiplied by 83.3 percent, the average effects of occupational upgrading on
earnings will be 0.238 percent during the 10 years after the local job growth shock,
which matches the estimates in Bartik (1991a, p. 150).
There are a few other assumptions needed to generate the results. First, to calculate
the earnings effects of this increase in labor force participation rates and reduction in unemployment rates, I needed to make some assumptions about wages. I
assumed that average wage per hour was initially a weighted average of the wage
rate calculated from the 2004 Outgoing Rotation Group of the Current Population
Survey. (The wage rate was later adjusted to 2007 prices.) The weight used was
the percentage of employment in each age group from age 16 to age 79. Because
this group, which is affected by the job growth shock, will age, the wage rate of
the affected group is also allowed to adjust based on the employment shares of
each age group that will be in the affected state, according to assumed age-specific
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mortality rates and out-migration rates from each state. In addition, this model—
and all models in the book—assume long-run annual growth rates of real wages
of 1.2 percent. Therefore, subsequent annual wage rates for this group affected by
the growth shock were adjusted upward by 1.2 percent for each year. All of these
estimated effects are for a single group affected by a business incentive–induced
growth shock in 2011. Similar effects were estimated for a permanent business
incentive program by assuming that the 2012 group would have 1.2 percent higher
wages every year and be 0.3 percent bigger, and so on for subsequent groups
affected by a permanent growth shock. (The default model throughout this book
also assumes annual population growth of 0.3 percent.) Real wage growth projections come from Holtz-Eakin (2005); population growth projections come from
the board of trustees of the Social Security system (OASDI 2005). Finally, the
costs of a permanent business incentive program were assumed to increase by 0.3
percent (to have the same percentage effect on jobs relative to population) plus
1.2 percent (under the assumption that the real cost of inducing a job via business
incentives will grow at the same rate as the real wage rate).
17. Appendix 3B provides more details. I also respond further in Appendix 3D to
other points made by Robert Lynch. My response explains some of the differences between his estimated costs per job created and my estimated costs per job
created.

4
The Economic Development
Effects of High-Quality
Early Childhood Programs
The previous chapter estimated how a state’s economic development is affected by business incentives. This chapter estimates how a
state’s economic development is affected by early childhood programs.
These economic development benefits are effects on the earnings per
capita of state residents. Early childhood programs have not usually
been thought of as economic development programs. But these programs have effects on state residents’ earnings, per dollar of program
costs, that are of a similar order of magnitude to business incentives.
This chapter provides estimates of economic development effects
for three different early childhood programs: 1) universal prekindergarten (pre-K) education, 2) the Abecedarian program, and 3) the
Nurse-Family Partnership program.1 The universal pre-K program that
is examined would provide free pre-K education to all four-year-olds
for three hours per day during the school year. The program is modeled
after the Chicago Child-Parent Center program and the Perry Preschool
program. The Abecedarian program provides disadvantaged families
with free, high-quality child care/early education. This child care/education is “high-quality” in that it has low class sizes, high-quality teachers, and a curriculum focused on optimal child development. The child
care/education is full-time and full-year for five years, from birth to age
five. The Nurse-Family Partnership program provides first-time mothers from disadvantaged backgrounds with 30 nurse visits from prenatal
to age two. These nurse home visits are focused on better prenatal care
and better child care for the child. These visits also help the mother by
providing advice and support for improvements in the mother’s education, job, and family life.
The economic development effects are for operating these programs at full scale. For universal pre-K, “full scale” means sufficient
for all four-year-olds whose parents choose the program. The other two
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programs are targeted at disadvantaged families. For them, “full scale”
means sufficient slots for all disadvantaged families.

CONTExT OF THESE THREE EARLY
CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS
Why study these three programs?
There are many early childhood programs. For example, the federal
Head Start program serves almost one million children annually. This
includes 8 percent of all three-year-olds and 11 percent of all four-yearolds. State-funded pre-K education programs have expanded in recent
years. As of 2007–2008, such programs are estimated to enroll more
than 1.1 million children. This includes 4 percent of all three-year-olds
and 24 percent of all four-year-olds (Barnett et al. 2008). Federal- and
state-subsidized child care for current and former welfare recipients
probably serves more than 2 million children per year (Besharov,
Higney, and Myers 2007). Many programs seek to improve parenting
practices through home visits and parenting classes.
These three particular programs—universal pre-K, the Abecedarian
program, and the Nurse-Family Partnership program—were chosen for
this project for two reasons. First, these three programs had evaluation data that allowed for reasonable calculation of economic development effects. Estimation of the economic development effects of early
childhood programs requires estimates of program effects on the adult
employment and earnings of former child participants. Out of the many
early childhood programs, these three programs have the best long-term
follow-up data on former child participants.
Second, these three programs are model early childhood programs.
I aim here to estimate the economic development effects of best current
practice in early childhood programs. Focusing on best current practice
is analogous to the previous chapter’s focus on well-designed business
incentives.
These best current practices are often only observed in small-scale
experimental programs. This raises the issue of whether such results
can be duplicated in full-scale implementation. I will explore this issue
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further in Chapter 5, which considers program design, and in Chapter 6,
which considers uncertainty about program impacts.
Even though much of the evidence for these three programs comes
from small-scale programs, this evidence is consistent with what we
know about larger-scale programs. For universal pre-K education,
although the Perry Preschool program was small-scale, the Chicago
Child-Parent Center program was run at a large scale. For state-funded
pre-K programs, well-designed studies in five states have found evidence of short-term cognitive effects (Gormley et al. 2005; Wong et al.
2008). Based on these studies of large-scale programs, it is plausible
that full-scale implementation of these three “best practice” programs
could have significant benefits.
On the other hand, not all large-scale early childhood programs are
equally effective. Head Start has had mixed evaluation results (Barnett
2007; Besharov and Higney 2007; Currie 2007). The most recent Head
Start impact study, using random assignment, finds that most impacts
fade out by the end of first grade (Puma et al. 2010). This fading of
Head Start impacts reflects the average performance for the Head Start
treatment group relative to the control group, who experienced a variety
of early childhood programs, including state pre-K programs. Although
former Head Start participants continue to learn over time, the control
group participants eventually catch up. Chapter 5 will consider what
design features of early childhood programs are most likely to lead to
long-term benefits.

SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS
The state economic development benefits of early childhood programs can be summarized using various metrics.
This book’s definition of state economic development benefits is the
increase in earnings per capita of state residents. I consider these early
childhood programs’ effects on the present value of the future earnings
of state residents. I analyze the ratio of these present value effects to the
present value of program costs. (Present value calculations take future
dollars and restate them in present-day dollars using some discount rate.
Chapter 7 will discuss the issue of discounting further.2) For these three
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programs, this ratio is in the range of $2 to $3 per dollar of costs. This
is roughly the same order of magnitude as the economic development
benefits-to-cost ratio for high-quality business incentive programs. As
Chapter 3 showed, such business incentive programs increase the present value of state residents’ earnings by $3.14 per dollar of costs.
More specifically, high-quality universal pre-K education increases
the present value of state residents’ earnings by $2.78 per dollar of
costs. An Abecedarian child care program increases the present value of
state residents’ earnings by $2.25 per dollar of costs. The Nurse-Family
Partnership program increases the present value of state residents’ earnings by $1.85 per dollar of costs.
Three aspects of these programs cause these increased state earnings per capita (which I define as state economic development benefits).
The first type of effect is the stimulation of the state economy from
increased state government spending, when that spending is financed
by taxes. The second type of effect is due to the increased education or
labor supply of parents. The third type of effect is due to the increased
adult education, employment, and occupational attainment of former
child participants. For both the parental and former-child-participant
effects, only a portion of earnings effects occur because of increased
educational attainment. Even holding educational attainment constant,
these programs appear to have some effects on the labor quality of parents and children that increase employment rates and earnings.
The benefits these programs achieve through more spending are
small. I will explore in more detail later why these stimulative effects
are small. The short answer is that most of the stimulative effects of
spending are offset by increased taxes.
The relative importance of effects on parents, versus former child
participants, varies across programs. Programs that provide more child
care, or that target the parent for assistance, have larger effects on parents. The Abecedarian program and the Nurse-Family Partnership provide roughly half of their benefits through benefits for parents. (The
other half occurs through earnings increases for former child participants.) The Abecedarian program provides five years of full-time and
full-year free child care. This explains its relatively large effects on
parents. The Nurse-Family Partnership’s program model emphasizes
improving the “life course” of parents as one important goal. Universal
pre-K education provides almost all of its earnings effects through for-
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mer child participants. The child care is too limited in scope and time
(three hours a day for the school year for four-year-olds) to dramatically
affect parents’ earnings.
Figure 4.1 graphically shows the breakdown of the various “transmission mechanisms” by which these programs provide economic
development benefits to a state’s residents. These transmission mechanisms are spending, effects on parents, and effects on former child
participants.
The economic development benefits of early childhood programs
are stronger in the long term than in the short term. Suppose a state
Figure 4.1 State Economic Development Benefits of Early Childhood
Programs, Divided among Various Mechanisms for Causing
Such Effects

Ratio of present value of
benefits to program costs

3.0

2.78

2.5

2.25

2.0

1.85

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Universal Pre-K

Abecedarian

Nurse-Family
Partnership

Spending

0.04

0.04

0.04

Parents

0.05

1.33

0.88

Former child participants

2.69

0.88

0.93

NOTE: For each early childhood program, this figure shows the ratio of the present
value of effects on state residents’ earnings to the present value of costs. These earnings effects are this book’s definition of state economic development benefits. The
earnings effects are divided among three mechanisms for achieving such effects: 1)
effects of spending more money on early childhood programs, 2) effects on parents
of participants in these programs, and 3) effects on former child participants in these
programs when they grow up and enter the labor force.
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in 2011 adopted full-scale versions of these early childhood programs.
Suppose that these programs were permanent. Under these assumptions, these programs would have some significant earnings benefits in
the short term. But these earnings benefits would be less than costs. For
example, these early childhood programs would provide state economic
development benefits in the first year (2011 in this simulation) whose
ratio to costs ranged from 0.17 to 0.31. As these programs continued,
the ratio of annual earnings effects to annual spending would increase.
But this ratio would not exceed 1.00 for any of these programs until
the 2030s. The ratio of annual earnings effects to costs then continues
upward until eventually all these programs have annual ratios of earnings effects to costs of 2.86 or greater.
The delay in receiving economic development benefits from early
childhood programs is due to these programs’ inherent nature as child
development programs. The earnings effects on former child participants do not begin to occur until these former participants reach age
16. Furthermore, the bulk of the earnings effects occur when former
child participants begin to reach prime earnings years, at age 30 or 40
or greater. A universal pre-K education program that begins providing
services to four-year-olds in 2011 will not increase the earnings of this
cohort until they reach age 16 twelve years later, in 2023. The earnings
effects on this first cohort will be much greater when they reach higher
earnings years at age 30 or 40 (the years 2037 or 2047).
The short-run earnings effects of early childhood programs are due
to the stimulative effects of spending or to effects on parents. But spending effects, as previously stated, are small. Although parent effects are
important for some programs, the effects on former child participants
are important for all early childhood programs, as one might expect.
In contrast, as discussed in Chapter 3, business incentives can provide a greater immediate boost to state earnings. A well-designed business incentive program can increase state residents’ earnings in its first
year of operation by almost twice the costs. Such a well-designed business incentive program immediately creates a relatively large number
of jobs for state residents. Figure 4.2 provides a summary of the ratio
of annual earnings effects to costs for these three early childhood programs and for a well-designed business incentive program.
Many state and local political leaders are focused on short-term
benefits. Increasing the political attractiveness of early childhood pro-
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Figure 4.2 Ratio of Annual State Economic Development Benefits to
Program Costs, Each Year after Permanent Program Is
Begun, for Three Early Childhood Programs and a Business
Incentive Program
Ratio of annual benefits to annual costs
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NOTE: This figure assumes that one of these three early childhood programs is begun
in 2011 and continued permanently. The figure reports effects on state residents’ earnings due to increases in the earnings of the state’s original residents who remain in the
state. These earnings effects are this book’s definition of state economic development
benefits. For comparison, the figure also shows effects for a permanent program of
business incentives whose scale remains at the same percentage of the state economy
over time. The calculations show the effects for each program, assuming that it is the
only program being run. Possibilities of synergy effects among these programs are
ignored. Synergy effects are discussed in Bartik (2008). NFP stands for the NurseFamily Partnership. Appendix 4A presents the numbers behind this figure. (Book
appendices are available on-line at the Upjohn Institute’s Web site.)

grams may depend in part upon redesigning these programs or their
financing to increase the short-term ratio of program benefits to costs.
This topic will be considered in Chapter 7.
These three programs differ in their size when operated at full scale.
A universal prekindergarten education program has the largest number of participants. I estimate that if such a program were operational
throughout the United States, it would have slightly less than 3 million
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participants. The other two early childhood programs are targeted at
disadvantaged families. Therefore, fewer children would participate in
a full-scale national implementation: 600,000 children for the Abecedarian program and 400,000 children for the Nurse-Family Partnership
program.
The programs also differ in spending per participant. The Abecedarian program is the most expensive. Providing free, high-quality,
full-day and full-year child care for five years is quite expensive. The
present value of net costs per child for the Abecedarian program is over
$60,000.3 (This figure adjusts for cost savings from reduced spending
on other pre-K and child care.) The present value of net costs per child
for the other programs is much less: $10,000 for the Nurse-Family Partnership program and $5,000 for universal pre-K. The cost figure for
universal pre-K is also a net cost figure, as it saves money on existing publicly funded pre-K programs. (The earnings benefits for these
early childhood programs are also calculated as net benefits. Net benefits show the earnings effects of these programs, compared to the earnings effects of the pre-K or child care program participation that they
displace.)
Combining these factors, universal pre-K and a full-scale Abecedarian program would be far bigger programs than a full-scale NurseFamily Partnership program. Full national implementation of the
Abecedarian program would cost about $40 billion for an annual
cohort of children. Universal pre-K would cost almost $15 billion for
an annual cohort of children. The Nurse-Family Partnership costs less
than $4 billion per annual cohort. The Abecedarian program costs “real
money” because of its high costs per participant. Universal pre-K has
moderately high costs because it has many participants. The NurseFamily Partnership program has modest overall costs because it has
both a modest number of participants and a modest cost per participant.
Table 4.1 summarizes this information.
As pointed out above, all three of these early childhood programs
have healthy ratios of state economic development benefits to costs.
But because these three programs are of dramatically different scales,
the sizes of their effects on a state’s economic development are quite
different. A state that adopted a full-scale Abecedarian program would
increase the present value of state residents’ earnings by 1.7 percent.
The effect of a state universal pre-K program is a little less than half
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as large: universal pre-K would increase the present value of state residents’ earnings by 0.75 percent. In contrast, the earnings impact of a
full-scale Nurse-Family Partnership program would be far smaller: this
program would increase the present value of state residents’ earnings by
slightly more than 0.1 percent. Table 4.2 summarizes these calculations.
(The table also includes net effects after subtracting the present value of
program costs, which tells a similar story of relative program effects.)
These results suggest that you get what you pay for. Early childhood programs that are of modest scale in both number of participants
and the intensity of intervention per participant are unlikely to have
large economic development benefits. If state policymakers want large
effects from investing in children, they need to make large investments.
Of course, the investments also need to have a high payoff.
Another metric for judging these programs’ effects is their longterm percentage effects on a state’s employment or earnings. In the long
run, a state that implemented a full-scale Abecedarian program would
increase its employment and earnings by between 2 and 3 percent. The
long-run effects of a state’s implementing universal pre-K education
would be about half as much, or about 1.2 percent. The Nurse-Family
Partnership program would have much smaller long-run effects of 0.2
percent on jobs and earnings.
Full-scale implementation of any one of these three early childhood
programs can be compared with business incentives of the same cost.
There is no unique scale for a business incentive program. The model
assumes that a business incentive program will have its effects scaled
with incentive costs. These calculations show that all three early childhood programs have larger long-run effects on state residents’ employment than business incentives of the same costs. Table 4.3 presents the
detailed numbers.
A different picture is presented by comparing the long-run effects
on earnings of early childhood programs versus business incentives. For
early childhood programs, long-run percentage effects on earnings are
somewhat greater than long-run percentage effects on employment. But
for business incentive programs, long-run percentage effects on earnings are much greater than long-run percentage effects on employment.
Therefore, the advantage that early childhood programs have over business incentive programs in long-run employment effects is lessened or
even reversed when looking at long-run earnings effects. For example,

NOTE: This table shows the number of participants and the present value of total costs per cohort if these three early childhood programs
were to be implemented at full scale in all states. The table also shows the present value of net costs per child participant in each program.
Net costs adjust, in the case of the Abecedarian program and universal pre-K, for offsets from reduced spending on other pre-K or child
care programs. All dollar figures are in 2007 dollars. Present value calculations use a 3 percent real social discount rate.
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Table 4.1 Comparison of Scale of Three Early Childhood Programs When Operated at Full Scale, in Number of Child
Participants per Cohort, Present Value of Net Costs per Child, and Present Value of Costs per Cohort
Number of child
Present value of net
Present value of costs
participants in a single
program costs per
per annual cohort
annual cohort (in millions)
participant ($)
($ billions)
Universal prekindergarten education
2.892
4,933
14.3
Abecedarian program
0.619
64,297
39.8
Nurse-Family Partnership
0.373
10,033
3.7

Table 4.2 Present Value of Earnings Effects on State Residents, Costs, and Net Effects of Three Early
Childhood Programs
Present value of earnings
Present value of net effect
effects on state residents, Present value of program (= earnings effects − costs)
as a percentage of state
costs, as a percentage of
as a percentage of state
residents’ earnings
state residents’ earnings
residents’ earnings
Universal prekindergarten education
0.75
0.27
0.48
Abecedarian program
1.69
0.75
0.94
Nurse-Family Partnership
0.13
0.07
0.06
NOTE: These calculations report the present value of earnings effects of each program for state residents, and the costs of each program,
as a percentage of the present value of state residents’ earnings. (Thus, 0.75 is three-quarters of 1 percent.) Present value calculations
use a 3% real discount rate. Both earnings effects and costs are measured for the program relative to whatever early childhood program
participation they displace. That is, if existing pre-K or child care programs have fewer participants as a result of introducing one of
these three programs on the scale assumed here, this both saves on costs and reduces earnings effects. The net effect calculation subtracts
program costs from “state economic development benefits,” which are defined as the earnings effects on state residents.
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Universal prekindergarten education
Abecedarian program
Nurse-Family Partnership

Percentage effects
on jobs as a
percentage of
state jobs

1.19
2.34
0.19

Percentage effects
on jobs of business
incentive program of
same cost as this early
childhood program

0.54
1.51
0.14

Percentage effects
Percentage effects
on state residents’
on state residents’ earnings of business
earnings
incentive program of
as percentage of same cost as this early
state earnings
childhood program

1.24
2.62
0.21

1.02
2.85
0.27

NOTE: Effects are percentage increases in state residents’ employment and earnings in the long run—here operationalized as 2090, 79
years after program initiation—due to permanent full-scale adoption of each of these three early childhood programs. These effects for
each early childhood program are compared with a permanent business incentive program of the same cost as that particular early childhood program.

88

Table 4.3 Long-Run Percentage Effects on State Residents’ Employment and Earnings of Three Early Childhood
Programs, Compared to Business Incentives
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universal pre-K still has greater long-run effects on earnings than business incentives of the same cost. But pre-K’s advantage over business
incentives in long-run earnings effects is not as great as it is for long-run
employment effects. For the Abecedarian program, and for the NurseFamily Partnership program, long-run effects on earnings are slightly
less than those of business incentives of the same cost.
Therefore, compared to business incentives, early childhood programs have greater relative effects on employment than on earnings. This
pattern occurs because of which socioeconomic groups are served by
early childhood programs, compared to business incentives. Early childhood programs provide their greatest assistance to disadvantaged individuals. The resulting increase in employment occurs at below-average
wages. Business incentive programs create jobs at closer to average
wages. Business incentive programs do help some nonemployed individuals get jobs, but they also increase the occupational attainment of
the overall workforce.
One implication of this analysis is that early childhood programs,
compared to business incentives, probably have more progressive
effects on the income distribution. These distributional effects are
explored in Chapter 8.

WHY YOU SHOULD CARE ABOUT 1 PERCENT EFFECTS
ON EARNINGS
Some readers may be underwhelmed by these estimated effects.
The effects of both early childhood programs and business incentive
programs may seem small. The effects are around 1 percent or 2 percent
of earnings. Why should we care?
We should care for several reasons.
First, 1 or 2 percent of earnings is a large number. The estimated
long-run effects on the total U.S. economy would amount to hundreds
of billions of dollars per year. For example, the implied long-run effect
on national annual earnings of universal pre-K education is about $300
billion (Bartik 2006).
Second, these earnings effects, for both early childhood programs
and business incentives, are two to three times their costs. A wise soci-
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ety should follow the rule of making such investments. If such a rule is
consistently followed, then society will repeatedly benefit from adopting innovations that raise net incomes. Over time, the cumulative effect
of numerous such decisions will be far more than 1 or 2 percent.
Third, the estimates used here are deliberately based on a conservative model of benefits. The model is conservative because it is “static.”
What do I mean by a static model? I examine the direct effects of
programs on earnings. However, I do not examine potential dynamic
effects on savings and investment.
For example, it could be argued that a portion of the higher earnings
from early childhood programs or business incentives will be saved.
Such savings may stimulate private business investment. One could
also argue that a portion of the higher earnings will be taxed. Some
taxes may be invested in other educational programs that will enhance
economic development.
Increased savings and private investment, or increased taxes
and public investment, can increase long-run economic growth. The
sequence of events is as follows: Increased earnings stimulate private
and public investment. Increased investment further increases the size
of the economy. This further stimulates private and public investment.
Depending on the model of how private and public capital affect the
economy, it is possible to get permanent effects on growth rates.
Recent Brookings Institution studies on universal pre-K and the
Abecedarian program incorporate such dynamic effects (Dickens and
Baschnagel 2008; Dickens, Sawhill, and Tebbs 2006). A wide variety of
long-run dynamic effects can be obtained, depending on what economic
growth model is used. In some of these models, the percentage effect on
the economy keeps on growing indefinitely over time.
Why am I not comfortable in adopting such dynamic models? First,
there is not widespread agreement among economists about what is the
“right” economic growth model. Therefore, there is a large range of
dynamic estimates of these programs’ effects on long-run earnings.
In addition, these dynamic effects are contingent on assuming that
increased earnings will be invested in private and public capital. It
seems more conservative to simply estimate the direct effects on earnings and note the possibility that further effects may occur if these earnings are used for investments. If households and governments choose to
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consume all of the increased earnings, then these dynamic effects will
not occur.
Finally, one could get huge and unbounded long-run economic
effects from any program that raises economic activity. This same type
of argument could be used for any tax cut or government program that
raises overall economic activity. It seems strange to argue that any program that raises economic activity will have unbounded effects over
time. This confuses the effects of the program with the normal process
by which increased economic activity may contribute to higher longrun growth.
However, readers should be aware of these possible dynamic
effects. These dynamic effects are real potential effects of programs that
raise earnings by 1 or 2 percent. Increasing the size of the economic pie
always has the potential of leading to a virtuous cycle of investment and
growth. The crucial issue in initiating such a growth process is whether
the program’s direct economic benefits exceed its costs. If so, then the
program may permanently increase economic growth. Long-run effects
could far exceed the programs’ direct effects of 1 or 2 percent.

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
To better understand the above estimates, the following sections
provide an expanded description of each of the three programs.
I include some description of how previous studies’ results were
used to generate this book’s estimates.4 Most estimated effects that I use
from previous studies are statistically significant or close to statistically
significant. However, I use the best estimate even when it is not statistically significantly different from zero. This issue is discussed further in
Chapter 6, which deals with uncertainty about program effects. A short
rationale is that the rule of using the best estimate is most likely to yield
the best decision about whether to adopt a program.
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Universally Accessible Prekindergarten (pre-K)
Education Program
The universal pre-K program used in this book is based on a program design of Lynn Karoly and James Bigelow of the RAND Corporation. They developed this program design in 2005 to estimate the effects
of universal pre-K in California (Karoly and Bigelow 2005).
I picked Karoly and Bigelow’s program design for two reasons.
First, as shown below, Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions about the
effects of pre-K are moderate. They do not assume some perfect pre-K
program that is unlikely to be implemented on a large scale. Karoly
and Bigelow’s assumed effects are considerably below those of previous small-scale pre-K programs. Second, I wanted to avoid using my
own program design, to alleviate possible concerns that I might have
manipulated my program design to get the desired results.
Karoly and Bigelow’s universal pre-K program is based on the Chicago Child-Parent Center program. However, it differs in some crucial
features. The program is assumed to be universally available to all fouryear-olds. (“Universal” does not mean mandatory.) Seventy percent of
all four-year-olds actually participate in this voluntary program. The
program operates for three hours per day during the school year for one
year for all participants. It has a class size of 20 children. A certified
teacher is the lead teacher, and the teacher’s aide is a paraprofessional.
Following Karoly and Bigelow’s lead, I assume that the effects of
universal pre-K on child participants are 23 percent of the effects per
participant of the Chicago Child-Parent Center (CPC) program. This
23 percent is based on Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions about how
much program effects per participant might be reduced from the CPC
program. Two factors might reduce the Karoly/Bigelow program’s
effects relative to CPC effects. First, a universal pre-K program would
include many middle-class and upper-class families, whereas the CPC
program was targeted for low-income families. Second, the estimated
effects of the CPC are relative to those for other families who are not
in any pre-K program, whereas some of the children in universal pre-K
would have otherwise been in some other pre-K program. The 23 percent assumption also acknowledges the somewhat larger class size and
shorter duration for universal pre-K compared to the CPC program. The
modeled universal pre-K program has student-to-staff ratios of 20-to-2,
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whereas the CPC program averaged 17-to-2. Some researchers of pre-K
education believe such a class size differential will not alter a program’s
effectiveness (Schweinhart et al. 2005, p. 202). However, I maintain
that it might lower effectiveness somewhat.
I assume that the net cost of this program, per child participant, is
$4,933. This net cost is arrived at after allowing for cost savings on
other public pre-K programs and child care programs. The gross cost
of the program per participant is $6,823. These net cost and gross cost
assumptions are derived from Karoly and Bigelow.5 From the available
evidence, this amount seems sufficient to fund a high-quality program.6
The modeled universal pre-K program is provided only for fouryear-olds, whereas the CPC program was offered at ages three and four.
However, only about half of the CPC program participants actually participated in the program for two years. Estimated program effects did
not differ by large amounts between one-year participants and two-year
participants (Reynolds et al. 2002, p. 285).
The CPC program was a pre-K program started in 1967 in various Chicago schools. The program is still continuing today. Estimates
of its effects are based on nonexperimental evaluations. However, the
comparison group appears to be quite similar to program participants.
Estimated effects on former child participants are based on all 989 CPC
participants who were born in 1980 and who participated at 24 different
CPC sites at 24 Chicago public schools. The outcomes for these former
child participants are compared with outcomes for 550 children born
in 1980 who attended five Chicago public schools that did not have
the CPC program but were otherwise similar in socioeconomic status
to the participating schools. (The description of the CPC program and
of research results from the CPC program are based on various publications by Arthur Reynolds of the University of Minnesota and his
colleagues, and particularly on Reynolds et al. [2002] and Temple and
Reynolds [2007]. These descriptions are also based in part on Galinsky
[2006].)
As of ages 20 and 21, the CPC program has reduced the percentage
of high school dropouts by 11 percentage points (Reynolds et al. 2002).
I assumed a universal program would reduce the dropout percentage by
23 percent as much. I used data on how employment rates and wages
vary with educational attainment to estimate effects of universal pre-K
on the jobs and earnings of former child participants.
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I wanted to estimate longer-term effects of universal pre-K on subsequent educational attainment and employment, beyond ages 20 and
21. To do so, I relied on estimates from the Perry Preschool program,
but modified to be appropriate for the CPC program. The Perry program was conducted from 1962 to 1967 in Ypsilanti, Michigan. The
58 randomly assigned experimental child participants and 65 randomly
assigned control group children have been followed to measure program effects. (The descriptions of the Perry program and its associated
studies are based in part on Schweinhart et al. [2005] and on Galinsky
[2006].)
The Perry program was similar to CPC but somewhat more intensive. Perry averaged 13 students to two teachers, as opposed to the CPC
class-size ratio of 17 students to two teachers. In addition, all of the Perry
teachers were certified teachers, whereas only the lead CPC teacher was
required to be certified. Both the Perry program and the CPC program
were half-day programs that only operated during the school year. Both
were offered for two years, for ages three and four. However, 80 percent
of the Perry children participated for two years, versus only half of the
CPC children. Finally, the Perry program, but not the CPC program,
included a one-and-a-half-hour weekly home visit.
One estimated effect of the Perry program on former participants
at age 19 was to reduce the high school dropout rate by 22 percent
(Schweinhart et al. 2005). This is a little less than twice the CPC program’s effect on high school dropouts at age 20 (Reynolds et al. 2002).
Based on this, I assume that the long-run effects of the CPC program on
educational attainment or employment rates will be about one-half of
the Perry effects. In turn, the effects for universal pre-K are assumed to
be 23 percent of the imputed CPC effects.
The Perry program’s effects on long-run employment rates are far
greater than could be predicted based on educational attainment. For
example, the Perry program is estimated to increase the employment
rate by 14 percent at age 40, but the program’s effects on educational
attainment predict that the employment rate will only increase by 2
percent (Bartik 2006, Table 11; Schweinhart et al. 2005). Presumably
these “extra employment rate” effects are due to better and more-jobrelevant skills that are not reflected in higher educational attainment.
These “extra employment rate” effects of Perry are used in my model. I
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infer long-run employment rate and earnings effects for universal pre-K
beyond those predicted by educational attainment.
The effects of universal pre-K on parents are based on research on
how child care costs affect mothers’ labor force participation rates. (See
Anderson and Levine [2000], Blau [2001], and Blau and Hagy [1998].
Also see discussion of the implications of this research in Bartik [2006],
p. 41.) Based on this research, the increase in mothers’ labor force participation rates is estimated to be about one-fifth of the percentage
reduction in child care costs. (For example, a 100 percent reduction in
child care costs—that is, making child care free—would be assumed to
increase mothers’ employment rates by 20 points. If the base employment rate was 30 percent, free child care would increase the employment rate to 50 percent). However, free half-day school-year child
care for one four-year-old child does not reduce child care costs by
100 percent. I made a number of adjustments to determine the effective
reduction in child care costs. Half-day school-year child care is about
one-fourth of yearly work time. About 47 percent of the participants in
Karoly et al.’s model of universal pre-K would have already received
free child care from another pre-K program. Thirty-nine percent of parents of four-year-olds also have a younger child.7 I ended up concluding
that for the average family in universal pre-K, child care costs are only
reduced by 8 percent (Bartik 2006).
Abecedarian Program
The Abecedarian program was operated as a random-assignment
experiment from 1972 to 1977 in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. It provided disadvantaged families with five years of free full-time and fullyear child care and pre-K education (from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., five
days a week, 50 weeks a year). Services began when the child was
six weeks of age and continued until the child entered kindergarten.
The program also included home visits every other week. The child
care incorporated educational goals from the very beginning, but with
a highly individualized curriculum. Group-size-to-staff ratios changed
from 6 infants to 2 teachers for the first year, to 8 toddlers to 2 teachers for the second year, to 10 preschoolers to 2 teachers for the third
year, and to 14 preschoolers to 2 teachers for the fourth and fifth years.
Teachers were high school graduates for children from birth to age two.

96 Bartik

Teachers were college graduates for children from ages three to five.
Salaries were competitive with public school salaries. (The description
of the Abecedarian program is based on various papers from this project, but particularly Ramey and Campbell [1991]. I also used information from descriptions of the Abecedarian program by Galinsky [2006]
and Ludwig and Sawhill [2007].)
The Abecedarian program had high costs. The present value of
gross program costs per child is almost $80,000. These high costs are
due to the intensive nature of the program. Class sizes were small. The
program devoted substantial time to each child. Children potentially
received over 12,000 hours of services from this program (5 years × 50
weeks per year × 5 days per week × 10 hours per day, minus the first 6
weeks at 5 days per week and 10 hours per day = 12,200 hours).
The program’s gross costs of $78,411 per child are reduced to net
program costs of $64,297 per child. This reduction occurs because of
reduced use of other publicly subsidized pre-K programs and child care.
The assumed magnitude of this reduction was derived from Ludwig and
Sawhill (2007).
The Chapel Hill environment of this experiment probably resulted
in good follow-up services for the Abecedarian students and families.
The public school system in Chapel Hill was considered to be one of
the two best public school systems in the state (Galinksy 2006, p. 14).
Chapel Hill schools had a relatively small percentage of disadvantaged
children. The school district also had a large number of different support services for children who were behind. In addition, among both
the treatment and the control group, half of the children were randomly
assigned to additional school-age interventions. In these school-age
interventions, home/school resource teachers helped provide supplemental materials for parents to work on with their children. Therefore,
the estimated effects of the Abecedarian intervention represent the
effects of early childhood intervention when subsequently these children are frequently eligible for a variety of services. If early childhood
services have positive synergistic effects with school-age services, this
may increase the effects of the Abecedarian program.8
The Abecedarian program was targeted at families who scored high
on a risk index. This index was based on a number of factors: low educational level of the mother or father, low family income, whether the
family was a single-parent family, family receipt of welfare, and low-
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IQ mother or father. It is difficult to determine exactly what percentage
of the U.S. population would meet the Abecedarian criteria. Ludwig
and Sawhill (2007) suggest that a full-scale Abecedarian program could
achieve similar results by targeting families below the poverty line. I
adopt their assumption, which results in about 15 percent of all children
participating in a full-scale Abecedarian program.9
The estimated effects of the Abecedarian program rely on random
assignment. Random assignment allows us to be confident that the differences between the treatment group and the control group are not due
to differences other than program assignment. This experiment included
57 children in the program group and 54 children in the control group.
The free child care provided by the program would be expected to
increase the labor supply of parents during the five years of the program. As discussed above for universal pre-K, we have good estimates
from previous research of how child care prices affect mothers’ labor
supply. The extra employment of mothers during the program’s five
years should increase their subsequent labor supply and wages. Program data provide direct evidence that mothers’ employment and earnings increase by sizable amounts after program completion. In addition,
the Abecedarian program results suggest that the program increases
postsecondary education of mothers. The model simulates short-run
effects on mothers’ employment and earnings due to the free child care.
The model then simulates long-run effects on mothers’ employment
and earnings due to the greater short-run employment experience and
greater educational attainment.
The Abecedarian experiment estimated an increase in attendance in
college BA programs for former child participants as of age 21. I use
the program’s estimated effects on education activity and enrollment at
age 21 to project final educational attainment of Abecedarian program
participants. These effects on educational attainment imply effects on
employment rates and wage rates. In addition, it appears that former
child participants are more likely to be employed at age 21 than one
would expect, given their educational attainment. As discussed above,
results from the Perry Preschool program suggest that early childhood
interventions may have employment rate effects beyond their effects
on educational attainment. I use estimated results from Perry to predict how the Abecedarian results for former child participants at age 21
might change at older ages.
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Nurse-Family Partnership Program
The Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP) program has been subject to
three experimental studies: Elmira, New York, starting in 1977; Memphis in 1987; and Denver in 1994. The program now operates in 32
states and serves over 21,000 families (Nurse-Family Partnership 2010;
Olds 2005). The NFP’s target group for assistance is disadvantaged
first-time mothers. Each mother is provided with two and a half years
of regular nurse visits, 75–90 minutes long, from prenatal to age two.
On average, about 7 visits occur prior to the child’s birth, and 23 after.
(These descriptions of NFP are based on Kitzman et al. [2000]; Olds
[2002]; Olds et al. [1997, 1998]; Olds, Kitzman, et al. [2004]; and Olds,
Robinson, et al. [2004].)
The “curriculum” presented in the nurse visits has three goals:
1) healthier prenatal care, 2) more sensitive child care, and 3) a better maternal life course. A better maternal life course includes better
spacing and planning of subsequent pregnancies, help for the mother
in completing her education and finding work, and more constructive
involvement of the father in the family (Olds 2002). The goals of the
NFP focus at least as much on the mother as on the child. First-time
mothers are targeted on the theory that they will be more open to the
program’s influence. Nurses are used as home visitors because of their
credibility with mothers and their health care knowledge. The Denver
experiment suggests that nurse home visitors are more effective than
paraprofessional home visitors (Olds, Robinson, et al. 2004).
In the initial NFP experiment, in Elmira, the program targeted modestly disadvantaged first-time mothers. However, research suggested
that the program had greater effects for more disadvantaged women
(Karoly et al. 1998; Olds et al. 1997). Therefore, subsequent tests of
the program have been targeted more greatly at disadvantaged women.
Isaacs (2007) estimates that a full-scale NFP program might qualify 9
percent of all children as eligible. I adopt Isaacs’s assumption.
The NFP has far fewer hours of intervention per family than the
Abecedarian program or universal pre-K education. The NFP only
interacts with its target group for perhaps 45 hours over two and a half
years (30 visits × 90 minutes per visit). The Abecedarian program interacts with children for up to 12,000 hours. Of course, the theory behind
the NFP is that interventions at a crucial period with the mother will
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have large effects later on. There is evidence from the experiments of
such effects on the mother’s behavior. The Elmira and Memphis experiments indicate that the program reduced subsequent pregnancies. The
Denver experiment indicates effects in delaying the time until a second
birth (Olds et al. 1997; Olds, Kitzman, et al. 2004; Olds, Robinson, et
al. 2004). Fewer subsequent pregnancies, or delayed second births, are
likely to improve the quantity and quality of the mother’s interaction
with the first child.
The lower intensity in hours of service of the NFP program is not
fully matched by lower costs. Costs of the NFP program per child are
about one-eighth of the costs per child of the Abecedarian program
(about $10,000 per child versus $78,000 per child). The hours of service
per child of the NFP program are less than 0.5 percent of the hours of
service per child of the Abecedarian program (45 hours versus 12,000
hours). The lower differential in costs than in service hours probably
reflects several factors. The NFP relies more on one-on-one service:
nurses meet individually with the mothers, whereas there are multiple
Abecedarian children per teacher. More NFP resources are devoted to
nondirect service hours. Finally, salaries may be higher for NFP nurses
than for the average Abecedarian employee.
The three NFP experiments have larger sample sizes than the Abecedarian program. Larger samples allow program effects to be estimated
with greater statistical precision. Sample sizes for the treatment group
and the control group at each site are in the hundreds.
The NFP’s effects on increasing the employment of mothers and
reducing welfare usage are greater in the Elmira experiment than in the
Memphis and Denver experiments. The lower effects in the later experiments may reflect changes in welfare policy that increase pressure on
welfare mothers to be employed. (Olds, Robinson, et al. [2004] note no
effects on mothers’ use of welfare in the Denver trial. This result differs
from the effects estimated in Memphis and Elmira. They speculate that
this may be due to welfare reform.) After welfare reform, reductions
or delays in subsequent pregnancies are less likely to affect mothers’
employment. Because of welfare reform, I use a more conservative estimate by relying on the Memphis and Denver experiments to estimate
the NFP’s effects on mothers’ employment and earnings.
The Memphis and Denver results suggest modest effects of the
experiment on increasing mothers’ high school graduation rates (Olds,
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Kitzman, et al. 2004; Olds, Robinson, et al. 2004). They also suggest
some short-run increases in mothers’ employment, during the period
from the child’s second to fourth birthdays, beyond what is predicted
based on educational attainment (Kitzman et al. 2000; Olds, Robinson,
et al. 2004). However, these short-run extra employment effects then
fade away (Olds, Kitzman, et al. 2004).
None of the three experiments has direct evidence on former child
participants’ employment or earnings, or their educational attainment.
Therefore, earlier indicators of effects on former child participants must
be used to predict effects on their employment and earnings as adults.
Estimates from Memphis suggest small effects of the NFP on age six
reading and math scores (Olds, Kitzman, et al. 2004). These reading and
math score test results can be used to predict adult employment rates
and earnings. The Elmira results also report large effects of the program
on reducing the former child participants’ arrests through age 15 (Olds
et al. 1998). These juvenile arrests can be used to predict reductions in
adult criminal activity. Predicted reductions in adult criminal activity
can then be used to predict changes in adult employment rates.

MODELING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS,
PART 1: SPENDING
These estimates of program size and program effects were then
used to simulate effects on the employment and earnings of state residents. These simulations were based on a model of how a state economy
responds to labor demand and labor supply increases.
The first type of economic development effect is due to increased
public spending. The additional spending on early childhood programs
will increase demand for goods and services produced within the state.
The increased program spending will create jobs for the staff of the
early childhood program. The increased spending will also create some
jobs in state-based suppliers to the early childhood program (e.g., suppliers of paper, furniture, books, toys, etc.). The workers in the early
childhood program and its suppliers will spend some of their salaries on
locally produced goods and services. This multiplier effect on demand
for locally produced goods and services will increase jobs and earnings
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at these local producers. In turn, there will be further effects as a portion
of these increased jobs and earnings in other local producers is respent
locally.
However, we also have to take into account the effects of increased
state taxes on demand for goods and services produced within the state.
I assume that the increased state spending on early childhood programs
is 100 percent financed by increased state taxes. These increased state
taxes will reduce the disposable income of state residents. Lower disposable income will reduce state residents’ demand for goods and services,
including goods and services produced within the state. This lower
demand for goods and services produced within the state will reduce
jobs and earnings from these employers.
Intuition might suggest that the stimulus from increased program
spending will be completely offset by higher taxes. The increased state
spending and taxes are the same dollar amount; therefore, they might be
assumed to have equally sized but opposite effects on demand.
This intuition is wrong. It overlooks an asymmetry in the first-round
effects of increased spending versus increased taxes. The increased
spending in the first instance directly creates jobs and earnings in
the early childhood programs. In this first round, 100 percent of the
increased state spending affects demand for locally produced goods and
services. This increased spending then goes on to have indirect effects,
as a portion of the state spending is respent by early childhood workers.
In contrast, higher state taxes have no direct effect in reducing jobs
and earnings in the state. The increased taxes reduce after-tax disposable income. Only a portion of the reduction in disposable income is
reflected in reduced demand for locally produced goods and services.
The rest of the reduction in disposable income is reflected in reduced
demand for goods and services produced outside the state, or reduced
savings.
Consider this example. Suppose a state increases taxes by $50,000
to pay for the salary and benefits of one lead pre-K teacher. All of this
$50,000 in increased spending goes to increasing jobs and earnings
in the state. However, of the $50,000 in increased taxes, some of that
$50,000 would have been spent on mail orders from L.L. Bean or trips
to other states. Some of the $50,000 might have been saved. And even
for the portion of the $50,000 that is spent locally, not all of that spending boosts jobs and earnings in the state. For example, reduced spend-
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ing on clothing at local stores, if the clothing is produced outside the
state, would be in large part reflected in reduced production outside
the state. (Of course, there would be some reduction in demand for
the retail services provided by local clothing retailers. Some local jobs
would be lost by clothing salespeople.)
This stimulative effect of an equal-sized increase in government
taxes and spending is well known in economics. It is referred to as
the balanced budget multiplier. The relevance of the balanced budget
multiplier to state government budget decisions has been emphasized
by many economists, including Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz and
President Obama’s first director of the Office of Management and Budget, Peter Orszag (Orszag and Stiglitz 2001).
To estimate the net effects on a state economy of an equal increase
in early childhood program spending and state taxes, I use a wellknown regional econometrics model, the REMI model (Regional Economic Models Inc). These estimated effects are then scaled up or down
depending upon the size of the particular early childhood program.
But this book measures “state economic development” as the
increase in the employment and earnings of the original state residents.
The estimated effects on the demand for labor from the REMI model
need to be translated into effects on the employment and earnings of the
original state residents.
To measure these effects on the employment and earnings of state
residents, I use the same methodology that was used to measure the
effects of business incentives. Both business incentives and increases in
early childhood spending can create jobs in a state economy. I use the
same assumptions as were used in Chapter 3 about what proportion of
those jobs in the short run and the long run will be reflected in higher
labor force participation rates and lower unemployment rates. I use the
same assumptions about how job creation in a state will allow some
state residents to move up to better-paying jobs. And I use the same
assumptions about how these effects change over time because of mortality, or because of state residents moving to other states.
However, spending more money on early childhood programs turns
out to have small “demand effects.” As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the demand effects of increased state spending on early childhood
programs only increase the earnings of state residents by four cents per
dollar of state spending.
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In contrast, a dollar devoted to business incentives is estimated to
increase the earnings of state residents by $3.14. Why this discrepancy
in demand effects?
This discrepancy occurs for two reasons. First, state spending on
early childhood programs must spend 100 percent of a job’s earnings
to directly create that job. In contrast, inducing a job’s creation through
business incentives costs only a portion of the job’s earnings.
Second, the jobs created by state spending on early childhood programs will only continue if state spending is kept at that higher level. If
the spending goes away, so do these jobs. In contrast, the model of business incentives assumes that once a job is attracted by business incentives, that job (although not necessarily that business) will remain in the
local economy. The market demand in the national and world economy
for that business will remain even after the incentive is gone. Maintaining a job through continuous spending is obviously more costly
than permanently inducing a job through a one-time package of tax
incentives.10

MODELING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS,
PART 2: STATE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF INCREASED
LABOR SUPPLY OF PARENTS OR FORMER CHILD
PARTICIPANTS
As discussed in Chapter 2, this book’s definition of state economic
development only includes the increased employment and earnings of
state residents who stay in the state. To measure the state economic
development effects for each early childhood program, I adjust for parents and former child participants who would be expected to die at various ages. I also adjust for what proportion of parents and former child
participants will remain in the state.11 I note, in Chapter 2, the finding
that more people stay in the same state than one might think.
The proportion that stays may vary with features of the local economy, e.g., its size. This issue is explored further in Chapter 9. Local
economic development effects of early childhood programs may vary
in metropolitan areas versus states, and with the size and growth rate of
the metropolitan area.
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From a national perspective, we would include the increased
employment and earnings for parents or former child participants in
early childhood programs who move to other states. Chapter 10 will
consider the national perspective.
We also allow for the possibility that increased labor supply may
cause displacement effects. The increased quantity or quality of labor
supply of parents or former child participants does not directly create
jobs in a state’s economy. The net effect on state residents’ employment
and earnings depends upon how employers respond to this increase in
state labor supply.
As discussed in Chapter 2, I assume one-third displacement effects
of early childhood programs. For every three jobs that parents or former
child participants who remain in the state will hold due to their higher
employment rates, I assume that net jobs in the state go up by two jobs.
The other job displaces some other state resident from employment
and is not counted in my simulations. Similar displacement effects are
assumed for increased earnings due to parents or former child participants getting better jobs. Allowing for displacement effects scales back
the economic development effects of early childhood programs by onethird. I believe that this one-third displacement assumption is reasonably supported by empirical evidence.12 I also note that these assumptions—i.e., scaling back the economic development benefits of early
childhood programs by one-third—are conservative.

DOES THIS ANALYSIS TREAT EARLY CHILDHOOD
PROGRAMS FAIRLY COMPARED TO BUSINESS
INCENTIVES?
Some economic developers don’t believe that multipliers for child
care count. They think multipliers are relevant in other fields—like
manufacturing or construction—but not for a service industry like
child care . . . Some will say that multipliers count for some services
such as banking or education, but not for child care. We believe
that multipliers count for both and that is the approach we’ve taken
in this report [on the economic impact of child care].
—Mildred Warner (2005)
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The educational impact on children has been a primary focus for
many researchers [on the impact of early childhood programs] and
the significance of this long-term benefit is clearly responsible for
the growing interest in universal Pre-Kindergarten. However, the
short-term economic returns that accrue from increased and stable
parental employment . . . as well as the child care industry as a
whole . . . should not be underestimated. Policy makers who face
budget cuts for early care and education or propose new spending
on early childhood services appreciate the research establishing
the short-term returns on the investment. Clearly, early childhood
education generates short- and long-term benefits for children, parents and society and all economic aspects of the field should be
explored to justify the level of investments needed.
—Dana Friedman (2004, p. 3)

This book is not the only attempt to analyze the economic effects of
early childhood programs; many research studies and consulting reports
analyze the economic impact of the child care industry. How do these
estimates compare? Do these alternative studies suggest any issues with
this book’s estimates?
Many of these economic studies of child care have involved two
groups of researchers. One group is associated with the Linking Economic Development and Child Care project at Cornell University, whose
principal investigator is Professor Mildred Warner. A second group is
associated with the Insight Center for Community Economic Development, formerly the National Economic Development and Law Center.
The Web site of the Insight Center lists 12 studies done by the Insight
Center from 2001 to 2008 on the economic impact of child care. These
include the states of California, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, and Ohio, and the cities of Los Angeles
and Washington, DC. The Web site of the Cornell project lists 74 studies done from 1997 to 2008 on the economic impact of child care. These
studies are written by a variety of researchers, including some of those
from the Cornell project as well as the Insight Center. (Thus, there is
some overlap between the two lists.) These include studies for the states
of South Carolina, Alaska, West Virginia, Indiana, Missouri, Oregon,
Iowa, Louisiana, Virginia, Colorado, South Dakota, Washington, North
Dakota, Connecticut, Arizona, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Texas, Florida,
New York, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont, as well as for the cities
of Buffalo, San Francisco, New York, and Memphis.
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Many studies come up with much larger estimates of the spending
impacts and parental labor supply impacts of early childhood programs
than I do in this book. For example, one study estimates that spending
on the child care industry increases employment by 2.0 percent. In addition, the employment and earnings associated with parents who are freed
up by child care to work amounts to 11 percent of total employment and
12 percent of total earnings (M Cubed Consulting Group 2002). These
are immediate impacts, not long-run impacts. In contrast, my estimates
of spending and parental labor supply effects are much lower. Consider my estimates of the spending and parental labor supply effects of
the Abecedarian program, which is a full-time and full-year child care
program. The immediate spending impact of a full-scale implementation of the Abecedarian program is to provide job creation and earnings
benefits equivalent to 0.02 percent of a state’s employment or earnings.
This spending impact increases over a four-year period to a maximum
of 0.07 percent of employment and 0.10 percent of earnings, before
declining toward zero. The immediate parental labor supply impact of
a full-scale implementation of the Abecedarian program is to provide
job creation benefits and earnings creation benefits of 0.05 percent of
state employment and 0.02 percent of state earnings. Eventually these
parental labor supply effects become much larger. These parental labor
supply benefits increase steadily over time to their long-run values of
1.1 percent of state employment and 1.4 percent of state earnings. (Figures are calculations by the author, from this book’s simulation model.)
These different impact estimates are obviously important to evaluating the social benefits from early childhood programs. In particular,
the size of the immediate benefits may be extremely important to political support for early childhood programs. As Dana Friedman points out
in the second quotation given above, “Policymakers . . . appreciate the
research establishing the short-term returns . . . ”
Therefore, an important question is, which estimate of short-term
effects is right? Have I missed something in evaluating the economic
development benefits of early childhood programs? Is my methodology
somehow biased against early childhood programs? Mildred Warner in
the first quotation above criticizes researchers who count multipliers
for business incentives but not for early childhood programs. Is that the
problem here?

The Economic Development Effects of Early Childhood Programs 107

The short answer is no. I use a consistent methodology for counting the economic development benefits of business incentives and early
childhood programs. I do count multipliers for the spending effects of
early childhood programs, just as I do for those of business incentives.
Why, then, are the impact estimates in this book, versus this large
body of studies, so much smaller? I believe there are three reasons for
these differences in estimates. First, there are different definitions of
“economic impacts.” Second, there are differences in the size of the
“program” being studied. Third, there are differences in the “counterfactual” used to define impacts.
On the first point, I use a more narrow definition of economic development benefits than is used by these child care studies. I use this definition consistently for estimating both business incentive effects and
early childhood program effects. However, this measure does yield
smaller numbers.
Specifically, as discussed in Chapter 2, this book focuses on increases in the employment rate and earnings per person of state residents who remain in the state. I do not include increases in state employment and earnings that are associated with in-migration. As explained
in Chapter 2, this measure does focus consistently on measuring the
benefits from economic development that accrue to specific individuals.
Growth in a state or local economy is not a benefit in and of itself. It is
only a benefit to the extent that such growth enhances the well-being of
specific individuals.
In contrast, the economic impact studies of child care include all
increases in jobs and earnings of state residents. This definition of economic impact includes job growth and earnings growth that do not provide benefits to any individual. For example, this definition includes
benefits that accrue to in-migrants who could have found similar jobs
and earnings elsewhere.
In my opinion, the child care studies’ definition of economic impact
is inferior to my definition. However, the child care studies’ definition
is similar to the definitions of economic impact used by some state and
local economic developers. As discussed in Chapter 2, some state and
local economic developers often focus on overall local growth. Who is
actually benefiting from that growth is not a focus.
On the second point, the early childhood programs I am considering are smaller than the overall child care industry. Smaller programs
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will have smaller impacts. For example, the most expensive program I
consider, the Abecedarian program, is at full scale assumed to have the
participation of 15 percent of U.S. children under the age of five. For
the child care industry, about 35 percent of U.S. children under the age
of five are in child care delivered by some “nonrelative” (Johnson 2005,
Table 1).
On the third point, my estimates of economic development effects
are compared to a different counterfactual world than these child care
studies. Any impact statement implicitly compares two hypothetical
worlds. I believe my comparisons are more relevant to real world policy
alternatives. However, the child care studies might be more politically
useful for dramatizing the importance of child care.
In my estimates, I am comparing a world with a particular early
childhood program to a counterfactual world without the early childhood program. This includes the effects due to financing the program.
Thus, I include all the multiplier effects of the spending on the early
childhood program. But I also include all the multiplier effects of the
increased taxes.13
In addition, in this book the parental labor supply effects are calculated based on the effects of free child care, compared to the labor supply in some counterfactual world where child care prices are unchanged.
Also, the parental labor supply effects add in other effects of the program on parental labor supply due to mentoring effects or educational
attainment effects. Again, these effects are measured by comparing
what happens in a world with the program compared to a world without
the program. These effects on parental labor supply will provide extra
labor market experience, which will over time increase employment
rates and earnings.
What is the counterfactual in these child care studies? This counterfactual is usually not explicitly stated. However, we can imagine some
counterfactuals that would yield impact estimates similar to the numbers produced by these studies.
For example, consider spending impact estimates based on the
size of the child care sector, plus its multiplier effects on suppliers and
local retailers. These impact estimates would be relevant if all current
child care was externally financed by someone outside the state or local
economy, for example the federal government. The impact estimates
answer the question, “What would a state’s economy be like in a world
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in which all child care was financed by the federal government, compared to a world in which there is no government financing for child
care?” Neither world is the world in which we live or are likely to live.
Therefore, these gross comparisons of child care spending impacts,
with multipliers, do not seem relevant to any real world policy change.
However, comparisons of worlds in which there is a little more or
a little less federal government financing for child care may encompass worlds we might live in. They answer the policy-relevant question, “What are the economic benefits to a state of getting a little more
federal financing of child care?”
Even so, these spending comparisons do not answer the question of
how the world would differ if we expanded child care using increased
state taxes. Therefore, the spending impact estimates of the child care
sector do not tell us much about how a state or local government on its
own can positively affect its economy through spending more on child
care.14
On parental labor supply, some of the child care impact studies estimate the economic impact of eliminating all parental earnings associated with child care. Some studies only include eliminating one parent’s earnings per household (under the implicit assumption that child
care frees up only one parent to work). Other studies include earnings
of both parents in households that use child care. Some studies then
go on to calculate multiplier effects, as these lower parental earnings
reduce demand for other local industries (e.g., M Cubed Consulting
Group 2002).
Such parental labor supply impact estimates could be interpreted as
a comparison of the world we live in to a world in which all nonparental
child care is made illegal. If somehow this occurred, one parent might
drop out of the labor force. The disappearance of this parent’s earnings
would then have multiplier effects on the local economy.
This comparison is perhaps useful as a thought experiment for dramatizing the crucial nature of the “child care industry.” A sizable chunk
of the economy does depend upon our permitting nonrelative care of
children.
However, I do not think that this comparison is relevant to any
policies that might be feasibly considered. Outlawing paid child care,
let alone nonparental child care, has no political feasibility. Furthermore, even if such a law were somehow passed, it would be difficult to
enforce.
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Therefore, I would argue that my spending impact estimates and
parental labor supply estimates are more relevant to real world policy.
My estimates do correspond to the economic development benefits for
a state of implementing at full scale some early childhood programs.
These benefits for individuals who live in and stay in the state can be
compared with the costs of the state’s paying for these programs.
The modest short-run benefits from early childhood programs may
make these programs less politically attractive to policymakers interested in short-run returns. Chapter 7 will consider how to deal with this
problem.

CONCLUSION
The best estimates suggest that high-quality early childhood programs can provide a state’s residents with substantial economic development benefits. These economic development benefits are of similar
magnitude to the benefits of high-quality business incentive programs.
Early childhood programs have particularly strong benefits in the long
run.
I now turn in the next chapter to exploring what designs work best
for early childhood programs and business incentive programs. Subsequent chapters explore the implications of uncertainty about these estimated effects, as well as other issues related to these estimates.

Notes
1. The reports on which this book is based also included estimates for the ParentChild Home Program, a home visitation program. However, these estimates were
largely derived from one study. I have been persuaded by an anonymous reviewer
of this book that this evidence base is too scanty to put much weight on the results
for PCHP.
2. Present value is calculated using a real discount rate of 3 percent. Chapter 7 considers alternative discount rates.
3. In present value, expressed in 2007 dollars. As mentioned in a previous chapter,
all dollar figures in this book, unless otherwise noted, are in 2007 dollars. Present
value calculations use a 3 percent social discount rate.
4. Appendix 4B provides more detail. This detail includes a description of the statis-
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5.

6.

7.
8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

tical significance of the various point estimates used. As mentioned previously, all
appendices are available on-line from the Upjohn Institute.
I update their cost estimates to 2007 dollars, and I also allow for costs to increase
by 1.2 percent per year from 2004 until the original start year of 2009. This 1.2
percent allows for real wage increases over time. These same start-year costs were
retained when the start year was changed to 2011. I also modified their adjustment
for offsets by assuming that all universal pre-K participants who previously participated in other public pre-K programs had the same average costs; Karoly and
Bigelow implicitly assumed that some had zero costs.
Gault et al. (2008) suggest that lower costs are needed for a high-quality program.
According to them, a similar three-hour-per-day school year program and a lead
teacher paid public school wages costs $4,071 per year per child at a class size of
20-to-2, $4,506 per year per child at a class size of 17-to-2, and $4,893 per year
per child at a class size of 15-to-2. These figures are current figures and might
increase somewhat by the assumed start-up date of this universal pre-K program
of 2011. In any event, it seems that the gross costs assumed in this book are easily
more than enough to pay for a high-quality program. Even if program offsets from
other programs are not as forthcoming as are assumed in this analysis, the net costs
assumed in this book should be able to pay for a high-quality program.
These are the author’s calculations using data from the Current Population Survey
for March of 2004.
In this case, positive synergistic effects mean that the school-year services differentially increase the success of participants in the Abecedarian preschool program
versus nonparticipants. This may take place if the Abecedarian services help children become better able to benefit from the school services. On the other hand, the
school services may be differentially targeted at children who are behind, which
may differentially help children who do not participate in Abecedarian preschool
services. This would be a negative synergistic effect. Finally, it is possible that the
school services equally help both participants and nonparticipants in Abecedarian
preschool services.
Their calculations also assume about a 75 percent take-up rate for the program
among families with eligible children.
This assumption is backed up by evidence that shocks to levels of local employment have very persistent effects. For evidence, see models estimated by
Blanchard and Katz (1992) or Bartik (1991b). In other words, local employment
can be thought of as following a random walk. One way to think about this is to
note that the business that has been incentivized will eventually decline or leave.
But in the meantime, the agglomeration economies associated with that business
will have attracted other export-based jobs, beyond those predicted by multiplier
effects on local suppliers and retailers. The negative effects of the gradual disappearance of the jobs in incentivized businesses are offset by the positive effects of
the agglomeration economies that occur before those jobs disappear.
The details on these predictions are in Appendix 4B.
Appendix 2B provides the evidence to back up that claim.
Such effects are also implicitly included in the calculations for the business incen-
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tive program. In Chapter 3, I am implicitly assuming no net demand effects, positive or negative, from the business incentive program. This requires that the business incentive program either be financed by increased average business tax rates,
or that the business incentive program be composed of some mix of tax incentives
with customized business services. Alternatives to these assumptions are considered in Chapter 5. In any event, the net demand effects of business incentive
programs in the baseline of Chapter 3 are assumed to be zero. The balanced budget multiplier demand effects of more spending on early childhood programs are
assumed to be positive.
14. This is true also of child care spending impact estimates that use Type I multipliers, which exclude household respending effects, rather than Type II multipliers,
which include such respending effects. (Warner and Liu [2006] present some estimates that distinguish between these two impact estimation approaches.) There
is no reason for the elimination of household respending effects to necessarily
have the same effect as the negative impact of households financing the program
through increased taxes.

5
Design Matters
What Features of Business Incentive
Programs and Early Childhood Programs
Affect Their Economic Development Benefits?
The preceding chapters have argued that business incentive programs and early childhood programs can provide large economic development benefits, if these programs are high-quality programs. But what
constitutes quality in these programs? What program designs are most
effective?
This chapter discusses in turn some key features of, first, business
incentive programs and, second, early childhood programs that affect
their economic development benefits. Program design’s effects on economic development benefits turn out to be large.

BUSINESS INCENTIVES
Chapter 3 estimates that each dollar invested in business incentives
increases the present value of the earnings of state residents by $3.14.
In this book’s terminology, that means that, per dollar of costs, the “economic development benefits” for state residents are $3.14. This return
on business incentives depends upon particular assumptions about the
features of a business incentive program. These economic development
benefits might be altered up or down by changes in these features. The
economic development benefits of business incentives are principally
altered by three features: 1) how the incentives are financed, 2) which
businesses the incentives target, and 3) how the incentives are designed.
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Incentive Financing
I conclude with a two pronged warning about why we can’t keep
giving money away in wasteful corporate subsidies. We have far
more urgent needs to spend our money on to really create good
jobs. Instead of steering so much money into private deals that are
unaccountable and ineffective, we need to get back to basics and
invest in public goods, especially our skilled labor base and our
infrastructure.
—Greg LeRoy (2005, p. 197)
The fact that public spending can stimulate the economy more than
tax cuts should come as no surprise. After all, when taxes are cut,
part of the forgone tax revenue will not be spent locally—some of
it will be saved, some will be spent out of state, and some will be
taxed by other jurisdictions. But when taxes are raised in order to
increase public services, the additional spending is typically done
locally.
—Robert Lynch (2004, p. 46)

In Chapter 3, I estimated the economic development benefits of
business incentives, under certain assumptions. One assumption was
that the incentives were financed without negative effects on demand
for goods and services in the regional economy. I also assumed that the
incentives were financed without negative effects on the quality of public services. Reduced quality of public services might negatively affect
business location and expansion. As Greg LeRoy argues in the above
quotation, local job creation depends upon the quality of an area’s labor
force and infrastructure.
Suppose instead that business incentives are financed by increases
in household taxes. This will negatively affect local demand for goods
and services because it reduces the after-tax income of local households. The incentives transfer resources from local households to the
owners of firms. Because many of these owners live out of state, the
increased income of owners will have little impact on local demand.
I estimate that household tax financing of business incentives will
reduce the present value of the earnings increase for state residents, per
dollar of resources devoted to business incentives, from $3.14 to $3.07.
This estimate is based on simulations using a well-respected regional
econometric model, the REMI model.1
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Suppose instead that the business incentives are financed by cuts in
public services. Suppose initially that the public services cuts are not
valued by businesses, and hence play no role in altering business location decisions. But this public spending cut will still reduce demand for
local goods and services. Based on the REMI model, this cut in public
spending will reduce the state economic development benefits of business incentives, per dollar of resources devoted to business incentives,
from $3.14 to $3.03.2
The negative demand effect of lowering public spending is greater
in magnitude than the negative demand effect of increasing household
taxes. Why is this so? The public spending cut has a direct effect on
reducing the demand for local goods and services and reducing local
jobs. The tax increase on households only has indirect effects on reducing demand for local goods and services. A portion of the reduction in
after-tax household income will be reflected in lower spending on local
goods and services. But some portion of the reduced after-tax income
will lead to household adjustments that do not lower spending on local
goods and services. For example, as Robert Lynch points out in the
above quotation, households may reduce savings, or purchases from
on-line retailers, or out-of-state travel and tourism. In addition, only a
portion of the lower spending on local goods and services affects local
jobs, as only a portion of the value of local goods and services is produced locally using local workers. Because public spending cuts have
a 100 percent effect on local jobs in the first instance, and tax increases
only have a partial effect, financing a business incentive program
through public spending cuts has larger effects on reducing the net benefits of the business incentive program.
These negative demand effects of incentive financing are modest.
Why are demand effects small relative to incentives’ other effects? A
permanent business incentive program creates new jobs each year. This
annual job creation will tend to be of similar magnitude over time. As a
result, the state’s job level will continually change. But demand effects
of incentive financing have mostly a once-and-for-all effect on reducing
the level of jobs in the state economy.3
The modest negative demand effects of incentive financing are not
generalizable to across-the-board business tax cuts. Across-the-board
business tax cuts lose much more revenue in the short run than business
incentives. Business incentives are cheaper to finance because they tar-
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get business tax breaks (or customized business services) at businesses
making new business investment decisions. According to a study I did
with my colleagues George Erickcek, Wei-Jang Huang, and Brad Watts
(2006), negative demand effects are much more important in analyzing
across-the-board business tax cuts. In the case we examined, financing
a general business tax cut through increased household taxes reduced
the tax cut’s effects by about one-fourth over a 10-year period. Financing a general business tax cut through cuts in public spending reduced
the tax cut’s effects by almost one-half over a 10-year period. These
larger negative demand effects occur because of the larger revenue loss
due to general business tax cuts.
Cuts in public services could have an additional negative effect on
economic development if these public services are valued by business.
For public services valued by business, a cut in the quality of these
public services may negatively affect business location and expansion
decisions.
Some studies suggest that cuts in business taxes, if financed by
cuts in some public services, may actually have a net negative effect
on a state’s economic development. Helms (1985) estimates that a tax
cut, if financed by cuts in any type of public spending except welfare
spending, would negatively affect a state’s personal income. Munnell
(1990) estimates that tax cuts that cut public capital spending would
negatively affect the growth of state private employment. And in Bartik
(1989), I estimate that business tax cuts, if financed by cuts in local
school spending or fire protection spending, would negatively affect a
state’s rate of small business starts. I also estimate that cuts in property
taxes, if financed by cuts in spending on higher education or health care,
would negatively affect a state’s manufacturing output (Bartik 1999).
Bania and Stone (2007) estimate that a cut in taxes, financed by cuts in
what they call “productive services and infrastructure” (e.g., education,
roads, and public safety), will reduce per capita income growth in all
but the four highest-tax states.4
How can a business incentive program avoid negative effects on
public services? One way to avoid hurting public services is to impose
a budget constraint on the annual dollar volume of business incentives.
The amount of resources to be devoted to business incentives can then
be part of an overall plan that avoids some of these negative financing
effects. Without a plan for financing business incentives within a budget
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constraint, it is easy for business incentive programs to expand over
time and thus threaten the state and local tax base that supports public
services.
One possible plan would impose an overall revenue goal for net
business tax revenue, after accounting for business incentives. This plan
would require that an increase in business incentives be financed by
offsetting increases in business tax revenue. These offsetting increases
in business taxes would be designed to avoid negative effects on business location decisions. For example, special tax breaks for non-exportbased businesses may be eliminated without adverse consequences for
overall business activity. As another example, increases in average corporate tax rates and investment tax credits may raise offsetting revenue
while having a neutral effect on business location decisions.
For such plans to be workable, it must be possible to impose a
meaningful budget constraint on the annual dollar volume of business
incentives. This can be readily done for business incentives that are
customized public services to business.
It is more difficult to impose an annual budget constraint on business incentives that are special tax breaks. It is politically difficult for
policymakers to deny business tax incentives to any business that meets
the eligibility criteria. Therefore, in practice, nominally “discretionary”
business tax incentives become “entitlement” tax breaks, which will
go to any business that meets the eligibility criteria. “Discretionary”
business tax incentives end up being quite similar to tax breaks that are
written into the law and are legal entitlements to eligible businesses.
If discretionary business tax incentives in practice are equivalent
to entitlement tax breaks, is there any reason not to incorporate such
“discretionary” incentives into the tax code? Incorporating discretionary incentives into the tax code avoids any illusion that such incentives
will be withheld from eligible businesses. The legislative authorization
of business tax breaks as part of the tax code may be more likely to raise
issues of the appropriate balance of business taxes versus household
taxes, or of lower taxes versus higher public spending.
However, business tax breaks to promote economic development
will yield greater economic development benefits if targeted at particular categories of eligible businesses. As will be discussed below,
we would want to target such business tax breaks at investment and
employment expansion decisions by businesses that are “export-based”
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and pay a higher wage premium. This targeting can readily be done
with discretionary business incentives. It can also be done as part of the
business tax code. However, such targeting as part of the business tax
code requires that the legislative process be willing to prioritize economic development benefits. Political pressures from other businesses
for “fairness” may discourage such targeting.
Even if business tax incentives for economic development are
incorporated into the tax code, business incentives that are public services cannot be made entitlements. For example, the customized job
training program that meets the needs of one business will not meet the
needs of some other business. Such services must be customized and to
a large extent discretionary.
In accounting for business incentive costs, it is important to be
moderate in estimating any possible revenue offsets to such incentives. Economic developers sometimes talk as if tax incentives have no
costs. Their argument is that if the tax incentive is decisive in tipping
the business location decision, then there is no forgone revenue from
the incentive, as otherwise the business would not be there. But this
ignores the estimate, discussed in Chapter 3, that incentives are decisive
in only 4 percent of the cases in which they are awarded. Therefore,
business incentives have net costs, because of the many cases in which
they reward businesses that would have located in the local economy
without the incentive. Plausible estimates indicate that typical business
incentives are unlikely to have more than 20 percent of their net costs
offset by fiscal benefits (Bartik 2005).5
Business tax incentives are one type of “tax expenditure.” Tax
expenditures are provisions in the laws that reduce revenue compared
to some “normal” tax code. These tax expenditures are usually undertaken for some particular purpose; for example, business tax incentives
are intended to promote economic development. For a business incentive program to be financed with minimum negative effects on public
services, business incentives’ costs must be budgeted for realistically
and must be discussed in the context of the overall state and local budget. This requires that this type of tax expenditure, along with other tax
expenditures, be regularly reviewed. If the costs are excessive relative
to the benefits, business incentives and other tax expenditures should
be curtailed.
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States are increasingly taking account of tax expenditures. For
example, 33 states now have some reasonably complete reports on tax
expenditures (Corporation for Enterprise Development 2007). However, these tax expenditures are in many cases not subject to the same
intensity of legislative and executive review as are spending programs.
Incentive Targeting
Business incentives will also be more effective if targeted at businesses that will yield greater economic development benefits for state
residents. Three factors are particularly important in determining the
economic development benefits from a particular business: 1) the wage
premium of the growth generated, 2) the multiplier effect of the created
jobs, and 3) whether the business is an export-based business.
As discussed in Chapter 2, different industries and businesses do
not always pay the same wage for the same quality of labor. Some businesses choose to pay relatively high wages compared to the educational
and other credentials of the workers hired. Paying higher wages reduces the time and money costs of hiring good workers, reduces worker
turnover, and encourages high worker productivity. Other businesses
choose to pay relatively low wages compared to worker credentials.
This saves on wage costs, but may increase hiring and turnover costs
and decrease productivity. These positive and negative wage premiums
relative to worker credentials vary systematically across industries.
Some industries pay higher wages than others for the same worker credentials. Within industries, different firms may follow different wage
strategies (Groshen 1991).
The calculations of Chapter 3 assumed that, on average, the jobs
attracted by business incentives pay no positive or negative wage premium relative to the local economy’s regular wage standards. The jobs
attracted by business incentives include the jobs directly induced by the
business incentives. It also includes the job growth due to the multiplier
effect. The estimate that a dollar of business incentives increases the
present value of state earnings by $3.14 assumes that the growth will
increase state employment rates and allow some state residents to move
up to better paying jobs. But it does not assume further effects due to
increasing or reducing state wage standards.
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Estimates indicate that if local employment growth has a positive or
negative wage premium relative to the area’s wage standards, this will
have some positive or negative effects on local earnings. Some of these
positive or negative effects are direct effects of the newly created jobs
paying more or less. But the wages paid by new jobs may have spillover
effects on wage standards for existing jobs. In addition, higher or lower
wages may encourage or discourage additional labor supply of local
workers. The estimates suggest that for each extra dollar in wages due
to new jobs paying higher wage premiums, total earnings in the local
area go up about $2.84 (Bartik 1993b).6
Based on these estimates, the economic development benefits of
business incentives vary greatly depending on the wage premiums in
the newly created jobs. If the new jobs pay a 10 percent wage premium
compared to prevailing wages in the state economy, the effect on the
present value of state residents’ earnings, per dollar invested in business incentives, increases from 3.14 to 4.03, an increase of almost onethird. Of course, this effect also goes in reverse. If the new jobs pay 10
percent less, controlling for worker credentials, compared to what jobs
customarily pay in the state economy, then the economic development
benefits per dollar spent decrease from 3.14 to 2.25.7
I emphasize that these calculations are based on the wage premiums
for all the jobs created. This includes jobs created through the multiplier
effect. If most of these jobs are in service industries rather than supplier
industries, these jobs may tend to pay relatively low wages. Therefore,
the average wage premium in the jobs directly attracted by the business
incentives may not represent the average wage premium for all jobs
created as a result of the business incentives.
Calculating the wage premium in all newly created jobs requires a
regional econometric model or input-output model that can determine
the likely industry composition of the newly created jobs. In addition,
the wage practices of the firms that are attracted may differ from industry standards. These firm-specific wage premiums should also be taken
into account.8
The economic development benefits from business incentives also
will be affected by the magnitude of multiplier effects. The calculations
of Chapter 3 assume a healthy multiplier of 1.8. Lower or higher multipliers, all other factors being equal, will proportionately raise or lower
these economic development benefits. For example, if the multiplier
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effect is only 1.4, which would not be unusually low, then the present value of earnings effects, per dollar devoted to business incentives,
would decline from 3.14 to 2.44.9
Multiplier effects will vary with the types of jobs created and the
nature of the local economy. Multiplier effects depend in part on the
likely density of local supplier links. If an attracted business uses more
local suppliers, multiplier effects will be greater. Multiplier effects also
depend on demand effects on local retailers. Demand effects on local
retailers will tend to be greater if the direct jobs and supplier jobs pay
more wages, either because of greater worker skills or because of greater
wage premiums. Estimating the magnitude of these multiplier effects
also requires a good regional econometric model or input-output model.
The economic development benefits from business incentives will
be affected by whether the direct jobs attracted are export-based jobs.
The calculations of Chapter 3 assumed that 100 percent of the businesses
targeted by business incentives are export-based businesses. If some
percentage of the targeted businesses are not export-based businesses,
then even if any such businesses are induced to locate or expand by the
incentives, their location or expansion will reduce jobs in competing
businesses. For example, consider the provision of business incentives
to restaurants. Even if a business incentive successfully induces a new
restaurant to open or an existing restaurant to expand, these “induced”
new restaurant jobs will reduce jobs in other local restaurants. There is
no reason to think that business incentives will magically increase local
demand for restaurants. Therefore, the increased sales at the restaurants
associated with the business incentives will reduce sales at other local
restaurants.
For this reason, the expected economic development benefits from
business incentives should be reduced proportionately by the percentage of targeted businesses that are not export-based businesses. For
example, if 50 percent of targeted businesses are not export-based businesses, the present value of expected earnings benefits, per dollar of
resources devoted to business incentives, will be reduced from 3.14 to
1.57. Benefits are halved.10
Focusing on export-based businesses with reasonably large multipliers and reasonable wage premiums is conventional wisdom in the
economic development profession. However, this focus is not always
successfully practiced. Two major types of business incentives are

122 Bartik

subsidies for sports teams and subsidies for retail businesses. In most
cases, such subsidies violate these principles for what types of businesses should be targeted by business incentive programs.
One significant type of business incentive is a subsidy for sports
teams and sports stadiums. The average subsidy from a host city to
a typical major league sports team now exceeds $10 million per year
(Noll and Zimbalist 1997, p. 494). In the case of sports stadiums, only a
portion of the revenue gained will generate new jobs for state residents,
for several reasons. First, many of the fans attending the games are
local residents who would have otherwise spent their money on some
other in-state activity. Second, much of the revenue from professional
sports goes to athletes, who largely spend their money outside the state.
On the other hand, the sports stadiums may attract outside visitors who
otherwise would not have visited, and who spend money in the state
on activities other than the sports themselves. However, this additional
spending does not make up for the displacement of other local spending
and the flow of revenue to nonstate residents (Blair and Swindell 1997).
In addition, most sports-related visitor spending supports relatively
low-wage employees working concessions or working in local hotels.
The resulting multiplier effects are likely to be modest. In addition, the
low wages will tend to lower local wage standards.
Another significant type of economic development subsidy is subsidizing retail businesses. For example, subsidies are frequently awarded
to such “destination retailers” as the outdoors outfitter Cabela’s. Such
subsidies are more common in the 31 states in which local governments are to some extent financed by local sales taxes (Cline and Neubig 1999). Local governments in these states often engage in incentive
wars to attract retailers, in order to raise their local sales tax base. For
example, I know from personal conversations with economic developers and local news media that such incentive wars over retail businesses
are common in Alabama and Arizona.
Even in the case of “big box” retailers or specialty retailers that
offer some unique product or pricing, most of the new sales for such
subsidized retailers will come from state residents who would otherwise have spent money at some other retailer in the state. Therefore,
a sizable portion of the new jobs at the subsidized retailers are offset
by displacement of jobs at other state retailers who lose sales. Furthermore, the new jobs at retailers frequently pay low wages. This reduces
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the size of the multiplier effect of any new retail jobs that are directly
created from attracting out-of-state spending, as the new employees’
increased expenditures on state consumer goods are necessarily modest. The low wages may also lower local wage standards.
Poor targeting can dramatically alter the effectiveness of business
incentives. Consider the following targeting: Only 30 percent of the
assisted business’s activity is assumed to be export-based. In addition,
I assume a lower multiplier of 1.5. Finally, I assume that the newly
created jobs pay 10 percent less relative to worker credentials than is
typical for that state’s economy. All of these assumptions seem quite
plausible for many sports stadium projects or big box retailers.
Under these assumptions, business incentives provided to retailers
or sports teams will only generate $0.57 in present value earnings for
state residents per dollar of costs. Under the baseline assumptions, business incentives provided to high-paying export-based firms generated
$3.14 in present value earnings for state residents per dollar of costs.
The 30 percent export-based assumption means that even if the new
business activity is induced by the subsidy, only 30 percent of this new
activity is truly net new activity to the state. As a result, the effectiveness of the subsidy is decreased by 70 percent. The lower multiplier of
1.5 versus 1.8 further decreases the effectiveness of the subsidy in creating jobs by another 17 percent. Finally, the 10 percent below normal
wage premium further reduces the benefits by another 28 percent.11
Incentive Delivery Approaches
In this era of heightened capital mobility, investments in skills and
infrastructure are especially wise because, unlike a call center or
a widget plant, they don’t up and run away. If a business fails or
moves, at least the taxpayers in the area retain the value of their
past investments: the dislocated workers will take their skills to
new jobs, and the infrastructure will still be there, helping other
businesses.
—Greg LeRoy (2005, p. 198)

The economic development benefits of business incentive programs
will also depend on how the program’s assistance is delivered. Three
aspects of program delivery are particularly important: 1) the timing
of assistance, 2) whether the program’s assistance is cash or in-kind
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services, and 3) whether and how the program seeks to shape the hiring
practices of assisted businesses.
To summarize the importance of the timing of incentives: business
incentive programs may yield greater benefits if the assistance is provided up-front. However, up-front assistance must try to recover the
public’s investment from assisted businesses that do not fulfill their job
creation commitments. The details of why up-front assistance makes
sense and how to design such up-front assistance follow.
The estimated effectiveness of the business incentives in the baseline simulation in Chapter 3 relies on the assumption that the incentives
are paid out over a 10-year period. This reflects customary practice.
Business incentives are paid out over a number of years in part because
this allows some costs to be postponed, which is politically preferable. In addition, this allows incentives to be credited against tax payments rather than paid out explicitly in cash. Finally, postponing some
payments lessens potential problems caused by a business’s receiving
incentives but then leaving after a few years. If a business leaves, state
and local economic developers would like if possible to “claw back”
all or part of the incentive given to induce the location decision. This
is often done through legal clawback agreements (Weber 2002, 2007).
Most local governments report that they always require such clawback
agreements (Bartik 2004a). However, such agreements can sometimes
be difficult to enforce. But if part of the incentive has only been agreed
to and not yet paid, then there is no problem in not paying the remaining
part of the incentive if the business leaves town.
However, we know that businesses apply relatively high real discount rates to future flows of profits in making corporate decisions.
Pressures from the stock market for short-run profits lead to an exaggerated focus on the short run. Studies suggest that the real discount
rate used by corporate executives in making decisions averages about
12 percent per year (Poterba and Summers 1995). A 12 percent real
discount rate implies, for example, that even without inflation, a dollar
of profits 10 years from now is equivalent to only 32 cents today. In
contrast, the suggested real discount rate for government investment
decisions (the social discount rate) is 3 percent per year. (Chapter 7 will
discuss the social discount rate issue in more detail.) At a 3 percent real
discount rate, a dollar of inflation-adjusted profits 10 years from now
is equivalent to 74 cents today. The discrepancy between corporate and

Design Matters 125

social discount rates means that the government can affect corporate
location decisions more, at the same present value from the public’s
perspective, by paying a higher proportion of business incentives upfront. For example, rather than providing one dollar of incentives 10
years from now, providing incentives between 32 cents and 74 cents
immediately will affect corporate location decisions more, at lower
present value costs to the taxpayer.
Paying more of the incentives up-front has a downside. Up-front
incentives make more acute the issue of whether the incentives can be
recovered if the business leaves the area. One way to make up-front
incentives more recoverable is to pay more of them in the form of
worker training, or infrastructure such as access road improvements
and utility provision (e.g., this was suggested in Bartik [2005], as well
as in the quotation given above from LeRoy [2005], p. 198). This
assistance is valuable to firms but is largely recoverable if the business
leaves. If the business leaves, the access roads and utility infrastructure
will remain, and most of the trained workers will probably stay. This
physical capital and human capital will help the area attract a replacement business. In addition, providing incentives through services
spending also provides an immediate boost to the local economy. The
stimulating effects on local labor demand of hiring workers to provide
the training or build the infrastructure will exceed the depressing effects
of the added taxes to pay for the training and infrastructure.
Resimulating the model with these up-front, in-kind incentives
results in greater economic development benefits. Up-front economic
development services increase the present value of state residents’ earnings, per dollar of present value costs, by $4.47. This compares to $3.14
under the baseline assumptions. Of that $4.47, $4.36 occurs because
these up-front incentives are more cost-effective in creating jobs. The
other $0.11 is due to the economic stimulus of spending government
money on job training and infrastructure.
Suppose that the timing of business incentives is held constant.
Cash assistance such as tax incentives, and in-kind services such as
customized job training, can both be delivered up-front. But the in-kind
services may still be more productive than tax incentives if the services reduce business costs by more than $1 per dollar of government
spending.
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Many studies suggest that economic development services can be
effective.12 However, only two studies allow a comparison of their jobcreating effects versus tax incentives.
My colleague Kevin Hollenbeck studied a customized job training program for incumbent workers in Massachusetts (Hollenbeck
2008). This program provided competitive grants to Massachusetts for
incumbent worker training. The typical training grant had a government cost of about $1,300 per worker, with a matching contribution
by the business. Training on average lasted 18 months. Two-thirds of
assisted businesses were in manufacturing. One-third of assisted businesses had fewer than 50 employees, and seven-eighths had fewer than
500 employees.
Hollenbeck analyzed survey data that asked the businesses about
the training’s impact. Economists are wary of self-reported impacts.
However, it is unclear why businesses would have a strong incentive to
lie about these impacts. In many cases, businesses seemed quite willing
to report that these training grants had no impact on job creation.
About 30 percent of the businesses reported that they hired new
workers as a result of the training grants. Among the 30 percent of firms
affected, an average of 12 workers were hired as a result of the training
grant. About 20 percent of businesses reported that the training prevented layoffs. Among the 20 percent of firms affected, the average
number of layoffs reported to have been prevented was 12.
To analyze job creation effects per training dollar, Hollenbeck
counted only the reported new hires or prevented layoffs in exportbased businesses. The created jobs were assumed to have a multiplier
effect of 2 on jobs in Massachusetts. Based on these calculations, this
customized job training grant program cost about $9,000 per job created. This is only 6 percent, or one-sixteenth, of the cost of creating jobs
through tax incentives.
Taken at face value, these estimates imply that a dollar invested
in the Massachusetts customized job training grant program would
increase the present value of state residents’ earnings by over $50. This
estimate could be scaled back in various ways. We could only count
jobs added, not averted job layoffs. We could assume a lower multiplier. We could assume that businesses may exaggerate the impact of
the training grants. However, even with these adjustments, it still seems
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plausible that customized job training is more cost-effective in creating
jobs than tax incentives.
Hoyt, Jepsen, and Troske (2008) compare the effects of customized
training incentives versus tax incentives in Kentucky counties. This
study relies on statistical analysis of the correlation of these incentives
with county employment growth. They find that customized training
incentives have roughly 10 times the job-creating impact of tax incentives. This is consistent with Hollenbeck’s results.
Other economic development services also seem to be effective in
altering business behavior:
• A random assignment experiment analyzed the effects of entrepreneurial training for unemployed workers who expressed an
interest in starting their own businesses. Forty-nine percent of
the group receiving entrepreneurial training successfully started
their own businesses, compared to 28 percent of the control
group (Benus, Wood, and Grover 1994).13 It is not easy to know
how to translate these results into labor market effects. However,
this study suggests the potential for help to entrepreneurs to be
cost-effective.
• Several studies of manufacturing extension services suggest these
programs can increase business productivity (Jarmin 1999). For
example, the Industrial Resource Center program in Pennsylvania is estimated to increase annual productivity growth in assisted
firms by 3.6–5.0 percent, compared to growth in similar but unassisted firms (Oldsman and Russell 1999). Other estimates suggest that these programs lower business costs by $3 per dollar
of program costs (Michigan Manufacturing Technology Center
2008).14
Determining the jobs impact of manufacturing extension is complicated. On the one hand, helping firms to improve productivity may
cost jobs, holding output constant. On the other hand, helping firms to
be more competitive may expand output and jobs. A careful analysis
is done in a study by Ehlen (2001). This study suggests that manufacturing extension, compared to business tax incentives, is about nine
times more cost-effective in creating jobs. This implies that per dollar
invested, manufacturing extension produces state economic development benefits of over $28.15
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The economic development benefits of business incentives can
also be increased by increasing the proportion of new jobs that go to
state residents rather than in-migrants.16 In the baseline simulations, I
assume, based on previous studies, that in the short run 6 out of 10 jobs
go to state residents and the other 4 to in-migrants. Of the six jobs going
to state residents, three go to the unemployed and three go to persons
out of the labor force. The effects of job creation on state residents’
unemployment are assumed to quickly fade. The effects on state labor
force participation are assumed to slowly fade with out-migration and
mortality of the original state residents. In addition, the greater the number of jobs that go to in-migrants, the fewer the possibilities for state
residents to get promotions to better-paying occupations.
Increasing the proportion of jobs that go to state residents can have
considerable effects on the jobs and earnings generated for state residents. Suppose we increased the proportion of new jobs going to state
residents from 6 out of 10 to 8 out of 10. I assume that this is evenly
divided between more jobs for the unemployed and more jobs for state
residents who are out of the labor force. The pattern of fading of effects
over time is assumed to be similar. But because the initial effect is that
more state residents get job experience, these state residents will develop
increased job skills, a stronger self-confidence, and an improved reputation with employers. As a result, these state residents’ future employment and wage rates will be higher. In addition, I assume that effects on
occupational upgrading are blown up proportionately with the effects
on labor force participation. With fewer in-migrants being hired, more
job vacancies will go to already-employed state residents as well as
to nonemployed state residents. This provides more opportunities for
occupational upgrading.
Under these alternative assumptions, the present value of real earnings generated for state residents, per $1 of business incentives, is $4.19.
This is one-third higher than under the baseline assumptions.
The share of jobs that goes to in-migrants depends on the availability of state residents with suitable skills for the job opportunities
created by economic development programs. The in-migrant share may
also depend on the ease with which employers and local job seekers
can get information about suitable job matches. Programs that provide carrots or sticks to encourage firms to hire local residents for the
jobs created by economic development programs may be helpful. For
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example, some local areas, such as Berkeley, California, and Portland,
Oregon, have used “First Source” programs to encourage more local
hiring. Under First Source programs, businesses receiving incentives
are required to consider local job seekers who are screened and referred
through the local job training and placement system. Businesses are
not required to hire those who are referred. The effectiveness of these
programs in altering businesses’ hiring practices depends upon whether
the programs provide effective training and screening services. If these
training and screening programs are effective, then businesses may get
better quality hires at less cost by using these First Source programs.17
In addition, greater availability of suitably skilled state residents
may increase the share of jobs that go to state residents. For example,
any program that improves the employability and job skills of state
residents may increase the proportion of the jobs created by economic
development that will go to state residents. Among such programs are
early childhood programs. Early childhood programs are therefore
potentially complementary to business incentives. High-quality early
childhood programs may increase the effectiveness of business incentives in providing state residents with higher earnings.

EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS
Supporters of a stronger government role [in early childhood care
and education] . . . argue that high-quality [early childhood] programs have bigger positive impacts and that the ingredients of a
high-quality program can be specified with some precision . . .
Opponents of a stronger government role . . . question whether
high-quality programs can be identified with any degree of
accuracy.
—William Gormley (2007a, pp. 634–635)
There are . . . a few “overarching principles” that these three interventions [the Perry Preschool program, the Chicago Child-Parent
Center program, and the Abecedarian program] had in common
. . . They began early . . . They had well-educated, well-trained and
well-compensated teachers—with resulting low staff turnover . . .
They maintained small class sizes and high teacher-child ratios . . .
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They were intensive programs . . . Intensity can be described in
several ways, including the contact hours with the child in the program, work with parents and extension into the school-age years . . .
They focused on children’s learning—not just their achievement.
—Ellen Galinsky (2006, pp. 19–20)

I have identified three early childhood programs that produce large
economic development benefits: universal high-quality pre-K education
(modeled after the Chicago Child-Parent Center program and the Perry
Preschool program), the Abecedarian program, and the Nurse-Family
Partnership program. But why were these programs successful? Can we
identify program features that were crucial to these programs’ success?
Do we know enough to be able to replicate these programs’ success on
a larger scale? As pointed out by Gormley (2007a) in the above quotation, opponents of a stronger government role in early childhood care
and education often argue that we don’t really understand how to create
high-quality early childhood programs. This section of the chapter will
explore these issues.
Imitating Successful Programs
One strategy for making early childhood programs successful on a
large scale is to imitate successful small-scale programs. This strategy
might focus on imitating those features of these successful programs
that could plausibly alter program effectiveness. As noted by Galinsky
in the above quotation, the pre-K and child care programs with the most
rigorous research evidence of success share some common features that
might plausibly affect child participants. These pre-K and child care
programs tend to have educated and trained staff and small class sizes.
They also are intensive in the hours devoted to each child. Finally, these
programs are administered locally rather than being subject to federal
rules.
On the other hand, we don’t know for sure whether these are the
crucial program details. The devil is in the details. For example, if staff
quality is important, how is that best ensured? Are education credentials the most important determinant of staff quality? Or does staff quality depend more on some combination of staff aptitude for work with
young children, good training, and low turnover?
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From the analysis in Chapter 4, we do know that intensity affects
the total benefits of early childhood programs. A program that is small
in both number of participants and program hours per participant may
have high benefits per dollar spent. But it will be difficult for such a
program to have large total benefits because of its limited size and
scope. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Nurse-Family Partnership program has large economic development benefits for state residents per
dollar spent, but not large total economic development benefits. This
program is targeted at disadvantaged groups and also has a moderate
level of services per participant. These factors limit total benefits. In
contrast, universal pre-K education and the Abecedarian program are
designed to be larger, more intense programs. As shown in Chapter 4,
the potential total benefits of implementing such programs on a larger
scale are therefore larger.
The Head Start Issue: Avoiding the Limitations of Programs with
More Modest Effects
Another strategy for making early childhood programs higher quality is to avoid imitating early childhood programs that seem to be less
successful. We might focus on avoiding features of these less successful
programs that intuitively seem plausible reasons for these programs’
being less successful.
Any discussion today of quality in early childhood programs has to
address recent research findings on Head Start. The Head Start program
was started in 1965 and currently serves almost 1 million children. The
program provides a mix of early education and other services (e.g.,
health services) to three- and four-year-olds. The impact of Head Start
has long been controversial. (For some recent reviews of the debate
from different perspectives, see Barnett [2007], Besharov and Higney
[2007], and Currie [2007].)
But the most recent entry into the Head Start debate is the January
2010 final report of the Head Start Impact Study (Puma et al. 2010).
This study is particularly noteworthy because the study was rigorous:
it evaluated Head Start using random assignment. Applicants to Head
Start at age three, and at age four, were randomly assigned to either a
treatment group that was allowed to enroll in a local Head Start center
or a control group that was not allowed to enroll at that center.
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The findings of the final report were disappointing to Head Start
advocates. Interim reports had shown some positive effects on children’s cognitive outcomes as of the end of Head Start. But the final
report indicated that almost all these cognitive effects faded out by the
end of kindergarten and first grade. By “faded out,” what is meant is
that although former Head Start participants continued to make progress in learning, the control group of children caught up.
A variety of arguments can be made about these findings. (Barnett
[2008] provides a useful discussion.) There certainly is some possibility of effects of Head Start on unobserved noncognitive skills that
may increase future success of Head Start participants. The Head Start
Impact Study is comparing Head Start not with parental care but with
a wide variety of other pre-K programs and child care programs. The
control group actually spent more hours per week in nonparental care
than was true for the Head Start treatment group. If some of these pre-K
programs and child care programs used by the control group are of high
quality, then this reduces Head Start’s relative impact. But this need not
imply that quality pre-K programs are unimportant.
Head Start may be a program that needs to improve to catch up
with recent improvements in other pre-K and child care programs.
Some rigorous studies suggest that Head Start has positively affected
participants in the long run (Currie and Thomas 1999; Garces, Thomas,
and Currie 2002; Ludwig and Miller 2007).18 These long-range positive
results can be reconciled with the recent Head Start Impact Study in two
ways. First, it could be that these long-range results reflect noncognitive
benefits of Head Start that were not measured in the Head Start Impact
Study.19 Second, these long-range studies inevitably are studying the
effects of Head Start on participants from many years ago. It is possible
that Head Start was much better than alternative child care and pre-K
programs many years ago, but that these alternatives have improved in
quality in recent years.
However, another reaction to these recent research findings is that
high-quality early childhood programs should avoid imitating some of
the features of Head Start. For example, traditionally Head Start has not
required that its teachers have high academic credentials. Furthermore,
perhaps Head Start’s attempt to deliver multiple services in addition to
early education distracts program staff from sufficiently focusing on
educational goals for the child participants.20 Finally, Head Start is a
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federal program, which arguably restricts its flexibility to respond to
local needs. (Some of these possible issues with Head Start are being
addressed by recent Head Start reforms. For example, legislation passed
in 2007 requires that 50 percent of all Head Start lead teachers must
have a bachelor’s degree by 2013. In addition, the federal government
is implementing a variety of accountability standards for local Head
Start centers [see Administration for Children and Families 2010].)
However, again the point can be raised that we don’t know which
features of Head Start may be impeding its success. For example, will
requiring that more Head Start teachers have bachelor’s degrees provide benefits sufficient to justify this requirement’s costs?
It should also be noted that some Head Start programs are considerably more effective than the average Head Start program. For example,
the Tulsa, Oklahoma, Head Start program seems to produce greater
cognitive gains at kindergarten entry than is true in the Head Start
Impact Study (Gormley et al. 2009). (The cognitive gains are not, however, as large as those for Oklahoma’s pre-K program.) More research
is needed on how the features of Head Start programs alter their effectiveness in improving children’s life chances. Gormley et al. (2009)
suggest that Tulsa’s Head Start program differs from other Head Start
programs in spending more time on instructional activities. This raises
a broader issue, to which we now turn: what can we tell from research
on all pre-K programs about which program features promote program
effectiveness?
Disentangling the Effects of Different Features of Early
Childhood Programs
It would be useful to find good research that identifies how different factors alter the effectiveness of early childhood programs. I
focus attention on pre-K and child care programs because there is more
research evidence for such programs than there is for the Nurse-Family
Partnership. I also bring in evidence from the research literature on what
determines school quality. It seems plausible that program attributes
that affect school quality for kindergartners and first-graders might also
be relevant for pre-K education programs.
The economic development benefits of early childhood programs
may be affected by six features of these programs:
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1) The structural features of these programs, such as class size
and staff qualifications;
2) The process quality of these programs, such as what goes on in
the interactions between the child and program staff;
3) The time intensity of these programs—for example, the number of hours per day, the number of days per year, and the
number of years of program services per child participant;
4) Whom the program serves—for example, whether the program is targeted at children from disadvantaged families or
has a wider clientele;
5) Whether the program is delivered by the public sector or the
private sector; and
6) Whether the program’s design and administration are dominated by federal control or involve more state or local
flexibility.
It could be argued that ultimately all of these six features only affect
program effectiveness by affecting process quality. The interaction
between the child and program staff is the ultimate factor that determines program outcomes. Other program features such as class size,
staff qualifications, the amount and structure of program time, whom
the program serves, and who administers the program, may be important because they affect how staff interacts with children.
However, in practice, those shaping policy interventions can
choose to work separately on these six features. There is a difference
between policy interventions that directly seek to target process quality
and policy interventions that indirectly seek to improve process quality by targeting other program features, such as class size and teacher
qualifications.
In the following analysis, I try to quantify the effects of changing
some of these features of early childhood programs. Specifically, I estimate the economic development benefit within the state. This benefit is
the increase in the present value of state residents’ earnings. This estimate can be compared with estimates of the present value of the costs
of the quality change.
In doing this analysis, I rely on estimates of the effects of features of
early childhood programs on early elementary test scores. These effects
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on early childhood test scores can then be used to predict later earnings.
This prediction relies on studies that link childhood test scores with
later earnings.21
This methodology for estimating the benefits from design improvements in early childhood programs is conservative. It is conservative
because the resulting estimates are likely to provide a lower bound,
compared to the true benefits from design improvements. The estimated
effects of pre-K programs on adult earnings significantly exceed what
one would expect based on eventual educational attainment, or on earlier test scores. This greater effect may be explained by effects of early
childhood programs on noncognitive skills that are less significantly
correlated with higher test scores and educational attainment. This
greater effect may also be due to early childhood programs’ impacts on
reducing former participants’ prison or jail time and criminal records.
These effects on noncognitive skills or crime are unlikely to be fully
captured by relying on effects on test scores.
As will become clear in the below discussion, in discussing the
effects of program features on the effectiveness of early childhood programs, I am walking into a minefield. These are controversial issues. In
part, the problem is that there is little rigorous experimental evidence
on how variation in program features affects outcomes. The evidence
used in the below discussion is usually from natural variation in program features. Researchers try to control for the influence of different
program features, but many program features may be unobserved. This
creates some uncertainty about all of the below results. I try to reflect
this uncertainty in considering different scenarios for how different program features affect program quality. Chapter 6 will discuss implications of uncertainty for program design.
Structural Quality
Class size
Lower class size in a pre-K program or child care center probably
significantly improves program effects. The overall research literature
is mixed.22 However, the best studies do seem to find significant effects
from lower class size.23
The Tennessee Class Size Study uses experimental methods to
show that lower class size in kindergarten through third grade sig-
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nificantly improves test scores in the short run and long run (Krueger
2003; Schanzenbach 2007). This strongly suggests that lower class size
should make a difference in pre-K.
The National Day Care Study combined experimental and nonexperimental methods to look at what variables affected child care quality for three- and four-year-olds (Travers and Goodson 1980). Average
group size proved to be one of the most significant variables affecting
test score gains by a center’s children. These results for average group
size are from nonexperimental analyses of the study’s data.
The implied “effect sizes” in the National Day Care Study are perhaps twice as large as those in the Tennessee Class Size Study. The
Tennessee Class Size Study implies that lowering kindergarten class
sizes from 22 to 15 students will raise test scores by about 0.2 “standard
deviation units”—that is, by about one-fifth of the standard deviation of
test scores across students in the sample (Krueger 2003; Schanzenbach
2007). The National Day Care Study implies that a similar decrease in
class size will raise test scores among students ages three and four by
about 0.4 standard deviation units.24 This is consistent with the notion
that group size may be more important for younger children. On the
other hand, the Tennessee Class Size Study’s estimates of the effects of
class size are based on random assignment experimentation, whereas
the National Day Care Study’s results for class size are based on analysis of natural variation in class size. Therefore, it could be argued that
the Tennessee Class Size Study’s results will be more reliable.
Based on such studies, we can roughly quantify the effects of lowering pre-K class size. The baseline estimates in Chapter 4 assumed a
pre-K group size of 20 students per class, which is slightly above the
class size of the Chicago Child-Parent Center program. Perry Preschool
averaged a class size of 12 or 13 students. I consider the possible effects
of reducing pre-K class size from 20 students to 15 students, which will
move us close to the Perry Preschool model. This is a class size reduction for which we have good estimates of the increase in per-student
costs (Gault et al. 2008).
Suppose I take the conservative approach of relying on the classsize effects from the Tennessee Class Size Study. This is a conservative approach because there is some reason to think that these rigorous
Tennessee results for kindergarten will understate the effects of lower
class size for pre-K. To calculate the change in economic development
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benefits from lower pre-K class size, I must estimate how the lower
class size will affect adult earnings. I do so by relying on prior research
on how early test scores affect adult earnings (Currie and Thomas 1999;
Krueger 2003).
Based on these calculations, lower pre-K class size has state economic development benefits that significantly exceed costs. As discussed in Chapter 4, at the baseline class size of 20, the ratio of state
economic development benefits to costs for universal pre-K was 2.78.
That is, the present value of the increase in state residents’ earnings was
2.78 times the program’s costs. Lowering class size to 15 is estimated
to increase state economic development benefits by 83 percent of the
original costs per participant. That is, the present value of the earnings
effects for state residents goes up from the original value of 2.78 times
the original program costs; it rises to 3.61 times the original program
costs. As a percentage of the original program costs, this is an increase
of 83 percent (= [3.61 − 2.78] ÷ 1.00). As a percentage of the original
earnings effects, it is an increase of 30 percent (= 0.83 ÷ 2.78). Program
costs are estimated to increase by 28 percent of the original costs per
child participant. Therefore, there are net benefits per child participant
equal to 55 percent of the original program costs (55 percent = 83 percent – 28 percent).25
These estimates use only the increase in test scores from lower class
size to infer the long-run economic development effects of lowering
class size. Yet we know that the economic development effects of preK go well beyond the effects that would be predicted based on preK’s effects on educational attainment. Apparently, pre-K education has
some effects on “noncognitive” skills that are important in explaining
earnings, but are not as important in determining educational attainment or test scores. Therefore, these estimates may be a lower bound to
the true economic development benefits of lowering class size.
Both the Tennessee Class Size Study and the National Day Care
Study suggest that class size is the key driver of quality, not the ratio
of students to adults. Obviously lower class size will tend to be associated with a lower ratio of students to adults. But once we control for
class size, lowering the student-to-adult ratio (by, for example, adding
a classroom aide) does not seem to increase student progress in kindergarten classrooms or in child care centers for three- and four-year-olds
(Schanzenbach 2007; Travers and Goodson 1980).
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What explains these results for class size? According to observational evidence in the National Day Care Study,
when the total number of children in the classroom was small, lead
teachers tended to spend time in various forms of social interactions with small clusters of children; when the total number of
children was large, lead teachers tended to spend time in passive
observation for the group as a whole. Children in small groups
showed more creative, verbal/intellectual, and cooperative behavior than their peers in larger groups. They were less likely to be
non-participants in classroom activities, and they had higher gains
on standardized tests from fall to spring. (Travers and Goodson
1980, p. 239)

Adding an aide does not help that much, if at all, because
high [staff/child] ratios often imply a kind of dilution of adult
responsibility, as well as requiring that the lead teacher divert some
of her energies to managing other adults . . . The number of children present with one or more caregivers, measured by a total head
count, effectively determines the size of the “subgroups” toward
which lead caregivers typically direct their attention. As the number of children assigned to a classroom increases, the size of these
subgroups increases, regardless of the prevailing staff/child ratio.
That is, classes are rarely divided into smaller groups of roughly
equal size, even when enough adults are present to permit such
division. Rather, lead caregivers appear to supervise most or all of
the children in the class at once, although aides may occasionally
take one or a few children aside for special activities. (Travers and
Goodson 1980, pp. 241, 235–236)

Therefore, class size matters because it affects the process of what
goes on in the classroom. Process can also be affected more directly, as
I will discuss below.
Staff educational credentials
Research on early childhood programs has reached mixed results
for the effects on children of increases in the general educational credentials of staff. Some studies of pre-K or child care find no significant positive effects of the lead teacher’s having a BA degree (Currie and Neidell 2007; Early et al. 2007; Mashburn et al. 2008; Travers
and Goodson 1980). Other studies of pre-K and child care find positive
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effects on children of teacher educational credentials (Barnett 2004;
Bueno, Darling-Hammond, and Gonzales 2010; Gormley 2007a; Kelley
and Camilli 2007). The lack of easy-to-detect effects of general educational credentials is analogous to research on K–12 student achievement and teacher credentials. A master’s degree for a K–12 teacher is
not associated with greater achievement gains for his or her students.
The effects of teachers’ educational credentials on early childhood
program quality may depend greatly on context. For example, requiring a BA degree might help improve early childhood program quality if there is sufficient funding that highly qualified teachers can be
recruited and retained, but not otherwise. If there is insufficient funding
to pay salaries competitive with K–12 teachers’ salaries, requiring a BA
degree for pre-K teachers might lower quality by restricting the hiring pool or increasing turnover. On the other hand, if a BA credential
requirement is accompanied by commensurately higher salaries, this
may reduce teacher turnover. Lower teacher turnover should increase
program effectiveness; we know from research on K–12 education that
first-year teachers tend to be less effective (Gordon, Kane, and Staiger
2006). The effect on program quality of a BA credential versus an AA
(associate’s degree) credential may depend upon the relative quality of
these colleges, which varies across states. The value of different educational credentials may also depend upon the specific majors of the individuals with those credentials: a BA or an AA degree with a major in
early childhood education may matter more than a BA or an AA degree
without those specialized classes.
Specialized staff training and education in early childhood development often has positive effects on child outcomes. For example, the
National Day Care Study found that “lead caregivers with specialized
education or training played a more active role with children than those
without such preparation, and children under their supervision made relatively rapid gains on standardized tests” (Travers and Goodson 1980,
pp. 241–242). Some of David Blau’s research also is consistent with
this conclusion that specific staff training matters (Blau 1997, 2000).26
Given the uncertainty in the effects of requiring different educational credentials for early childhood teachers, I consider instead a hypothetical question: how big would these effects have to be for increased
educational credentials to have state economic development benefits
that exceed costs? I consider variations in the credentials of lead teach-
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ers in pre-K programs. Chapter 4’s baseline calculations assumed that
the lead pre-K teacher had a BA degree and was paid wages competitive with public schools. Suppose the credential requirement was lowered, so that the lead pre-K teacher only was required to have a child
development associate (CDA) credential. This credential “requires
a high school diploma (or GED), at least 120 hours of formal education across eight areas of early childhood education/child development/
professional practice, and at least 480 hours of direct experience working with preschool children” (Gault et al. 2008, p. 4, footnote g). Based
on research by Gault et al., lowering the lead teacher credential from a
BA to a CDA might at most save 29 percent of costs.27
Based on research on the relationship between early elementary test
scores and adult earnings, requiring a higher credential for lead pre-K
teachers would pass a benefit-cost test even if such a credential requirement only increases student test scores slightly. Average test scores
need only increase by an “effect size” of 0.045 for a BA requirement
(rather than a CDA) to have benefits exceeding the extra salary costs.28
This required effect is quite small: the effect size is probably equivalent
to increasing what the average student learns during the pre-K year by
about 5 percent.29 In other words, requiring the lead teacher to have a
BA rather than a CDA will pay off if average learning rates increase
by more than 5 percent. The required effect size is so small because
of the large state economic development benefits of increasing student
achievement. Even a tiny increase in former participants’earnings, added
over many years, adds up to a considerable sum.30
Composition of student body in pre-K education: economic
integration versus economic segregation
One structural quality issue that has not been adequately explored
by research is whether overall child benefits from pre-K education
would be improved by greater integration of students from different
economic backgrounds in pre-K classes. This topic is highly relevant to
the debate over universal pre-K education versus programs that target
the disadvantaged, such as Head Start.
There is some evidence that pre-K peer effects are important. Henry
and Rickman (2007) found statistically significant and substantively
large peer effects in Georgia pre-K classrooms. Their results suggest
that the abilities of a child’s peers in his or her classroom, as measured
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at the beginning of the pre-K school year, had large effects on the test
score gains of pre-K students. A one standard deviation increase in
peers’ measured prior abilities was associated with effects of more than
three-tenths of a standard deviation on several post pre-K tests.31
This suggests that children from disadvantaged backgrounds will
benefit from being placed in pre-K classrooms with children from more
advantaged backgrounds who have higher test scores. But what about
effects on the children from advantaged backgrounds? These children
might have their pre-K gains lowered by being placed in classes with
children whose prior abilities were lower. If peer effects are of similar
magnitude for children from all income groups, then the overall benefits
from “income mixing” of pre-K classrooms will be nil.
As far as I know, there is no good research evidence on how peer
effects vary for children from different economic backgrounds.32 If peer
effects are greater for low-income children than for upper-income children, then economic integration will raise overall pre-K effectiveness.
At the extreme, if peer effects are important for low-income children,
but not important for upper-income students, we can validly claim that
economic integration will help low-income children at little cost to
upper-income children. On the other hand, if peer effects are important,
but of similar magnitude for different income groups, then the policy
choices are more difficult. Economic integration would then have little
effect on overall pre-K effectiveness. However, economic integration
would promote greater achievement among lower-income students at
the expense of reduced achievement among upper-income students.
Even if a policy wonk might favor such redistribution, it is unlikely to
have much political popularity.
More research is clearly needed on peer effects and how they vary
across income groups. As of right now, we don’t know whether economic integration will raise the overall effectiveness of pre-K education, nor how it will redistribute the effectiveness of pre-K education
across income groups. We need better information to give more reliable
advice.
Process Quality
The overall message of this section is that there is little convincing
evidence that structural child care inputs affect child outcomes,
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while there is more evidence that “process quality” has a positive effect on child development. These findings are rather similar to those in the school quality literature, in which many studies
find that structural inputs such as class size, teacher education and
experience, and teacher pay have little impact on student outcomes,
while more intangible teacher characteristics (captured by teacher
fixed effects) are strongly associated with student outcomes . . .
—Blau and Currie (2006, p. 1195)

Even the minority of researchers who are unconvinced that class
size and teacher credentials affect child outcomes (such as Blau and
Currie in the above quotation) agree that child outcomes are affected
by “process quality.”33 “Process quality” is jargon for the quality of the
interaction between the teacher and the child. It is intuitively plausible that the effectiveness per hour of early childhood programs mainly
depends on the quality of the interaction between the teacher and the
child. Structural features of the early childhood program, such as group
size and the teacher’s training, may be important because of their effects
on the interaction between teacher and child.34
Two studies provide good measures of how the quality of teacherstudent interactions affects children’s learning gains in pre-K. The first
study is the National Day Care Study (Travers and Goodson 1980).
This study included a measure of the “social interaction” between the
lead teacher and children in the centers. This measure is based on the
proportion of time that the teacher engages in particular types of activities. Specifically, the measure is equal to the proportion of time that the
teacher engages with children by questioning children, responding to
children’s questions, comforting children, and praising children, minus
the proportion of time that the teacher is simply passively observing.
(Other uses of teacher’s time, which include giving commands to children, correcting children, and instructing children, as well as interacting with adults, are ignored. This implicitly treats these other activities
as neutral activities.) The study measures across 53 centers how this
“social interaction” variable affects student learning gains from the fall
to the spring. These estimates control for the influence of average group
size in the center. Smaller average group size is positively correlated
with a higher level of this social interaction variable. Because group
size is controlled for, there is some reason to believe that these empirical estimates reflect the influence of better “social interaction” between
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teachers and students, and do not just proxy for the benefits of smaller
group size.
A more recent study looks at more than 2,400 children in 671 pre-K
classrooms in 11 states with well-established programs (Mashburn et
al. 2008). This study included a measure of the instructional quality
of teacher-child interactions. Trained outside observers assessed whether
teacher-child interactions encouraged children to further develop concepts and thinking skills, and whether teachers provided children with
high-quality feedback. The empirical work examined how instructional
quality predicted test score gains, controlling for child characteristics
but not other program characteristics. Therefore, estimated effects of
instructional quality could proxy for other program characteristics. The
empirical work suggests that instructional quality is greater when group
size is smaller.
The two studies yield similar results: pre-K classes in which teachers interact with children more frequently to develop concepts and
thinking skills, and provide higher-quality feedback, have modestly
greater test score gains. Such test score gains predict modestly greater
economic development benefits. I consider the effects of an increase in
instructional quality of one standard deviation of its variation across the
53 centers (the National Day Care Study) or 672 classrooms (the state
pre-K study). (This is a large but not unusual change. If instructional
quality were distributed normally across centers or classrooms, a one
standard deviation improvement would move a center or classroom at
the median level of instructional quality to the eighty-fourth percentile.)
Such an increase would yield increases in test scores of 0.074 (NDCS)
or 0.045 (state pre-K study) in “effect size” units—that is, as a proportion of the standard deviation in test scores across individual students.35
This increase in test scores would be expected to increase the state
economic development benefits, in increased present value of state residents’ earnings per dollar of costs, by an amount equal to 0.47 (NDCS)
or 0.29 (state pre-K study). Therefore, these process improvements
would pass a benefit-cost test unless they increased pre-K program
costs by more than 47 percent or 29 percent. Obtaining such process
quality improvements might require some improvements in management quality. But it seems unlikely that such improvements in management would inevitably necessitate increases in costs of 29 or 47 percent.
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Better “process quality” in pre-K is positively associated with
smaller class size (Mashburn et al. 2008; Travers and Goodson 1980). It
is also positively associated with more staff training in early childhood
development (Travers and Goodson 1980). Therefore, it is plausible
that these structural changes achieve their effects through improving
the “process” of what goes on in the classroom.
Can process quality also be improved through better pre-K curricula? The evidence is mixed but suggestive. In a recent randomized
experimental test of 14 different pre-K curricula, 12 out of the 14 did
not have consistently positive effects on student achievement compared
to the “normal” curriculum used in the control classes. However, 2 out
of the 14 curricula did have consistently significant positive effects on
student learning in either reading or mathematics. In another recent randomized program study, two out of the three curricula that were studied had significant positive effects on student learning.36 In addition, in
most cases the control classrooms also used pre-K curricula that have
their advocates. A random assignment study of the “Tools of the Mind”
curriculum suggests that this curriculum, compared to a control curriculum, helped pre-K students to significantly improve their ability to stay
self-disciplined and focused (Diamond et al. 2007).37 Finally, in another
study, which used rigorous but not experimental methods, the researchers found that “scientifically based” reading instruction in pre-K seems
to have statistically significant effects on some literacy indicators but
not all (Jackson et al. 2007). I conclude that there is potential for systematic experimentation with pre-K curricula to improve the effectiveness of pre-K education in improving student outcomes.
Time Intensity of Services
The baseline pre-K program in Chapter 4 assumed a half-day pre-K
program, operating only during the school year, for four-year-olds only.
What about the effects of a longer pre-K school day, or more pre-K
days per year, or adding a three-year-old program to the four-year-old
program?
The available research suggests that having children spend more
hours in pre-K increases economic development benefits. However, it
may not always increase economic development benefits by more than
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the increased costs. This is particularly true for spending more hours
per day in pre-K education.
The only rigorous study of the effects of the pre-K day length is
a study by Robin, Frede, and Barnett (2006). They look at an experiment in New Jersey that used a random assignment lottery to admit
applicants to a special program that increased the pre-K day to eight
hours. The pre-K day in control classrooms was two-and-a-half to three
hours. (The experiment also increased the length of the pre-K year by
four weeks, from 41 weeks to 45 weeks.) Increasing the length of the
pre-K day does have cognitive benefits for test scores. These test score
effects average 0.205 of a standard deviation. Based on these test score
gains, I estimate that a pre-K program with a longer school day has a 56
percent greater effect on state residents’ earnings. On an original cost
basis, benefits per dollar increase by 155 percent of the original costs,
from 2.78 times the original costs to 4.33 times the original costs (1.55
= 4.33 − 2.78; 56 percent = 1.55 ÷ 2.78).38
These estimates not only reflect benefits from greater cognitive
attainment for former pre-K students when they grow up, they also
reflect greater child care benefits from a longer pre-K day. In addition,
because this expanded pre-K involves greater government spending,
there are also balanced-budget multiplier benefits from a longer pre-K
day.
However, costs also go up significantly. Using cost estimates from
a study by Gault et al. (2008), I estimate that costs would almost quadruple, swelling to 3.62 times the original cost base. The new full-day
pre-K program would have economic development benefits exceeding
costs (4.33 is greater than 3.62). So the full-day pre-K program would
be better than not having a program. But the increase in the present
value of benefits, as a proportion of the original costs, of 1.55 (4.33 −
2.78) is less than the increase in the present value of costs of 2.62 (3.62
− 1.00). The added state economic development benefits are less than
the added program costs. From a state economic development perspective, the move from a half day to a full day does not have a net payoff.
Of course, there may be other benefits of a longer pre-K day that are
not captured by test-score gains and state economic development benefits. For example, perhaps there are noncognitive benefits of a longer
pre-K day. However, they would have to be very large to justify the
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extra expense. Furthermore, a longer pre-K day might in some cases
have harmful effects on behavior.
However, a full-day program may allow more families to have
access to a high-quality pre-K program. A half-day pre-K program may
not be accessible to some families unless they can find affordable child
care for the rest of the parents’ or guardians’ workday. This may require
that half-day programs be accompanied by some type of subsidized
child care program. This would add to the costs of a half-day program.
In addition, perhaps the child care benefits of a longer pre-K day
could be better exploited with some program add-ons. The pre-K program could be combined with programs that would target the adults in
the pre-K participant’s family for training and work. This issue will be
considered further in Chapter 7.
For the Chicago Child-Parent Center program, Arthur Reynolds has
done some analysis of the effects of adding a second year of pre-K
education (Reynolds 1995). By adding a second year, we generally
mean having the child enrolled in pre-K programs at age three and age
four rather than just at age four. The second year improved test scores
by about 0.253 of a standard deviation.39 These higher test scores translate into predictions of higher earnings for former participants. In addition, a second year of pre-K adds child care benefits for parents. Adding
a second year increases costs by a little more than double. (It costs more
than double because there is a lower proportion of three-year-olds currently enrolled in public pre-K programs, and therefore less saved costs
on existing programs.) Doubling costs also increases the balanced budget multiplier effects of pre-K. Summing up all the benefits, adding a
second year of pre-K education increases the effects on state residents’
earnings by 47 percent.40 As a ratio to the original cost basis, benefits
increase from their original value of 2.78 to 4.09, an increase of 1.31.
This is slightly more than the increase in costs of 1.25 (from 1.00 to
2.25 with the second year added).41
The state economic development benefits of adding a second year
of pre-K education are only slightly greater than the added costs. However, these calculations are only based on the cognitive test score gains
caused by pre-K. If the second year of pre-K has even modest noncognitive benefits, then the second year’s net benefits will increase
significantly.
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Why does adding more hours per day have lesser net benefits than
adding more days? Perhaps there are limits to how much pre-K students
can learn during a day. Adding learning time may be more productive
when adding days rather than adding hours per day.
There are no rigorous studies of the effects of a longer pre-K year.
However, it seems likely that adding days to the year may have similar
effects to adding a second pre-K year.
Targeted versus Universal Programs
The effects estimated in Chapter 4 of high-quality universal pre-K
programs assume that the benefits of universal pre-K are greater for
children from low-income families than for children from upperincome families. The greater effectiveness of pre-K for lower-income
families is plausible based on what we know about child development.
There is significant evidence that middle- and upper-income families
are more frequently successful in encouraging vocabulary development
and higher-order thinking skills (Hart and Risley 2003). Therefore,
pre-K education has a smaller deficit to fill for middle- and upperincome families. This suggests that pre-K’s effects will be smaller for
these families.
If this pattern of effects occurs, then there is a possible argument for
targeting pre-K programs to children from lower-income families. The
economic development benefits per dollar spent will be greater.
The issue of targeted versus universal pre-K programs will be more
fully considered in Chapter 8. I note here the bottom-line conclusions
of Chapter 8: Although targeting may increase benefits per dollar spent,
universal pre-K programs have both economic and political advantages.
It seems likely that pre-K’s benefits for the middle class are extensive
enough that broadening pre-K services beyond a lower-income target
group has net economic development benefits. Furthermore, universal
pre-K services seem more likely to develop stronger political support
precisely because of those same middle-class benefits. These overall
political and economic benefits of universal pre-K are more important than benefits per dollar spent. The purpose of public policy is to
increase overall social benefits, not to maximize ratios of benefits to
costs. Therefore, universal pre-K is probably preferable to targeted pre-
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K, although changing political circumstances or research evidence may
alter that conclusion.
Institutions Delivering Pre-K Education
What institutions deliver pre-K education does not seem crucial to
quality—or at least, there is no strong evidence that institutions matter to quality. Oklahoma’s near-universal pre-K system is mostly delivered through its public schools. Georgia’s extensive pre-K system is
largely delivered through payments to private pre-K providers. Both
systems have significant evidence of success in improving educational
outcomes.42 Either public or private provision of pre-K education seems
potentially compatible with high quality.
The Federal versus State/Local Role in Early Childhood Programs
Federal involvement in early childhood education may affect quality. The pros and cons of federal involvement will be considered further
in later chapters, particularly Chapters 10 and 13.

CONCLUSION
As this chapter shows, program design makes a huge difference
to the economic development benefits of both business incentive programs and early childhood programs. The devil is in the details of these
programs’ designs.
The estimates of economic development benefits in this chapter,
and in Chapters 3 and 4, rely heavily on results from empirical research.
There is always considerable uncertainty in social science research. Are
the estimates valid? Can they be generalized to a larger-scale program?
The next chapter considers how policymakers should respond to this
uncertainty.
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Notes
1. Specifically, this is based upon previous simulations that I have done with George
Erickcek examining the short-run demand-side effects of spending cuts and tax
increases on Michigan’s budget (Bartik and Erickcek 2003). Based on this analysis, an increase of $x in taxes in Michigan will have an immediate demand-side
impact of about 1.8 times the impact of reducing spending and taxes by $x. (Compare $554.4 million with $308.8 million in personal income impacts in the table in
Bartik and Erickcek [2003] labeled “Economic Impact of $925 Million in Adjustments to the Michigan State Budget FY 2004.”) We know from the analysis of
pre-K that the balanced budget multiplier effects have a present value of $0.04
compared to the present value of costs. Therefore, for the same present value of
costs, cutting public spending will have impacts of 1.8 times 0.04, or 0.07.
2. This calculation is based upon Bartik and Erickcek (2003). Cutting public spending by $x is estimated to have immediate demand-side effects that are about
2.8 times the effects of cutting both public spending and taxes by $x. (Compare
$863.2 million and $308.8 million in the table in Bartik and Erickcek [2003]
labeled “Economic Impact of $925 Million in Adjustments to the Michigan State
Budget FY 2004.”) The calculated present value of balanced budget multiplier
earnings effects per dollar of program costs is 0.04. Multiplying 0.04 by 2.8 yields
a demand-side impact of the public spending reduction of 0.11. Of course, as the
text points out, the supply-side impact of cutting public services could be orders
of magnitude higher, and indeed could wipe out the beneficial supply-side effects
of business tax incentives.
3. This argument is the same as the rationale given in Chapter 4 for why balanced
budget multiplier effects of early childhood programs are modest.
4. Bania, Gray, and Stone (2007) provide some additional theory and evidence for
this model.
5. Even the most effective business tax incentives are unlikely to be free. Bartik and
Erickcek (2010) consider the most recent data on Michigan’s MEGA tax incentive
program. Because of its focus on auto-related manufacturing in a state with strong
supplier links and high wages, MEGA’s most recent data shows an extremely high
estimated multiplier effect in the long run, at 3.88. We estimate that MEGA may
have two-thirds of its gross costs offset by fiscal benefits. But there still are net
budgetary costs of MEGA.
6. This estimate weights the gains to whites versus gains to blacks that are reported
in Bartik (1993b) at 84.4 percent versus 15.6 percent. This is based on my calculations, using CPS data, of non-Hispanic white and black percentages in the United
States.
7. These calculations are based on taking the earnings generated under the original
estimates and multiplying these by the percentage wage premium times 2.843.
The assumption is that the wage premium effect on local residents depends upon
those local residents whose employment rates or wage rates are directly altered by
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8.

9.
10.

11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

the new job opportunities, with proper allowance made for the spillover effects of
higher or lower wage premiums.
The notion that business incentive programs should take into account wages of
assisted businesses is broadly consistent with the philosophy behind living wage
campaigns (Pollin and Luce 2000). It also is broadly consistent with the philosophy behind the so-called high road approach to economic development that is
associated with Joel Rogers and the Center on Wisconsin Strategy (e.g., Luria and
Rogers 1999). However, the details of exactly how higher-wage businesses should
be targeted pose some complex issues. Targeting businesses that pay high average
wage premiums relative to the skills they require is not exactly the same as conditioning business incentive availability on the lowest wage paid by an assisted business. However, under some circumstances, it may be a useful simplifying political
approach to the issue. I discuss some of the complexities in Bartik (2004b).
This revised number of 2.44 is based on multiplying 3.14 times the ratio of a 1.4
multiplier to a 1.8 multiplier.
For business tax incentives awarded to all eligible businesses (as opposed to
incentives targeted at some eligible businesses), the analysis of economic development impact is more complicated. If tax incentives are awarded to all retail
businesses, or all service businesses, it seems likely that the incentive will be to
some extent shifted forward in the form of lower prices. Lower prices for retailers or service businesses for consumers will tend to increase real wages. This
will attract in-migrants, which may lead to some downward pressure on nominal
wages. This increased availability of labor may attract some increased business
activity. It seems likely that the resulting job creation effect per dollar of incentive
will be lower than the job creation effect per dollar for incentives to export-based
businesses. But the job creation effect will not be zero. In the case of incentives
to businesses providing services to other local businesses, these incentives may
result in lower prices for local business inputs. This will also result in some job
creation effects because of lower business input costs. Although these job creation
effects are not zero, they are likely to be lower than for incentives to export-based
businesses.
0.57 = 3.14 × 0.3 × (1.5 / 1.8) × 0.72.
For example, there are a variety of studies of job training programs that are quite
similar in structure to customized job training programs. These include studies of
sectoral job training programs (Pindus et al. 2004), such as the Wisconsin Regional
Training Partnership (Dresser and Rogers 1997).
The Corporation for Enterprise Development provides a wide variety of ideas for
programs to promote regional economic development through entrepreneurship.
See the organization’s Web site at http://www.cfed.org.
Luria and Rogers (2008) provide a broader perspective of the possible role of
manufacturing extension services in improving regional economic development.
Ehlen (2001) estimates a cost-per-job figure that is only 1/9.06 times as great as
the cost-per-job figure for business tax incentives. Therefore, the earnings effects
per dollar invested will be at least 9.06 times as great. Multiplying the 3.14 ratio
for business tax incentives times 9.06 yields a figure of 28.45. In addition, the up-
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16.
17.
18.

19.

20.
21.

22.
23.

front spending stimulus will provide a net positive effect of 0.11 of the cost of the
program. Therefore, per dollar invested, the Ehlen study implies economic development benefits with a present value of $28.56. These calculations were originally
developed in Bartik (2009d).
An extensive exploration of the issue of “who gets the jobs” is undertaken in Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson (2004).
For more information on Portland’s programs, see Bartik (2001), pp. 256–258,
and for more information on Berkeley’s programs, see Bartik (2004a), p. 363. For
more information on both, see Molina (1998).
Although these studies don’t use random assignment, they are rigorous in that
the differences between Head Start participants and nonparticipants are arguably
exogenous and result from a reasonable “natural” experiment. Currie and her colleagues’ studies rely on comparing Head Start participants with their siblings who
did not attend Head Start. This controls for many of the unobserved family characteristics that may affect children’s later success. Ludwig and Miller’s research
relies on comparing counties whose poverty rates were high enough to trigger
special assistance from the Office of Economic Opportunity in the mid-1960s in
doing their Head Start applications, to counties that were slightly above the poverty rate threshold that triggered such OEO assistance.
For example, as shown in Gormley et al. (2009), Head Start may produce greater
gains in child health than is true of programs that are more focused on cognitive
gains. It is certainly possible that even if there are no long-run cognitive effects
of Head Start, health gains from Head Start could contribute to greater long-run
success in life.
Of course, it could also be true that some of Head Start’s noncognitive goals could
contribute to long-run life success.
I rely on Krueger’s (2003) estimate that a one standard deviation increase in these
early test scores increases long-run earnings by 16 percent. This estimate is based
on a study by Currie and Thomas (1999), using British data. These estimated
effects are then adjusted in my simulation model for out-migration and displacement effects. Krueger’s estimated effects of early test scores on earnings are quite
similar to a more recent study by Chetty et al. (2010). This more recent study finds
that one standard deviation–higher test scores in kindergarten increase future earnings, as of age 27, by 14.8 percent.
However, Gormley (2007a) summarizes the literature by saying that “in general,
researchers have concluded that lower child-to-staff ratios are better, especially
for infants.”
I should mention that Blau (1997) seems to find no effects from structural features
of preschool and child care when he looks at the effects of variations in these
features within centers. I owe this point to Gormley (2007a). My own take on this
issue is that variations within centers will in many cases be endogenous in ways
that may obscure effects. For example, more parents may ask for a better teacher,
or a better teacher may be asked to take on more students by a center director. In
addition, students with special needs may be put in smaller classes. Therefore I
rely more on studies that look at effects that are either exogenous (Tennessee Class
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Size Study, a pure random assignment experiment) or that appear to plausibly vary
exogenously across centers (the National Day Care Study).
24. From Table 5.1 on p. 192 of Travers and Goodson (1980), I infer that the standard
deviation of PSI scores among students within centers is 3.56. I use the coefficient
in Table 5.2 on the logarithm of observed group size of −3.89 to infer that the
effect of a reduction in group size from 22 students will increase test scores by
0.42 standard deviation units. I note that according to the study, most of these child
care centers had group sizes of between 12 and 24 students (pp. 31–32), which is
within the range considered here.
25. The calculations begin with the estimates of Chapter 12 that a 0.1 “effect size”
increase in early elementary test scores for one student provides an increase in
the present value of earnings in the state—i.e., state economic development benefits—of $8,312. This estimate is derived from studies of how early elementary
test scores are associated with later earnings (Currie and Thomas 1999; Krueger
2003). I then calculate what this means for the effects of changes in test scores
at the end of the pre-K program. Test score effects of a pre-K program would be
expected to decay over time. Based on the meta-analysis by Camilli et al. (2010),
the decay rate between the end of the pre-K program and early elementary school
is assumed to be such that a program’s effects on elementary test scores will be 38
percent of its test score effects at the end of the pre-K program. (This is based on
their estimate of mean effect sizes of 0.50 at the end of the early childhood program versus 0.19 between ages 5 and 10.) Camilli et al.’s results seem consistent
with evidence on the Tennessee Class Size Study from Schanzenbach (2007). As
a result, a one standard deviation or one “effect size” increase in test scores at the
end of the pre-K program is estimated to provide state economic development
benefits of $31,586 (= $8,312 × 10 to get a one standard deviation change × 0.38
to convert from the end of the pre-K program to early elementary school). This
estimated effect indicates that a one standard deviation improvement in test scores
at the end of a pre-K program will provide state economic development benefits
of 6.40 times the net cost per student of the pre-K program considered in Chapter
4, which had a net cost of $4,933 per student (6.40 = $31,586 ÷ $4,933). Based on
Schanzenbach’s analysis of the Tennessee Class Size Study, a reduction in class
size in kindergarten from an average of 22.4 students per class to 15.1 students
per class increases test scores at the end of kindergarten by an effect size of 0.187
(Schanzenbach 2007, Tables 2 and 4). This analysis is considering a reduction in
pre-K class size from 20 to 15 students. This reduction of five students is slightly
smaller than the Tennessee class size reduction of 7.3 students. I assume the effect
size for a pre-K class size reduction of five students is 0.128 (= 0.187 × 5 ÷ 7.3).
Based on this effect size at the end of the pre-K program, the resulting economic
development benefits for former child participants’ earnings will increase, as a
proportion of the original net cost of the pre-K program, by 0.82 (= 0.128 × 6.40).
I assume that child care and social spillover effects of pre-K programs do not
vary with class size. Balanced budget multiplier effects will go up with higher
costs and spending, which I turn to next. Gault et al. (2008) provide estimates that
suggest that reducing class size from 20 to 15 students will increase per-student
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27.

28.

29.
30.

costs by 20.2 percent. I assume this increase applies to the gross pre-K costs per
student that were assumed in Chapter 4 of $6,823. Net costs are lower at $4,933
because of reduced costs of other programs. An increase in gross costs per student
of 20.2 percent is equivalent to an increase in net costs of 27.9 percent (= 20.2%
× $6,823 ÷ $4,933). This program cost increase of 27.9 percent also increases
balanced budget multiplier effects by 27.9 percent, from their original ratio to the
original program cost basis of 0.04 to a new value of 0.05, an increase of 1 percent
of the original cost basis. Combining the effects on child participants’ earnings
with balanced budget multiplier effects, total state economic development benefits
increase by 83 percent of the original program costs. This exceeds the increase in
program costs of 28 percent of original program costs.
The importance of program staff credentials has also been studied for the NurseFamily Partnership programs. Although these findings are important in designing
parenting programs similar to NFP, the NFP findings are not necessarily generalizable to pre-K education or other early childhood programs. The Nurse-Family
Partnership did a random assignment experiment that compared a control group
with two treatments that differed in whether the “home visitor” was a nurse or a
paraprofessional. The paraprofessional was required to have a high school degree
but was specifically required to not have a bachelor’s degree or any college education in “helping professions.” However, preference was given to hiring paraprofessionals with some background in working in human services. Furthermore,
referrals were sought for the best-quality paraprofessional home visitors from
existing home visiting programs. All nurses and paraprofessionals in the experiment received one month of extensive training prior to providing services. From
evaluation evidence gathered when the children were 21 months old, the nurse
home visitors, compared to paraprofessionals, had twice as much effect in improving mother and child outcomes. However, by age four, the effects of nurse home
visitors and paraprofessionals were more similar. The nurse home visitors had
greater effects on child outcomes, whereas the paraprofessional home visitors had
greater effects on the mothers (Olds et al. 2002; Olds, Robinson, et al. 2004).
Gault et al. (2008) estimate that lowering the requirement from a BA-I credential
(BA paid public school wages) to a CDA credential saves 21.2 percent at a class
size of 20 (Gault et al. 2008, Table 2). This reduction is applied to Chapter 4’s
gross costs per student of $6,823. As a percentage of net pre-K program costs, this
reduction in costs is 29.3 percent (= 21.2% × $6,823 ÷ $4,933).
The cost savings is 0.29 on the original cost basis. A one standard deviation reduction in test scores at the end of pre-K reduces state economic development benefits
by 6.40 times the original cost basis, from a previous endnote. This downgrading
in educational credentials is a bad idea if it only reduces test scores at the end of
pre-K by 0.045 of a standard deviation (0.045 = 0.29 ÷ 6.40).
For example, in the study by Lamy et al. (2005), typical learning during the preschool year on many tests is about equal to an effect size of 1.
Gault et al. (2008) calculate cost effects of various credentials for different types
of pre-K programs. I consider their case of a BA-I credential (a BA degree paid at
public school wages) versus an associate’s degree and a CDA, for a school year
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program of three hours per day and a class size of 20, which is the pre-K program
modeled in this book (Gault et al. 2008, p. 10, Table 2). The percentage differentials calculated by Gault et al., as a percentage of the BA-I credential, are a reduction of 17 percent for going from a BA-I to an associate’s degree and a reduction
of 21 percent in going from a BA-I credential to a CDA credential. These percentage reductions are applied to the gross per-child cost of this book’s modeled pre-K
program of $6,823 (see Chapter 4), but are then recalculated as a percentage of
this book’s net per-student costs of $4,933 as 24 percent and 29 percent, respectively. The dollar savings per student of going from a BA to an AA are $1,190,
and the dollar savings in going from a BA to a CDA are $1,436. In Chapter 12,
I calculate that the present value of the future earnings effects of increasing one
student’s test scores in early elementary school by an effect size of 0.1 is $8,312.
Therefore, upgrading the credential from an AA to a BA, which costs $1,190, will
generate an increased present value of earnings equal to or greater than $1,190
if the increase in elementary test scores is greater than or equal to: 0.014 = 0.1 ×
$1,190 ÷ $8,312. Similar calculations can be done for moving from a CDA to an
associate’s degree, or from a CDA to a bachelor’s degree.
Qualitatively similar results were found in a smaller study by Schechter and Bye
(2007).
Henry and Rickman (2007) recognize this issue and identify it as a future research
priority. They say that “future studies should include estimates of the effects of
peer abilities on children with both high and low initial levels of skills. We were
unable to obtain reliable estimates, because of the limited number of children
within the classes on whom the peer skills were estimated. It is very important to
have estimates of the effects on children at both ends of the skills continuum to
inform policy deliberations related to mixing of students at . . . [a] time when publicly subsidized pre-Kindergartens and preschools are rapidly developing across
the U.S.” (p. 111).
As pointed out in endnote 23, Blau’s finding that structural quality does not matter
to child outcomes in child care centers is based on considering variation within
centers (Blau 1997). As argued by Gormley (2007a), the variation within centers
may be endogenous, which may make it difficult to find causal effects of structural
quality. As for the K–12 research literature, also referred to by Blau and Currie
(2006), there is a long-standing debate over the strength of the evidence on whether
class size and other resources affect student test score gains. Krueger (2002, 2003)
represents one side of the debate, arguing that lower class size does significantly
improve student achievement. Hanushek (2002) represents the other side of the
debate, arguing that there is no convincing evidence that lower class size or more
resources per student affect student achievement, at least once resources per student are beyond some minimum threshold. As is obvious from the text, my own
views agree with Krueger that the Tennessee Class Size Study, with its use of random assignment, tips the balance of the research evidence in favor of the proposition that more resources per student can improve student achievement.
Goffin (2010), in a recent research brief, argues that structural quality is important
for how it affects process quality. Goffin, however, adds the point that providing
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better structural quality, such as lower class size, in addition to improving process
quality, such as the quality of teacher interactions with children, may also augment
the effects of higher-quality teacher interactions with children. Thus, structural
quality may have an effect independent of process quality. This may be true with
respect to measured teacher-student interaction quality. However, it would be difficult to refute the proposition that lower class size may affect various aspects of
unmeasured teacher-student interaction quality. Thus, even if structural quality
features have effects independent of measured process quality, it may be that these
occur through affecting unmeasured process quality.
35. This calculation was done as follows. First, I consider the calculation for the
NDCS study. The process variable whose effects I examined from this study was
its “social activity” variable. “Social activity” is defined as a linear combination
of the proportion of time spent in various activities in Table 6.1, p. 224 (Travers
and Goodson 1980). This linear combination is the sum of the time that the lead
teacher spends directly questioning, responding to, comforting, and praising students, minus the time that the lead teacher spends observing students. The study’s
Table 3.3 (p. 79) and Table 3.4 (p. 82) provide standard deviations and correlations of the time the lead teacher spends in each of these activities. (Statistically
insignificant correlations are omitted. I treat these as zero.) From these standard
deviations and correlations, I generated an estimated variance of the social activity
linear combination.
However, this variance is for the individual observation for a lead teacher.
The actual measure used in the regressions is aggregated to the center level. The
report mentions that the “generalizability” of this social activity measure is 0.2 (p.
226). This means that the proportion of the variance in the individual observations
that can be explained by the center is 0.2 (p. 63). Therefore, I assume that the
center mean of this social activity variable has a variance of 0.2 times the variance of the individual lead teacher–measured variable. The resulting calculation
yields an estimated standard deviation in this social activity center mean variable
of 0.06877.
The estimated effect of social activity on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
(PPVT) is 8.63 (p. 234). The estimated standard deviation in the PPVT test, based
on unadjusted PPVT test scores, is 8.03 (derived from Table 5.1, p. 192). Therefore, a change of one standard deviation in the social activity variable is estimated
to increase the PPVT test score by 0.074 standard deviation units.
For the state pre-K study (Mashburn et al. 2008), the process variable I focus
on is the Classroom Assessment Scoring System “Instructional Support” (CLASS
IS) variable. This CLASS IS measure is derived from a factor analysis. CLASS IS
reflects whether teachers promote thinking skills and creativity and provide highquality feedback to students.
I focus on the effects of the CLASS IS variable on the three tests for which
standard deviations were reported. These three tests are the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test (PPVT), the Oral Expression Scale from the Oral and Written
Language Scale (OWLS), and the Woodcock-Johnson III Test of Achievement, in
the area of applied problems. Each of these tests has a standard deviation of 15.
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I focus on the average effects of the CLASS “Instructional Support” (IS)
measure on these three tests. The average reported effect of a one-unit change
in CLASS IS on these three tests is 0.807. But because the standard deviation of
each of these tests is 15, the effect in “standard deviation units” is 0.054 = 0.807
÷ 15. The reported standard deviation of the CLASS IS variable is 0.83 across the
classrooms included in the study. Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in
the CLASS IS variable will increase test scores by an effect size of 0.045 (= 0.83
× 0.054).
For comparison, the standard deviation of group size in the National Day
Care Study was 5.6, which is a little bit greater than the five-student reduction in
group size considered earlier.
36. In the 14-curricula study, by “consistently” statistically significant, I mean that
the effects were significant both at the end of pre-K and at the end of kindergarten. The two curricula that had significant consistent effects were 1) DLM Early
Childhood Express supplemented with Open Court Reading Pre-K and 2) Pre-K
Mathematics supplemented with DLM Early Childhood Express math software
(Preschool Curriculum Evaluation Research Consortium [PCERS] 2008). In the
“Project Upgrade” study (Layzer et al. 2007), the two successful curricula are RSL
and BTL. It is interesting that RSL did not have statistically significant effects in
the PCERS study even though it was included. This may reflect differences in the
quality of the curriculum used in the control classrooms. The Project Upgrade
report suggests that the baseline standards for literacy in their sample pre-K classrooms were weak.
37. The Tools of the Mind curriculum appears to increase what is known in educational research jargon as “executive functions” or “cognitive control.”
38. This calculation is done similarly to calculations reported in other endnotes in this
chapter. A 0.205 effect size due to a longer pre-K day is estimated to increase adult
earnings of former pre-K participants by a proportion that is 1.31 of the original
costs (1.31 = 0.205 × 6.40 effect of a one standard deviation increase in pre-K test
scores).
This is an increase in adult earnings effects of 49.5 percent of the original
earnings effects of 2.65 for former child participants only, from Chapter 4. I
assume that social spillover effects are blown up by a similar amount, going from
0.04 to 0.06 on an original cost basis, an increase of 0.02.
Child care hours increase by a factor of 3.24 (= 8 hours ÷ 3 hours per day
× 45 weeks ÷ 37 weeks). Accordingly, I assume that child care benefits, which
originally had a present value of 0.05 as a proportion of the original cost base, will
expand by 0.11, becoming 0.16 of the original cost base.
I assume that the expanded-time pre-K program will cost 3.62 times as much
as the original pre-K program. This is derived from figures from Gault et al. (2008).
They calculate that a three-hour-per-day program will cost $4,071 per school year,
and that a nine-hour-per-day program will cost $10,884 (Gault et al. 2008, p. 10). I
extrapolate this to the relative cost of an eight-hour-per-day program by multiplying by eight-ninths, and to the relative cost of a 45-week program by multiplying
by 45/37. The resulting cost increases are used to blow up the Chapter 4 baseline
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program’s gross costs of $6,823, and then are reexpressed as a proportion of the
Chapter 4 net costs per student of $4,933.
This expanded time increases the original cost basis to a new cost basis that
is 3.62 times its original value. In addition, it expands balanced budget multiplier
effects: they increase from 0.04 on an original cost basis to 0.15 on an original cost
basis, an increase of 0.11.
The total effect is to increase benefits, on an original cost basis, to 4.33 (=
2.78 + 1.31 + 0.02 + 0.11 + 0.11). However, the cost basis has increased to 3.62.
The new ratio of benefits to costs still exceeds 1 (4.33 ÷ 3.62 = 1.20), but the
increased benefits of 1.55 (= 4.33 − 2.78) are less than the increased costs of 2.62
(= 3.62 − 1.00).
39. This simply averages Reynolds’s results across the three test score measures for
kindergarten, reported in his Table 3 on p. 15.
40. Readers may note that the percentage effect on earnings is smaller for the second
year of pre-K than for the move from a half-day pre-K program to a full-day
program, even though the effect on test scores is greater for adding a second year
of pre-K. The reason, as detailed in other endnotes, is that the benefits and costs
of adding an extra year of pre-K are scaled back based on some displacement of
usage of other pre-K programs. For the move from a half-day to a full-day pre-K
program, I do not adjust benefits or costs for any reduced usage of other pre-K
programs.
41. The 0.253 effect size for the second year of pre-K suggests an earnings effect for
former child participants of 1.62 on the original cost basis. However, this should
be cut back somewhat to allow for the displacement of other public pre-K programs by universal pre-K, and to allow for possible lower benefits for middle- and
upper-income children. According to Barnett et al. (2008), public pre-K enrollment of four-year-olds is 35 percent and of three-year-olds is 12 percent. The calculations in Chapter 4 scaled back pre-K benefits for four-year-olds by 77 percent
because of other public enrollment and lower benefits for other groups. I assume
this scale-back factor is proportional to enrollment in public pre-K, and thus I
scale back gross three-year-old benefits by a factor of 26 percent (= 77% × 12%
÷ 35%). This reduces the earnings benefits for former child participants from the
added year at three years of age to 1.19 on the original cost basis (= 1.62 × [1 −
0.26]). This is an increase of 45 percent compared to the original earnings benefits
of former child participants (45% = 1.19 ÷ 2.65).
Social spillover benefits on labor productivity are also assumed to expand by
45 percent, from 0.04 to 0.06.
Child care benefits will double, from 0.05 to 0.10. Balanced-budget multiplier benefits will increase by the increase in costs, which I calculate next.
Gross costs increase by the assumed gross costs per pre-K participant of
$6,823. But these gross costs will be reduced by some offset from saved costs on
existing programs. The Chapter 4 calculations assume that net costs will be lowered from $6,823 to $4,933, a scaling back of 28 percent (28 % = [6,823 − 4,933]
÷ 6,823). I assume that this scaling back is reduced proportionately with the lower
existing public enrollment of three-year-olds (12%) vs. four-year-olds (35%).

158 Bartik
Therefore the scale-back factor from gross costs for three-year-olds is 10 percent
(10% = 28% × 12% ÷ 35%). The increased costs on the original net cost basis will
then be 1.25 (= [1 − 0.10] × $6,823 ÷ $4,933). Balanced-budget multiplier effects
will then be 2.25 of their original value, increasing from 0.04 to 0.09, an increase
of 0.05.
Total benefits on the original cost basis will be 4.09 (= 2.78 + 1.19 + 0.02 +
0.05 + 0.05). This is an increase of 1.31 on the original cost basis (1.31 = 4.09 −
2.78). Of course, the original cost basis increases from 1.00 to a new cost basis of
2.25. The state economic development benefits of 1.31 are slightly greater than the
increase in costs of 1.25.
42. For Oklahoma, see the various papers by William Gormley, such as Gormley et al.
(2005). For Georgia, see the review by Levin and Schwartz (2007).

6
Dealing with the Known Unknowns
How Policymakers Should Deal with
Dueling Estimates from Researchers
Thus far, this book’s analysis of business incentives and early childhood education has ignored that these benefits are uncertain. Business
incentive programs are estimated to increase the present value of state
residents’ earnings per dollar spent by $3.14. Early childhood programs
are estimated to increase the present value of state residents’ earnings
per dollar spent by $2–$3, with specific dollars-and-cents figures given
for each program. But these figures are best estimates. These best estimates are surrounded by considerable uncertainty. How much might
uncertainty affect benefits? What are the sources of this uncertainty?
How should this uncertainty affect our decisions about adopting these
programs? How should uncertainty affect program design? This chapter
addresses these questions. I conclude that despite uncertainty, we can
move forward with needed program expansions, while designing programs to increase our understanding of what works.

SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY
I read the research literature to say that preschool programs can
probably make a marked improvement in the lives of disadvantaged children, but that we have only a partial idea of how they
should be organized and managed, that is, brought to scale.
—Douglas Besharov (2007, p. 3)
My conclusion based on [my experience with studies focused on
state fiscal policy] is that we are uncertain about the effects of economic development policies, including broad state fiscal policy, on
economic growth.
—Therese McGuire (1992, p. 458)
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We examine the results of some of the programs considered to
be early education models—including Perry Preschool, Chicago
Child-Parent Studies, Abecedarian, and Head Start—and find the
research to be flawed and therefore of questionable value.
—Darcy Olsen and Lisa Snell (2006)
The upshot of all of this is that on the most basic question of all—
whether incentives induce significant new investment or jobs—we
simply do not know the answer. Since these programs probably
cost state and local governments about $40–$50 billion a year, one
would expect some clear and undisputed evidence of their success.
This is not the case.
—Peter Fisher and Alan Peters (2004, p. 32)

As with most social science research, the research findings on early
childhood programs and business incentives are viewed as “uncertain,”
“disputed,” or “questionable” by some observers. The above quotations
give some examples of such views. There is indeed some uncertainty in
the research on early childhood programs and business incentives. This
uncertainty is sometimes used by critics to argue that the research is
“flawed.” For example, the above quotation by Olsen and Snell comes
from a report by the libertarian Reason Foundation, in which they give
many reasons why there might be uncertainty about the success of early
childhood programs in different research studies. Although there is
uncertainty in research results, its magnitude is sometimes exaggerated,
and such uncertainty is inevitable in any social science research.
The uncertainty in estimated economic development benefits of
early childhood and business incentives programs has multiple sources.
These sources include the following:
• Small sample size in some studies
• Methodological differences across studies
• Problems in identifying causation
• Difficulty in observing long-term effects
• The use of local labor market models to infer labor market effects
• The complexity of defining “quality”
• Challenges in generalizing from studies and analyses to new and
often broader programs
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The small sample sizes of some studies of these programs makes
their estimates more uncertain. This small sample size is particularly a
problem for some (not all) studies of early childhood programs. Two of
the best random assignment studies, of Perry Preschool and the Abecedarian program, have low sample sizes. The Perry Preschool program
had 58 treatment-group children and 65 control-group children. The
Abecedarian program had 57 treatment-group children and 54 controlgroup children. These small sample sizes make it surprising that these
studies found any statistically significant effects. Statistically significant effects only occurred because some effects were large. The small
sample sizes make these studies vulnerable to attack by critics. Critics
such as Olsen and Snell can push hard on whether these studies “prove”
that early childhood programs work. As another example, the Cato
Institute has argued that many of Perry’s effects “disappeared when
the scientific standard [of statistical significance] was used” (Schaeffer
2008). (Although some of Perry’s results are not statistically significant,
many of its most important economic development effects are statistically significant. For example, effects on educational attainment and
employment rates are usually statistically significant at least at the 90
percent level, and sometimes at the 95 percent level.)1 Some econometricians argue that the Perry program’s multiple tests of outcomes
may have led to some overstatement of the statistical significance of
program results (Anderson 2008).
A larger source of uncertainty is differences across studies. For
example, the business incentive estimates in this book are derived from
studies of how state and local business taxes affect business location
or state and local economic growth. The estimates used here are average effects across studies. However, effects differ widely across various
studies. In my 1991 book, I concluded that plausible estimates of how
business taxes affect state and local economic development could be
one-half to three times the figures used here (Bartik 1991a).2
Moreover, a plausible alternative methodology is to infer the effects
of business incentives from the effects of overall business costs. Using
business taxes to infer the effects of business tax incentives already
assumes that “a dollar is a dollar”: the effect on business location decisions of a dollar of business incentive is the same as that of a dollar’s
reduction in business taxes. But why infer the effects of business incentives from the effects of business taxes? Instead, we can infer the effects
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of business incentives from the effects of a more comprehensive measure of business costs. Estimates suggest that state and local economic
development is less than half as responsive to overall business costs as
to business tax costs. For some unknown reason, state and local economic development is much less sensitive to labor costs, which dominate total business costs, than to business tax costs. Which estimates
are more accurate measures of how businesses will respond to business
incentives? As pointed out in Bartik (1991a), there are arguments on
both sides. I argue in Bartik (1991a) that it is more likely that the estimated labor cost effect is biased toward zero. However, the discrepancy
raises doubts about the estimated business tax effect.
The estimated business responsiveness to incentives has a large
effect on these programs’ ratios of economic development benefits to
program costs. For example, the well-known REMI regional econometric model estimates a sensitivity of local business activity to business
costs that can be used to estimate the cost per job created of business
incentives. This estimated cost per job created is 2.55 times the cost per
job created of business incentives that is assumed in this book (Bartik
et al. 2006). The baseline ratio of economic development benefits per
dollar of business incentives is 3.14. Using the REMI estimates, this
ratio would be reduced to 1.23 (= 3.14 ÷ 2.55). Other estimates could
reduce this ratio below 1.3
For early childhood programs, there are also wide variations across
studies. For example, results for home visitation programs vary widely.
The Nurse-Family Partnership program gets consistently favorable
reviews. Many other home visitation programs do not seem to have
large positive effects. For example, according to Steve Barnett and
Ellen Frede, codirectors of the National Institute for Early Education
Research, “Home visitation programs for children under age three
are popular, but most fall short of their goals for improving children’s
learning and development” (Barnett and Frede 2009, p. 5). According to
re-searcher Deanna Gomby, “For every outcome, as many as half of the
studies and programs [involving home visiting] demonstrate extremely
small or no benefits at all” (Gomby 2005, p. 44). These disparate findings suggest that home visitation programs may need especially good
designs or program contexts to be successful. High-quality pre-K education programs tend to have more consistent positive effects. (Even
Head Start on average has short-term positive results, although more
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modest than many high-quality pre-K programs or exemplary Head
Start centers.) This may reflect the greater number of contact hours
with the child in high-quality pre-K programs than in home visitation
programs.
Another source of uncertainty is that it sometimes is difficult to be
sure that we have identified causal effects of the programs. For example, the Chicago Child-Parent Center program was not evaluated using
random assignment. Instead, outcomes for former participants in CPC
programs were compared with outcomes for students in similar neighborhoods without CPC programs. This procedure is reasonable. But it
means there could have been other differences between the two groups
of students than access to the CPC program. In contrast, the evaluations
of many other early childhood programs are based on random assignment. This includes Perry Preschool, the Abecedarian program, and
the Nurse-Family Partnership program. Random assignment implies
that estimated effects should be unbiased estimates of causal effects of
the program. Absent random assignment, estimates could be biased by
other systematic differences between program participants and the control group.
In business incentive studies, state and local business tax rates may
be endogenous, which biases estimates. Business tax rates are sometimes measured by dividing business tax revenue by some measure of
economic output or income. Using such measures, business tax rates
will be affected by state economic growth. Better measures of business
tax rates would hold the economy constant. For example, rates could be
measured by business taxes as a percentage of business profits or value
added for a hypothetical firm whose characteristics are held constant.
Even with this better measurement, business tax rates are obviously
chosen by state and local government. State legislators and other political leaders may base these choices on the economy.
The endogeneity of business taxes may bias estimates. The estimated “effect” of state and local business taxes on the state economy
may instead represent effects of the economy on taxes. Studies try to
control for this endogeneity. For example, if lagged tax rates are used,
the measured tax rate will not be directly affected by today’s economic
growth. But there are no perfect solutions. Lagged economic growth
and today’s economic growth may be positively correlated. The esti-

164 Bartik

mated correlation of lagged tax rates with today’s economy may in part
reflect the influence of the past economy.
Another source of uncertainty is that studies usually only observe
the effects of programs in the short term. But the economic development benefits of these policies depend greatly on their long-term effects.
Such long-term effects may be inferred but are usually not directly
observed. For example, the estimated effects of business taxes are typically based on studies that look at new location decisions, or at business growth over some short-term time period. To get long-run effects
of business taxes, we must make assumptions about how local economies behave. For example, I assume that business activity only adjusts
gradually to some change in business tax rates (see Bartik 1991a, p.
237). I also assume that a local economy’s output and employment follow a random walk. Under this hypothesis, an induced increase in business activity that is due to business incentives will permanently persist
at the same level, rather than gradually depreciating or appreciating.
(This issue was previously addressed in an endnote to Chapter 4.) The
random walk behavior is consistent with data on how local economies
behave (for example, in the well-known article by Blanchard and Katz
[1992]).4 However, this assumption is a plausible model, not a proven
objective fact.
For early childhood programs, observed effects on former child participants never encompass their entire lifetime work history. How could
they, unless the studies extended for 70 years? The Perry Preschool
program has effects estimated through age 40. This gives a fairly good
idea of total career effects. For the other early childhood programs I
consider (Abecedarian, NFP), the estimated effects are largely inferred
from effects observed at age 20 or earlier. I look at effects as of age 20
on educational attainment, employment rates, earnings, and criminal
activity. Effects on these indicators can be used to project lifetime earnings effects. These estimates are plausible, but they are extrapolations.
A related problem is that even long-term impact studies may not
tell us the impact of programs today. As Ludwig and Phillips (2007,
p. 3) point out, “[There] is a generic challenge to understanding the
long-term impacts of contemporaneous government programs—we can
only estimate long-term impacts for people who participated in the program a long time ago.” Programs implemented a long time ago were
implemented in a different social context. There will always be some
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uncertainty as to whether the same program implemented today will
have similar long-term impacts.
For example, the best long-term evidence for the impacts of early
childhood programs is from the Perry Preschool program. This program
has now followed former childhood participants up to age 40. But the
Perry Preschool study is based on a program in which enrollment began
in 1962. The United States was quite a different country in 1962 than
it is today. One crucial difference is that back in 1962, there were relatively few pre-K programs available for low-income families. This is no
longer true today. As a result, any new pre-K program may not have as
much “value added” as the baseline programs that are already available.
Another source of uncertainty is that estimated economic development benefits rest on plausible but not totally proven models of how
local labor markets respond to supply or demand shocks. Consider the
estimated effects of early childhood programs on state residents’ earnings. These effects reflect plausible estimates of how many former child
participants in early childhood programs will stay in their home state.
The estimated effects also use labor market models that suggest that
labor supply shocks will have displacement effects of one-third.
Consider the estimated effects of business incentives. These effects
assume a particular time path of how state employment growth will
affect state population, unemployment rates, and labor force participation rates. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, these estimates are based
on good empirical evidence. However, these estimates are contested by
some prominent researchers, such as Blanchard and Katz (1992).
Another uncertainty is the complexity in defining quality in these
programs. This is discussed in Chapter 5 and need not be detailed here.
We do have a basis for informed opinions about what makes a goodquality business incentive program or early childhood program. But
there is some inevitable remaining uncertainty about what program
designs work best.
A challenging issue is whether the estimates derived from particular
studies can be generalized to new programs. For example, most of the
early childhood programs focused on in this book (Perry Preschool,
Abecedarian, and NFP) included extensive involvement of researchers
with program design. Furthermore, the Perry and Abecedarian programs
are quite small-scale. Will these small, researcher-tended, hothouse
programs do as well when transplanted to a different setting, expanded
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to a large scale, and overseen by a state or local government of average
competence? According to psychologist Mark Lipsey, large-scale programs tend to have about half the effects of their small-scale, researcherrun counterparts (Lipsey 2009). It is reassuring that the Child-Parent
Center program, which was run on a large scale by the Chicago Public
Schools, does appear to have been successful.
This book’s estimates also assume that estimated effects of overall
business taxes can be generalized to business tax incentives. In addition, this book’s discussion of business incentives that are services to
business assumes some generalization from small-scale to large-scale
programs. I assume that programs providing customized job training,
manufacturing extension services, entrepreneurship training, or smallbusiness development help, will be equally effective per dollar spent if
they are scaled up.

THE BEST RESPONSE TO UNCERTAINTY
We need . . . large-scale state demonstrations with careful evaluations. Then—and only then—will we be justified in having a true
national movement and spending serious money—the $20 billion,
$30 billion, $40 billion per year it will cost to make sure that all of
our at-risk kids get a high-quality preschool program.
—Ron Haskins, codirector, Brookings Institution Center on Children and Families (Haskins and Rolnick 2006, p. 7)5
My message to policymakers is that the effects of state and local
tax policy are so uncertain that concern over this issue should not
be a driving force in general fiscal policy decisions.
—Therese McGuire (1992, p. 458)
The more fundamental question . . . is whether we should wait
until we have developed the perfect program before we move to
extend Head Start to all eligible children. Obviously the answer is
“no.” Research and expanded funding for Head Start can be compatible. We can make funds available for grantees that are willing
and able to evaluate the effectiveness of various aspects of their
programming while expanding enrollments.
—Janet Currie (2007)
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How should our decision-making about policy respond to these
many sources of uncertainty? There are at least three types of responses.
(However, a strategy might combine these three types.) The possible
responses include the following:
1) Wait for better evidence. (Haskins and McGuire in the above
quotations seem to take this perspective.)
2) Go ahead with large-scale program implementation, based on
the best empirical estimates, of what we currently know to be
the best-quality design of the program.
3) Go ahead on a large scale with the best design of these programs, but design the program structure so as to maximize our
learning from the programs’ experience. (Currie in the above
quotation seems to take this perspective.)
Waiting has its attractions. We can imagine many fine social experiments that would enormously increase our knowledge about what
works in business incentives and early childhood education. If such
experiments were not too costly, in both money and time, then it clearly
would be better to wait. If waiting could provide better proof of what
strategy makes the most sense, at low costs, who could object?
But of course experiments are costly. The main cost is not the money
cost. The most important cost is a time cost or opportunity cost. Waiting
means that in the interim we forgo the economic development benefits
of earlier, large-scale implementation of these programs. It is a cliché to
say that children only grow up once. If they miss having a good pre-K
experience now, our later learning about a possibly better program will
not make up for what past cohorts of children have missed. A similar
argument could be made for business incentives: If we wait for more
studies, some jobs will not be created in this state today. Some state
residents will not be employed who otherwise would be employed. This
lack of employment experience has long-lasting effects on these state
residents’ wages, employability, and self-confidence.
An attractive option is to move ahead with large-scale implementation of our best current estimate of the optimal business incentive
programs and early childhood programs. Suppose a policymaker is
faced with many decisions about what public policies to implement.
Suppose there is considerable uncertainty about each decision. With
many uncertain decisions, the best course of action is to be guided by
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the expected net benefits of each decision. This course of action maximizes the total net benefits from all the decisions, judged collectively.
If the uncertainty in each individual policy decision is uncorrelated with
the uncertainty in the other policy decisions, the positive and negative
surprises will tend to balance out.6
However, an even better option is to have our cake and eat it too. We
can implement at a large scale our current best guess about an optimal
business incentive or early childhood program. But we can also design
these programs so their quality can be continuously improved. How can
such learning capabilities best be designed into a large-scale program?
First, learning will be advanced if the program tests a variety of
planned variations in program design. We should test variations that
plausibly might improve performance, but for which we don’t know
enough about effectiveness. For example, some business incentive
programs should test variations in the length of customized training
programs, whether these customized training programs focus on new
or incumbent workers, and the size and industry of businesses participating in the programs. As another example, pre-K programs should
be tested that systematically differ in class size, weekly hours, days
per year, and one versus two years of pre-K education. We should also
explore planned variation in pre-K curricula, and in teacher credentials
and training.
Second, data should be systematically collected on program outcomes, program structure and costs, and program processes. For
example, early childhood programs should all collect data on the same
measures for child achievement, child behavior, child mental health,
and family behavior. Data should also be collected on key structural
features of each program, such as class size and teacher qualifications.
Data should be regularly collected on what is actually going on in each
program’s interactions with children and/or parents. Programs might
also choose to collect data on other measures, but some measures
should be collected by all programs.
For business incentive programs, core data should be collected in
all programs on selected measures of businesses’ assessment of the
programs’ quality, and on the programs’ impact on jobs, productivity,
and wages. Data should also be collected from state data files—available in all states from the unemployment insurance program—on the
employment and earnings of individual businesses. In addition, data
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should be collected on the costs and design features of the program. For
example, data should be collected from customized training programs
on the dollar costs per trainee, the class size of customized training, and
who delivers the training. For manufacturing extension services, data
should be collected on the number of hours of advice per business, and
the technical expertise of the person providing the advice. Furthermore,
data should be collected on qualitative features of the program. These
qualitative features might include what types of skills are taught in customized training, or what specific types of information are provided in
manufacturing extension services. Collection of data on core measures
allows programs to be compared.
Third, program learning will also be facilitated if there is room for
creative new program designs by local program operators. This means
that ideas for additional variations in program design should not just be
generated from the top down, but also from the bottom up.
Several researchers have highlighted the greater measured effects
on early childhood educational development of state-run prekindergarten programs relative to Head Start. Even prior to the recent final
report of the Head Start Impact Study, Steve Barnett, codirector of
the National Institute for Early Education Research, summarized the
research literature as concluding that “Head Start’s effects on learning
may be smaller than those of many state and local pre-K programs . . .”
(Barnett 2008, p. 18). The smaller effects of Head Start are surprising because Head Start is more expensive per child. Of course, Head
Start has broader goals than educational development, such as family
health. But some researchers have argued that Head Start may also suffer from some rigidity because of its centralized federal control. For
example, economist Art Rolnick of the Minneapolis Fed has argued
that “Head Start . . . [has] performed well below expectations because
[it] approach[es] the problem of early childhood development from the
top down” (Haskins and Rolnick 2006). Ron Haskins of the Brookings
Institution has argued that “we’re not going to figure this [early childhood education] out at the federal level . . . The states are really the key
to this” (Jacobson 2007, p. 16).
For business incentives, no one would argue that federal agencies
have led the way in creating new program approaches. The U.S. Economic Development Administration is not the source of most new ideas
in economic development. It is state and local agencies that have pro-
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vided the creativity in coming up with new program approaches. The
federal role has mostly been to provide supportive funding.
We don’t have to assume that state and local governments are inherently more creative than federal agencies to see some merit in multiple
approaches. More new ideas are likely to be generated if there are more
groups that have the freedom to try new ideas. Providing some considerable autonomy to state and local initiatives is one way to do so.
Fourth, the results of these programs should be measured by comparing program results for program participants to results for similar
nonparticipants. This requires that data on the core program success
measures be collected for these similar nonparticipants. Adding in nonparticipants adds considerably to the costs of data collection: more data
must be collected, and collection of data from nonparticipants may be
more difficult.
This comparison of program participants with nonparticipants
requires identifying similar nonparticipants. In some cases, it may be
possible to do random assignment. However, random assignment is frequently politically and ethically difficult. How do you refuse to admit
a child to a universal pre-K program? How do you refuse to provide
extension services to a manufacturer struggling with difficult competitive issues? Therefore, it is necessary to develop approaches that will
plausibly identify similar nonparticipants without random assignment.
Without random assignment, high-quality program evaluation can
still be pursued. Program design may often cause program participation
to vary because of factors that do not dramatically alter program participants’ success. If such factors affecting program participation can be
modeled, then the evaluation can come up with reasonable estimates of
the causal effects of the program. For example, child participation in a
universal pre-K program that charges income-based fees may vary with
whether the family’s income is below or above the cutoff for charging
fees.7 Child participation in a universal pre-K program may also vary
with where pre-K facilities are located relative to the family’s location.8 For a business incentive program, a business’s participation may
also vary with the business’s location relative to the location of the
program’s service provider. Business incentive programs may also do
selective or random marketing of the program to different businesses.
This difference in marketing to individual businesses may result in
variation in business program participation that is independent of likely
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business success. Such variation in program participation may generate
evidence on the true effects of the program on various business success
measures.9
For these measures and evaluations to be credible, they need to
be conducted independently of program providers. However, program
providers will need to cooperate in helping collect the needed data on
program design and from program participants. For the evaluations
to be comparable, they need to be coordinated according to uniform
standards.
To implement all these creative program features, such programs
should allow for considerable state and local discretion. However, the
federal government is the only plausible source of uniformity in standards. We need uniform national standards for data collection, for the
program variations that will be prioritized for testing, and for the methodology of program evaluations. These standards should be accompanied by the federal funding needed to support this large-scale data collection and evaluation. Therefore, some combination of state and local
program management, with federal funding and standards for systematic program learning, seems the most sensible division of government
responsibility. These general principles leave room for arguing about
the exact division of responsibility between the federal government versus state and local governments.10 (Chapters 10 and 13 include further
discussion of appropriate federal versus state and local roles in business
incentive programs and early childhood programs.)

CONCLUSION
Uncertainty need not paralyze action. Despite uncertainty, we have
reasonable estimates of the economic development benefits of business
incentives and early childhood programs. We also have reasonable estimates of what program designs will maximize those economic development benefits.
We can both realize the expected benefits from expanding these
programs and also learn more about what works. To do so, program
expansions must allow for testing a wide variety of creative program
approaches. These tests should include requirements to collect good data
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on key program success measures and key program operation details.
A combination of state and local creativity, with good federal standards
for data collection and evaluation, seems the best way to move forward.
It is a cliché to say that state and local governments are laboratories
of democracy. State and local governments, left to their own devices,
will clearly experiment with different designs for business incentives
and early childhood education. But without federal support and requirements for data collection and evaluation, these laboratories of democracy will not be good laboratories. Strong federal incentives must be
provided so that these laboratories will produce knowledge about what
works that is useful to the nation.

Notes
1. The Perry effects used in Chapter 4 are reviewed in Appendix 4B of this book,
available on-line from the Upjohn Institute. This appendix includes a discussion
of whether various effects are statistically significant. The educational attainment
and employment rate effects are statistically significant at some ages at the 95
percent level, and at other ages at the 90 percent level. In all cases, however, these
effects are substantively large. Most of the statistical evidence reviewed in Appendix 4B comes from Schweinhart et al. (2005).
2. This book uses Wasylenko’s summary estimate that the elasticity of state and local
economic activity with respect to state and local business taxes is −0.2. The range
of plausible estimates in my book is from −0.1 to −0.6. Studies that control for
fixed effects or public services tend to find larger elasticities (in absolute value).
One can easily find studies outside that range, including some very good studies.
For example, Hines’s (1996) estimates find an elasticity of −0.65. His estimates
use an unusually good methodology. He compares the location decisions among
U.S. states of foreign corporations from countries that only allow a deduction for
U.S. taxes versus countries that allow a full credit for U.S. taxes. This different
treatment of state and local business taxes seems a plausible exogenous shift in the
tax price of different U.S. states.
3. For example, the estimated long-run elasticity of business activity with respect
to wages is −0.67 (Bartik 1991a, p. 51). Labor costs are about 14 times state and
local business tax costs (p. 49). Therefore, based on the wage elasticity, we would
expect the long-run elasticity with respect to state and local business taxes to be
about −0.05 (= −0.67 ÷ 14). The elasticity used in the current book is −0.20. Using
an elasticity of −0.05 would quadruple the costs per job created of business incentives. The ratio of economic development benefits to program costs would decline
from 3.14 to 0.79 (= 3.14 ÷ 4).
4. This random walk behavior is also consistent with theories of why city size distributions look the way they do. A regularity in city size distributions is that the
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5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

product of a city’s population and the city’s population rank among cities in the
country is a constant for a given country and time period. This regularity can be
derived if city growth shocks are random draws from a distribution, which is random walk behavior. See Gabaix (2008).
This quote from Ron Haskins comes from Haskins and Rolnick (2006), which is a
transcript of a discussion between Ron Haskins and Art Rolnick.
Ludwig and Phillips recently commented on this issue in the context of Head Start:
“Some observers have focused on the fact that many of the estimated impacts in
the recent randomized experiment evaluation of Head Start are not statistically
significant, and so follow the usual scientific convention of assuming that any estimates that cannot be statistically distinguished from zero are zero . . . But . . . the
expected value of a program’s benefits and costs may be a more relevant framework for making policy decisions than statistical significance, and the expected
net value of Head Start is positive” (Ludwig and Phillips 2007, p. 4).
These comments came before the recent release of the final report of the Head
Start Impact Study. I do not know whether Ludwig and Phillips still believe that
the findings of the Head Start Impact Study support the notion that the expected
net benefits of Head Start are positive. However, the point they make remains
valid in concept, although perhaps not in this specific application.
This is sometimes called a regression discontinuity approach. Outcomes are
assumed to vary smoothly with family income. Yet participation in the program
varies discretely as the income cutoff is crossed.
An approach such as this was used by David Card to estimate the causal effects of
college education on earnings (Card 1995).
If the marketing is selective, we have a regression discontinuity model. Business
success without the program would vary smoothly with whatever cutoff is used to
select businesses for marketing. Yet participation will vary discretely around the
cutoff. Alternatively, random marketing will yield experimental estimates. The
marketing will cause random variation in the percentage participating in two different groups. The difference in success measures in the two groups can be divided
by the difference in the percentage participating to yield a plausible estimate of
program effects. This is similar to the approach used in any regular experiment for
converting “intent to treat” estimated effects to actual program effects.
For example, one hot political issue is the future of Head Start. Some more conservative analysts, such as Ron Haskins, have advocated converting Head Start to
a block grant to state and local governments. Other more liberal analysts, such as
Jens Ludwig and Deborah Phillips, have worried about the risk in allowing this
radical change in Head Start program design.

7
Bringing the Future into the Present
How Policymakers Should Deal with the
Delayed Benefits of Early Childhood Programs
As discussed in Chapter 4, early childhood programs and business
incentives differ in their benefits’ timing. Business incentives deliver
sizable economic development benefits almost immediately. Jobs are
attracted, and this immediately increases employment rates and upgrades
many state residents to better jobs. In contrast, most benefits of early
childhood programs are long delayed. Early childhood programs have
some economic development benefits in the short term. Free child care
and other services to parents increase parental labor supply. Spending
more money stimulates the state economy. But these short-term economic development benefits are modest. During the years right after
these programs are begun, earnings of state residents go up by only 20
to 30 percent of program costs. Annual earnings effects of these programs do not exceed annual costs until at least 20 years later. (Figure
7.1, which reproduces Figure 4.2, shows the time pattern of effects.)
These delays in benefits occur because so many of the benefits are due
to the improved adult labor supply of former child participants. Better
child development’s benefits are only achieved in the long run.
The delayed nature of benefits from early childhood programs
raises two issues. First, how should policymakers weight future benefits versus current costs? I will argue that policymakers should not
discount future benefits too much. At any reasonable discount rate, benefits exceed costs for high-quality early childhood programs. However,
policymakers often do drastically discount or disregard social benefits
that are in the future. This leads to the second issue. Given that policymakers discount the future too much, what can be done to encourage
policymakers to adopt early childhood programs? How can we get policymakers to adopt programs that are socially beneficial but politically
unattractive because their benefits are delayed? Various approaches will
be discussed to making such programs more attractive. We can work on
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Figure 7.1 Ratio of Annual Economic Development Benefits for State
Residents to Program Costs, Each Year after Permanent
Program Is Begun, for Three Early Childhood Programs and
a Business Incentive Program
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NOTE: As defined in this book, annual economic development benefits for state residents are just effects on state residents’ earnings per capita. This figure assumes that
one of three early childhood programs is begun in 2011 and continues permanently.
The figure reports effects on state residents’ earnings due to increases in the earnings
of the state's original residents who remain in the state. For comparison, the figure also
shows effects for a permanent program of business incentives whose scale remains at
the same percentage of the state economy over time. This figure is identical to Figure
4.2.

costs. Short-run costs can be postponed or reduced. Alternatively, we
can work on benefits. Long-run benefits can be shifted toward the present. Short-run benefits can be increased.
Improving the short-run benefits versus costs of early childhood
programs would put these programs on a more level playing field with
business incentive programs. As will be discussed below, business
incentive programs use various techniques to increase short-run benefits relative to costs. The magnitude of short-run benefits versus costs is
not an immutable attribute of a program, but can be affected by policy.
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DISCOUNTING
What social discount rate should be used for evaluating public policies? This question has been extensively debated in the economics literature. Recently, the debate over discount rates has been reignited in
discussing environmental issues. Environmental issues such as global
warming often involve trade-offs between short-run costs and long-run
environmental benefits. The discount rate used to compare future benefits with current costs makes a big difference in whether specific policies pass a benefit-cost test. Low social discount rates support stringent
environmental policies. High social discount rates support lax environmental policies.
For this book, I assume we are determining a discount rate for comparing consumption over time. What is the value of a dollar of consumption a year from now, or 10 or 30 years from now, compared to a
dollar of consumption today?1
The relative value of future consumption versus current consumption should depend on several factors. First, the value of future versus
current consumption should depend on how fast one assumes the social
value of extra consumption declines with higher per capita consumption. Most economic models assume some growth of per capita consumption over time. If one assumes that the value of an extra dollar of
consumption dramatically declines as per capita consumption declines,
then future changes in consumption should be down-weighted more
heavily. Second, the value of future versus current consumption should
depend on how fast one expects per capita consumption to increase. If
per capita consumption will increase more rapidly over time, then people in the future will have higher per capita consumption. Other things
being equal, this reduces the social value of an extra dollar of consumption in the future versus a dollar today. Third, it is possible that there is
some inherent bias toward current consumption over future consumption. Even if per capita consumption did not increase over time, it is
possible that many people would value a dollar of consumption today
more than a dollar of consumption in the future.2
The discount rates used in this book should be compatible with the
growth rate of per capita consumption that I assume. For this book, I
assumed a rate of growth of real wages (and hence per capita consump-
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tion) of 1.2 percent per year. We could assume different rates of per
capita consumption growth. But then we would need to adjust future
earnings flows as well. For this discussion, I hold real wage growth and
per capita consumption growth constant at 1.2 percent per year.
However, there are many possible assumptions about how rapidly
the social value of consumption declines as per capita consumption
increases. There are also different assumptions about how much the
present should be inherently preferred to the future, even if per capita
consumption were the same.
The debate over global warming has involved different assumptions about these determinants of discount rates. Sir Nicholas Stern, the
lead author of the well-known Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, which was prepared for the British government, adopted
assumptions that led to a relatively low discount rate (Stern 2007).
Some of the American critics of the Stern Review, such as economists
William Nordhaus and Martin Weitzman, adopted assumptions that led
to somewhat higher discount rates.
In addition, the leading American academic journal on public policy, the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, recently published
an article that made other assumptions about discount rates. The article
was titled “Just Give Me a Number! Practical Values for the Social Discount Rate” (Moore et al. 2004). The article tries to provide assumptions that would lead to some consensus on the social discount rate.
For the current book, I explored how it makes a difference to follow
all these varying assumptions about discount rates. However, I adjusted
all these discount rates to this book’s assumption of a 1.2 percent annual
growth rate in real wages. Under that wage growth scenario, the Stern
Review’s assumptions imply a social discount rate of less than 2 percent.
Nordhaus’s and Weitzman’s assumptions imply social discount rates of
3.9 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively (Nordhaus 2007; Weitzman
2007). The Moore et al. assumptions imply a social discount rate of 2.2
percent. Finally, this book’s baseline estimates assume a social discount
rate of 3 percent.
How do these discount rates affect the benefits and costs of business incentives and early childhood programs? Table 7.1 shows ratios
of economic development benefits for state residents to costs for these
programs under various discount rates. Notice two points about these
results: First, as one would expect, the higher discount rates of Nordhaus
or Weitzman make the early childhood programs look somewhat

Table 7.1 Effects of Alternative Discount Rate Assumptions on Ratio of Present Value of State Economic
Development Benefits to Program Costs, for Business Incentives and for Three Early Childhood
Programs
Discount rate assumption of:
Moore
Stern
et al.
This book Nordhaus Weitzman
Implied discount rate on aggregate future earnings (%)
1.6
2.2
3.0
3.9
4.4
Ratio of present value of earnings effects to costs for:
Business incentives
3.56
3.36
3.14
2.92
2.82
Universal pre-K
4.46
3.62
2.78
2.10
1.82
Abecedarian
1.59
2.54
2.25
1.88
1.71
Nurse-Family Partnership
1.88
2.23
1.85
1.49
1.33
NOTE: State economic development benefits are defined in this book as increased earnings per capita of state residents. See Appendix 7A
for methodology and references.
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worse relative to business incentives. Higher discount rates mean that
the future adult earnings of former child participants are not weighted
as highly. Second, under all these discount rates, the present value of
increased earnings for state residents exceeds the cost of the program.
Therefore, even under assumptions that yield relatively high discount
rates, these early childhood programs still make sense from a state economic development perspective. Benefits for former child participants
are so large that even high discount rates do not make these benefits
unimportant.
Another possible way to analyze these different policies is in terms
of their rate of return. The “rate of return” of a proposed public policy is
the maximum discount rate at which the project is still worth pursuing.
This maximum rate of return helps reveal whether the project would be
worth doing under more extreme assumptions about appropriate discount rates. As is well known in benefit-cost analysis, this rate of return
should not be used to rank projects. The present value, calculated using
the correct discount rate, should be used to rank projects. The discount
rate’s purpose is to allow a comparison of the relative value of consumption at different points of time.
Table 7.2 shows these rate-of-return calculations. Business incentives yield benefits exceeding costs immediately. Therefore, business
incentives will have a positive return at any discount rate. Early childhood programs are all worth doing unless real social discount rates
exceed 5.7 percent. Such high discount rates are implausible.
This discussion focuses on what policymakers should do. Research
on the social discount rate suggests that policymakers should discount
the future, but not too much. Therefore, policymakers should be willing to implement early childhood programs, even though many of their
benefits are far in the future.
Unfortunately, this is probably not the way many state, local, and
federal policymakers actually view the world. These early childhood
programs do not have benefits exceeding costs for the remaining political career of most policymakers. In the short run, while the policymakers considering these programs are in office, these early childhood programs have benefits that fall short of costs.
Many policymakers may have implicit discount rates that exceed 10
percent. Research suggests that corporate executives evaluate investment projects at discount rates that average 12 percent (Poterba and
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Table 7.2 Annual Rate of Return to Business Incentives and Three
Early Childhood Programs, from a State Economic
Development Perspective
Program
Annual rate of return, state perspective
Business incentives
Infinite or undefined
Universal pre-K
6.7
Abecedarian
7.7
Nurse-Family Partnership
5.7
NOTE: This table shows the highest real interest rate at which the present value of
effects of the program on state residents’ per capita earnings exceeds the present value
of program costs. Business incentives’ benefits exceed costs regardless of how high
the real interest rate is, as estimated program benefits in the first year exceed costs.
Therefore, the “rate of return” to business incentives can be seen as infinite or undefined. Note that all these “rates of return” only include “economic development benefits” for the state. Thus, these rates of return do not count, for example, the benefits of
reduced crime, or spillover effects on earnings of residents of other states.

Summers 1995). Government policymakers might be at least as shortsighted. If policymakers’ discount rates are 10 percent or greater, the
value of the earnings benefits from early childhood programs will fall
short of these programs’ costs.
Can anything be done to change the net benefits of early childhood
programs, as perceived by policymakers? We could simply argue for
adopting a long-term perspective. However, changing such underlying attitudes is difficult. Political pressures encourage policymakers to
worry about reelection.
A more politically feasible alternative is to adjust the benefits and
costs of early childhood programs to increase their short-term payoff.
Short-term costs can be postponed or otherwise reduced. Long-term
benefits can be shifted toward the short term, or short-term benefits can
be otherwise increased. The rest of this chapter considers the options
for increasing the short-term economic development payoff of early
childhood programs.
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REDUCING SHORT-RUN COSTS: POSTPONING COSTS
THROUGH BORROWING
One way to reduce short-run costs of early childhood programs is
to finance the programs through borrowing. Borrowing delays program
costs, allowing the timing of costs to better match the timing of economic development benefits.
Borrowing is generally accepted as a way for the government to pay
for “physical capital”—roads, public buildings, prisons. The rationale
for this borrowing is that it allows the costs of building or rehabilitating
physical capital to be better matched to the stream of benefits from such
capital. For example, building a new highway has large up-front costs.
Yet its benefits will be received for many years to come.
Allowing borrowing for early childhood programs would put these
programs on a more level playing field with business incentives. Business incentive programs can postpone many of their costs by promising future incentives to business. Because these programs can postpone
costs, they become more attractive to policymakers.
However, most state constitutions severely restrict public borrowing, except for the building or redevelopment of tangible physical
capital. In most states, it would be illegal for the government to sell a
30-year bond to pay for early childhood programs.
State and local governments have come up with creative ways of
borrowing to get around these constitutional restrictions. States have
sometimes securitized streams of revenues they will receive from dedicated sources. For example, states have sold off future revenues that
they will receive from the settlement with tobacco companies, and
have used the proceeds to finance public programs (Scheppach 2003;
Sindelar and Falba 2004). Some states have sold off the rights to collect
tolls on a public highway (Burwell and Puentes 2009).
In economic development policy, one common program is tax increment financing (TIF) (Dye and Merriman 2006). In a TIF program, the
increase in property tax revenue in a particular geographic area is dedicated to a special TIF fund. For example, this geographic area might be
a downtown area. This dedicated revenue can only be used for purposes
determined by the authority overseeing the TIF district. It is common to
use TIF revenues as backing for bonds that are sold to finance various

Bringing the Future into the Present 183

public improvements in the TIF district. For example, in a downtown
area, the TIF revenues might be used to finance parking ramps, or for
marketing the downtown.
TIFs are being used in more creative ways. Of particular relevance
here is that TIFs are starting to be used for educational programs. Michigan recently passed a “Promise Zone” law, which was inspired by the
Kalamazoo Promise. Under the Kalamazoo Promise, private donors
guaranteed that they would pay up to four years of tuition at Michigan
public universities and community colleges for all graduates of Kalamazoo Public Schools. The Michigan Promise Zone law allows for
TIF zones to help finance similar programs in other areas of Michigan.
A school district or some other local government can develop a plan to
provide free college tuition to all students within the district or government jurisdiction. If this plan is approved by the state of Michigan, the
plan can in part be funded by TIFs. The plan would receive the state
education property tax revenue from the increase in property values in
the designated area.3
Similar TIFs could be created to finance early childhood programs.
Some portion of the increment in a tax’s revenue could be dedicated to a
fund to support early childhood programs. The incremental tax revenue
would not have to necessarily be property tax revenue. Early childhood
TIFs could be financed with incremental revenue from the sales tax or
income tax. The dedicated revenue in that fund could be used to support
bond issues to pay the up-front costs of early childhood programs.
What objections might be raised to borrowing for early childhood
programs? One is that borrowing only makes sense if the early childhood program does produce sizable future benefits. If the early childhood program does not produce sizable long-run benefits, then it would
be a mistake to borrow to pay its costs.
A second objection is that allowing borrowing for the operating
costs of public programs, even highly desirable programs, might lead to
abuses. There are good historical reasons why state constitutions often
restrict public borrowing. In the early nineteenth century, American
states were extraordinarily active in borrowing. This borrowing was
often used to support corporations that promoted state economic development, such as investments in canals, railroads, and banks. However,
this large-scale borrowing led to eight states defaulting on their debts
during the economic downturn of the 1840s. Subsequent state constitu-

184 Bartik

tional amendments put significant limitations on state debt issuance and
investment in corporations (Wallis 2000).
A third objection is that the current period does not seem the most
favorable time to expand debt. The recession that began in December
2007 is widely attributed to excessive promotion of overly risky debt
by many different financial institutions and government agencies. The
financial system might not be ready for new forms of government financing. The political winds might not support such government borrowing.
It is somewhat disconcerting that a few years ago, Citigroup was
promoting the financing of early childhood education with debt financing. In October 2006, the managing director of the Student Loan Group
of Citigroup made a presentation to a group of early childhood advocates on this topic (Sheldon 2006). According to the meeting summary,
the Citigroup director pointed out that “because early care education
[ECE] spending is a capital formation expenditure . . . , an optimal way
for society to pay for ECE costs would be to match the repaying of cash
to the time when benefits are received . . . He proposed this might be
accomplished via a financing mechanism similar to the federal government’s student loan program . . . Under such an arrangement, the same
entities (parents, federal and state governments) that currently pay for
early education would be responsible to pay under [this new financing] proposal” (Invest in Kids/PAES 2006). These are all cogent points.
However, now does not seem the best time for new creative financing
schemes.

REDUCING SHORT-RUN COSTS: POSSIBLE OFFSETS
FROM REDUCED SPECIAL EDUCATION COSTS
One significant short-run cost offset to early childhood programs
is reduced special education costs. High-quality early childhood programs have been shown to significantly reduce the percentage of students in K–12 special education. For example, the Perry Preschool project reduced special education assignments for mental impairment from
35 percent in the control group to 15 percent in the treatment group
(Schweinhart et al. 2005). Reductions of about half as much in special
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education assignments were found in the Chicago Child-Parent Center
program: from 25 percent down to 14 percent (Reynolds et al. 2002).
The more intensive and more expensive Abecedarian program had
somewhat larger effects on special education assignments: it reduced
them from 48 percent to 25 percent (Masse and Barnett 2002).4
Reducing special education assignments even modestly can yield
significant cost savings. Special education is expensive. It is estimated
that special education assignment costs an average of more than $10,000
a year per special education student. This is an extra $10,000 cost above
regular education costs (Parrish et al. 2004, Part II; updated to 2007
dollars using the CPI). These special education costs can extend over
many years, from kindergarten through high school (and even beyond
in some cases). Because special education costs such a great amount per
year and extends for many years, the cost savings from reducing special
education assignments can be large.
Early childhood programs might also cause other savings for the
education system, the social welfare system, and the criminal justice
system. However, in the present context, we are focusing on cost savings that are short-term. Reducing grade retention saves costs only in
the long run. The costs that are saved from reduced criminal activity
also take many years to be realized. Savings in child welfare costs from
reduced abuse and neglect cases may be more immediate. However, the
evidence suggests that such savings for the child welfare system are
small relative to special-education cost savings. For example, for the
Chicago Child-Parent Center program, cost savings for the child welfare system are only 11 percent of estimated cost savings from reduced
special education costs (Reynolds et al. 2002). Estimates for the NurseFamily Partnership also suggest modest fiscal savings from reduced
child-welfare system costs (Aos et al. 2004, Technical Appendix, p. 96).
I added reduced special education costs into my simulation model
of universal pre-K and a full-scale Abecedarian program. I used this
revised simulation model to recalculate the flows of benefits versus
costs of these programs over time. This revised simulation model calculates “net costs” of these early childhood programs for each time period.
These net costs subtract out the reduced special education costs.5
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show the results.6 As the figures show, the ratio
of economic development benefits to net costs increases significantly.
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Figure 7.2 Ratio of Annual State Economic Development Benefits to
Net Program Costs, Before and After Adjusting for Reduced
Special Education Costs, for Universal Pre-K Education
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NOTE: Program is assumed to start full scale in 2011 and continue indefinitely. Ratio
shown is earnings benefits for state residents in each year, divided by program costs
in that year. Assumptions used are described in text and text endnotes. Appendix 7B
shows the numbers behind this figure.

Calculations suggest that the ratio of benefits to net fiscal costs increases
from 2.78 to 4.90 for universal pre-K education. For the Abecedarian
program, this ratio increases from 2.25 to 3.21.
However, the short-term perspective on these programs only modestly improves. For example, under these revised calculations, which
consider reduced special education costs, it takes 19 years after universal pre-K is implemented for annual economic development benefits
to exceed annual net costs. (In terms of the figure, this happens when
the ratio of annual economic development benefits to net costs exceeds
1.) This is an improvement over the baseline calculations. In the baseline calculations, it took 24 years for economic development benefits to
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Figure 7.3 Ratio of Annual State Economic Development Benefits to
Net Program Costs, Before and After Adjusting for Reduced
Special Education Costs, for Abecedarian Program
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NOTE: Program is assumed to start full scale in 2011 and continue indefinitely. Ratio
reported is ratio of earnings benefits for state residents for that year, divided by net
program costs for that year. Assumptions used are described in text and text endnotes.
Appendix 7B shows the numbers behind this figure.

exceed costs. However, 20 years is still a long time to wait for economic
development benefits to dominate costs.
In addition, during the first 10 years or so, the ratio of benefits to
net costs only modestly improves if one considers special education
cost savings. For example, 10 years after the universal pre-K program
is begun, annual benefits are 17 percent of net costs, up from 16 percent
in the original simulation.
For the Abecedarian program, under these revised calculations, it
takes 16 years for annual economic development benefits to exceed
annual net costs. In the baseline calculations, it took 21 years. Sixteen
years is a long time to wait for annual economic development benefits
to exceed costs.
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In addition, 10 years after a full-scale Abecedarian program is
begun, annual economic development benefits are 54 percent of net
costs. This is only up modestly from the 47 percent figure calculated
before, which did not consider special education cost savings.
In sum, even when special education cost savings are considered,
early childhood programs are only attractive to policymakers who possess the patience needed to take a long-term perspective.

REDUCING SHORT-RUN GOVERNMENT COSTS:
FINANCING PRE-K OUT OF THE K–12 SCHOOL BUDGET
Universal pre-K education or other early childhood programs could
be financed without increasing taxes or borrowing. Some other spending category could be reduced. This budget reallocation would promote
state economic development if this other spending category has lower
economic development benefits than the early childhood program.
Politically, the most likely spending cut to finance universal preK would be to cut K–12 spending. Local school districts are likely
sponsors of pre-K education. If they choose to finance universal pre-K
education, and voters are not inclined to increase taxes, then universal
pre-K’s costs are implicitly being financed by reduced K–12 spending. At the state level, state governments frequently have special funds
for support of public education spending. In addition, public education
spending proposals are often considered together as part of a particular appropriations bill. Moreover, public education spending proposals
often are considered together by the same committee. In this political
process, achieving increased funding for high-quality pre-K education
may involve some reduction in K–12 spending. This reduction may be
explicit or it may be implicit. Because of expanded pre-K spending,
K–12 spending may not increase as fast as it otherwise would. However, it would be politically naïve to deny the possibility of a political
trade-off between pre-K funding and K–12 funding.
This political trade-off does not reflect any necessary logical consequence of increased pre-K spending. Increased pre-K education spending can logically be financed by cutting any spending category, not just
K–12 spending. We can increase pre-K spending without increasing
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taxes or government borrowing by cutting such budget categories as
prisons, Medicaid, state employee benefits, and others. However, these
logical possibilities are less politically likely than financing universal
pre-K through reduced K–12 spending.
Suppose we did finance 100 percent of the costs of universal pre-K
through reduced K–12 spending. Then this budget reallocation would
have no net government spending cost. The short-term tax costs of
increasing pre-K spending are eliminated. State policymakers need not
worry about proposing tax increases to pay for universal pre-K.
But what would be the consequences of this budget reallocation
for state economic development? Universal pre-K education increases
state economic development largely by increasing the earnings of former child participants. K–12 education has similar types of effects on
state economic development. The quality of K–12 education affects
the earnings of former students. The quantity and quality of the labor
supply of former K–12 students who stay in the state will affect the
state’s economic development. A cut in K–12 spending may damage the
quality of K–12 education, which will adversely affect state economic
development. If universal pre-K is funded, but K–12 spending is cut,
which of these policy changes will dominate the state’s future economic
development? Will state residents’ earnings increase or decrease?
To address these questions, I used this book’s simulation model to
estimate the economic development benefits derived from reallocating
K–12 spending to universal pre-K education. To do so, I needed an
estimate of how reductions in K–12 spending will affect the earnings of
former students.
For this simulation, I used a maximum plausible estimate of how
large the effects of cutting K–12 spending could be. I used estimates
derived from economist Alan Krueger’s estimates of how spending
on reduced class size in grades K–2 affected future earnings (Krueger
2003).
Krueger’s estimates are derived from the Tennessee Class Size
Study. This study was a random assignment study in which students
were randomly assigned to either “normal” K–2 classes that averaged 22 students or “experimental” lower class sizes that averaged 15
students. The study estimated effects of this lower class size on early
elementary test scores. Krueger used these test score effects to estimate effects on future earnings. For his benefit-cost analysis, he also
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estimated what percentage increase in K–2 spending was needed to
achieve these results. Under reasonable assumptions, lower K–2 class
sizes clearly passed a benefit-cost test. For example, under discount rate
and wage growth assumptions similar to this book’s assumptions, the
present value of future earnings benefits is about three times the extra
K–12 spending costs.7
Suppose we use Krueger’s estimates to estimate the earnings effects
of all changes in K–12 spending. Krueger’s estimates imply that a 1
percent decrease (increase) in K–12 spending that occurs for one year
of a student’s K–12 career will decrease (increase) that student’s future
earnings by 0.03 percent. This is derived by assuming that the earnings
effects of any change in K–12 spending will be the same as the earnings
effects of changes in spending on smaller class sizes in grades K–2.8
I regard this as a maximum plausible estimate of the effects of
lower K–12 spending for several reasons. First, not everyone accepts
Krueger’s estimates. For example, there is an ongoing dispute between
Krueger and other education researchers such as Eric Hanushek about
whether K–12 class size and spending have effects as large as those
estimated by Krueger (Hanushek 2002; Krueger 2002). Second, even if
we accept Krueger’s estimates, it is unlikely that most changes in K–12
spending have as large an effect on student learning and future earnings as K–2 class size. Therefore, there are less damaging ways to cut
the K–12 budget than increasing K–2 class size. As a result, we would
expect the future earnings effects of an optimal cut in the K–12 budget
to be less than the effects estimated by Krueger for K–2 class size.
Financing universal pre-K education is estimated to cost 2.8 percent
of the K–12 budget.9 Therefore, the simulations consider the economic
development effects of implementing universal pre-K by cutting the
K–12 budget by 2.8 percent.
Many effects of reduced K–12 spending are long delayed. In the
first year, the spending cut only reduces the quality of education of students leaving K–12 for one year. Based on the Krueger estimates, a cut
of 2.8 percent in K–12 spending experienced for only one year will
reduce future earnings by only 0.08 percent (= 2.8 × 0.0296). After two
years, this impact doubles. It keeps going up for each successive cohort
of students for the next 13 years. After 13 years, we have students who
have experienced 2.8 percent lower school funding from kindergarten through twelfth grade. Using the Krueger estimates, the 13 years
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of lower school funding is estimated to reduce earnings by 1.08 percent. After 13 years, each successive cohort of students leaving public
schools is estimated to have its members’ lifetime earnings reduced by
1.08 percent.10
These effects on students’ earnings are entered into this book’s
simulation model. As was done with early childhood programs, I make
assumptions, based on reasonable estimates, on how many former
K–12 students will survive to various ages and how many will stay
in their home state. I also make similar assumptions that one-third of
this change in the state’s labor supply is offset by displacement effects.
Due to the funding cuts, students leaving the K–12 system have lower
labor force participation and job skills. This increases job opportunities
for other state residents. These increased job opportunities offset onethird of the direct negative effects on state earnings due to students who
remain in the state.11
The reduced K–12 education spending also has some immediate
economic development effects. Reduced education spending reduces
demand for labor in the K–12 sector and also reduces the need for taxes
to finance the expanded preschool. The reduced K–12 spending offsets
1-for-1 the balanced budget multiplier effects of the extra universal preK spending.
Figure 7.4 shows the estimated economic development effects of
financing universal pre-K through reduced K–12 spending. The chart
shows the annual effects of pre-K education by itself on the earnings
of state residents, as a percentage of total state earnings. The chart
also shows the negative effects on state residents’ earnings of reducing
K–12 spending. Finally, the chart shows the net effects of both changes
combined.
As the figure shows, at first this budget reallocation has little or no
net effect on state residents’ earnings. However, after about 16 years,
this budget reallocation begins to have positive effects on state economic development. These positive effects steadily increase until they
max out, as a percentage of the state economy, at about a 0.75 percent
boost to the economy, after about 60 years.
The negative effects of reduced K–12 spending are estimated to
offset about two-fifths of the positive effects of universal pre-K education.12 Why are there gains from this budget reallocation? These gains
occur because the estimated effects of universal pre-K on child develop-
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NOTE: Effects for universal pre-K are as previously described in Chapter 4, and in
Bartik (2006). Effects of cutting K–12 are modeled as described in chapter text, and
follow estimates of Krueger (2003). The net effect is simply the difference between
the two. Appendix 7C provides the detailed numbers behind this figure.

ment and adult success are significantly greater than the effects of later
intervention. One can explain this as being due to the inherent advantages of earlier intervention. One could also hypothesize that increasing
the time that children spend in school may be somewhat more productive per dollar than increasing the quality of that time.
None of this means that this budget reallocation is the best alternative. All the estimates say is that if we assume that the total K–12 plus
pre-K budget is fixed, reallocating funds from K–12 to pre-K seems to
have net positive effects on state economic development. But increasing total spending on pre-K and K–12 may also pay off. Recall that
Krueger’s estimates show a positive benefit-cost ratio for increasing
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K–12 spending. In the present scenario, earnings benefits are scaled
back, as I only count earnings effects due to former students who stay in
the state, and I assume that extra quality of labor supply has some displacement effects. But I still conclude that reducing K–12 spending has
negative economic development effects that are 22 percent greater than
the resulting budget savings.13 In this simulation, cutting K–12 spending is a bad idea from a state economic development perspective.
Therefore, the best alternative would be to increase spending for
universal pre-K, and finance this in some way other than cutting K–12
spending. Cutting K–12 spending is definitely a “second-best” way of
financing universal pre-K education.
What are this simulation’s limitations? One obvious limitation is
that the simulation does not allow for any interaction between universal
pre-K education and reduced K–12 spending. The simulation assumes
the effects of universal pre-K education and reduced K–12 spending are
additive. But what if the effects of universal pre-K depend on the level
of K–12 spending? Then the effect of the budget reallocation will differ
from simply adding the two effects.
It has sometimes been argued that early childhood interventions
will have stronger long-term effects if these interventions are coupled
with a quality K–12 school system. For example, some believe that the
effects of the Abecedarian program were enhanced by the relatively
high quality of the Chapel Hill school system. According to Galinsky,
the public school system in Chapel Hill at the time of the experiment
was considered one of the two best public school systems in the state.
The Chapel Hill public schools had a relatively small percentage of disadvantaged children, and a large number of different support services
for children who were behind. Perhaps this excellent school system
helped the Abecedarian treatment group more than the control group.
Therefore, it is possible that the estimated impacts of universal
pre-K will be reduced if the quality of subsequent K–12 education is
reduced, beyond the prediction from adding up the separate effects of
these two interventions. In that case, Figure 7.4 may overstate the net
benefits of this budget reallocation.
On the other hand, perhaps universal pre-K has greater impacts on
children when K–12 school quality is lower. In that case, the combined
impact of the budget reallocation will be more positive than shown in
Figure 7.4.
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Another issue is whether reducing K–12 spending will have the
earnings effects estimated by Krueger. As mentioned above, it seems
plausible that there are better ways to cut the K–12 school budget than
by increasing K–2 class size. For example, in 2006, Mark Tucker and
his colleagues at the National Center on Education and the Economy
advocated that we consider getting rid of at least the senior year in high
school for most students, as the senior year often seems unproductive.
This is just one of many possible K–12 changes that could cut spending
at lower costs to student achievement and earnings than by raising early
elementary class sizes.
Finally, although funding universal pre-K through cutting K–12
spending avoids short-run tax increases, it does not produce short-run
economic development benefits. As the figure shows, under this scenario,
there are few economic development benefits for 25 years. This budget
reallocation is only attractive to a policymaker with great patience.

INCREASING SHORT-RUN BENEFITS
THROUGH CAPITALIzATION
Benefits of early childhood programs would be realized earlier if
some of these benefits were “capitalized” into higher property values.
A state or local government that implements at full-scale a high-quality
early childhood program is providing a service that is valuable to families. The increased future earnings of former child participants should
be valued by parents. Parents should be willing to pay more to obtain
access for these future benefits. This willingness to pay could be reflected in a willingness to pay more to buy a house or rent an apartment
in the state or local area that offers these services. This willingness to
pay more for housing should increase property values. This increase
in property values may occur as soon as buyers and sellers of property
fully understand the future benefits provided by early childhood programs. These increased property values do not have to wait for these
future benefits to occur if sufficient numbers of buyers and sellers of
property believe that these benefits will occur. Therefore, capitalization
of future earnings benefits into property values could increase the upfront benefits of early childhood programs.14
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The value of property should also reflect the property’s taxes. However, the economic development argument for early childhood programs
is that these future earnings benefits significantly exceed the costs of
financing these programs. Furthermore, as other authors have pointed
out, early childhood programs provide many medium-run and long-run
fiscal benefits. These fiscal benefits include the lower special education
costs mentioned above. They also include other reductions in spending,
such as lower criminal justice system costs and lower costs for welfare and Medicaid. Fiscal benefits also include increases in taxes due to
the increased earnings in the state economy. Some simulations suggest
that fiscal benefits greatly outweigh the costs of these programs (Bartik
2006; Dickens and Baschnagel 2008; Lynch 2007). The medium-run
and long-run fiscal benefits are great enough that at modest discount
rates such as 3 percent, the adoption of these programs has a positive
net present fiscal value, not a cost.
How buyers and sellers of property value these short-run fiscal
costs versus long-run fiscal benefits is uncertain. This may depend in
part on how short-run fiscal costs are paid for. If all short-run fiscal
costs are reflected in higher property taxes, costs may loom larger in
property owners’ minds. If short-run fiscal costs are financed in ways
that are less visible, less tied to property purchases, or less a burden on
the general taxpayer, then these short-run costs may have less influence
on how typical buyers and sellers value property. For example, if these
short-run costs are financed through higher sales taxes, they may be less
visible to many households and therefore not affect property bids much.
If short-run costs are financed through an increase in the top rate on a
graduated state income tax, then these costs may not affect property
bids that much.15
Will buyers and sellers of property perceive the benefits of early
childhood programs as benefits that should increase their valuation of
property? This seems much more likely for programs such as universal
pre-K education that provide widespread benefits to many households.
On the other hand, it seems less likely that property values will go up if
early childhood programs only provide benefits to relatively few households. Some early childhood programs help relatively few households
because they are targeted at disadvantaged households. This includes
programs such as the Abecedarian program. It also includes many
home-visiting programs, such as the Nurse-Family Partnership.
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Whether universal pre-K education will affect property valuation
depends in part on whether it provides benefits that are visible to prospective property owners in the state or local area. Some benefits of
universal pre-K education do manifest themselves in the short run in a
way that we know is visible enough to affect property valuation. Specifically, high-quality universal pre-K will affect elementary school
test scores. We know from previous research that elementary school
test scores are visible enough and tied enough to property ownership to
affect property values.
Studies suggest that universal pre-K will increase average test scores
in third, fourth, and fifth grades by about 0.08 in “effect size” units.
This “effect size” jargon of educational researchers means that average test scores will increase by eight-hundredths of the typical standard
deviation across students in test scores.16 Based on previous studies of
the housing market, an increase in average test scores in third, fourth,
and fifth grades of one standard deviation probably increases property
values by 5 to 10 percent.17 Therefore, because of its effects on average
elementary school test scores, universal pre-K should increase a state or
local area’s residential property values by 0.4 to 0.8 percent. This calculation assumes that property buyers and sellers value the increase in test
scores but ignore the possible fiscal consequences of universal pre-K.
As outlined above, fiscal consequences might be ignored because these
fiscal consequences are on net positive in the long run, or because the
short-run fiscal costs are not salient to homeowners’ property valuation
decision.
Based on typical U.S. property values, if universal pre-K raises
residential property values by 0.4 to 0.8 percent, the capital gain from
universal pre-K will be 6.4 to 12.7 times the annual gross budgetary
costs of universal preschool.18 If property valuations are unaffected
until test scores actually improve, then this property value gain will
begin to occur when the original participants in pre-K reach third grade,
four years after the universal pre-K program is adopted. At average U.S.
property tax rates, such an increased valuation of property would raise
property tax revenues of 8 to 17 percent of the annual gross costs of the
universal pre-K program.19
Universal pre-K would have much larger effects on property values if
buyers and sellers of property fully valued its effects on future earnings.
This book’s simulations allow a calculation of universal pre-K’s effects
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on state residents’ earnings. I can also calculate the effects on the earnings of former preschoolers who leave the state. These effects should also
be relevant to parents’ property valuation decisions. Combining these
calculations, we can calculate the net present value of the increase in
earnings that can be accessed by buying property in this state.20
This net present value obviously depends upon the discount rate typically used by buyers and sellers of property. What discount rate might
actually be used by prospective buyers and sellers of property to value
earnings effects that occur for their children? The honest answer is, we
don’t know. However, we can come up with some plausible alternatives. I consider four alternatives. First, prospective home buyers might
use the same discount rate as the ideal policymaker. For this alternative, I use a discount rate of 3 percent, which this book has consistently
assumed is optimal for the ideal policymaker. A second alternative is to
rely on evidence of how parents behave in making investments in children. A study of parental investments in children’s health estimated a
parental discount rate of 4.70 percent (Agee and Crocker 1996). A third
alternative is to estimate what discount rate is compatible with the finding that a one standard deviation increase in test scores raises property
values by 5 to 10 percent. I calculated what discount rate would make
this property value effect reasonable. I estimated discount rates of 7.48
percent (5 percent property value effect) and 6.06 percent (10 percent
property value effect). Finally, as argued by Barrow and Rouse (2004),
we might use the average 30-year real interest rate on mortgages. They
calculate this to be 7.33 percent. This mortgage rate is quite close to
the estimated discount rate associated with a 5 percent property value
effect. I combine these two possible discount rates in the analysis.
Table 7.3 uses these plausible discount rates to calculate effects of
universal pre-K on property values and property taxes. I consider two
scenarios. Under one scenario, I only consider the property value effects
of the gross economic development benefits provided by universal preK. This scenario ignores the fiscal effects of universal pre-K education.
It implicitly assumes that the short-run taxes to support universal pre-K
aren’t relevant to property buyers and sellers. Perhaps the taxes are not
paid by the decisive property buyer or seller. Or perhaps these short-run
taxes are perceived as being outweighed by the long-run fiscal benefits
of pre-K education in lowering special education costs, criminal justice
system costs, and welfare system costs. Under the second scenario, I

Discount rate used
Source of discount rate
or estimates

3.00%
Optimal social
discount rate.

4.70%

6.06%

Parental discount
Discount rate
rate for investment
compatible with
in children, inferred estimate that a onefrom investment
standard-deviation
choices regarding increase in test scores
children’s health.
increases property
values by 10%.
Gross capitalization of economic development benefits
% effect on property values
18.3
5.1
2.5
Ratio of property value
292.1
81.2
39.4
effect to annual costs of
universal pre-K
Property taxes raised as
3.88
1.08
0.52
proportion of annual
costs of universal pre-K
Net capitalization of economic development benefits
% effect on property values
14.0
3.0
1.0
Ratio of property value
178.4
38.7
12.9
effect to annual costs of
universal pre-K
Property taxes raised as
2.37
0.51
0.17
proportion of annual
costs of universal pre-K

7.33%

Elementary test score
effect for comparison

Average 30-year real
mortgage rate from
Barrow and Rouse.
(Also compatible
with a one-standarddeviation test score
effect of about 5%.)

Due to effects of
elementary test
scores on property
values, and effects
of universal pre-K
on elementary
test scores.

1.4
22.7

0.4 to 0.8
6.4 to 12.7

0.30

0.08 to 0.17

0.3
3.4
0.05
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Table 7.3 Possible Capitalization Effects of Universal Pre-K Education

NOTE: The figures in the last column come from the previous section of the text, which analyzed capitalization effects expected because
of universal pre-K’s effects on elementary test scores. The remaining columns calculate capitalization under various assumptions about
discount rates and whether all of the program costs are deemed relevant to property valuation. The first three rows of numbers simply
consider capitalization under the assumption that only gross economic development benefits of universal pre-K are capitalized. Fiscal
effects are ignored under the assumption that these are not relevant, either because of the many fiscal benefits (e.g., reduced special ed
costs, criminal justice system costs, welfare costs, and child welfare costs) as well as costs of universal pre-K, or because the marginal
home buyer may not pay many of those costs (e.g., fiscal costs may not be deemed relevant to property bids if financed by the sales tax, or
a progressive income tax, or a business tax). The final three rows of numbers consider the opposite extreme example: all of the program
costs of universal pre-K are capitalized, ignoring any fiscal benefits of universal pre-K. Capitalization effects on property values calculate
the discounted present value of economic development benefits (or economic development benefits minus program costs) under various
discount rates and get the percentage effect by dividing by the estimated total residential property values, which are estimated based on
Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds data (Federal Reserve Board 2009). Property tax collections assume a real property tax rate of
1.33%, based on average national data from Yilmaz et al. (2006) of the Tax Policy Center. The discount rate assumptions are based on
different plausible discount rates. 3% is the optimal social discount rate used in this book. 4.7% is an estimate of the average discount rate
used by parents for making decisions about investments in their children’s health. 6.06% is an estimate of the discount rate that would
be needed to explain how elementary test scores affect housing prices, assuming that a one-standard-deviation increase in test scores
increases housing prices by 10%. 7.33% is an estimate from Barrow and Rouse of the average real 30-year mortgage rate. 7.33% is also
close to the discount rate needed to explain how elementary test scores affect housing prices, under the assumption that a one-standarddeviation increase in test scores increases housing prices by 5%. (The actual discount rate for a 5% effect is 7.48%.)
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consider the property value effects of universal pre-K after subtracting out 100 percent of the program costs for universal pre-K. No fiscal
benefits from universal pre-K are considered. In the real world, it seems
likely that the truth is between these two scenarios.
These property value effects vary widely. However, these results do
support several conclusions. First, property value effects of universal
pre-K are potentially about three times as great as predicted by effects
on elementary test scores. This estimate is derived by comparing the
elementary test score effects with the effects of gross economic development benefits using the comparable discount rate. This reflects that
universal pre-K has considerably greater effects on the future earnings
of former child participants than would be predicted from its effects on
elementary test scores.
Second, effects of universal pre-K on property values are often large
under plausible discount rates. Effects are many multiples of annual
program costs.21 The property taxes raised from these higher property
values are often significant fractions of annual program costs. Under
some plausible scenarios, these property tax increases are sufficient to
fund universal pre-K.
Third, whether such capitalization effects will actually occur obviously depends greatly on how property buyers and sellers value universal pre-K. This depends in part on whether property buyers and sellers
have accurate information about the quality of universal pre-K. It also
depends on whether property buyers and sellers understand fully the
potential long-run benefits of high-quality universal pre-K. Finally, this
valuation depends on how heavily these buyers and sellers discount
these benefits to children.
At present, I doubt whether most property buyers and sellers directly include pre-K quality in their property valuation decisions. I
doubt this because information on pre-K quality is often weak. Furthermore, many property buyers and sellers may not sufficiently understand the effects of pre-K quality on future earnings of former child
participants. Therefore, to the extent that universal pre-K currently has
a property value effect, it is probably mostly indirect, through effects on
elementary test scores. Elementary test scores are more widely known
by prospective home buyers. Parents do believe that such test scores are
related to future life prospects for their children.
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However, these valuations of universal pre-K by property buyers
and sellers may potentially be affected by pre-K advocates. Pre-K advocates might consider disseminating better information for prospective
homeowners on the quality, availability, and cost of pre-K in different
states and metropolitan areas. Some beginning attempts to provide such
information include the State of Preschool Yearbook by the National
Institute for Early Education Research.
Pre-K advocates might also consider further measures to inform the
public about the future earnings effects of universal pre-K education. A
fuller understanding of these effects might boost household valuations
of these earnings effects.
Finally, public relations efforts that stress how children are affected
by early childhood programs might alter parental discounting of these
effects. Stressing the effects on children in public discourse may reduce
parental discounting of such effects.
The rationale for increasing parental valuations of pre-K’s effects
is in part to improve parental choice options by providing better information. But public relations efforts to increase parental valuations will
also change the incentives facing state policymakers. If pre-K quality,
availability, and cost become more salient to prospective home buyers,
the effects of these factors on property values and property tax revenues
will increase. This will increase the attractiveness of high-quality universal pre-K to state and local policymakers who wish to boost their
state or local area in the short run. Short-run boosts in property values
and property tax revenues may be more of an incentive to policymakers than long-run boosts to earnings. As I will discuss in Chapter 13,
property value effects have been used as an argument by past grassroots
American movements to expand education.
One trade-off with increased capitalization is that it transfers some of
the benefits of universal pre-K education to property owners. This will
be further discussed in the chapter on distributional effects (Chapter 8).
Capitalization effects are relevant when universal pre-K is analyzed
from a state perspective. These capitalization effects reflect the relative
attractiveness of a given state, versus other states, due to the state’s
offering high-quality universal pre-K. At the national level, we would
not expect universal pre-K to lead to capitalization effects. Chapter 10
further considers the national perspective.
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INCREASING SHORT-TERM BENEFITS: INCORPORATING
PARENTAL EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS INTO EARLY
CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS
The short-run benefits of early childhood programs may also be
increased by program modifications. What program components might
be added to significantly increase short-run benefits?
It seems reasonable to focus on program add-ons that might have
some synergy with the early childhood programs. Otherwise, short-run
benefits could be increased by adding any arbitrary program X that has
a high ratio of short-run benefits to costs. But if program X’s social
returns do not depend on the existence of the early childhood programs,
and vice versa, then it is unclear why we would consider the early childhood programs plus program X as a package. For example, perhaps
some antipollution regulation would have large short-run benefits relative to costs. But it would seem strange to claim that we have “solved”
the problem of delayed benefits to early childhood programs by adding
an antipollution regulation to the policy package.
One program add-on that might have some synergy with early
childhood programs is an employment and training program for the
parents of the child participants. It seems possible that early childhood
programs that provide some free child care, such as universal pre-K
and the Abecedarian program, might make employment and training
services for the parents more effective.
Employment and training services for parents may provide more
short-run economic development benefits than are provided by early
childhood programs. Increases in parental employment and wages will
occur immediately, while improvements for former child participants
have to wait until the children grow up.
What are plausible returns to high-quality employment and training
programs for the parents of the child participants in universal pre-K or
the Abecedarian program? How might adding on parental employment
and training programs affect the short-run benefits from an early childhood program package?
We don’t know the answer. There has not been much experimentation to explore the social returns to adding parental employment programs to early childhood programs.
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I wanted to gauge the potential for adding on parental programs. To
do so, I considered what would happen if the add-on parental employment program had a rate of return that matched the highest rates of
return that have been reliably estimated for employment and training
programs. I consider two scenarios. First, I consider an add-on parental
job-training program that matched the highest rates of return that have
been estimated for federally run job training programs. Second, I consider an add-on program that matched the highest rates of return that
have been estimated for state or locally run job training programs.
For the first scenario, I assumed the parental employment and training program had returns as high as the estimated effects of Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) programs on disadvantaged adults. JTPA was
the main federally funded job training program from 1982 to 1998. It
was evaluated by a random assignment experiment in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.
The random assignment experiment indicated that JTPA had
extremely high rates of return for adults. The experiment indicated
modest effects per trainee on average earnings. Annual earnings for
trainees increased by over $1,200 (Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins [1997], updated to 2007 dollars). The evidence suggests that these
earnings increases persisted without much change for at least five years
after training (GAO 1996).22 These increased earnings were achieved at
a cost per adult trainee of about $2,000 for women and $1,400 for men.
The real rate of return to society from JTPA training for adults exceeds
70 percent per year under any reasonable assumptions (Friedlander,
Greenberg, and Robins 1997).
Although these rates of return to JTPA are high, the annual earnings
effects are modest, at only $1,200. Why not consider a training program that had more dramatic effects on annual earnings than $1,200?
For federally funded job training programs, research does not find any
training programs that have persistent annual earnings effects for broad
groups that exceed the $1,000 to $2,000 range (Bartik 2001, Chap. 4).
Furthermore, until recently, most of the job training research literature
has not found job training programs with annual earnings effects that
exceed the $1,000 to $2,000 range. This research literature finds that
the annual earnings effects for training programs, once they exceed
some minimum threshold for services per trainee, do not significantly
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increase with program spending per trainee (Greenberg, Michalopoulos,
and Robins 2003).
Recently, however, there have been some estimates suggesting
that job training programs may have annual earnings effects that are
greater, at least for some job training programs that are state or locally
directed, and are somewhat higher-cost. Hollenbeck and Huang (2006,
2008) have estimated annual earnings effects of some state and locally
directed job training programs that exceed $4,000 annually. These large
annual earnings effects are sometimes persistent.
These recent estimates are less rigorously estimated in that they
are not derived from random assignment experiments. Instead, the estimates are derived by estimating the postprogram earnings experiences
of participants in job training programs with nonparticipants who are
matched on their preprogram characteristics and earnings. Although
this matching eliminates observed preprogram characteristics and earnings as an explanation of the postprogram earnings differences, there
could also be unobserved preprogram differences between program
participants and nonparticipants that might explain the differences.
However, it is noteworthy that Hollenbeck and Huang’s estimates for
federally funded job training programs are similar to previous estimates
for federally funded job training programs that use experimental methods. Hollenbeck’s estimates for annual earnings effects for programs
under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), the successor program
to JTPA, seem roughly consistent with the experimental estimates for
JTPA. This similarity adds some credibility that such nonexperimental
methods may be reliable in this context.
One possible explanation for these higher earnings effects in Hollenbeck and Huang’s research is that training programs may be better directed by state and local governments than by the federal government. Prior research suggests that job training programs may be
more effective if they work closely with local employers (Bartik 2001,
Chap. 4). Local employers can help identify higher-wage jobs that have
strong local growth and a shortage of available workers with suitable
skills. Local employers can also help identify what job skills are best
addressed by training. Perhaps greater state and local discretion will
allow for sufficient flexibility to facilitate better partnerships with local
employers. Federally funded job training programs, such as JTPA and
WIA, allow for state and local administration. However, federal rules
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may inhibit the flexibility that is needed to work with local employers
to meet local needs.
For the second scenario, I assumed that the add-on parental job
training program had annual earnings effects similar to those estimated
by Hollenbeck and Huang for community college job prep programs in
the state of Washington. These community college programs provide
training for individuals that leads directly to jobs, rather than to transfer
to a four-year college or university. Hollenbeck and Huang estimate
annual earnings effects of $4,758 as of three quarters after exiting training, and $3,962 as of three years after exiting training.23
These large annual earnings effects come at considerable program
cost. The estimated additional community college tuition costs, plus
state subsidized costs that are not part of tuition, amount to $11,231 per
trainee (Hollenbeck and Huang [2006, p. 179], updated to 2007 dollars).
The costs of this type of training are over $9,000 greater than the average costs per trainee of most federally funded job training, such as the
JTPA program. However, this $9,000 in extra costs pays off, because it
increases annual earnings effects by over $2,500 (e.g., $3,962 − $1,200
for JPTA = $2,762). These extra earnings effects appear to be persistent,
so these estimates suggest that the more expensive training investment
is worth it.
Costs of this community college training program are so much
greater because the program is more intense. The program modeled is
assumed to last 1.9 years on average. During those 1.9 years, the program requires full-time attendance at the community college. In contrast, average costs for JTPA, WIA, and other federally run job “training programs” reflect that for many “trainees,” the training provided is
mostly job placement assistance and very short-term training.
I resimulated the economic development benefits and costs of universal pre-K and the Abecedarian program with these two types of addon training programs for parents. In one simulation, I assumed that the
program had costs per trainee and earnings effects per trainee that were
similar to the JTPA program’s effects for adult women.24 In the second scenario, I assumed that the add-on program had costs and earnings effects per trainee that were similar to the state of Washington’s
community college job prep programs.25 I assumed that 75 percent of
the families involved with the Abecedarian program would enroll in
training, as the Abecedarian program targets disadvantaged families. I
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assumed that 75 percent of the “high-risk” families enrolled in universal
pre-K would enroll in training, along with 25 percent of “medium-risk”
families. This assumption means that 26.3 percent of all families in universal pre-K would enroll in training. In calculating increased earnings
of state residents, I make my usual adjustments to include only survivors who stay in the state, and to adjust for labor market displacement.
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show the annual ratio of economic development
benefits to costs for universal pre-K education and the Abecedarian
program with these two types of adult training add-ons. For comparison, the figures also show the annual ratios without the adult training
add-ons.26
As shown in Figure 7.5, adding training to universal pre-K has the
potential for significantly improving the short-term and medium-term
economic development benefits of pre-K. The original program has
annual economic development benefits that hover at about 15–23 percent of costs for the first 13 years or so after the program is initiated.
With the add-on adult training, economic development benefits steadily
increase during those first 13 years. This package of pre-K and adult
job training yields much bigger benefits sooner. For example, five years
after the original program is initiated (the year 2016), annual economic
development benefits are only 16 percent of annual costs. With the addon of JTPA-style training, by five years after program initiation, annual
economic development benefits are 35 percent of annual costs, or twice
as great. With the add-on community college job preparation training,
by five years after program initiation, annual economic development
benefits are 47 percent of annual costs. Annual economic development
benefits of the original program did not exceed annual costs until 24
years after the program’s start. With the JTPA-style training add-on,
annual economic development benefits exceed costs after 18 years—
six years earlier. With the community college job preparation training,
annual economic development benefits exceed costs after 15 years.27
The potential for greater short-term ratios of benefits to costs is limited in a universal program because of the assumption that training benefits will be restricted to disadvantaged families. A more targeted pre-K
program would have its short-term benefits-to-cost ratio boosted more
by adult training add-ons. Alternatively, a training program that had
high returns to more advantaged workers could increase the short-term
benefits-to-cost ratio.
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Figure 7.5 Ratio of Annual State Economic Development Benefits to
Program Costs, Universal Pre-K Education, with Two Types
of Adult Training Components, Compared to Similar Ratio
without a Training Component
Ratio of annual benefits to annual costs
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NOTE: Methodology is explained in chapter text and Appendix 7D. Economic development benefits are increases in earnings of state residents. The figure shows how
the ratio of these annual economic development benefits to costs, for universal preK education, changes when either of two types of adult job training is added to the
pre-K program. All these calculations are for a permanent universal pre-K program,
with any adult job training add-ons also being permanent, that starts in 2011. As is
discussed in the text, what is particularly important is how these add-on training programs affect short-run ratios of benefits to costs.

As Figure 7.6 shows, adding adult training to the Abecedarian program does not much affect the time pattern of the ratio of benefits to
costs.28 The lack of effect reflects the large costs of the Abecedarian
program. The modest earnings benefits provided by adult training do
not loom large compared to the large costs per child participant in the
Abecedarian program.29 In addition, the Abecedarian program already
has considerable short-term benefits for parents, even without adult
training add-ons.
These potential effects of short-term training are hypothetical. It
would seem important to do some demonstration projects and experi-
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Figure 7.6 Ratio of Annual State Economic Development Benefits to
Program Costs, Abecedarian Program, with Two Alternative
Adult Training Components, Compared to Similar Ratio
without a Training Component
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NOTE: Methodology is explained in chapter text and Appendix 7D. Economic development benefits are increases in earnings of state residents. The figure shows how
the ratio of these annual economic development benefits to costs, for the Abecedarian program, changes when either of two types of adult job training is added to the
program. All these calculations are for a permanent Abecedarian program, with any
adult job training add-ons also being permanent, that starts in 2011. As is discussed in
the text, what is particularly important is how these add-on training programs affect
short-run ratios of benefits to costs.

mentation with adding training and employment services for adults to
early childhood programs.
It is particularly important to do such experimentation because there
may be synergies between early childhood programs and adult training
and employment programs. High-quality early childhood services may
increase the return to adult training and employment programs by providing free child care and peace of mind to parents. Improved parental
employment and earnings may increase the rate of return to early childhood programs. Higher family income may reduce stresses of poverty
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that harm child development and adult outcomes for those children. For
example, research by Duncan, Kalil, and Ziol-Guest (2008) suggests
that among families with less than $25,000 in annual income, increasing a family’s income by $1,000 per year increases the future earnings
of children in that family by 6 percent.30 The calculations so far do not
reflect these potential synergies, which may be important.
To gauge the potential importance of such synergies, I reestimated
the economic development benefits from the adult training add-ons to
the Abecedarian program, but this time including possible effects of
adult training programs on the earnings of their children. I used Duncan, Kalil, and Ziol-Guest’s estimates to do this reestimation. Including
effects on the children of trainees increased the net present value of benefits of the JTPA-style training program by 22 percent. Including children’s effects increased the benefits of the community college training
program by 30 percent.31 The benefit-cost analysis of adult job training
programs is significantly altered by considering effects on children.32
It should be an important research priority to investigate the potential for programs that integrate services to children with services to their
parents.

CONCLUSION
The economic development benefits from high-quality early childhood programs are mostly long-term. This is a problem for policymakers with short time horizons. What can be done about this problem?
Based on this chapter, a variety of solutions seem possible:
• Do calculations that demonstrate the likely savings in special
education costs from early childhood programs.
• Establish systems of regularly rating the scope, quality, and costs
of state and local pre-K education programs in a comparable way.
Promote these quality rating systems to potential property owners. Also, promote the importance of pre-K education to potential property owners. Such rating systems and promotion efforts
would improve family awareness of the importance and quality
of preschool. As a result, high-quality universal pre-K programs
would be more likely to increase property values in the short run.
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• Do demonstration projects and experiments that add adult employment and training programs to early childhood programs.
See what works and what doesn’t work, and what potential synergies there are in combining such efforts.
• If policymakers are reluctant to raise taxes to improve early
childhood programs, urge policymakers to finance such programs with reductions in other government spending that has
lower rates of return.
• Once the current U.S. financial crisis has passed, explore options
such as tax increment financing to fund expansion of high-quality
early childhood programs.
Of all these options, I believe there are two options that offer the
most promise: 1) promoting capitalization benefits and 2) experimenting with combining early childhood programs with programs for parents. We can increase capitalization by increasing information on pre-K
education programs. This option directly addresses the central problem: policymakers undervalue the most important benefits of universal
pre-K, the future benefits for former child participants. If parents have
sufficient information that these benefits for children are reflected in
property valuations, then these future benefits become visible to policymakers in the short run. Furthermore, greater parent knowledge and
valuation of pre-K education is also likely to affect how parents vote.
Such a change in voting behavior would certainly affect state policymakers. Finally, a sustained effort to promote better information on preK across states is relatively cheap compared to its potential benefits.
Comprehensive programs that include assistance to parents directly
increase short-term benefits. We may find that such comprehensive
programs offer higher returns. Early childhood programs may increase
the rate of return of adult job training programs, and adult job training
programs may increase the rate of return of early childhood programs.
Experimentation should explore such possibilities. But even if these
synergies are modest, a comprehensive program will have greater shortterm benefits relative to costs.
This chapter has focused on the distribution of the benefits of early
childhood programs over time. The next chapter focuses on the distribution of the benefits of early childhood programs and business incentive programs across different income groups.
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Notes
1. Savings and investment issues may complicate the discussion. Suppose the policy
affects savings and investment flows. Suppose further that the social value of a dollar of savings or investment exceeds the social value of a dollar of consumption.
Under these assumptions, we need to determine some shadow prices of savings
and investment to adjust the different dollar flows to consumption equivalents.
The financing of the policy’s costs may affect savings and investment in several ways. The financing may affect incomes, which will affect savings. Borrowing may affect interest rates. Extra taxes may affect the returns on savings and
investment.
But the benefits of the project may also affect savings and investment in several ways. Project benefits may also affect incomes. The project may also create a
fiscal surplus. This may reduce borrowing’s burden on interest rates, or affect the
need for taxes that distort the returns on savings and investment.
The shadow price of savings and investment may exceed 1 because of tax
wedges between the private before-tax return on investment and the private aftertax return on savings. In addition, the shadow price of savings and investment
may exceed 1 because of the social return on investment’s exceeding the private
before-tax return on investment. For example, if there are agglomeration economies, then investment may have external benefits for the economy.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, I avoid in this book taking account of these longrun dynamic effects of changes in savings and investment. I avoid these dynamic
investment effects because I think there is no consensus among economists on the
magnitude of such effects. Dynamic investment effects can lead to unbounded
effects of policies under certain assumptions, but not under other also plausible
assumptions. Dickens and his coauthors have models of early childhood programs
that incorporate dynamic investment effects (Dickens and Baschnagel 2008;
Dickens, Sawhill, and Tebbs 2006).
2. Appendix 7A provides a more technical discussion. This includes an equation for
the discount rate. It also includes discussing plausible values in that equation. Like
all the appendices, Appendix 7A is available from the Upjohn Institute Web site.
3. Under Michigan’s school finance law, this diversion would not significantly reduce
revenue for the local schools or other governmental units in the area that approved
the Promise Zone. The state education property tax is paid into the state School
Aid Fund. Other state revenues are also paid into the state School Aid Fund. These
School Aid Fund revenues are used to provide sufficient aid to each school district
to make up the difference between capped local property taxes for schools and a
largely state-determined foundation grant per student. This foundation grant per
student constitutes essentially all local school district general operating revenue.
A Promise Zone would reduce overall revenue going into the state School Aid
Fund. This would tend to reduce overall foundation grants per student, unless
state policy offsets this loss of revenue. However, the consequence of one Promise
Zone for the foundation grant per student would be quite small. Therefore, each
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Promise Zone has very little impact on the operating revenue per student of its
own school district. But if many Promise Zones are designated, the program as a
whole might significantly reduce K–12 school funding in Michigan.
4. This ratio compares the Abecedarian control group to the entire Abecedarian treatment group. Ramey et al. (2000) point out that the Abecedarian group that only
received services prior to kindergarten, without extra K–12 support services, only
had a special education services receipt rate of 12 percent. They argue that the
extra K–12 services may have increased the recognition of special education service needs. However, the group that received only services prior to kindergarten
has a sample size of 23. Therefore, to be conservative, I decided to use the comparison between the overall Abecedarian treatment group and the control group to
calculate the special education cost savings for the Abecedarian program.
5. The simulation was done in the following way: I assumed that the reduced special
education percentage due to universal pre-K education would be 2.3 percent of
all participants. This is 23 percent of the approximately 10 percent effect found
in the Chicago Child-Parent Center (CPC) program. This same 23 percent factor
was used to scale back the CPC effects for all earnings effects of the program,
and reflects the assumption that a universal program will have somewhat smaller
effects on more-middle-class children and on children who would have attended
pre-K even without the universal program.
For the Abecedarian program, I assumed that special education assignments
would be reduced by 23 percent of all participants. This 23 percent has nothing to
do with the CPC scale-back factor. The Abecedarian 23 percent is based on experimental evaluations of the Abecedarian program that show a reduction in special
education assignments from 48 percent in the control group to 25 percent in the
treatment group.
Increased special education costs were initially assumed to be $10,054 in 2007
dollars. This is based on Parrish et al. (2004, Part II) figures on special education
costs for 1999–2000 of $8,080 (p. 22). These special ed costs are updated to 2007
dollars using the CPI-U. I assume that only 10 percent of special education costs
are paid by the federal government and 90 percent by state and local governments.
This seems consistent with the figures in Parrish et al. I only count as cost savings the state and local cost savings, as in this book I am focusing on the state
perspective.
It is assumed that the cost savings from reduced special education assignments
accrue for all 13 years from kindergarten through twelfth grade. This implies that
special education cost savings for a given cohort of early childhood participants
begin accruing one year after the universal pre-K program begins, and five years
after the Abecedarian program begins. For each cohort, it is assumed that special
education costs after 2011 increase in real terms by 1.2 percent a year, which is
this simulation model’s assumption about average real-wage increases. As in the
regular simulation models, each subsequent cohort is assumed to be 0.3 percent
bigger, as this is the population growth assumption of these models. In addition,
each subsequent cohort is assumed to have 1.2 percent higher special education
costs per student, to reflect wage growth. These assumptions about increasing real
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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

special education cost trends are modest, given that data from Parrish et al. suggest that special education costs have increased in real terms by an average of 1.6
percent a year from 1977–1978 to 1999–2000.
The simulations also allowed for reduced balanced-budget multiplier effects
from the reduced special education spending. This reduces economic development benefits. However, this reduction in benefits is less than the reduction in net
costs. Reduced balanced-budget multiplier effects were calculated the same way
balanced-budget multiplier effects were calculated for the original simulations.
Appendix 7B presents the numbers behind these figures.
This comes from the scenario in Krueger where the social discount rate is 3 percent and the annual productivity growth rate is 1 percent. I use the same social discount rate and a wage growth rate of 1.2 percent. Under Krueger’s assumptions,
the present value cost of this intervention per student is $7,660 in 1998 dollars,
and the present value of future earnings benefits is $21,667 (Krueger 2003, Table
5, p. F56). The resulting ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value
of costs is 2.83.
Krueger estimates that earnings will go up by 3.2 percent because of smaller class
sizes. These smaller class sizes require a 47 percent increase (e.g., 22 over 15 =
1.47) in funding. This estimate assumes that when class sizes are lower, all elements of per-pupil spending must increase proportionately, not just the ratio of
teachers to students. The average experimental student in the Tennessee Class
Size Study experienced these smaller class sizes for 2.3 years. If we divide 3.2
percent by the product of 47 percent and 2.3 years, we get an earnings effect of
0.0296 percent for a 1 percent change in spending for one year of a student’s K–12
experience.
This is based on the estimates given in Chapter 4 for the costs of implementing universal pre-K. In 2007 dollars, this is estimated to have a net cost nationally of $14.3 billion. This figure is assumed to apply to the 2009–2010 school
year. According to the Digest of Education Statistics, total public K–12 operating
spending in the 2004–2005 school year was $424.6 billion. Updating to year 2007
prices yields a cost of $459.2 billion. According to projections from the Institute
of Education Statistics, real education spending for public elementary and secondary schools is expected to increase by 32 percent from 2004–2005 to 2017–2018,
which is an increase of 2.16 percent per year. Applying this annual rate of increase,
we get projected K–12 spending for the 2009–2010 school year of $510.9 billion.
Pre-K spending of $14.3 billion divided by $510.9 billion is 2.8 percent.
The actual simulation calculation is slightly more complicated. Because I am
focusing on state residents and state earnings, I adjust these impacts down slightly
to account for in- or out-migration during the K–12 school years. Therefore, of
students leaving the K–12 school system at age 18, not everyone will have experienced their entire K–12 education in the state that is reducing its K–12 spending
by 2.8 percent. This consideration lowers the average effect on earnings after 13
years from 1.08 percent to 0.96 percent.
I also have to make assumptions about how many public school students will
annually exit the public school system through graduating or dropping out. For
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graduates, I start with the figures on public school graduates for 2005–2006 from
the Digest of Education Statistics. For dropouts, I use Heckman’s figure that the
true four-year graduation rate is 77 percent (Heckman and LaFontaine 2007).
(Reported high school dropout rates are probably too low.) I calculate from this
figure an annual dropout rate. I apply this dropout rate to total public high school
enrollment in the fall of 2005 to get the number of dropouts exiting the high
schools at that time. These 2005–2006 figures for annual numbers of both graduates and dropouts are adjusted to 2009 by using projections that public school
graduates will grow at 0.59 percent per year (Projections of Education Statistics
to 2017 report by Hussar and Bailey [2008]). These 2009 figures are compatible
with the 2009 starting date for the original pre-K projections. For 2011 starting
numbers, I assume that all effects are the same percentage of total earnings.
The long-run positive effects of universal pre-K are a 1.241 percent boost to earnings. The long-run negative effects of reduced K–12 spending in this scenario are
−0.495 percent. The ratio of this negative effect to the positive effect is 0.40.
This is my calculation using this simulation. I assumed a cutback in K–12 spending of 2.8 percent, and calculated the present value of state earnings losses versus
the savings in K–12 program costs. The resulting ratio of the present value of state
earnings losses to the present value of savings in K–12 program costs is −1.218.
In the model of this developed by Roback (1982) and used by many subsequent
researchers, increased household amenities at the interstate or intermetropolitan
level could also in theory be reflected in lower wages. However, as was pointed
out in Bartik and Smith (1987), for an increase in an amenity that is just valued by
households and not businesses, the percentage increase in property values should
be much greater than the percentage reduction in wages. Labor is a much larger
share of business costs than land, and therefore only very small reductions in
wages are compatible with keeping profits the same after an increase in land
prices. Furthermore, it could be argued that business will also place some direct
value on the “amenity” of better early childhood programs. Any direct benefit to
businesses from this amenity will further drive up both property values and wages.
These remarks are somewhat speculative. We really don’t know the true incidence
of many tax and spending programs at the state and local level. Economists seem
to believe that higher property taxes will be capitalized into lower property values. There is less agreement about what will happen because of other changes in
state and local taxes and spending. The text passage suggests that the incidence
may depend in part on how many households mentally classify a particular tax
or service as being tied to property ownership. Property taxes are clearly tied to
property ownership. By longstanding tradition, the quality of public education is
also tied to where a household lives, and so is mentally considered to be part of the
property purchase. The question is whether households think of early childhood
programs as being tied to property ownership. The issue that this section of the
chapter explores is whether such a connection either naturally is made (through
effects of early childhood programs on school test scores) or can be made through
the right marketing of pre-K’s benefits.
This is based upon estimates from the Chicago Child-Parent Center program that
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the program increased participant average test scores in third, fourth, and fifth
grades by an average effect size of 0.22 (Reynolds 1995). I assume, as was done
in the simulation, that the effects of a universal pre-K program will be only 23
percent of the effects of a program (such as CPC) that is targeted. On the other
hand, peer effects will multiply effects by 1.54 times the raw effects. Therefore,
the effects on average test scores are 0.08 = 0.22 × 0.23 × 1.54.
This statement principally relies on studies by Black (1999); Bayer, Ferreira,
and McMillan (2007); and Kane, Riegg, and Staiger (2006). Black found that an
increase of one standard deviation in across-school average test scores increased
property values by 2.2 percent. Based on studies of test score variation by Bloom
(2006) and Kane, Riegg, and Staiger, a one-standard-deviation difference in crossstudent test scores is probably between two and five times the standard deviation
in cross-school test scores. So Black’s numbers imply that a change in average test
scores of one standard deviation will increase property values by 4 to 11 percent.
Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan find that an increase in average school test scores
of one standard deviation increased property values by 1.8 percent. Multiplying
by two to five yields an effect of an increase in average test scores of one standard
deviation of 4 to 9 percent. However, Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan also find
effects that are perhaps twice as great if one allows for test scores changing demographic composition of school neighborhoods. It could be argued that the long-run
effect of school test-score changes should include such adjustments, which would
raise the test score effects on property values to 8 to 18 percent. Finally, Kane,
Riegg, and Staiger concluded that an increase in average school test scores of one
standard deviation across students increased property values by about 10 percent.
Therefore, an effect with a range of 5 to 10 percent seems reasonable.
This is based on figures from the Federal Reserve Board’s (2009) Flow of Funds
report indicating that residential property values in the United States as of the
fourth quarter of 2008 totaled 23.1 trillion dollars. (This sums the residential real
estate values of the household sector and the noncorporate sector.) Multiplying
this by the percentage effects on property values, converting to 2007 dollars, and
comparing this figure to the estimated national cost of universal pre-K in 2007
dollars of $14.3 billion, I get the ratio cited in the text.
This uses a figure from the Tax Policy Center that typical property tax rates in the
United States are 1.33 percent of property value (Yilmaz et al. 2006).
I take the total flow of earnings in the state due to universal pre-K, including
effects on parents, children, and spending effects. These effects are calculated
including displacement effects. I then add in the flow of earnings for former child
participants who leave the state. For these leavers, I do not adjust for displacement. The assumption is that prospective property buyers in the state will consider
the net effect on their earnings if they stay in the state, which will include displacement effects, and also consider the net effect on their earnings if they leave the
state, which will not include displacement effects because the state is assumed to
be small relative to the nation.
Why are property value effects so much higher relative to annual program costs
than the ratio of the present value of benefits to costs? This largely occurs because
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property value effects take into account the entire present value of future benefits,
and annual program costs represent just one year’s costs. As a result, property
value effects can plausibly be tens or hundreds of times the annual program costs
of universal pre-K.
This is not how GAO spun the results. GAO emphasized that results became statistically insignificant some years after training. However, the results also indicated that results did not statistically significantly change over time. In any job
training experiment, one would expect training effect estimates to become more
imprecise with time. With more time since training, there are more random shocks
to earnings that increase imprecision.
These figures take the difference-in-difference, regression-adjusted estimates
from Hollenbeck and Huang (2006, Table 6.5, p. 68), adjust these quarterly figures to annual figures, and then use the CPI to adjust these earnings effects to 2007
dollars rather than first quarter 2005 dollars.
This add-on JTPA-style program, by itself, had a ratio of the present value of
benefits to the present value of costs of 8.78. These benefits are mostly earnings
benefits but also include some balanced budget multiplier effects (0.04 out of the
8.78). These benefits only count state economic development benefits, so they
adjust downward for out-migration and displacement. These adjustments are similar to those made in Chapter 4 for early childhood programs.
This community college program by itself had a ratio of the present value of benefits to costs of 2.63. These benefits are mostly earnings benefits but also include
some balanced budget multiplier effects (0.04 out of the 2.63). These benefits
only count state economic development benefits, so they adjust downward for
out-migration and displacement. These adjustments are similar to those made in
Chapter 4 for early childhood programs.
The numbers behind the figures are in Appendix 7C.
The ratio of the present value of benefits to costs improves from 2.78 to 3.35
with the add-on of a JTPA-style training program. The ratio of the present value
of benefits to costs decreases somewhat from 2.78 to 2.72 with the add-on of a
community college job preparation program. The annual costs of the add-on JTPA
training program are initially about $1.5 billion. The annual costs of the add-on
community college job prep training program are initially about $8.6 billion.
The ratio of the present value of economic development benefits to the present
value of program costs increases from 2.25 to 2.37 with the add-on of a JTPAstyle adult training program, and increases from 2.25 to 2.28 with the add-on of
a community college job preparation program. The annual costs of the add-on
programs are somewhat lower than for universal pre-K because the number of
assumed Abecedarian participants is lower than for universal pre-K, owing to the
more targeted nature of the Abecedarian program. The annual costs of the add-on
JTPA program are initially about $0.7 billion. The annual costs of the add-on community college job prep training program are initially about $4.1 billion.
The present value of costs for the add-on JTPA program are about 2 percent of
Abecedarian’s high costs, but are about 10 percent of costs for the cheaper universal pre-K program. The much more expensive add-on community college job prep
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program has costs that are about 10 percent of Abecedarian’s costs but 59 percent
of costs of the universal pre-K program. Therefore, these add-on programs can
sway the short-term and long-term rates of return of universal pre-K much more
readily than they can sway the returns to the Abecedarian program.
30. This calculation uses the regression coefficients from Appendix Table 3 in Duncan, Kalil, and Ziol-Guest (2008). I use the coefficient of 0.584 in predicting
ln(earnings) using income measured in $10,000 units, and then translate this effect
on ln(earnings) into an actual percentage effect.
31. To do these calculations, I relied on Duncan, Kalil, and Ziol-Guest’s analysis that
a $4,326 increase in average family earnings for low-income families, while children are ages 0–5, will increase adult earnings at ages 25–37 by an annual average
of $4,919. I adjusted this effect so that it applied to age 31, and I assumed that the
dollar effect varied by age from ages 20 to 79 in the same way as did control-group
female earnings in the database used to estimate the adult earnings effects of the
Abecedarian program. As discussed in appendices to Chapter 4, these data are ultimately derived from CPS data on black females. Adult earning effects were only
calculated from ages 20 to 79. I calculated effects on average earnings when the
child is ages 0–5 by using figures for the JTPA and community college program’s
effects from the time the training starts until five years later. These figures are
adjusted downward because of out-migration and displacement. Effects on children when they grow up are also adjusted downward for migration out of the state,
death rates, and displacement. Thus, these calculations reflect state economic
development benefits, not national economic benefits. Total earnings effects for
the child, adjusted for displacement, from ages 20 to 79, are then discounted using
a 3 percent discount rate back to age equals zero, when the training is supposed
to start. The resulting discounted present value of earnings effects on the children
of adult trainees, for the JTPA-style training program, is 2.60 times the program’s
costs. The discounted present value of earnings effects on the children of adult
trainees, for the community college training program, is 1.14 times the program’s
costs. Thus, either of these programs passes a benefit-cost test based solely on its
indirect effects on the earnings of the children of trainees.
32. The overall benefit-cost picture for the Abecedarian program is improved, but not
by much, because of the high costs of the program. The ratio of benefits to costs
for the Abecedarian program was originally 2.25. With the benefits of add-on adult
training for both adults and their children, the ratio of benefits to costs with a
JTPA-style add-on increases to 2.41. With a community college job prep add-on,
the ratio of benefits to costs increases to 2.39.
I should also point out that although the Abecedarian program also directly
increases the earnings of the parents of the child participants, the effects of this
parental earnings increase on the Abecedarian child participants, when they enter
the labor market, are already captured by the baseline estimates.
Similar calculations do not make as much sense for universal pre-K. An intervention with parents when their children are age four will not substantially affect
average earnings from birth to age five. In the Duncan, Kalil, and Ziol-Guest estimates, family earnings when the child is age six and over do not have much effect
upon the child’s future adult earnings.

8
Who Benefits?
Distributional Effects of Early
Childhood Programs and Business Incentives,
and Their Implications for Policy
How do early childhood programs affect the poor, the middle
class, and the rich? The answer to this question is important for several
reasons.
First, effects on different income groups may change these programs’ social benefits. In this discussion, I assume that programs that
tilt benefits toward the poor are more socially desirable. Policymakers,
policy analysts, and voters may favor such a tilt because of special concern for the poor. Alternatively, policymakers, policy analysts, and voters may be concerned with making the income distribution more equal.
A more equal income distribution may increase the number of people
who can meet social standards for being a respectable member of society. Concern over the income distribution may be greater at present
because over the last 30 years the U.S. income distribution has become
more unequal. To address concerns about the poor, we need information
on whether early childhood programs significantly affect the incomes
of the poor. To address concerns about the income distribution, we need
information about how the effects on the poor compare with effects on
other income groups.1
Second, how early childhood programs affect various income
groups may influence who will provide these programs with political
support. An income group’s support for a program may depend on what
the program implies in taxes and benefits for that group. Assessing patterns of political support requires comparing the program’s benefits
with taxes for different income groups. Adopting and sustaining a program requires political support that is sufficiently powerful.
Third, how a program affects different income groups may influence
program design. For early childhood programs, one important design
issue is whether these programs should be targeted at children in lower
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income groups, or whether services should be universally available to
all children. This is most prominently an issue for pre-K education programs. The targeting versus universal service debate is advanced by
looking at specific numbers for how programs benefit different income
groups under different designs.
To frame this chapter’s discussion, I begin with arguments for targeting pre-K education at the poor versus universalizing pre-K education. I then consider the effects on different income groups of business
incentives. The effects of business incentives provide a baseline for considering the income distribution effects of early childhood programs. I
then go on to provide estimates of the income distribution effects of
pre-K programs under various assumptions about program design and
program effects. Finally, I consider the income distribution effects of
other early childhood programs.
In this chapter, I show that under a variety of distributional assumptions, early childhood programs have net overall benefits that are progressively distributed. Business incentives are more likely to benefit
all income groups, but they provide much less net benefit for the poor.
Among early childhood programs, universal pre-K, which combines
large benefits for the poor with broad benefits for all income groups,
has economic and political advantages.

TARGETED PRE-K VERSUS UNIVERSAL PRE-K
Advocates for targeting pre-K education argue that policymakers
should invest where returns are greatest. Targeting advocates perceive
returns as being greatest for children from lower income families. Nobel
Prize–winning economist James Heckman (2005) makes the following
argument: “I think the evidence is very strong that family background is
a major predictor of future behavior of children. So a disproportionate
number of problem kids come from disadvantaged families. The simple
economics of intervention therefore suggests that society should focus
its investment where it’s likely to have very high returns. Right now, that
is the disadvantaged population . . . Functioning middle-class homes are
producing healthy, productive kids . . . It is foolish to try to substitute for
what the middle-class and upper-class parents are already doing” (p. 24).
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Advocates for universal services make two arguments. The first is
that even if pre-K’s benefits are greater for the poor, pre-K may still
have benefits for middle-class children that exceed its costs. Steven Barnett, codirector of the National Institute for Early Education Research
(NIEER), argues that “if the development of children in higher-income
families is taken as an indicator of what is optimal, then it is clear that
not only children in poverty, but children at the median income are
entering school far less prepared to succeed than they should be. Children at the median income are as far behind their peers from families
in the top income quintile as children in poverty are behind their peers
from middle-income families” (Barnett 2006).
Barnett (2006) admits that “the weight of the evidence seems to
indicate that effects [of pre-K education] are somewhat smaller for children who are not economically disadvantaged. However, these effects
are not trivial and are proportionately large enough that long-term
economic benefits [of pre-K] for middle-income children could easily
exceed costs.”
The second argument is that universal programs are more politically feasible and sustainable than programs targeted at the poor. This
argument has been made with great force by Harvard sociologist Theda
Skocpol (1991):
Rarely . . . do advocates of targeted benefits or specially tailored
public support services face up to the problem of finding sustained
political support for them . . . When U.S. antipoverty efforts have
featured policies targeted on the poor alone, they have not been
politically sustainable, and they have stigmatized and demeaned
the poor . . . It seems highly unlikely that further redistributive
benefits or intensive services targeted on the poor alone can succeed politically. We still live amidst the backlash against the War
on Poverty and the Great Society . . . Instead of policies for the disadvantaged alone, targeting within universalism is the prescription
for effective and politically sustainable policies to fight poverty in
the United States. (pp. 414, 420, 434)

By “targeting within universalism,” Skocpol means policies that
provide disadvantaged groups with extra services within a program that
has universal accessibility.
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Targeted programs may lack the political support needed to be
enacted or sustained. Even if the programs can be sustained, lack of
political support may mean there is inadequate funding or political
attention to maintain program quality. Steven Barnett restates the oftenused phrase, “The truth is that programs for the poor are too often poor
programs.” Barnett (2006) argues that pre-K programs targeted at the
poor too often do not follow the best program designs:
The targeted programs provided to low-income children have
never been closely modeled on those that produced the largest benefits. Preschool teachers in many targeted programs are required to
have only a high school diploma. Even Head Start requires only
half of its teachers to have a two-year college degree. Many statefunded preschool programs do not require college degrees. Looking at subsidized child care policy at both federal and state levels,
there is little evidence of a commitment to anything more than
warehousing young children. Preschool teachers are paid about
half what public school teachers earn, and child care staff are even
more poorly paid.

The counterargument is that universal programs are much more
expensive. Providing expensive services to the affluent may be politically controversial. Heckman (2005) outlines the following argument
which might be made against universal pre-K education:
Unfortunately, in discussions of early childhood interventions, people often bundle political issues with economic issues. Part of the
appeal of universal early childhood intervention is that it provides
universal day care, so some groups favor universal early childhood
education because it effectively subsidizes women’s working. But
bundling in this way also creates an opposition group saying, “Why
should we subsidize affluent working women?” (p. 24)

Robert Greenstein, executive director of the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, argues that the right kind of targeted programs for the
poor can get political support. In contrast, universal programs may run
into problems because of large costs. According to Greenstein (1991),
the evidence . . . indicates that factors other than whether a program is universal or targeted have a significant bearing on the
political prospects of social programs. Targeted programs, for
example, are more likely to be strong politically when they serve
low-income and moderate-income working families as well as the

Who Benefits? 223
very poor. They are also more likely to succeed when they are
regarded as providing an earned benefit or are otherwise linked
to work, when they are entitlement programs with federally prescribed and funded benefits, when they seem effective, and when
they are not provided in the form of cash welfare assistance for
young, able-bodied people who do not work.
Skocpol’s principal conclusion, that those seeking to develop new
anti-poverty policies should rely almost exclusively on universal
approaches, seems weak on another account as well: it conflicts
with current fiscal constraints. Advocates of new universal programs need to acknowledge the political difficulties posed by the
large costs of such programs, just as advocates of targeted programs
need to acknowledge the political problems inherent in spending
tax dollars on a narrow segment of the population. (p. 438)

Whether targeted or universal programs are the better way to deal
with poverty is a fascinating philosophical debate. However, numbers
can provide greater content to the argument. I now provide some actual
numbers for the income distribution effects of different programs. I
begin with business incentives before going on to various designs of
universal pre-K and other early childhood programs.

BUSINESS INCENTIVES: WHO BENEFITS
I begin by analyzing the income distribution effects of business
incentives. This analysis serves as a baseline for analyzing the income
distribution effects of early childhood programs. The analysis also
introduces the concepts that will be used to analyze income distribution
effects.
Unlike the early childhood programs, business incentive programs
as I have defined them have no natural scale. My models assume that
business incentive programs have similar ratios of earnings effects to
costs at different scales. In the following simulations, I scale this permanent business incentive so that its cost, in present value terms, is the
same as that of the modeled universal pre-K program. As it happens,
such a scale is a lower-bound estimate of what state and local governments typically spend on discretionary tax incentives for businesses
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(as opposed to specialized business services).2 Therefore, the effects
reported can be interpreted as a lower-bound estimate of the likely
effects of a typical state’s tax incentives for business. An upper-bound
estimate might be one-and-a-half times the effects I report here.
To analyze distributional effects, I consider the effects on different
quintiles of the household income distribution (Table 8.1). Quintiles are
defined by ranking all households in the United States by household
income, then dividing the ranking into five parts.
The quintiles differ widely in their share of overall household
income (row 1 of Table 8.1).3 If each household in the United States had
the same income, then each quintile would have 20 percent of total U.S.
income. Instead, the lowest income quintile has only 3.4 percent of total
household income, which implies that the average household income
of this quintile is about one-sixth of the average household income for
all U.S. households. In contrast, the highest income quintile has 49.7
percent of total household income. This implies that the average household income of this quintile is about two-and-a-half times the average
household income for all U.S. households.
The simulations in this chapter report the effects of a particular program on the present value of household earnings or the present value
of taxes. These figures are sometimes calculated as a percentage of the
total present value of income for each household income quintile. This
analysis thereby includes both immediate and long-term effects of each
program on household income. All effects are included by discounting
all future earnings, tax, and income flows at a 3 percent real discount
rate.4
For each quintile, I calculated the estimated dollar effects of business incentives on the present value of household earnings, relative to
the average dollar effects for the lowest income quintile. These figures
are derived from estimates of how metropolitan income distributions
are affected by increases in employment growth (Bartik 1994b).5
The dollar effect of business incentives on earnings tends to be lower
for lower income quintiles, and higher for higher income quintiles (row
2 of Table 8.1). For example, the dollar effects of business incentives
on the present value of earnings for the middle income quintile are a
little more than twice the dollar effect on the lowest income quintile.
The dollar effect on the highest income quintile is about three times the
dollar effect on the lowest income quintile. Why is this the case? Busi-

Table 8.1 Distributional Effects of Business Incentives

Row
1
Quintile % share of total household income
Business incentive effects on:
2
Relative dollar effects on earnings,
disadvantaged group = 1
3
Earnings benefits as % of income
4
Tax costs as % of income
5
Net benefits as % of income
6
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

Income quintile
Middle
3
4
14.8
23.4

Lowest
1
3.4

2
8.7

1.00

1.39

2.25

1.532
0.249
1.283
6.15

0.835
0.227
0.607
3.67

0.791
0.216
0.575
3.66

Highest
5
49.7

Overall
100

3.64

3.10

2.38

0.811
0.206
0.606
3.95

0.325
0.179
0.146
1.82

0.620
0.197
0.422
3.14

NOTE: Dollar benefits per participant for each quintile are indexed to lowest income quintile equals 1. All figures for percentages of
income report the present value of that item as percentages of the present value of income for the relevant group. Ratios report ratios
of the present value of earnings benefits or net income benefit to the present value of tax costs for the relevant group. All present value
calculations use 3 percent real discount rate. Overall earnings effects and tax costs come from the simulation model for business incentives of this book. Earnings are translated into income percentages using the labor share figures of Gordon (2009). Earnings effects are
allocated across quintiles based on how income effects of labor demand increases are allocated across quintiles in Bartik (1994b). Tax
costs are allocated across quintiles based on average quintile incidence of state and local taxes reported in McIntyre et al. (2003). More
details are in text and endnotes to text.
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ness incentives increase earnings by increasing demand for labor. How
much a given income group can respond to this labor demand increase
is influenced by its involvement with the labor market and its skill level.
Lower income groups have a lower percentage of their income in earnings. Furthermore, they earn lower hourly wages, so a given increase in
hours of work has smaller dollar effects. Therefore, an increase in labor
demand increases earnings by less, in dollar terms, for lower income
groups.
However, as a percentage of income, the effect of business incentives on earnings is much greater for lower income quintiles (row 3 of
Table 8.1). For example, the percentage effect of incentives on earnings for the lowest income quintile is about twice the effect for the
middle income quintile. The percentage effect on earnings for the lowest income quintile is almost five times the effect on earnings for the
highest income quintile. Dollar effects of business incentives decline in
lower income quintiles, but not as fast as income, so percentage effects
increase in lower income quintiles. Because lower income quintiles
have more hours per year of unemployment and nonparticipation in the
labor force, there is more room for greater percentage effects on their
incomes.
The earnings effects of this business incentive program must be
compared to the program’s effects the on taxes of each income group.
From the previous analysis in Chapter 3, we have estimates of the costs
of a business incentive program relative to its effects on earnings. We
need to determine how to allocate these costs across different income
quintiles. I use estimates from the Institute on Taxation and Economic
Policy on the relative percentage burden of state and local taxes across
income quintiles (McIntyre et al. 2003; Table 8.1, row 4).6
These estimates are consistent with the consensus among public
finance economists that state and local tax burdens are distributed in a
modestly regressive fashion. That is, state and local tax burdens tend to
be a somewhat higher percentage of income for lower income quintiles.
From these estimates of percentage earnings benefits by quintile
and percentage tax costs by quintile, I construct two statistics for each
quintile to describe income distribution effects. These same two statistics will be constructed for early childhood programs as well. First,
for each quintile I calculate the simple difference of earnings benefits
minus tax costs (each as a percentage of income). This is the net per-
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centage effect on the present value of income of each income quintile
due to the program. Second, for each quintile I calculate the ratio of the
present value of earnings effects of the program to the present value of
its tax costs. This is the ratio for each quintile of what it pays for the
program to what it gets—a type of benefit-cost ratio.
Both these statistics might play a role in whether a given income
quintile would support a program. The first statistic gives a “bottom
line” for each program in terms of net effects on income. The second
statistic reveals whether the program returns much in effects compared
to what each income quintile invests in the program.
Both of these statistics are only calculated for effects on state residents’ earnings and income. The focus of this book is on economic
effects for states. Therefore, these statistics are calculated to reflect the
effects of business incentives (and later, of early childhood programs)
on the income distribution of a state.
For business incentives, the net percentage effects on each income
quintile are positive (Table 8.1, row 5). Furthermore, the ratio of net
earnings benefits to net costs is considerably greater than 1 for each
quintile (Table 8.1, row 6). Overall, each income quintile has good economic reasons to favor a high-quality business incentive program.
Why do business incentives benefit all income quintiles? First, as
discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 5, this high-quality business incentive program has overall benefits that substantially exceed costs, by a
factor of more than three to one. Second, as outlined above, the benefits of stronger local economic growth tend to be spread quite broadly.
Higher income quintiles actually gain more in dollar terms from local
economic growth, even though they gain less in percentage terms. At
the same time, the regressivity of the tax burden from these programs is
insufficient to offset the progressive effect that local economic growth
has in increasing the incomes of lower income quintiles by a greater
percentage.
The income distribution effects of business incentive programs are
modestly progressive.7 Net percentage effects of the program on the
lowest income quintile are slightly more than double those on the middle income quintile. Net percentage effects on the middle income quintile are about four times those on the highest income quintile. In terms
of ratios, the ratio of earnings effects to costs is about 70 percent greater
for the lowest income quintile than for the middle income quintile. The
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ratio of earnings benefits to costs is about twice as great for the middle
income quintile compared to the highest income quintile.
However, the bottom line is that the net percentage effects of business incentives on the lowest income quintile are quite modest. The
estimates suggest that a typical state’s financial business incentives only
raise the income of the lowest income quintile by about 1.3 percent.
These programs are not going to dramatically raise the well-being of
the poor.
Effects on the poor are modest because the lowest income groups
have many labor market problems. Expanding overall labor demand
only addresses one of the problems that low income groups have in the
labor markets. Given the more limited involvement of lower income
groups in the labor market, and given their lower wages, there are limits
to how much expanded overall labor demand can do to help the poor.
More progressive distributional effects might be achieved by business incentives that target more labor demand at lower income groups.
For example, business incentive programs might encourage assisted
businesses to hire more of the local unemployed. As discussed in Chapter 5, greater hiring of the local unemployed can be encouraged through
First Source programs coupled with customized job training. Business incentives may also be provided for hiring the local unemployed,
such as in Minnesota’s MEED (Minnesota Employment and Economic
Development) program.
Business incentives could be made more progressive. However, the
progressivity of boosts to labor demand is limited by how much such
programs can change the job skills of the disadvantaged. Customized
job training programs can increase job skills. Getting more job experience through greater labor demand can increase job skills. However,
larger changes in skills may require human capital programs that directly focus on skills development. Adding on human capital components to business incentives may have more limited effects on job skills.
Greater help for the labor market problems of the poor requires
greater changes in their skills. This is probably most appropriately
addressed through human capital programs. Early childhood programs
are human capital programs that try to intervene early, when skills are
thought to be the most malleable.
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PREKINDERGARTEN (PRE-K) EDUCATION: SPECULATION
ABOUT POSSIBLE DISTRIBUTIONAL BENEFITS
The challenge in assessing the distributional effects of pre-K education is that there is no direct evidence. The best studies, such as those
of Perry Preschool and the Chicago Child-Parent Centers, focus on the
long-run effects on children from disadvantaged families. No studies
rigorously examine the long-run effects of high-quality pre-K on children from middle-class and upper-class families. For example, although
Heckman believes the returns from pre-K are lower for middle-class
families than for the poor, he admits that this belief is not proven by
empirical evidence: “Now you say, Do I have really hard evidence on
this? The answer is no” (Heckman 2005, p. 24).
We can speculate about possible patterns of pre-K effects across different income groups. On the one hand, children in more disadvantaged
groups are further from “optimal patterns” of child development. This
might make it easier to improve the development path for these children. On the other hand, as Barnett argues, middle-class children also
lag behind children from upper-class families. He maintains that there
might be considerable benefits for middle-class children.
With respect to later outcomes, children from disadvantaged families will have greater baseline high school dropout rates. Therefore, it
might be easier to improve high school graduation rates for disadvantaged groups. On the other hand, children from more advantaged groups
might be closer to attaining a college degree. It might be easier for preK to positively affect college graduation rates for advantaged groups.
In this context, it is relevant that the dollar return from attaining
a college degree is greater than the dollar return from attaining a high
school degree. The annual earnings boost from attaining a four-year
college degree, versus having only a high school degree, is $19,400
(2005 dollars), increasing average annual earnings from $31,500 to
$50,900. The annual earnings boost from attaining a high school degree
but no higher degree, versus being a high school dropout, is $8,100,
increasing earnings from $23,400 to $31,500 (Baum and Ma 2007).
Thus, fewer additional college graduates are needed to raise the population’s total earnings by x dollars than would be required using additional high school graduates.
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Another way to describe the contending influences is as follows.
Disadvantaged groups have lower baseline wages and employment
rates than more advantaged groups. On the one hand, this provides more
potential for increasing earnings through boosting wages and employment rates. On the other hand, a given boost in employment rates or
wage rates will increase earnings by more in dollar terms for groups
with higher baseline rates.
The best direct evidence on the distributional effects of universal
pre-K education is from studies of Oklahoma’s universal pre-K program (Gormley et al. 2005).8 This evidence is only for short-run effects,
as of the beginning of kindergarten. The Gormley et al. study uses an
evaluation methodology, “regression discontinuity” analysis, which is
regarded as giving rigorous results.9 Gormley and his colleagues find
evidence that pre-K has short-run positive effects on test scores for children from all income groups. As is common in educational research, the
only information on income status of children is whether they are eligible for a free lunch under federal rules (family income of less than 130
percent of the poverty line) or a reduced-price lunch (family income
between 130 percent and 185 percent of the poverty line), or whether
they must pay full price for lunch (family income above 185 percent
of the poverty line). Test score effects for the highest income group
are quite similar to test score effects for the lowest income group. Test
score effects for the middle income group are somewhat higher than
test score effects for either the higher income or lower income groups.10
Gormley et al.’s results weaken the case that pre-K education will
have smaller effects on more advantaged children. Pre-K is about as
effective in increasing the test scores of higher income groups as it is
for lower income groups.11

BASELINE RESULTS FOR DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF
UNIVERSAL PRE-K
For the baseline results, I use distributional assumptions from
Karoly and Bigelow (2005). Their results assume that lower income
children are more likely to enroll in universal pre-K than upper income
children. In addition, lower income children are assumed to be less
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likely than upper income children to be enrolled in high-quality pre-K
in the absence of a high-quality universal program. Finally, for any particular change in pre-K enrollment brought about by universal pre-K,
the dollar benefits are assumed to be more for lower income children
than upper income children. For example, consider children who without universal pre-K would not have been in any pre-K program. Karoly
and Bigelow assume that in this group of children, benefits for upper
income children are one-fourth the benefits for lower income children.12
I simulate the distributional effects of universal pre-K under these
assumptions (Table 8.2). One part of the simulation calculates the dollar effect of pre-K on the average participant in each income quintile
relative to the lowest income quintile (row 2, Table 8.2). These dollar
effects are based on Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions. These distributional effects across quintiles assume a quite rapid fall-off in dollar
effects from the lowest income quintiles to middle and higher income
quintiles. For example, the dollar effects on the middle income quintile
are less than a third of the dollar effects on the lowest income quintile.
Dollar effects on the two highest income quintiles are less than onetenth of the dollar effects on the lowest income quintile.13
This fall-off of dollar effects with family income is qualitatively
consistent with the opinions of other pre-K experts. For example, NIEER
codirector Steve Barnett assumed that effects for children in the middle
three quintiles would be one-half those of children in the lowest income
quintile, while effects for the top quintile would be zero (Barnett 2004).
He regards these as “realistic assumptions about program participation and extrapolated benefits” (p. 10). Heckman has not made specific
assumptions about how pre-K’s returns decline for higher-income children. However, his remarks imply that returns are smaller for middleand upper-income children, not nonexistent.
Under these distributional assumptions, universal pre-K’s benefits
are distributed highly progressively. The return per dollar of tax cost
is about 25 to 1 for the lowest income quintile (row 6, Table 8.2). This
is almost nine times the return per dollar of tax cost for the middle
income quintile. Furthermore, the return per dollar of tax cost is about
nine times as great for the middle income quintile as it is for the highest
income quintile.14
Pre-K provides large benefits for the lowest income quintile. The
net present value of earnings benefits, even allowing for the regressive
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Table 8.2 Distributional Effects of Universal Pre-K Education, Baseline Distributional Assumptions
(with comparisons to business incentives)
Income quintile
Lowest
Middle
Highest
Row
1
2
3
4
5
1
Quintile % share of total household income
3.4
8.7
14.8
23.4
49.7
Pre-K effects on:
2
Relative dollar effects on earnings,
1.00
0.81
0.31
0.08
0.08
disadvantaged group = 1
3
Earnings benefits as % of income
6.252
2.133
0.630
0.122
0.057
4
Tax costs as % of income
0.249
0.227
0.216
0.206
0.179
5
Net benefits as % of income
6.003
1.906
0.414
−0.083
−0.122
6
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
25.08
9.38
2.91
0.59
0.32
Comparison with business incentive effects on:
7
Net benefits as % of income
1.283
0.607
0.575
0.606
0.146
8
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
6.15
3.67
3.66
3.95
1.82

Overall
100
0.38
0.549
0.197
0.351
2.78
0.422
3.14

NOTE: Rows 2 through 6 of table show effects of universal pre-K under the baseline distributional assumptions. Rows 7 and 8 show distributional effects of business incentives and are taken from Table 8.1. Dollar benefits per participant for each quintile are indexed to lowest
income quintile equals 1.00. All figures for percentages of income report the present value of that item as percentages of the present value
of income for the relevant group. Ratios report ratios of the present value of earnings benefits or net income benefits to the present value
of tax costs for the relevant group. All present value calculations use a 3 percent real discount rate. Overall earnings effects and tax costs
come from the simulation model for universal pre-K used in this book and described in Chapter 4. Earnings are translated into income
percentages using the labor share figures of Gordon (2009). Earnings effects for former child participants and parents are allocated across
quintiles based on the Karoly and Bigelow (2005) distributional assumptions, which are applied to quintiles as explained in Appendix
8A. Balanced-budget multiplier spending effects on earnings are allocated across quintiles based on how labor demand increases are
allocated across quintiles in Bartik (1994b). Tax costs are allocated across quintiles based on average quintile incidence of state and local
taxes reported in McIntyre et al. (2003). More details are in text and endnotes to text.
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nature of state and local taxes, is more than 6 percent of income for
the lowest income quintile.15 This large effect is not surprising. The
estimates for the lowest income quintile are based on studies of the Chicago Child-Parent Center program. This program gained fame because
it was so effective.16
On the other hand, under these distributional assumptions, pre-K’s
benefits are distributed quite broadly. There are net positive benefits
for the bottom three income quintiles, and thus net positive benefits for
over half the population. The net benefits for the middle income quintile
are a little more than 0.4 percent of income. Even the two upper income
quintiles get some nonnegligible benefits. The highest income quintile
gets 32 cents in benefits for every dollar that this quintile pays in taxes
to support pre-K. The next-highest income quintile gets 59 cents in
benefits for every dollar of taxes paid for pre-K. These benefits occur
partly due to the broad labor demand benefits of simply spending more
money. But they also occur because pre-K’s benefits are so large for
the disadvantaged that even benefits for upper income quintiles that are
drastically scaled back have some importance.
But universal pre-K’s benefits are more progressive, and hence less
broad, compared to business incentives. For example, consider a universal pre-K program and a business incentive program of the same
cost. For the lowest income quintile, the net benefits of the pre-K program are almost five times the net benefits of the business incentive
program (Table 8.2, row 5 versus row 7). Yet the business incentive
program overall has higher net benefits and returns. The upper three
quintiles clearly gain much more from business incentives than from
universal pre-K.
Universal pre-K’s benefits are more progressive than those of business incentives because of how dollar benefits vary across income quintiles. As discussed above, the research literature suggests that increases
in labor demand yield considerably higher dollar benefits for higher
income quintiles. On the other hand, everyone seems to agree that dollar benefits of universal pre-K are highest in the lowest income quintile.
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ADDING IN POSSIBLE CAPITALIzATION EFFECTS
As was discussed in Chapter 7, universal pre-K programs may lead
to some property value increases. Property buyers and sellers may recognize the benefits of universal pre-K in increasing the earnings of former child participants and their parents. If they do so, property value
increases will “capitalize” some of the benefits of universal pre-K. Benefits will be transferred from workers to property owners. This capitalization is likely to make the returns to pre-K more regressive.
The extent of capitalization depends upon whether property buyers
and sellers recognize the future earnings benefits of pre-K. Capitalization also depends upon what discount rates are used by property buyers
and sellers to value these future earnings benefits. I will assume here
the maximum possible capitalization that has some empirical support,
as discussed in Chapter 7. Specifically, I will assume that property buyers and sellers take full account of future earnings effects. I assume the
taxes associated with these programs are ignored by property buyers
and sellers. I assume property buyers and sellers use a real discount rate
of 4.7 percent in considering how the earnings benefits from universal pre-K should affect property valuations. These assumptions yield
a relatively large amount of capitalization. Other plausible assumptions about how property buyers and sellers behave would yield lower
degrees of capitalization. Based on these assumptions, I calculate that
universal pre-K will increase property values by 5.1 percent. How this
particular property value increase is derived is discussed in Chapter 7.
I simulate the distributional effects of universal pre-K education
under this capitalization assumption (Table 8.3). A considerable percentage of the total earnings benefits of pre-K are capitalized into higher
values. I estimate that pre-K leads to property value increases that are
about two-fifths of the present value of earnings benefits.17
Furthermore, the costs and benefits of this capitalization are distributed in a manner that makes distributional effects less progressive.
For example, the lowest income quintile has a much higher percentage
loss (about four times as great) from higher consumer housing prices
than is true for the highest income quintile (0.681 percent versus 0.177
percent; row 3 of Table 8.3). But the highest income quintile has a
somewhat higher percentage gain from higher property values than the
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lowest income quintile (0.261 percent versus 0.216 percent, more than
one-fifth greater; row 4 of Table 8.3).
Higher consumer housing prices have larger costs for lower income
quintiles because housing expenditures are a greater percentage of
income for lower income quintiles. Higher property values provide
greater benefits for the highest income quintile because the highest
income quintile owns more property relative to its income.
Therefore, on net, capitalization makes the distribution of the benefits from universal pre-K less progressive. The lower income quintiles
gain less, and the highest income quintile gains more.
However, the earnings benefits from universal pre-K are so great for
the lower income quintiles that their net benefits from universal pre-K
are still quite high. For example, for the lowest income quintile, capitalization only lowers the ratio of net after-tax benefits to costs from about
25 to about 23. (Compare rows 8 and 10 in Table 8.3.) This is still a very
progressive program.
Capitalization does significantly increase the payoff from universal
pre-K to the highest income quintile. The highest income quintile now
receives 79 cents in benefits for every tax dollar invested. This is more
than double the 32 cents that accrues without capitalization (rows 8 and
10, Table 8.3).18

ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
The baseline distributional assumptions for universal pre-K seem
reasonable. As Karoly and Bigelow say, these distributional assumptions “can arguably be viewed as quite conservative.” Given current
evidence, the most reasonable assumption is that pre-K benefits significantly decline as we go from disadvantaged families to middle income
families, but not to zero.
However, because of the lack of evidence on long-term distributional effects of universal pre-K, it seems prudent to consider alternative distributional assumptions. I consider two sets of alternative
assumptions. One set is that the dollar benefits for the children of all
income groups are the same as the dollar benefits for the children of
the disadvantaged. This set of assumptions broadens benefits. Given
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Table 8.3 Distributional Effects with Capitalization Effects of Universal Pre-K Education
Income quintile
Lowest
Middle
Row
1
2
3
4
1 Quintile % share of total household income
3.4
8.7
14.8
23.4
Pre-K effects with capitalization
2 Earnings benefits as % of income
6.252
2.133
0.630
0.122
3 Costs of increased housing prices to consumers 0.681
0.360
0.267
0.223
4 Benefits of increased housing prices to
0.216
0.210
0.207
0.210
property owners
5 Net benefits before taxes and after
5.787
1.983
0.570
0.109
capitalization (row 2 − row 3 + row 4)
6 Tax costs as % of income
0.249
0.227
0.216
0.206
7 Net benefits as % of income
5.538
1.755
0.353 −0.097
8 Ratio of before-tax benefits to tax costs
23.21
8.72
2.63
0.53
Comparison to pre-K effects without capitalization
9 Net benefits as % of income
6.003
1.906
0.414 −0.083
10 Ratio of before-tax benefits to tax costs
25.08
9.38
2.91
0.59

Highest
5
49.7

Overall
100

0.057
0.177
0.261

0.549
0.234
0.234

0.141

0.549

0.179
−0.038
0.79

0.197
0.351
2.78

−0.122
0.32

0.351
2.78

NOTE: Rows 2 through 8 of table show effects of universal pre-K when housing prices increase. Rows 9 and 10 show effects without such
capitalization effects and are taken from Table 8.2. Earnings effects and tax costs for capitalization cases are also taken from Table 8.2.
Overall capitalization effects are based on the assumption that property buyers and sellers have full knowledge of the overall earnings
effects of universal pre-K, and on using a 4.7 percent discount rate to value such effects. This leads to a 5.1 percent increase in property
values, as explained in Chapter 7 (Table 7.3 and surrounding text). This property value increase is recalculated as a percentage of the
present value of overall income, using figures on earnings and a labor share of income of 73.5 percent (Gordon 2009). The effects of
this housing price increase are allocated across consumers based on each income quintile’s share of total shelter expenditures in the

Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2007 (see the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Web page http://www.bls.gov/cex/2007/Standard/quintile
.pdf). The effects of this housing price increase are allocated across property owners based on figures used in Bartik (1994b) on how
home ownership, ownership of rental property, and ownership of business real estate are divided across income quintiles. How these calculations are done is detailed in Bartik (1994b), but the allocation is largely based on CPS information on each income quintile’s share of
rental and dividend income, and of self-employment income, and on each income quintile’s home ownership, combined with American
Housing Survey data on home values by income quintile.
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that everyone seems to agree that dollar benefits actually decline with
increasing family income, this set of assumptions captures one bound
that contains the possible assumptions. The other set of assumptions
assumes that benefits are zero for the children of nondisadvantaged
income groups. Given that there should be some benefits of pre-K for
middle-class children, this second set of assumptions captures another
bound that contains the possible assumptions.
I did simulations that compared the distributional effects of universal pre-K under three sets of assumptions: the baseline assumptions and
these two sets of extreme-bound assumptions (Table 8.4). I focused on
comparing three types of effects for each income quintile: 1) the dollar
benefits of pre-K relative to the lowest income group, 2) the present
value of the net after-tax benefits of universal pre-K as a percentage of
income, and 3) the ratio of the present value of earnings benefits to the
present value of tax costs.
Despite the extremity of the assumptions, the results have some elements in common. First, under all these assumptions, overall net benefits are positive. Second, under all these assumptions, the distribution
of the benefits of universal pre-K is highly progressive.
Overall net benefits are positive in all three cases because the benefits of universal pre-K for the disadvantaged group alone are greater
than the overall costs of universal pre-K. Extra benefits for nondisadvantaged groups are icing on the cake. Furthermore, benefits are always
distributed progressively because the most regressive assumption is that
different income groups have the same dollar benefit from pre-K. Even
with this extreme assumption of equal dollar benefits, the percentage
benefits from pre-K will be much greater for lower income quintiles.
Of course, there also are some large differences in results. As one
would expect, universal pre-K’s overall benefits are much greater
when we assume that pre-K’s large dollar benefits for the disadvantaged broadly extend to all income groups. Overall net benefits more
than triple. (Overall net benefits increase from 0.351 percent of income
under the baseline assumptions to 1.216 percent under the equal dollar benefits for all group assumptions. See rows 3 and 6, Table 8.4.)
This broadening of benefits means that all income groups have net benefits from universal pre-K education, not just the first three quintiles
(rows 3 and 6). In contrast, universal pre-K’s benefits are much lower
when benefits are restricted to the disadvantaged. Overall net benefits

Table 8.4 Distributional Effects of Universal Pre-K Education under Alternative Distributional Assumptions
Income quintile
Lowest
Middle
Highest
Row
1
2
3
4
5
Overall
1 Quintile % share of total household income
3.4
8.7
14.8
23.4
49.7
100
Pre-K effects under:
Baseline distributional assumptions
2 Relative dollar effect on earnings,
1.00
0.81
0.31
0.08
0.08
0.38
disadvantaged group = 1
3 Net benefits as % of income
6.003
1.906
0.414
−0.083
−0.122
0.351
4 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
25.08
9.38
2.91
0.59
0.32
2.78
“Equal dollar” distributional assumptions
5 Relative dollar effect on earnings,
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
disadvantaged group = 1
6 Net benefits as % of income
6.003
2.408
1.738
1.253
0.507
1.216
7 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
25.08
11.59
9.03
7.09
3.83
7.16
“Only disadvantaged benefit” distributional assumptions
8 Relative dollar effect on earnings,
1.00
0.67
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.26
disadvantaged group = 1
9 Net benefits as % of income
6.003
1.557
−0.194
−0.192
−0.173
0.180
10 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
25.08
7.85
0.10
0.06
0.03
1.91

239

NOTE: Top rows of table show effects of universal pre-K under the baseline distributional assumptions. These figures are taken from Table 8.2.
The next two sets of results resimulate these effects under alternative distributional assumptions. These alternative distributional assumptions
assume the same dollar effects per participant for children in the lowest income quintile. What changes is what these dollar effects per participant
are for other income quintiles. The “equal dollar” assumptions assume that the dollar effect per participant is the same for all quintiles. The “only
disadvantaged benefit” distributional assumption assumes that the dollar effects per participant only occur for the disadvantaged group in Karoly
and Bigelow (2005), which is in the bottom 35 percent of the household income distribution. Tax costs are not reported in this table, but are
the same as in Table 8.2. All percentage effects are for the present value of the relevant variable as a percentage of the present value of income.
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of universal pre-K are cut in half when only the disadvantaged benefit.
(Overall net benefits decrease from 0.351 percent under the baseline
assumptions to 0.180 percent. See rows 3 and 9, Table 8.4.) The program redistributes income from the upper three quintiles to the bottom
two quintiles. If only the disadvantaged get earnings benefits from the
program, the upper three quintiles all lose about 0.2 percent in income
from the increased taxes they have to pay for the universal pre-K program (row 9, Table 8.4).

TARGETED VERSUS UNIVERSAL PRE-K
Given the distributional possibilities, should pre-K be targeted at
the disadvantaged rather than be universally accessible?
I consider the implications of targeting pre-K on Karoly and
Bigelow’s disadvantaged group (Table 8.5). That group is the lower 35
percent of the household income distribution. Targeting considerably
lowers pre-K costs. Because of lower enrollment, the total costs of this
targeted pre-K program are only 26 percent of the costs of a universal
pre-K program. Karoly and Bigelow’s assumptions imply that only 26
percent of enrollment in a universal pre-K program will be in this disadvantaged group.19
These lower program costs reduce the tax cost of pre-K for all
income groups. To calculate these costs, I scale back the costs of universal pre-K for each income group by 74 percent.
Targeting also means that benefits will be the same under all three
sets of distributional assumptions. As discussed above, the different sets
of distributional assumptions differ in the dollar benefits for nondisadvantaged groups relative to disadvantaged groups. If services are only
targeted at children from the disadvantaged group, then these distributional assumptions are irrelevant in determining gross or net benefits.
I calculated net benefits, and the ratio of benefits to tax costs, for
each income group from a targeted pre-K program. This targeted program has a very high overall ratio of benefits to costs—more than seven
(row 5 of Table 8.5). Targeting services to a disadvantaged group that is
estimated, based on several good studies, to have high returns to pre-K
obviously will result in a program that has high overall returns.
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The returns to the bottom two quintiles are particularly high. These
two quintiles receive much the same benefits from services as under a
universal program. Benefits go down a little bit because of lower economic development benefits from pre-K spending. But this lowering of
benefits is slight. However, the targeting lowers tax costs by 74 percent.
The ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs for the two bottom quintiles
more than triples (Table 8.5, row 5 versus row 7). However, this corresponds to only increasing the net benefit to the lowest income quintile
by 0.1 percent of income (row 4 versus row 6, Table 8.5). Net benefits to the second lowest income quintile actually go down, because
some households in this quintile are excluded from pre-K services with
targeting.
On the other hand, the targeting means there is no possibility of
substantial economic development benefits for the upper three quintiles. (There are no child benefits at all in these groups; there are some
assumed benefits from the spending.) However, the targeting does hold
down the tax burden from pre-K. Under a pre-K program that is strictly
limited to households in the lower third of the household income distribution, the top three quintiles all suffer net losses from paying taxes to
support the targeted program.
It should again be noted that this analysis focuses on economic
development benefits. An analysis that also considers the benefits of
reduced crime would probably come up with larger benefits overall, and
some additional benefits for the upper three quintiles.
Given these data, then, which is better, targeted or universal preK? I will consider two perspectives. The first is that of some objective
policymaker or policy analyst. This policy wonk is trying to choose the
policy that maximizes some weighted sum of overall efficiency benefits
plus benefits from making the income distribution more progressive.
The other perspective is that of a political operative. Which program
will be easier to get enacted, and to sustain and grow over time at a
high-quality level?
From the first perspective, the targeted versus universal pre-K
issue depends upon which world we live in. Do we live in a world
in which pre-K only benefits the disadvantaged? Or do we live in a
world in which pre-K has at least some significant benefits for the
nondisadvantaged?

Row

Targeted or
universal
program?
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Table 8.5 Distributional Effects of Targeted Pre-K Program vs. Universal Pre-K Program, under Alternative
Distributional Assumptions
Income quintile
Distributional
assumptions

Variable calculated to
right for each quintile
Quintile % share of total household
income

1

Lowest
1

2

Middle
3

4

Highest
5

3.4

8.7

14.8

23.4

49.7

Overall
100.0

2
3

Targeted
Universal

Consistent with
all 3 sets

Tax costs of targeted as % of income
Tax costs of universal as % of income

0.064
0.249

0.058
0.227

0.056
0.216

0.053
0.206

0.046
0.179

0.051
0.197

4
5

Targeted

Consistent with
all 3 sets

Net benefits as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.099
96.15

1.691
29.91

−0.053
0.05

−0.050
0.05

−0.045
0.03

0.313
7.16

6
7

Universal

Baseline

Net benefits as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.003
25.08

1.906
9.38

0.414
2.91

−0.083
0.59

−0.122
0.32

0.351
2.78

8
9

Universal with
Baseline
capitalization

Net benefits as % of income
Ratio of earnings and housing price
effects to tax costs

5.538
23.21

1.755
8.72

0.353
2.63

−0.097
0.53

−0.038
0.79

0.351
2.78

10
11

Universal

“Equal dollar”

Net benefits as % of income
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.003
25.08

2.408
11.59

1.738
9.03

1.253
7.09

0.507
3.83

1.216
7.16

12
13

Universal

“Only disadvan- Net benefits as % of income
taged benefit” Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

6.003
25.08

1.557
7.85

−0.194
0.10

−0.192
0.06

−0.173
0.03

0.180
1.91

NOTE: After the top row showing quintile income shares, each of the next pairs of rows considers results from the simulation of one
scenario, with one row showing net benefits as a percentage of income, and the other row showing the ratio of benefits to tax costs. The
columns “Targeted or universal program?” and “Distributional assumptions” show the assumptions made under that scenario for that

pair of rows. (For example, rows 6 and 7 both show results when program is universal and the distributional assumptions are the baseline
assumptions.) The top 2 rows of results consider tax costs of a targeted versus a universal program. The next pair of rows considers the
effects of a targeted program on net income and the ratio of earnings effects to tax costs. For comparison, the following rows compare
these effects to effects of a universal pre-K program under various distributional assumptions. The baseline distributional assumption
results for universal pre-K are taken from Table 8.2. The results with capitalization are taken from Table 8.3. The results for the “equal
dollar” and “only disadvantaged benefit” distributional assumptions are taken from Table 8.4. The targeted program only includes pre-K
for the disadvantaged group, which is in the bottom 35 percent of the household income distribution and makes up 26 percent of the
enrollment in a universal program. Therefore, the tax costs in the top row are simply 26 percent of the universal program’s costs. The
net benefits and benefit-to-cost ratios for the targeted program are simulated by assuming the same effects for disadvantaged children
and parents as under the universal program, but setting such effects for all other groups to zero because they will not be enrolled. The
balanced budget multiplier effects of spending are also reduced to 26 percent of the original spending effects for all groups. As in all the
tables in this chapter, effects as a percentage of income are the present value of relevant variable effects as a percentage of the present
value of income. Ratios are ratios of present values of relevant variables. Present value calculations use a 3 percent discount rate.
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If we live in a world in which pre-K only benefits the disadvantaged, then a targeted pre-K program is the better policy. In that world,
the net overall benefits from a targeted program are more than 70 percent greater than those of a universal program (0.313 percent versus
0.180 percent, from row 4 versus row 12, Table 8.5). All income groups
will be better off with a targeted pre-K program than with a universal
program (row 4 versus row 12).
At the other extreme, if we live in a world in which pre-K’s dollar
benefits do not decline with family income, then a universal program
is the better policy. In that world, the universal program’s overall net
benefits are almost four times as great as those of the targeted program
(row 10 versus row 4, Table 8.5). Both the targeted and the universal
program have the exact same “bang for the buck,” delivering more than
$7 in benefits for every dollar of costs (row 5 versus row 11). But the
universal program operates at an almost a four times greater scale. Four
out of the five income groups gain more from the universal program
than from the targeted program, and the benefits for the lowest income
group are the same in either program (row 10 versus row 4).
But these are the extreme cases. More interesting is the set of baseline distributional assumptions. What if we live in a world, as we probably do, in which pre-K’s benefits do decline significantly with income,
but there are still considerable benefits for middle-income families? In
that case, I think the objective policymaker would probably favor universal pre-K over targeted pre-K. Targeted pre-K does have a higher
bang for the buck than universal pre-K: targeted pre-K has overall benefits of more than $7 for every dollar of cost. These benefits are more
than twice as great per dollar of cost as those of universal pre-K, which
has benefits of less than $3 per dollar of cost (row 5 versus row 7).
However, net overall benefits of universal pre-K are about 12 percent
greater (0.351 percent of overall income versus 0.313 percent, from
the last column of row 6 versus row 4). And under universal pre-K, the
second-lowest and the middle income quintiles do better than under
targeted pre-K. The lowest income quintile’s net benefits are almost
unchanged. And the two highest income quintiles do somewhat worse
under universal pre-K (row 6 versus row 4). Therefore, universal pre-K
would seem to be preferable on efficiency grounds to targeted pre-K,
as net benefits are higher. And universal pre-K would also seem preferable to targeted pre-K on distributional grounds, as it redistributes more
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income from the highest income quintiles to the low and middle income
quintiles.
From a policy wonk’s perspective, there are net efficiency and distributional benefits to choosing universal pre-K over targeted pre-K.
Returns to pre-K are lower as we extend services to higher income families. However, these returns are high enough that the gains for lowermiddle and middle income quintiles outweigh the losses to the highest
income quintiles. Cutting off pre-K service to middle-class families
doesn’t make sense. The benefits of such services to middle-class families outweigh the costs. The benefit-cost ratio is not as high as it is for
lower income families, but it still exceeds 1.
But the practical political perspective is just as important. What
conditions will make a program easier to enact and sustain? From a
political perspective, what is important is what people perceive to be the
benefits of universal pre-K. Perceived benefits may differ from actual
benefits.
From a political perspective, expanded pre-K is more feasible and
sustainable if it is perceived as having broader benefits for the middle
class and if the proposal is for a broad program. In that case, the universal program will probably benefit a majority of the population. A
targeted program, in contrast, relies for its support on some altruism
from a majority of the population.
This political case for universal pre-K over targeted pre-K is
strengthened if the public and political actors believe universal pre-K
may be capitalized into higher property values. Capitalization creates
larger benefits of pre-K for the politically powerful upper income quintile. The ratio of benefits to tax costs for this quintile more than doubles (row 9 versus row 7). Targeted pre-K, with its narrower eligibility,
seems less likely to lead to capitalization. With capitalization, the net
losses for the upper income quintile from adoption of a pre-K program
are slightly lower for a universal program than for a targeted program
(row 8 versus row 4).
Three other factors may increase the policy-wonk and political
case for universal pre-K over targeted pre-K: 1) administrative costs,
2) stigma costs of targeting, and 3) reduced peer effects due to targeting.
My simulations of strict targeting assume that administrative costs are
unchanged because of adding income-targeting to a pre-K program. I
assume these costs are slight because all the program has to do is accept
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or reject some participant. However, if these costs prove to be significant, they would lower net benefits of the targeted program, which
would hurt the case for targeting. For example, administrative costs of
targeting could be significant if there were political demands to recertify
eligibility every month or every calendar quarter. Administrative costs
of targeting could also be significant if there were political demands to
push the error rate in targeting too close to zero, which would require
extensive documentation of eligibility. In contrast, a more reasonable
targeting system for a single year of pre-K would have more modest
documentation demands and would certify eligibility once at the beginning of the pre-K year. “Good enough” targeting is considerably cheaper
than “close to perfect” targeting.
Targeting may also impose stigma costs on participation. Targeting
means that pre-K is now identified as a program that serves the disadvantaged. Some disadvantaged parents may choose not to participate
in a targeted program but would participate in a universal program. If
this occurs on a large scale, then the benefits of targeted pre-K may be
significantly reduced.
Finally, targeted versus universal programs may affect peer effects.
The work of Henry and Rickman (2007) provides evidence of significant peer effects in pre-K education. Targeting, compared to universal programs, means that the publicly funded pre-K will have less
middle-class and upper-class participation. This may reduce positive
peer effects on disadvantaged students. On the other hand, this greater
income integration may have negative peer effects on middle- and
upper-class students. It is often assumed in discussions of income integration in K–12 education that peer effects are asymmetric by income
group (e.g., Kahlenberg 2001). It is assumed that the positive effects
on the lower income students from the presence of middle-class and
upper income students will exceed the negative effects on the middle
and upper income students from the presence of lower income students.
The rationale for this asymmetry is that the academic achievement of
lower income students may be more sensitive to school culture. If this
asymmetry is true, then reducing income integration will lower the
overall effectiveness of early childhood experiences in preparing children for future success. Even if this asymmetry of peer effects is untrue,
peer effects mean that the reduction of income integration in a targeted
program will hurt the academic achievement of lower income students.
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For all of these reasons, if universal pre-K has some significant
actual and perceived benefits for middle-class students, then I think a
universal program is preferable to targeting pre-K education at the disadvantaged. A program with broader middle-class benefits makes more
economic and political sense. If such benefits are at all plausible in
public debate, universal pre-K is the way to go.
But what if the vision of broad benefits for pre-K does not win out
in the political marketplace of ideas? For example, what if the “research
consensus” moves toward finding that these programs only benefit the
disadvantaged? In that case, a targeted pre-K program is a reasonable
fall-back position. Such a targeted program would deliver significant
benefits to low income groups. (For example, the net benefits for the
lowest income quintile are more than 6 percent of income.) And the
tax costs for the middle and upper income quintiles are modest: the
net losses for these three upper income quintiles are only about 0.05
percent of income (row 4). If the public does not believe that universal
pre-K has broad benefits, this may be all the public is willing to pay for.

TARGETING WITHIN UNIVERSALISM: UNIVERSAL PRE-K
WITH INCOME-GRADUATED FEES
What about a more moderate targeting effort that maintains universal accessibility? Specifically, I did simulations that considered the possible effects of running a universal program with some fees for children
from upper income families.
To try to preserve middle-class benefits, these fees are only imposed
on families in the upper 40 percent of the income distribution (greater
than $62,000 in household income). In the baseline set of assumptions,
this upper 40 percent of households was the group with the lowest benefits from pre-K. In contrast, the lower three quintiles all had significant
benefits from pre-K. Therefore, restricting fees to the upper 40 percent
seems more likely to increase efficiency than a broader fee structure.
Imposing fees on the bottom three quintiles might discourage use from
those quintiles, which after all have the highest benefits. Furthermore, it
seems politically wise to only impose fees on a minority of the population. This is consistent with the political advice, given above, by Robert
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Greenstein of the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities that “targeted
programs . . . are more likely to be strong politically when they serve
low-income and moderate-income working families as well as the very
poor.”
The fees I considered were half of pre-K costs for upper income
families. This ends up being a fee of $4.70 per hour.20 This seems
roughly consistent with what upper income families might be willing
to consider paying. Data suggest that families in such income brackets
average paying $3.90 per hour for all types of paid child care.21 Paying
a little more for high-quality pre-K seems feasible.
Charging fees to upper income families should reduce their demand
for the pre-K program. I used estimates from a previous study by Blau
and Hagy (1998) of how overall demand for all types of child care
responds to changes in hourly fees. However, we would assume that the
change in usage of one type of child care, a public pre-K program, in
response to a fee would be larger than the change in usage of all types
of child care in response to fees. Other types of child care and private
pre-K programs are substitutes for the public pre-K program. The availability of these substitutes will increase the demand response. Households can more readily reduce demand for any good or service if there
are adequate substitutes for that good or service. Therefore, I assumed
that the change in public pre-K demand due to the fee would be twice
the overall child care demand response estimated by Blau and Hagy.
With this assumption about the demand response to fees, usage of
pre-K among households with incomes greater than $62,000 (the top 40
percent) is reduced by 26 percent. This demand response seems plausible. Overall usage (and costs) of the pre-K program is reduced by 13
percent. Fee revenue makes up 20 percent of the overall costs of the
program. Fees do have significant effects on the size and financing of
the program.
A targeted program that charges fees should have some extra
administrative costs. The program will have to determine household
income and the appropriate fees, and collect those fees. I assumed that
these extra administrative costs from fees amount to about 5 percent of
program costs.22 The exact magnitude of administrative costs depends
upon being reasonable about how much documentation of income is
required and how often such documentation is required.

Who Benefits? 249

What are the effects of charging income-based fees in a universal pre-K program? I do simulations using the baseline distributional
assumptions (Table 8.6).23 The simulations suggest that the addition of
these fees has almost no effect on the overall net benefits of the program
(row 7 versus row 11; a 0.352 percent net benefit versus 0.351 percent).
The fees do promote economic efficiency to some extent by cutting
back usage from upper income quintiles whose benefits from the program are low. On the other hand, charging fees does add administrative
costs to the pre-K program. Furthermore, the new program does reduce
economic development benefits somewhat. This occurs for some of
the upper income families that now forgo pre-K. It also occurs for all
income quintiles because of the reduced spending and size of the program. On net, all of these factors turn out to be a wash.
However, adding fees does have some important redistributive
effects. First, charging fees redistributes some income from the two
upper income quintiles to the three lower income quintiles. This redistribution is relatively modest. The net losses for the two top income
quintiles, and the net gains for the three bottom income quintiles, are all
less than 0.1 percent of income (row 7 versus row 11). This redistribution takes place for two reasons: The reduced demand for pre-K from
upper income families 1) reduces benefits for pre-K for the upper two
income quintiles and 2) reduces costs for pre-K services for the three
lower income quintiles. The fees paid by the upper income families also
reduce net benefits for the top two income quintiles and reduce the taxes
that the three lower income quintiles pay to finance the program.
Second, charging fees redistributes how program cost is financed
in the upper two income quintiles. Some program cost is shifted from
upper income households that do not use this pre-K program to families
that do. For upper income households that do not use pre-K, what is
relevant is the change in their tax cost from the program. This tax cost
is reduced by a little more than one-quarter for these upper two income
quintiles (row 3 versus row 10). Although this is large as a percentage of
the tax burden of the program, it is modest in relation to income—again
less than 0.1 percent of income. For upper income households that use
pre-K, they now are charged a fee for the program. However, they still
presumably are better off having the program than having no program,
or else they would not have chosen to enroll their children and pay the
fee. In addition, I note that the estimates suggest that the earnings ben-

Highest
5
49.7

Overall
100

Effects of universal pre-K with fees on:
2 Fees
Earnings benefits as % of income
3
Tax costs as % of income
4
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
5
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
6
Tax-plus-fee costs as % of income
7
Net benefits after taxes and fees as % of income
8
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax-plus-fee costs

0.042
0.130
−0.088
0.33
0.167
−0.125
0.25

0.533
0.144
0.389
3.71
0.181
0.352
2.95

Effects of universal pre-K that is free on:
9 Free
Earnings benefits as % of income
(baseline)
10
Tax costs as % of income
11
Net benefits after taxes as % of income
12
Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
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Table 8.6 Distributional Effects of Universal Pre-K with Income-Based Fees
Income quintile
Lowest
Middle
Fees or
Row free?
1
2
3
4
1
Quintile % share of total household income
3.4
8.7
14.8
23.4
6.238
0.182
6.057
34.37
0.182
6.057
34.37

2.128
0.166
1.962
12.85
0.166
1.962
12.85

0.628 0.092
0.158 0.150
0.471 −0.058
3.99
0.61
0.158 0.229
0.471 −0.137
3.99
0.40

6.252

2.133

0.630

0.122

0.057

0.549

0.249
6.003
25.08

0.227
1.906
9.38

0.216 0.206
0.414 −0.083
2.91
0.59

−0.122

0.179

0.197
0.351
2.78

0.32

NOTE: The first set of rows, 2 through 8, examines the effects of a universal pre-K program with income-based fees. These rows analyze
net benefits, and ratio of benefits to costs, in two ways. One way simply looks at benefits versus tax costs. The other way includes fees as
part of costs. The inclusion of fees is proper for an overall social benefits analysis. However, the analysis without fees is more relevant
for households that do not use universal pre-K. The second set of rows, 9 through 12, considers the case of universal pre-K without any

fees. These estimates are taken from Table 8.2. The fees are set and analyzed as described in the text. The reduced usage induced by
fees requires that both tax costs and balanced-budget multiplier effects be recalculated for all groups. In addition, the earnings benefits
of pre-K must be recalculated for all groups. I assume that the usage of pre-K that is due to fees is distributed equally across the top two
income quintiles. The effects as a percentage of income are the present value of the relevant variable as a percentage of the present value
of income. The ratio is formed by the present value of benefits divided by the present value of costs. Present value calculations use a 3
percent discount rate.
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efits for upper income families who use the program exceed the fees.24
Does charging income-based fees improve universal pre-K? From
a policy wonk’s perspective, the fee-based program might be slightly
preferable. The fee-based program does not affect the overall net benefits of the program. However, the modest redistribution from the upper
two quintiles to the bottom three quintiles would be desirable.
From a perspective of political practicality, it is unclear whether
charging fees makes universal pre-K easier to enact and sustain. The
political attractiveness of fees depends on the political influence of
upper-class households who don’t use pre-K versus those who do. The
upper-class “nonusers” may be more supportive of a universal pre-K
program that holds down costs by charging fees. They may be less supportive of a free universal program that can be framed as subsidizing
“affluent working women” (Heckman 2005). On the other hand, the
upper-class users of pre-K may resent paying these income-based fees
while other families receive free services. This may reduce this group’s
support for universal pre-K. Whether fees make sense from a political
perspective depends on how fees and their rationale are perceived by
both pre-K users and nonusers in upper-class groups.
An interesting analogy is made by comparing need-based fees for
universal pre-K to need-based college scholarships. There is general
public support for providing college scholarships based on need. But
despite this, it appears that college scholarship programs for the needy
are underfunded. Based on the U.S. experience with need-based college
scholarships, it is apparently politically feasible to base education assistance on needs, but doing so does not ensure a well-funded program.

THE ABECEDARIAN PROGRAM: DISTRIBUTIONAL
EFFECTS OF A LARGE-SCALE TARGETED PROGRAM
As described in Chapter 4 and its references, the Abecedarian program is an intense and costly intervention targeted at children from
disadvantaged families. The program provides full-time, full-year, and
high-quality child care and pre-K from birth to age 5. The program
potentially provides over 12,000 hours of service to each child. Because
of the program’s intensity, the Abecedarian program is very expensive
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per child. The present value of gross costs for each child is close to
$80,000. Of course, in return for those intense services, the program
produces large economic development benefits. As outlined in Chapter
4, of the various early childhood programs considered here, the Abecedarian program yields the largest economic development benefits per
child participant. This is partly due to the large effects on the future
earnings of former child participants. But it also is due to the much
larger effects on parents’ labor supply of five years of free child care,
compared to the more limited intervention of other early childhood
programs, such as one year of part-time, school-year prekindergarten
education.
To analyze the income distributional effects of the Abecedarian program, I assume that services would be restricted to the bottom quintile
of the population. As outlined in Chapter 4, Ludwig and Sawhill (2007)
estimate that a full-scale Abecedarian program could achieve similar
results to those of the original model by targeting families below the
poverty line. This would involve providing services to families in the
lowest 15 percent of the family income distribution.
Why not an Abecedarian program that is universal? First, there is
no research basis for estimating the effects of such a program. Second,
as will be seen below, the costs of a full-scale Abecedarian program for
15 percent of the population are already extremely high. A universal
Abecedarian program would be prohibitively expensive.
Targeting for the Abecedarian program faces some complications
because the program lasts five years. If targeting were based strictly on
each year’s family income, families would cycle in and out of the program. This would reduce the program’s effects. If targeting were based
solely on family income just prior to admission to the program, when
the child was an infant, then a significant number of family participants
would greatly exceed income cutoffs sometime in the next five years.
A pragmatic approach to targeting for the Abecedarian program is
to require that families at admission score high on some number of
risk factors. These risk factors would be family characteristics that are
known to be good predictors of a family having persistent poverty. For
example, risk factors might include family income, single-parent family, teenage mother, welfare receipt, low education of the parents, etc.
To be admitted to the program, families would have to score high on a
certain number of these risk factors, as well as having family income
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below some cutoff. Once admitted to the program, the child and his or
her family would stay in the program for the full five years. With these
procedures, the overwhelming majority of participating families would
be in poverty or close to poverty for most of the five-year period. This
risk-factor targeting approach is similar to how the original Abecedarian program participants were selected. It is also similar to how children
are selected for some state pre-K programs. For example, Michigan’s
state-funded pre-K program requires that the child and his or her family have at least two risk factors from a list of 25 (Daniel-Echols and
Schweinhart 2007).
The simulations of the distributional effects of the Abecedarian program used similar methods to those used for universal pre-K education.
Therefore, the results can be compared (Table 8.7).
As previously shown in Chapter 4, a full-scale Abecedarian program has quite large net benefits. Overall net benefits are almost twice
those of universal pre-K education, even though these benefits are confined to the lowest quintile (row 4 versus row 6).
Furthermore, a full-scale Abecedarian program results in extraordinary net benefits for the lowest income quintile. The program boosts
net income for this group by over 35 percent. This is nearly six times
the effects on the lowest income quintile of universal pre-K education
(row 4 versus row 6).
Why are effects on the lowest-income quintile so high for the Abecedarian program compared to pre-K education? The greater effects for
Abecedarian compared to pre-K probably occur because of the more
intense services provided by the program to both children and their parents. Five years of full-time, high-quality child care and pre-K education is a far more extensive intervention in the lives of children than one
year of part-time, school-year pre-K education. Five years of full-time,
full-year free child care changes the working opportunities for parents
far more than one year of part-time, school-year, free child care.
However, the Abecedarian program is so large and so redistributive
that it imposes large net costs on the upper 80 percent of the income distribution. The upper 80 percent of the population gets very little direct
economic development benefit from the Abecedarian program. (There
are some economic development benefits for these upper income groups
from the increased spending, but these benefits are small.) The upper 80
percent of the household income distribution suffers average net losses

Table 8.7 Distributional Effects of the Abecedarian Program

Row
1 Quintile % share of total household income
Abecedarian program’s effects on:
2 Earnings as % of income
3 Tax costs as % of income
4 Net benefits as % of income
5 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs
Comparison to universal pre-K’s effects on:
6 Net benefits as % of income
7 Ratio of earnings benefits to tax costs

Income quintile
Middle
3
4
14.8
23.4

Lowest
1
3.4

2
8.7

35.814
0.696
35.118
51.45

0.033
0.635
−0.602
0.05

0.031
0.604
−0.574
0.05

6.003
25.08

1.906
9.38

0.414
2.91

Highest
5
49.7

Overall
100

0.032
0.574
−0.542
0.06

0.013
0.500
−0.487
0.03

1.240
0.551
0.689
2.25

−0.083
0.59

−0.122
0.32

0.351
2.78

NOTE: Rows 2 through 5 show distributional effects for a full-scale Abecedarian program. Rows 6 and 7 show distributional effects for
a universal pre-K program. These bottom rows are taken from Table 8.2. The overall size, effects, and costs of an Abecedarian program
are derived in Chapter 4. The earnings effects due to effects on former child participants and their parents are derived by assuming all of
these effects are allocated to the lowest income quintile; see text for the rationale for this assumption. Balanced-budget multiplier effects
of spending are allocated across quintiles based on results in Bartik (1994b) for distributional effects of labor demand. Tax costs are
allocated across quintiles based on results in McIntyre et al. (2003). These procedures are similar to what was done for universal pre-K
in Table 8.2. All effects as a percentage of income are effects on the present value of the relevant variable as a percentage of the present
value of income. Ratios are the present value of benefits divided by costs. Present value calculations use a 3 percent discount rate.
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in income from a full-scale Abecedarian program of about 0.5 percent
of income (row 4). This far exceeds the net losses for any income quintile from universal pre-K. And of course universal pre-K results in net
gains for the middle income quintile and below.
The Abecedarian program is so expensive per participant that its
tax burden for the population is almost three times as great as universal
pre-K, even though universal pre-K is projected to have more than four
times as many participants. (See Table 4.2, and compare the overall tax
cost in Tables 8.2 and 8.7.) Because of its more limited number of participants, the Abecedarian program has many fewer direct beneficiaries,
and these beneficiaries are concentrated in the lowest income quintile.
This analysis, as is true of all the analysis in this book, only looks at
economic development benefits. Studies have not found evidence that
the Abecedarian program reduces crime, so anticrime benefits for the
overall population cannot be counted on. There may be some benefits
for other income quintiles in reduced social service costs.
However, overall, a full-scale Abecedarian program appears to be
economically promising but politically troubled. The program could
deliver large antipoverty benefits. However, achieving such benefits
puts great demands on the altruism of the majority of the population,
which is ineligible for the program.

THE NURSE-FAMILY PARTNERSHIP: DISTRIBUTIONAL
EFFECTS OF A SMALLER-SCALE ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM
As detailed in Chapter 4, the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP) provides disadvantaged first-time mothers with nurse home visits from the
prenatal period to age two. These visits focus on delivering a curriculum that includes healthier prenatal care, more sensitive child care, and
a better maternal life course. Direct hours of interaction during the visits
with each mother total perhaps 45 hours over this two-and-a-half-year
period. Estimates suggest that a full-scale NFP would perhaps include
about 9 percent of all children.
The NFP is much less intense and costly in services per child than
the Abecedarian program. The NFP has a present value of $10,000 per
child. This compares to almost $80,000 for the Abecedarian program.

Who Benefits? 257

The NFP is also highly targeted on the disadvantaged population compared to universal pre-K: the NFP serves less than 10 percent of all
children, whereas universal pre-K is estimated to serve about 70 percent
of all children. As shown in Chapter 4, the NFP has an economic development benefits-to-cost ratio that exceeds 1, at 1.85. But the highly targeted nature of the NFP, and its relatively modest costs per child, shape
the magnitude and distribution of its economic development benefits.
I simulated the distributional impact of a full-scale version of the
NFP (Table 8.8). The methodology was identical to that used for universal pre-K and the Abecedarian program, to allow comparisons.
This full-scale NFP program is assumed to deliver all of its benefits
to children and mothers in the lowest income quintile. This is because
the full-scale program that is modeled is a targeted program. There is no
research basis to project what impact the NFP would have if delivered
universally. The NFP was designed to address the needs of disadvantaged families. Early experiments with the NFP suggested that its benefits were greater for more-disadvantaged women (Karoly et al. 1998;
Olds et al. 1997).
As expected based on Chapter 4, the NFP has net benefits overall.
And given how the NFP is targeted, these benefits are delivered in a
highly progressive way (row 4).
However, the lesser intensity of the NFP has two consequences.
First, the NFP only has moderate percentage effects on the income of
the lowest income quintile, even though this quintile receives most of
the NFP’s benefits. The NFP increases the income of the lowest income
quintile by 2.7 percent (row 4). This is less than one-half of the effects
on the lowest income quintile of universal pre-K (row 6 versus row 4).
These lesser effects occur even though the NFP is a far more targeted
program than universal pre-K. But the hours of services per participant
are far less for NFP than for universal pre-K. It is therefore not surprising that its benefits are smaller for lower income groups.
Second, the cost of the NFP for the remaining upper 80 percent
of the income distribution is quite modest. The NFP costs about onetwentieth of 1 percent of income for these upper income groups (row
4). In contrast, the costs of the Abecedarian program for upper income
quintiles are more than 10 times as great (row 8). Compared to the
Abecedarian program, the NFP is quite cheap because of the lesser
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Table 8.8 Distributional Effects for the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP)
Income quintile
Lowest
Middle
Row
1
2
3
4
1 Quintile % share of total household income
3.4
8.7
14.8
23.4
NFP’s effects on:
2.770
0.003
2 Earnings as % of income
0.003
0.003
3 Tax costs as % of income
0.066
0.060
0.057
0.054
4 Net benefits as % of income
2.704
−0.057
−0.054
−0.051
5 Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs
42.14
0.05
0.05
0.05
Comparison: Universal pre-K’s effects on:
6 Net benefits as % of income
6.003
1.906
0.414
−0.083
7 Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs
25.08
9.38
2.91
0.59
Comparison: Abecedarian effects on:
35.118
8 Net benefits as % of income
−0.602
−0.574
−0.542
9 Ratio of earnings effects to tax costs
51.45
0.05
0.05
0.06

Highest
5
49.7

Overall
100

0.001
0.047
−0.046
0.03

0.096
0.052
0.044
1.85

−0.122

0.351
2.78

−0.487

0.689
2.25

0.32
0.03

NOTE: Rows 2 through 5 show effects for full-scale implementation of the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP). The next set of rows, 6 and
7, shows effects for universal pre-K. The final set of rows, 8 and 9, shows effects from the Abecedarian program. The universal pre-K
effects and Abecedarian effects come from Table 8.2 and Table 8.7, respectively. The NFP effects on overall earnings and taxes are
derived from the simulation models outlined in Chapter 4. These effects are expressed as percentages of income by using data from Gordon (2009) on the labor share. NFP effects on former child participants and parents are allocated across quintiles under the assumption
that all such effects occur in the lowest income quintile. Balanced-budget multiplier effects of NFP are allocated across quintiles based on
estimates in Bartik (1994b) for how labor demand affects the income of different quintiles. Tax costs are allocated across quintiles based
on estimates by McIntyre et al. (2003). All effects for percentage of income are the present value of the relevant variable as a percentage
of the present value of income. All ratios of earnings to tax costs are the present value of earnings effects to the present value of tax costs.
All present value calculations use a 3 percent social discount rate.
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costs per participant. Compared to universal pre-K, the NFP is cheap
because it is far more targeted.
These findings suggest that politically, a full-scale NFP program
may be an easier sell than a full-scale Abecedarian program. The net
sacrifice required does not put as much strain on voters’ altruism. On
the other hand, the antipoverty effects of the NFP are more modest.

CONCLUSION
Previous chapters show that high-quality business incentives and
early childhood programs can deliver economic development benefits
that exceed costs for state residents overall. This chapter shows that all
of these programs increase the progressivity of the income distribution
and help the poor.
All of the early childhood programs are far more progressive than
business incentives in their effects on the income distribution. This is
partly because some of these early childhood programs are designed to
target assistance to disadvantaged families. But it also reflects the idea
that programs to develop human capital may by their very nature deliver more progressive benefits than programs that boost labor demand.
The progressivity of boosts to labor demand is more limited by the current capacities of disadvantaged groups. Early childhood programs are
not so limited. As a result, business incentives are unlikely to deliver
large boosts to the economic well-being of state residents who are poor.
How politically feasible is it for early childhood programs to be targeted to the poor? For smaller-scale programs, such as the NFP, the program cost is low enough that such targeted efforts are probably politically feasible. However, the trade-off is that the antipoverty benefits
are modest. Smaller-scale targeted programs such as the NFP have the
potential to play an important role in addressing the problems of lower
income groups. However, they clearly do not have sufficiently large
effects to be the “solution” to poverty. This should not be interpreted
as a criticism of these programs. I doubt whether advocates of the NFP
think that this program can “solve” poverty on its own.
For large-scale early childhood programs, such as the Abecedarian
program and universal pre-K education, their political feasibility may
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be improved if the program can be plausibly designed to deliver broad
benefits across many income groups. These larger-scale programs have
a greater potential to deliver large benefits to lower income groups.
Whether this potential is politically enacted and sustained depends on
whether some combination of the general population’s altruism and
self-interest can be mobilized to support these efforts. Universal accessibility, if not necessarily universal free access, may be helpful in making credible the notion of broad benefits, including improvements in
property values. But if political perceptions change so that broad benefits are not plausible, either because of changing research findings or
changing perceptions of these findings, then a more targeted program
may be the only politically sustainable fall-back position. However, targeted programs may be more limited than universal programs in terms
of the costs that a majority of the public is willing to pay. This more
limited willingness to pay may limit the quality and hence effectiveness
of a targeted program. It may also limit how many disadvantaged children are able to access a targeted program. Universal early childhood
programs may be more politically effective than targeted programs in
delivering assistance to the poor.

Notes
1. For a useful and insightful recent discussion of the consequences of income
inequality, and recent trends in income inequality in the United States and other
industrial democracies, see Kenworthy (2008).
2. The estimated annual cost of universal pre-K if implemented nationwide is $14.3
billion. As stated in Chapter 2, annual costs of state and local business incentives
are probably $20–$30 billion. Most of these business incentive dollars come in
the form of tax incentives. Based on Michigan’s figures, about two-thirds (more
precisely, 68.2 percent, or $678 million in Michigan tax incentives out of $994
million total Michigan resources for business incentives) of annual state and local
business incentives are tax incentives. Out of a $20–$30 billion total in state and
local business incentives, this would imply $13.6–$20.5 billion in annual state and
local business tax incentives. So, $14.3 billion is probably a conservative estimate
of the magnitude of business tax incentives.
3. Figures on what percentage of each household is in each quintile are reported
on-line by the U.S. Census Bureau from the 2008 Annual Social and Economic
Supplement to the CPS. This reports data for calendar year 2007. The relevant
figures are in Table 2 and Table A-3 of DeNava-Walt, Proctor, and Smith (2008).
The cutoffs for each income quintile are as follows: quintile 1 (lowest income),
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less than $20,300; quintile 2, from $20,300 to less than $39,100; quintile 3 (middle
income), from $39,100 to less than $62,000; quintile 4, from $62,000 to less than
$100,000; quintile 5 (highest income), $100,000 or more. These income cutoffs
are provided on-line in Table HINC-05, available at the Census Bureau’s Web
site at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/macro/032008/hhinc/new05_000.htm
(accessed June 22, 2010). Mean income of each quintile, available in Table A-3 of
Denava-Walt et al. (2008), is as follows: quintile 1, $11,551; quintile 2, $29,442;
quintile 3, $49,968; quintile 4, $79,111; quintile 5, $167,971. The implied mean
income of all households is $67,609, which is increased relative to the middle
income quintile mean by the high incomes of the top quintiles.
4. All these calculations use figures for current income, and the present value of
such, for the relevant group. I used current income rather than permanent income
because it is more straightforward to measure, and because there are better data on
the effects of policies and programs relative to current income. Permanent income
is a concept that is never directly measured but only inferred. Trying to measure distributional effects relative to permanent income adds complications about
how to measure permanent income. Is consumption a valid measure of permanent
income? How can we incorporate borrowing constraints into a model of effective permanent income? The distributional calculations relative to current income
probably exaggerate the progressivity of all programs relative to the permanent
income distribution. However, the relative progressivity of the different programs
would probably hold even if measured against permanent income.
5. Specifically, I first used this book’s model to calculate the present value of earnings increases due to business incentives, as a percentage of the present value of
earnings. This was then multiplied by 0.735. This factor of 0.735 reflects the estimated labor share of income (Gordon 2009). I use Gordon’s figures for the average labor share from 1998 to 2008. Looking at Commerce Department figures on
personal income and compensation, and allowing for proprietors’ income to have
a two-thirds labor share, yielded similar labor share figures. The overall percentage effect on income for all households was then allocated across income quintiles
based on the results in Bartik (1994b). I used my estimates from this paper of
how income percentages varied by quintile to calculate percentage effects in each
income quintile. These percentage figures were then translated into dollar impact
figures using each quintile’s estimated share of total income.
6. These estimates use fairly standard incidence assumptions. However, as noted by
Reschovsky (1998), they may yield more regressive impacts of state and local
taxes than is consistent with many economists’ views of tax incidence. Therefore,
these estimates are somewhat tilted toward not finding progressive effects of these
various economic development programs. As a result, the finding in this chapter
of progressive impacts of all these programs is strengthened. I also considered
incidence using Pechman’s estimates (Pechman 1985, variant 3b, p. 61). I had
used Pechman’s estimates in Bartik (1994b). Pechman’s estimates are somewhat
more regressive at the lower end, and more progressive between the middle and
high end. The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) numbers imply
the following relative tax rates by quintile, where the overall tax rate average is

262 Bartik
indexed as 1.00: quintile 1 (lowest), 1.26; quintile 2, 1.15; quintile 3, 1.10; quintile 4, 1.04; quintile 5 (highest), 0.91. Pechman’s numbers imply the following
relative tax rates by quintile: quintile 1, 1.48; quintile 2, 1.11; quintile 3, 0.97;
quintile 4, 0.91; quintile 5, 1.00. None of the qualitative and quantitative findings
of this chapter are altered significantly by using the Pechman incidence assumptions rather than the ITEP incidence assumptions. The interested reader can use
the numbers in this endnote to recalculate the numbers.
The allocation first calculates the present value of taxes paid overall for business incentives, divided by the present value of future earnings. This percentage is
then multiplied by 0.735 to reflect the share of labor compensation in total income.
The overall percentage share of taxes in income is then used to calculate the percentage share of taxes in income of each quintile using the relative percentage tax
rates in McIntyre et al. (2003). The specific ITEP numbers I used were state and
local taxes before considering the potential federal income tax offset. This is the
row labeled “Total taxes” in the table for “Averages for All States.” Therefore,
there may be some additional net benefits from all these programs, both business
incentives and early childhood programs, from federal tax deductibility, particularly for higher income quintiles.
The ITEP figures for tax burden by income quintile are for nonelderly couples
and individuals. Therefore, the procedure I use implicitly assumes that tax burdens
by household income quintile follow the pattern for tax burdens by income quintile for nonelderly couples and individuals.
7. These calculations focus on the economic development benefits. They do not
include the effects on capital gains that were included in my 1994 paper. But
including capital gains would not make much difference. The real earnings effects
calculated here already adjust for changes in local prices, including changes in
local housing prices. Therefore, capital gains due to increases in property values
are a net addition to benefits, above and beyond what has been counted so far.
These capital gains have an estimated present value of only about 0.05 percent of
the present value of income. The ratios of gross earnings benefits plus capital gains
to tax costs, by income quintile, are as follows: quintile 1 (lowest), 6.30; quintile 2,
3.83; quintile 3, 3.83; quintile 4, 4.13; quintile 5, 2.08; overall, 3.35. (The identical
numbers for this ratio for quintiles 2 and 3 is not a typo; it is merely an odd coincidence.) These ratios are not much of an increase from what is reported in Table 8.1.
8. Although there are other studies of how pre-K effects differ with economic status, all these other studies are potentially subject to much more serious selection
effects. Parents choose to send their children to pre-K. As a result of this choice,
pre-K attendees differ from nonattendees in many ways, both observed and (most
critically) unobserved. This selection will bias estimates of pre-K effects. There is
no reason to think that this selection bias will be of similar magnitude or even sign
across different income groups. Gormley et al. (2005) use a regression discontinuity approach, which, as outlined in the text and in Lee and Lemieux (2009), is
potentially much less biased by selection effects.
9. The merits and issues with regression discontinuity studies are discussed in Lee
and Lemieux (2009). Gormley et al.’s (2005) regression discontinuity analysis
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exploits the fact that Oklahoma’s pre-K program has an age cutoff. The same
tests were administered at both the beginning of Oklahoma’s pre-K program and
the beginning of kindergarten for students who had participated in the pre-K program the previous year. These two groups, one of beginning kindergartners, the
other of beginning pre-K students, will tend to be similar on most observed and
unobserved characteristics, because both groups of families chose to participate
in the state pre-K program. We can also add statistical controls for any observed
differences across these two groups that happen to occur. The one observed characteristic that will significantly differ across the two groups is age, as the beginning kindergartners will be older than the beginning pre-K students. However, the
sample of beginning kindergartners includes students who in the previous year
barely made the pre-K program’s age cutoff. Furthermore, the sample of beginning pre-K students includes students who in the previous year barely missed the
pre-K program’s age cutoff. We can estimate how test scores vary with age, controlling for other student characteristics. We would expect test scores to smoothly
vary with age, except that there may be a sharp jump at the age cutoff. Those
students above the age cutoff were able to participate in state-funded pre-K for
one year. Those students below the age cutoff instead participated in other activities, including private pre-K programs. Gormley et al. find that although test score
results improve with age, there is an abrupt jump in test score results at the age
cutoff. This abrupt jump is most likely associated with having attended the state’s
pre-K program. The jump is inferred as being the effects of participating in the
state’s pre-K program, compared to alternative activities.
10. Gormley and his colleagues do not report the statistical significance of these differentials across different income groups. My own calculations suggest that in
comparisons across any two groups for any of the tests, the results are not statistically significantly different across income groups. This can be computed by calculating the difference of estimates, then calculating the variance assuming the coefficient estimates are uncorrelated. They would appear to be uncorrelated in that
each estimate comes from separate regression estimates using a different sample.
With the three tests involved and three groups, there are nine possible comparisons of two groups for a given test. Six of these nine comparisons have t-statistics
on the differences of less than 1 in absolute value. The largest in absolute value
t-statistic is 1.47, which is statistically significant only at the 14 percent level.
In some discussions of these results, Gormley’s presentation may lead some
readers to infer that pre-K’s effects are larger for lower income groups. For example, the presentation of results in Gormley et al. (2004) or Gormley (2007b) show
larger percentage effects on the test scores of lower income children. Percentage
effects are larger for lower income groups because average test scores of lower
income groups are lower. Absolute effects on test scores are similar across income
groups. The implication of these greater percentage effects for later-life effects is
unclear. Will the same absolute increase in test scores have greater effects on laterlife success starting from a small base test score compared to starting from a large
base test score? I know of no evidence that addresses this question.
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11. One could argue that a given absolute increase in test scores will have greater
effects on lower income groups. This could occur because of the lower test score
base of lower income groups (see endnote 10). Or, it could occur because lower
income groups are at greater risk of dropping out of high school, or of becoming
involved in criminal activities or other negative activities that may reduce employment and earnings. On the other hand, as noted in the text, middle and upper
income groups may be easier to induce to have large absolute earnings increases.
These groups have higher employment rates and wage rates, so any given absolute
increase in employment rates or wage rates will cause larger dollar effects on earnings. In addition, middle and upper income groups may be closer to the margin of
being induced to attain a college degree, which affects annual earnings much more
than high school graduation.
12. Appendix 8A summarizes their distributional assumptions and explains how I use
them to generate some distributional results by quintile. Appendix 8A, like all of
this book’s appendices, is available from the Upjohn Institute.
13. Earnings effects per quintile do not fall off quite so fast per household in each
quintile. The Karoly and Bigelow enrollment assumptions imply that although a
higher percentage of four-year-olds who are low-income enroll in universal pre-K,
this enrollment is a lower percentage of households in the lowest income quintile. This probably reflects that the lowest income quintile includes a considerable
number of single-person households. The pattern of dollar benefits per household,
relative to the lowest income quintile, is as follows: quintile 1, 1.00; quintile 2,
0.87; quintile 3, 0.43; quintile 4, 0.12; quintile 5, 0.12. See Appendix 8A for more
details.
14. Because of the way in which these distributional effects are calculated, the model
implicitly assumes that such phenomena as peer effects and displacement effects
occur within each quintile. If peer effects or displacement effects occur across
quintiles, this will broaden the benefits of pre-K somewhat. However, there is no
way to reliably estimate the extent of such broadening. It seems unlikely that such
broadening would significantly reduce the highly progressive nature of benefits
for pre-K and other early childhood programs.
15. This 6 percent figure does not measure the annual percentage effect of pre-K on
participants. The 6 percent is the present value of the effect on state residents
as a percentage of the present value of the income of that quintile. This will be
below the long-run annual effects on former child participants for several reasons.
First, some former child participants move out of state. Second, the model allows
for displacement effects. Third, because the effect on former child participants
is long-delayed, this reduces the present value percentage effect relative to the
long-run annual percentage effect. Calculations of annual percentage effects on
participants suggest that they average 17.3 percent from ages 16 to 79. This is
an unweighted average. The percentage effects do not vary greatly across years.
Percentage effects on earnings for each year range from 13.6 to 23.5 percent.
16. Estimated effects for the lowest income quintile are somewhat reduced relative to
CPC because the CPC estimates are only assumed to fully apply to lower income
children who otherwise would have attended no pre-K program. Some members
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17.

18.

19.
20.

of the lowest income quintile would otherwise have attended some other pre-K
program. The estimated benefits for these children are assumed to be lower than
the CPC program’s estimated effects. Overall, the average benefits per participant
for the lowest income quintile are about 61 percent of the estimated benefits per
participant of the CPC program.
Pre-K’s benefits lead to a 0.549 percent boost to the present value of overall earnings, as a percentage of the present value of income (Table 8.3, row 2). The property value increase is equivalent to 0.234 percent of the present value of income
(row 3). Therefore, capitalization into higher property values captures about 42
percent of the earnings effects of pre-K (42% = 0.234 ÷ 0.549). Overall property
value increases do not capture all of the overall earnings effects of pre-K because
we assume different discount rates. From a social perspective, we use 3 percent
to discount future earnings, but we assume that property buyers and sellers use a
higher discount rate in determining property bids. Individuals may be more myopic in their market behavior than is socially optimal.
It is apparent from these calculations that even complete capitalization would not
eliminate the overall progressivity of universal pre-K education. Even if the overall benefits of pre-K are fully capitalized into higher property values, this does not
mean that these benefits are completely capitalized for each income group. We can
think of blowing up capitalization benefits so that they are the same as the overall
earnings benefits. Under this assumption, the lowest income quintile still gains
so much from the higher earnings benefits that the capitalization effects cannot
completely offset these effects. Because all income groups participate in the same
housing market, capitalization effects cannot perfectly offset earnings benefits for
each income group, even if they do so overall.
Why doesn’t capitalization differentiate by income groups to capture differential benefits? Differential capitalization is implausible given that land can be
reallocated from one housing type to another. In terms of Table 8.3, if capitalization differentiates by income group, then capitalization implies that housing prices
of the lowest income quintile would have to go up by much more in percentage
terms than those of the average household, while housing prices of the highest
income quintile would go up by much less in percentage terms than for the average household. Presumably these housing price changes are due to differential
land price changes, as in the long run the price of structural capital should be
related to replacement costs. In any event, it would be very difficult to sustain the
large differences in land prices between income groups implied by non-uniform
capitalization. Perhaps in theory some perfectly enforced zoning and new housing regulations could do so. In practice, the required land price differentials seem
likely to overwhelm any such regulatory barriers.
This largely occurs because the lower income household groups seem to have
fewer four-year-olds. This probably occurs because lower income households
have a greater percentage of single individual households.
This fee is based on the pre-K program being three hours a day, 175 days a year,
and having net costs in 2007 dollars of $4,933. This cost is what was assumed
in my original report in 2006. These cost estimates were derived by Karoly and
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21.

22.

23.
24.

Bigelow (2005). These are net cost figures that net out cost savings on existing
pre-K programs. Therefore, the fee as a percentage of gross pre-K costs would
be higher. However, the net cost figures assumed by Karoly and Bigelow end up
being similar to some estimates of the gross costs of high-quality pre-K programs.
Consider the estimates of the cost of high-quality pre-K education in Gault et al.
(2008). There, a similar three-hour-a-day school-year program and a lead teacher
paid public-school wages cost $4,071 per year per child at a class size of 20 to 2,
$4,506 per year per child at a class size of 17 to 2, and $4,893 per year per child
at a class size of 15 to 2. The calculation of pre-K costs also adds in extra administrative costs of 5 percent above this $4,933 per child to monitor family income
and regularly collect the fees. (However, fees are set at half of the net costs before
these extra administrative costs.)
This figure is taken from PPL Table 6B from the on-line version of Smith (2002).
It can be found at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/child/ppl-964/
tab06.pdf (accessed June 28, 2010).
Specifically, I looked at the weekly child care expenditures divided by weekly
child care hours for children less than five, and for families with annual incomes
greater than $69,763 per year in 2007 dollars. (In the table, these are families with
an average monthly income of greater than $4,500 in 1997 dollars.) I then updated
this hourly figure to 2007 dollars using the CPI.
Karoly and Bigelow (2005) assume that charging fees will increase administrative costs by 10 percent. However, this appears to be based on a statement by
Barnett (1993) that refers to the overall administrative costs of welfare programs,
not the extra administrative costs that result simply from charging fees. Studies
of administrative costs as a percentage of benefits in the United States suggest
that non-means-tested programs such as Social Security have administrative costs
of 2.5 percent of benefits, while welfare and unemployment insurance programs
have administrative costs of 12.1 percent and 11.8 percent of benefits (Kesselman [1982], of which I was made aware by Besley and Kanbur [1990]). This
might suggest that means testing adds 9–10 percent in administrative costs as a
percentage of benefits. However, many of the administrative costs of welfare and
unemployment insurance programs are due to complex work search rules, as well
as administrative procedures that in part are meant to discourage usage. Therefore,
I suspect that the extra administrative costs of charging fees to upper income families in a universal pre-K program would be considerably less than 9–10 percent.
An extra 5 percent is a somewhat arbitrary but reasonable assumption.
A working-paper version of this chapter considers other distributional assumptions.
This can be derived by comparing row 2 to the fees paid, which is given by the
difference between row 7 and row 3. For income quintile 4, the earnings benefits
from pre-K with fees are 0.092 percent of income, whereas fees are 0.079 percent
of income. For income quintile 5, the earnings benefits from pre-K are 0.042 percent of income, whereas fees are 0.037 percent of income.

9
Locality Matters
How Economic Development Benefits
Vary in Diverse Local Economies
In this book, up until now, the analysis has focused on economic
development benefits for a typical state. For example, consider my
statement that high-quality universal pre-K education produces $2.78
in economic development benefits per dollar of costs. That statement
is true for an “average U.S. state.” In an average U.S. state, high-quality
universal pre-K would increase the present value of state residents’
per-capita earnings by $2.78 per dollar of program costs. Consider also
my statement that high-quality business incentives produce economic
development benefits of $3.14 per dollar of costs. That statement, too,
is true in an “average U.S. state”: in an average U.S. state, high-quality
business incentives will increase the present value of state residents’
per-capita earnings by $3.14 per dollar of incentive costs.
But states differ. These differences may affect economic development benefits. I show in this chapter that economic development benefits of pre-K education differ somewhat across U.S. states. However,
in all states, pre-K education has economic development benefits that
considerably exceed program costs.
Furthermore, economic development benefits for a typical state may
differ from economic development benefits for a typical metropolitan
area. This is important because public policy toward early childhood
programs and business incentives is not solely the prerogative of state
governments. Local policymakers also make decisions about investing
in early childhood programs, or in business incentives.
I show in this chapter that for a typical metropolitan area, compared to a typical state, the ratio of economic development benefits to
program costs of early childhood programs is reduced. However, this
reduction is small enough that these programs still make sense from a
metropolitan area’s perspective. Even if local governments in a metropolitan area pay all the costs of pre-K, this investment can still pay off
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in producing economic development benefits for the metropolitan-area
economy.
Local economic development benefits may also vary because of the
size and growth rate of the metropolitan area. I show in this chapter that
the economic development benefits of early childhood programs will
be smaller in smaller metropolitan areas, or in slower-growing metropolitan areas. However, these effects of metro-area size and growth on
the returns to early childhood programs are modest. Even in small and
slow-growing metropolitan areas, early childhood programs still have
local economic development benefits exceeding costs.
I also show that the local economic development benefits of business incentives may be significantly lower in fast-growing metropolitan
areas. In metropolitan areas that already have rapidly growing labor
demand, policies to add even more jobs have lower benefits. These benefits may be insufficient to justify incentives’ costs.
Therefore, local economic development strategy should vary with
the local area’s growth trends. Areas with plenty of jobs may not benefit much from business incentives. These high-growth areas should
instead focus on early childhood programs and other programs to give
local residents the skills needed for available jobs. Low-growth areas
may benefit more from business incentives. However, low-growth areas
will also benefit from early childhood programs and other skill-building
programs.
The purpose, then, of this chapter is to explain how locality matters to economic development benefits. This includes quantifying how
much it matters.

WHAT THIS CHAPTER IS AND ISN’T
This chapter focuses on characteristics of state and local areas that
affect the benefits of early childhood programs or business incentive
programs, holding constant who participates in these programs. As previous chapters have explored, benefits of early childhood programs may
vary with the income mix of families participating. Benefits of business
incentive programs may vary with the wage rates of businesses receiving incentives.
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The types of families participating in early childhood programs
may tend to vary with a locality’s socioeconomic makeup. The types of
businesses receiving incentives may tend to vary with a locality’s business mix. But who participates in these programs also depends upon
program design and administration. The locality’s socioeconomic mix
and business mix do not completely determine program participation.
This chapter considers how benefits would vary if we had the same
mix of participants but were in a different state or local area. For early
childhood programs, even with the same income mix of family participants, how would economic development benefits vary with state and
local characteristics? For business incentive programs, even with the
same types of businesses receiving incentives, how would economic
development benefits vary with state and local characteristics?

THE MECHANISMS BY WHICH LOCALITY MATTERS
What characteristics of a state or metropolitan area affect economic
development benefits for early childhood and business incentive programs? How do these characteristics affect economic development
benefits?
States
For states, the main characteristic affecting economic development
benefits of early childhood programs is the out-mobility of residents
from early childhood to adulthood.1 For this book’s calculation of economic development benefits of early childhood programs, I only count
earnings gains for those who remain in the state.
For states with lower percentages of children remaining in the state
during their careers, we would expect economic development benefits
of early childhood programs to be lower. I will quantify this below.
Metropolitan Areas
Compared to the typical state, the typical metropolitan area will be
smaller and less diverse in amenities and industrial characteristics. As
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a result, we would expect that fewer children would remain as adults
in the same metro area than in the same state. This will lower the economic development benefits of early childhood programs from a metropolitan perspective compared to a state perspective.
It is unclear what the smaller size and reduced diversity of metro
areas, compared to states, imply for the economic development benefits of business incentives. On the one hand, the smaller size and
reduced diversity of a metropolitan area as opposed to a state might
mean that employment growth at the metro-area level will attract fewer
in-migrants than at the state level. This would raise the economic development benefits of employment growth for the original residents of the
area. On the other hand, the smaller size and reduced diversity of metro
areas, compared to states, might mean that there is less likelihood of a
good match among the original residents for any newly created jobs.
This would reduce the effects of job creation on local employment
rates, which would reduce economic development benefits.
In addition, it is possible that the responsiveness of business
employment to incentives could differ at a metropolitan level compared
to a state level. Business location decisions are more responsive to
incentives if the location has more close substitutes. Because the typical metro area is smaller than the typical state, it might be thought to
have more close substitute locations. On the other hand, state boundaries sometimes split metropolitan areas and other local labor markets.
Two locations within the same local labor market are more likely to
be close substitutes than two locations in different local labor markets.
Metropolitan Area Size
Metro area size might affect economic development benefits for
reasons similar to why economic development benefits would differ for
metro areas versus states. Smaller metro areas will have fewer and less
diverse opportunities, amenities, and industries. This should reduce the
percentage of children who later stay in the metro area during their
adult working careers. The result is that local economic development
benefits would be lower for early childhood programs in smaller metro
areas.
For business incentives, the effects of metro area size on economic
development benefits are uncertain. Smaller metro areas may attract
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fewer in-migrants. On the other hand, smaller metro areas may have
more trouble matching their current workforce to new job opportunities. In addition, a typical small metro area may have more close substitute locations than a typical large metro area. This may increase the
responsiveness of area employment to business incentives in small metro
areas. On the other hand, some small metro areas may be dominated
by less-footloose industries, those having strong historical or natural
resource ties to the area. This would tend to reduce the response of area
employment to incentives.
Metro Area Growth Trend
Metro areas differ in their usual growth rates. The previous metro
growth trend matters to economic development benefits because this
growth trend will affect the baseline ratio of job opportunities to labor
supply. If the previous metro growth trend was slow, the metro area
will have a lower ratio of job opportunities to labor supply. We would
expect this to discourage persons from staying in the metropolitan area.
This would lower the local economic development benefits from early
childhood programs.
Slower growth in a metro area means there are greater economic
development benefits to adding jobs through business incentives. The
previous slow growth means there is more local nonemployed population available to fill newly created jobs. In addition, the newly created
jobs will be less attractive to in-migrants because the local labor market
still has higher unemployment.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON VARIATION ACROSS STATES
Across states, there is some variation in what percentage of childhood residents stay during adulthood. However, this variation is insufficient to dramatically alter the economic development benefits of early
childhood programs.
The variation in out-of-state mobility can be illustrated by considering what percentage of persons born in a state still live in the state.
Based on the 2000 Census, on average 68 percent of all Americans
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born in a state still live there. But the percentage living in their birth
state varies across states. At one extreme, only 43 percent of those born
in Wyoming still lived there in 2000, and 45 percent of those born in
North Dakota still lived in that state. At the other extreme, 80 percent
of those born in Texas were still living there in 2000, and 77 percent of
those born in California. Thirty-seven states had a percentage of “birthright” state residents still living there of 60 percent or greater as of 2000
(Table 9.1).
These variations in out-of-state mobility can be used to estimate
how economic development benefits of early childhood programs vary
across states. Consider the case of pre-K programs. For the typical
state, the economic development benefits per dollar of program costs
are 2.78. Across states, economic development benefits per dollar of
program costs vary from a high of 3.15 in Texas to a low of 1.96 in
Wyoming. However, in 38 states this ratio is 2.50 or above (Table 9.2).2
The bottom line is that the economic development benefits-to-cost
ratio of early childhood programs does not differ dramatically for most
states. Even for states that have more out-migration of former child
participants, a sufficient number of former child participants will stay to
yield economic development benefits that exceed program costs.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON METROPOLITAN AREAS
VERSUS STATES
The empirical evidence suggests that persons are only modestly less
likely to spend their career in their childhood metropolitan area than in
their childhood state. Therefore, metropolitan economic development
benefits of early childhood programs are only modestly less than state
economic development benefits. (This statement is for a typical state
and a typical metropolitan area. We consider metropolitan areas of different size and growth later in this chapter.)
The available evidence suggests that the percentage of four-yearolds who still live in the same metropolitan area at age 31 and above
is a little less than four-fifths of the percentage of four-year-olds who
reside in the same state at age 31 and above. This finding is based in part
upon research of mine that uses data from the Panel Survey of Income

% living in
state of birth
71.6
66.3
68.5
66.2
73.7
71.1
60.3
66.0
53.3
56.0
62.9
61.1
64.5
59.9
63.2
74.8
44.8

State of birth
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
U.S. average

% living in
state of birth
70.9
60.3
66.0
69.1
60.4
69.8
49.6
70.2
79.8
70.7
59.1
67.3
70.4
52.2
73.3
42.8
68.4

NOTE: This is derived from a special tabulation by the U.S. Census Bureau from the 2000 U.S. census, released on the Internet on January
31, 2005, and available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/phct38.html (accessed June 28, 2010). This includes all U.S.
residents in 2000 born in the United States. The percentage simply reflects what percentage of native-born citizens are living in the same
state they were born in, broken down by state of birth. For example, the 68.2% for Alabama means that 68.2% of persons born in Alabama still live in Alabama, and should not be interpreted as meaning that 68.2% of current residents of Alabama were born in Alabama.

Locality Matters 273

Table 9.1 Percentage of Persons Living in Birth State
% living in
State of birth
state of birth
State of birth
Alabama
68.2
Louisiana
Alaska
53.5
Maine
Arizona
69.9
Maryland
Arkansas
58.8
Massachusetts
California
76.9
Michigan
Colorado
62.0
Minnesota
Connecticut
65.0
Mississippi
Delaware
62.3
Missouri
Florida
73.6
Montana
Georgia
73.4
Nebraska
Hawaii
63.0
Nevada
Idaho
55.4
New Hampshire
Illinois
65.7
New Jersey
Indiana
69.1
New Mexico
Iowa
59.0
New York
Kansas
55.9
North Carolina
Kentucky
65.8
North Dakota

Ratio

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

2.86
2.52
2.71
2.80
2.53
2.83
2.18
2.84
3.15
2.85
2.48
2.75
2.84
2.26
2.94
1.96
2.78

2.77
2.31
2.83
2.47
3.05
2.58
2.67
2.59
2.95
2.94
2.61
2.37
2.69
2.80
2.48
2.38
2.70

Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

2.88
2.71
2.78
2.71
2.95
2.87
2.52
2.71
2.30
2.38
2.61
2.55
2.65
2.51
2.62
2.98
2.03

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
U.S. average

NOTE: These state-specific ratios of economic development benefits to costs are generated by adjusting for differential out-migration. This is
based on the percentage of those born in the state that still live there. I extrapolate to different states based on how benefits are altered from
the United States to the typical state by out-migration. The benefits to pre-K participants in the typical state are a ratio of 2.65 to costs. (There
are also balanced-budget multiplier benefits and benefits to parents. These benefits are assumed to be unaltered by state migration, as these
benefits are more immediate. There are also benefits from social spillover effects of more education. These are also assumed to be unaltered,
as these may be larger if there is more mobility.) The benefits to pre-K participants in the United States are 3.66. To extrapolate this to other
states, I multiply 3.66 by the following ratio: (1 − [(3.66 − 2.65) / 3.66] × [100 − % born in state that remain] / [100 − 68.4]). The figure 68.4
is the percentage of those born in a typical state that are still living there in the 2000 Census. This calculation generates a figure of 3.66 for the
United States and 2.65 for the typical state. After this figure is calculated for some other state, using figures from Table 9.1, I add 0.13 to reflect
benefits of more spending, benefits to parents, and social spillover benefits of education.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Table 9.2 Ratio of Economic Development Benefits to Costs of Universal Pre-K, by State
State
Ratio
State
Ratio
State
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Dynamics (PSID) to follow the same four-year-olds for up to 31 years.
(Thirty-one years is the maximum number of years for which we can
follow a sufficiently large sample using the PSID to obtain reasonably
precise estimates.) The percentage of four-year-olds who live in the
same state at ages 31–35 as they lived in at age four averages 72.2 percent. The percentage of four-year-olds who live in the same metropolitan area at ages 31–35 as they lived in at age four averages 56.2 percent.
Other evidence suggests that the percentage living in the same area at
ages 31–35 does not change much at later ages (Bartik 2009b). (Figure
9.1 presents the data from the PSID on the percentage of four-year-olds
living in the same state or metropolitan area at later ages.)
Because the percentage staying in a typical metro area is about fourfifths of the percentage staying in a typical state, the economic development benefits of early childhood programs for the typical metro area
will be about four-fifths of the economic development benefits for the
Figure 9.1 Percentage of Four-Year-Olds Living in Same State or Metro
Area at Later Ages

% living in same state or
metro area as at age 4

100
80

Same state

60

Same metro area

40
20
0
0

10

20
30
Ending age

40

50

NOTE: Data are from the Geocode version of the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), 1970 to 2005. Estimated percentages pool data over all year pairs. All
estimated percentages use appropriate individual weights in the PSID. All metro area
definitions for all year pairs are based on year 2008 metro area definitions. Percentage living in same state or metro area includes returnees—that is, the person does not
need to have stayed continuously in the same state or metro area; rather, the question
is whether at some later age they are living in the state they were in at age four.
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typical state.3 Consider universal pre-K programs. I estimate that for
the typical metropolitan area, economic development benefits per dollar
of costs will be 2.20, compared to 2.78 for the typical state. Economic
development benefits are modestly lower for the typical metropolitan
area. However, the economic development benefits still considerably
exceed the costs.4
For business incentives, there is no clear evidence on whether the
economic development benefits of increasing employment growth differ at the metropolitan level compared to the state level. In the absence
of clear evidence, I assume the benefits are the same.5 There also is
no clear evidence on whether incentives are more effective in causing
business growth at the metro area level than they are at the state level.
I assume that incentives have the same growth effects in the typical
metro area as in the typical state.6 If incentives affect growth similarly
in the typical metro area and in the typical state, and if growth affects
real earnings similarly in the typical metro area and in the typical state,
then incentives will have similar economic development benefits in the
typical metro area as in the typical state. The ratio of economic development benefits to costs for the typical metro area will then be 3.14, as it
is for the typical state.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON METROPOLITAN AREA SIzE
Empirical evidence suggests that the percentage of children in a
metro area who stay as adults only varies significantly from the allmetro-area average for the smallest metro areas (Bartik 2009b). These
smallest metro areas have a population of less than 330,000. For these
smallest metro areas, the percentage of four-year-olds who as adults
live in the same metro area is about one-fifth lower than for the average
metro area.7
This lower percentage staying should lower the economic development benefits of early childhood programs in the smallest metro
areas. The adjustment should be to lower benefits by about one-fifth
compared to the average metro area. For example, I estimate that for
universal pre-K programs in the smallest metro areas, the ratio of economic development benefits to costs is 1.74. This is modestly smaller
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than the all-metro-area average ratio of 2.20, which in turn is modestly
smaller than the state ratio of 2.78. However, even though this ratio is
smaller in the smallest metro areas, economic development benefits still
exceed costs. Even in metro areas with less than 330,000 in population,
the local economic development benefits from universal pre-K are sufficient to justify the costs. Similar results are obtained for other early
childhood programs.8
For business incentives, the empirical evidence suggests that the
effects of local growth on real earnings might be larger for the smallest
metro areas (Bartik 2009c). Growth has larger effects on real earnings
for metro areas below about 800,000 in population. However, growth
effects do not vary significantly among larger metro areas.9 This empirical evidence is only suggestive because we do not have good measures
of local prices for smaller metro areas. However, at least part of the differential higher growth effects in smaller metro areas seems to be due
to greater effects on labor force participation rates, which are not biased
by problems in measuring local prices.
The estimates suggest that smaller metro areas, compared to the
average metro area, may have growth effects on real earnings that are
about one-sixth greater in magnitude.10 Much of this greater effect is
due to the greater effects on labor force participation. Newly created
jobs in smaller metro areas are more effective at increasing the labor
force participation rates of the original residents, as opposed to attracting in-migrants.
These one-sixth-greater effects on real earnings suggest that economic development benefits will be increased by a similar amount. For
business incentives in these smallest metro areas, I estimate that the
ratio of economic development benefits to incentive costs will be 3.66.
This compares favorably with the baseline estimates for the average
metro area or average state of 3.14.11

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON METRO AREA GROWTH
The empirical evidence suggests that the percentage of adults living
in the same metro area as they did when children only differs significantly with metro growth for the slowest-growing one-fifth of metro
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areas (Bartik 2009b). These are metro areas whose annual population
growth is less than 0.2 percent. For these slowest-growing metro areas,
the percentage of four-year-olds who live in the same metro area as
adults is a little more than one-tenth lower than for the average metro
area.12
As a result, for the slowest-growing metro areas, the economic
development benefits of early childhood programs will be about onetenth lower. For universal pre-K, I estimate that for the slowest growth
metro areas, the ratio of economic development benefits to program
costs is 1.96. This can be compared with 2.20 for the average metro area
and 2.78 for the average state. However, although economic development benefits are lower, they still exceed costs. Even for slow-growing
metro areas, a sufficient number of child participants in early childhood
programs will remain in the metro area for these programs to produce
economic development benefits that exceed costs.13
For business incentives, the empirical evidence suggests that the
effect of additional jobs on real earnings only differs significantly for
metro areas with the highest previous growth trends (Bartik 2009b).
These high-growth metro areas are metro areas whose growth rates
are ranked in the highest two quintiles, or the highest 40 percent of all
metro areas. In the time period examined, these metro areas had annual
employment growth rates exceeding 1.9 percent. For these high-growth
metro areas, the real earnings effects of additional jobs are considerably lower than for the average metro area. Real earnings effects of
additional jobs in these high-growth metro areas are only one-seventh
of effects in the average metro area.14
The lesser effects of additional jobs on real earnings in high-growth
metro areas are due in part to the lesser effects on local labor force
participation rates. In a metro area that is already experiencing high
growth, additional jobs are less likely to find untapped local labor supply. Additional jobs are more likely to attract in-migrants. The original
residents benefit less from additional jobs in these high-growth metro
areas.
Based on these estimates, we would expect the economic development benefits of business incentives to be considerably lower than average in high-growth metro areas. I estimate that in the highest-growth
metro areas, the ratio of local economic development benefits to incentive costs is only 0.42, as compared to the baseline estimate for the

Locality Matters 279
Figure 9.2 How Ratios of Economic Development Benefits to Costs Vary
in Different Types of Local Economies, for Universal Pre-K
Programs and Business Incentives

Ratio of present value of benefits to costs

4.0
3.5
3.0

Pre-K

3.66
3.14

3.14

Incentives

3.14

2.78

2.5

2.20

2.0

1.74

1.96

2.20

1.5
1.0
0.42

0.5
0.0
Typical state Typical metro
area

Small metro
areas

Slow-growth
metro areas

Fast-growth
metro areas

NOTE: Each ratio is the ratio of the present value of economic development benefits
to the present value of program costs for either a permanent universal pre-K program
or a permanent business incentive program. Each pair of bars shows these ratios for a
particular type of local economy.
SOURCE: Author calculations, as discussed in chapter text and endnotes, and in
Appendix 9B.

average metro area of 3.14. In the highest-growth metro areas, adding additional jobs through business incentives does not yield sufficient
local economic development benefits to justify the incentive costs.

CONCLUSION
Figure 9.2 provides a summary of this chapter’s results.15 The local
economic development benefits of early childhood programs are some-
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what lower for metro areas than they are for states. This is particularly
true for smaller metro areas or slower-growing metro areas.
However, even in small and slow-growing metro areas, early childhood programs yield local economic development benefits that considerably exceed costs. Such programs can effectively promote local economic development even if they are totally paid for by local government.
For average-growth or slow-growth metro areas, the economic
development return to early childhood programs is somewhat reduced
relative to business incentives. In such metro areas, which need additional jobs, a comprehensive economic development strategy should
consider including high-quality business incentives that directly target
employer job creation.
However, in high-growth metro areas, the benefits of creating new
jobs through business incentives are much lower. In high-growth areas,
which already are creating many new jobs, economic development
strategies should focus more on improving the skills of the local labor
force. Early childhood programs are one effective way of increasing
local skills.
The current chapter, like the preceding ones, has focused on the
state or local perspective on economic development benefits. The next
chapter reconsiders the economic development benefits of early childhood programs and business incentives from a national perspective.

Notes
1. We might also expect state characteristics, such as the average health of state labor
markets, to matter for the economic development benefits of business incentives.
The rationale would be the same as what is given below for metropolitan areas:
states with faster growth of labor demand are less likely to benefit from even faster
growth. However, it is difficult to empirically measure these effects, given that
there is a limited sample of 50 states. It is much easier to detect such effects for the
larger numbers of metropolitan areas. I therefore focus in this chapter on exploring
how metro area characteristics affect the returns to business incentives. Furthermore, one could argue that metropolitan areas are local economies, whereas states
are at best some collection of local economies. Therefore, the returns to business
incentives at a state level should depend not only on the average characteristics
of the local economies that make up the state, but also on the distribution of such
characteristics.
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2. Similar calculations can be done for other early childhood programs. See Appendix 9A for calculations. Appendix 9A, like all appendices in this book, is available
from the Upjohn Institute.
3. The actual calculation is more complicated because I extrapolate from how benefits are reduced from the national level to the state level. Furthermore, I use the
percentage leaving the local area, rather than the percentage staying, to center the
extrapolation.
4. Similar results occur for other early childhood programs. See Appendix 9B.
5. There is actually some evidence, cited in Bartik (2001, p. 419) that the earnings
effects of employment growth shocks might be somewhat greater at the metropolitan level than they are at the state level. However, these estimates do not control
for prices. We don’t know whether the price impact of growth is greater at the
metropolitan level or at the state level. It could be argued that housing supply is
likely to be less elastic at the metropolitan level than at the state level, which may
offset the greater effects of growth on nominal earnings at the metropolitan level.
Furthermore, I note that the baseline estimates of how business incentives affect
real earnings at the state level are derived from metropolitan area data. Therefore,
if some future research eventually finds that employment growth shocks have
greater effects at the metropolitan level than at the state level, the baseline state
estimates should be adjusted downward rather than the metropolitan estimates
adjusted upward.
6. The research literature that examines the effects of business taxes implicitly
assumes this by combining results for states and metropolitan areas. See Bartik
(1991a) or Wasylenko (1997).
7. The exact estimate is for metro areas in the lowest quintile of population size,
where the quintiles are population-weighted quintiles (i.e., one-fifth of the total
metro population lives in each quintile). For this smallest quintile of metro areas,
the percentage of four-year-olds who still live there as 30- to 35-year-olds is estimated to be 43.7 percent. This can be compared with a metro area average of 56.3
percent. The ratio of 43.7 percent to 56.3 percent is 0.776.
8. See Appendix 9B.
9. See Bartik (2009c) for more details on the estimates. The estimates actually classify metro areas by employment size, not population size. I assume that the ratio
of total population to CPS-defined employment is about two in stating results for
population size. These estimates suggest that effects are only significantly different from the all-metro-area average for the lowest employment size quintile,
where quintiles are defined as employment-weighted quintiles (i.e., one-fifth of
the total employment in this metro area sample is in each quintile).
10. This estimate is based upon comparing the estimated effect on real earnings for
this metro-area-size quintile of 0.466 to baseline estimates of 0.4 for the average
metro area.
11. This estimate is simply derived by multiplying 3.14 by the ratio of 0.466 to 0.4.
12. These estimates are for the slowest-growth quintile of metro areas, where quintiles
are population size–weighted quintiles. The exact estimate is that for ages 30–35,
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the percentage of four-year-olds remaining in the same metro area for the slowestgrowth quintile is 49.7 percent. The average percentage remaining over all metro
areas is 56.3 percent. The ratio of 49.7 percent to 56.3 percent is 0.882.
13. Similar findings apply to other early childhood programs. See Appendix 9B.
14. See Bartik (2009c) for more details on these estimates. These estimates average results for the top two metro area quintiles in prevailing employment growth
trends. Effects are 0.0245 for the highest growth rate quintile and 0.0827 for the
second-highest growth rate quintile. The average is 0.0536. This is 13.4 percent of
the 0.4 baseline effect used in previous calculations. These estimates do not have
good local price data for most metro areas. However, a considerable portion of
these differential real earnings effects for metro areas with different growth rates
is due to the different effects on labor force participation rates.
15. Appendix 9B provides similar information for other early childhood programs.

10
The National Perspective
How Local Business Incentives and Early
Childhood Programs Affect the National Economy
Thus far, this book has adopted the perspective of a state or local
policymaker. This perspective focuses on what a state or local area’s
business incentives or early childhood programs can do for that state or
local area. Any benefits or costs of this state’s policies for other states
are irrelevant.
But what about the national perspective? What if a state’s business
incentives have spillover effects on other states? For example, some of
the jobs created by business incentives may have otherwise been created in other states. This loss of jobs in other states is a cost. From a
national perspective, this cost should be considered.
And what if a state’s early childhood programs have spillover effects
on other states? For example, some former child participants in a state’s
early childhood programs will end up living in other states. The greater
skills of these former child participants will increase their employability and wage rates in these other states. This will enhance earnings in
these other states. This increase of earnings in other states is a benefit.
From a national perspective, this benefit should be considered.
This chapter explores the national perspective on business incentives and early childhood programs. Two issues are of importance. First,
what is the magnitude of the spillover benefits or costs for the nation
of one state’s business incentives or early childhood programs? These
spillover benefits or costs are benefits or costs that states probably will
not consider. Larger spillover benefits or costs imply that states are less
likely on their own to pursue the best policies toward business incentives and early childhood programs.
Second, what would be the national benefits if the nation as a whole
adopted large-scale business incentives or early childhood programs?
This chapter’s findings on these two issues will lead to a discussion
of the federal role toward business incentives and early childhood pro-
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grams. Should the federal government encourage or discourage these
programs? If federal intervention is needed, what form should it take?
Should the federal government take over these programs?
According to the data presented in this chapter, a national perspective provides more of a case for federal regulation of state business
incentive programs than of early childhood programs. The national perspective provides a cautious case for federal encouragement of early
childhood programs. However, such federal intervention should allow
for local flexibility.

NATIONAL VERSUS STATE BENEFITS OF
BUSINESS INCENTIVES
The U.S. . . . derives no social benefit when jobs move from Missouri to Mississippi, and any tax dollars spent to fund such a move
result in a net loss of social welfare.
—Ev Ehrlich and Tracy Kornblatt (2004, p. 4)

Business incentives are often argued to be against the national interest. As in the above quotation from Ehrlich and Kornblatt, the argument
is that business incentives are a “zero-sum game.” The jobs gained by
one state are lost by other states.
If this argument was completely true, then “economic development
benefits” of business incentives would not represent national benefits.
The increased earnings of this state’s residents would be 100 percent
offset by the reduced earnings of other states’ residents.
The zero-sum game argument is far-reaching. This argument
does not just apply to the effects of business incentives on relocating
jobs from one state to another. The argument would also apply to any
newly created jobs. This includes jobs created in small businesses. For
example, suppose a business incentive encourages the creation of new
export-based jobs in small businesses in industry Y and state X. The
zero-sum-game argument is that the national market for industry Y
would otherwise be served by businesses throughout the nation. The
business incentive only determines where industry Y is located. The
business incentive does not affect total national activity in industry Y.
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My research suggests that the zero-sum-game argument is partly
true. To be more precise, the argument is 79.3 percent true, and 20.7
percent untrue. Simulations suggest that each dollar invested in business
incentives creates $0.65 in increased present value of national earnings.
This $0.65 national “economic development benefit” is 20.7 percent of
what investing $1 in business incentives provides in economic development benefits for a state, which was estimated in Chapter 3 to be $3.14.
The logic for this national economic development benefit is as follows.1 There are four reasons why national effects of business incentives might differ from state effects. First, the cost of creating a new job
in an industry might be different at the national level, compared to the
state level. Second, the multiplier effects of creating a new job might
differ at the national level. Third, the earnings effects might differ at the
national level because these earnings effects will include persons who
move out of state. Fourth, the labor market might respond differently at
the national level to an increase in labor demand.
Estimates of how businesses respond to investment incentives at the
national level suggest that there is some national response. However,
this response is less per dollar of incentives than is true at the state level.
This makes sense because at the state level, businesses can respond to
incentives in two ways, only one of which is possible at the national
level. At the national level, an incentive may induce new job creation.
At the state level, an incentive can induce new job creation, or it can
cause the location of jobs to be different. This makes it easier to create a
new state job than a new national job. Estimates suggest that per dollar
of incentives, the job effect at the national level in assisted businesses is
only 14 percent of the effect found at the state level (or more precisely,
13.7 percent). To put it another way, the cost of creating a job through
business incentives at the national level is seven times as great as it is at
the state level (7.299 = 1 ÷ 0.137).
But multiplier effects of the additional jobs in assisted businesses
will be greater at the national level than at the state level. Multiplier
effects of additional jobs in assisted businesses will in part occur in
suppliers to assisted businesses. Some suppliers will be located in the
same state, and some in other states. Therefore, more supplier jobs
will be created in the nation than in the state. Multiplier effects also
occur because of additional retail demand from workers at assisted businesses and suppliers. Only a portion of this increased retail demand will
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increase jobs in the same state as the assisted business. Increased retail
demand will also increase jobs outside the state. Estimates suggest that
multiplier effects at the national level will be about 40 percent greater
than at the state level (or to be more precise, 40.7 percent greater).
At the national level, earnings effects will include residents of all
states. At the state level, earnings benefits exclude out-migrants. Including residents of all states increases earnings benefits by about 7 percent
(more precisely, 7.3 percent).
Finally, there is the issue of how earnings will respond to an increase
in labor demand. Increased labor demand does not mean that the quantity of labor supplied will fully match that increase. An increase in labor
demand will affect wages, unemployment, and labor force participation.
This will in turn affect the quantities of labor supplied and demanded.
This will feed back into further equilibrium effects on wages, unemployment, and labor force participation. There will be some final resulting equilibrium effect on earnings. I assume that the earnings response
to a labor demand increase is similar at the national and state levels.2
These four factors combine to yield national effects on the present value of earnings, per dollar of incentives, of $0.65. Net earnings
effects at the national level versus the state level will equal the product
of the following:
• The ratio of effects on assisted businesses at the national level to
those effects at the state level, or 0.137;
• The ratio of the multiplier effect at the national level to the multiplier effect at the state level, or 1.407;
• The ratio of total earnings effects considering residents of all
states to effects including only residents who stay in a particular
state, or 1.073;
• The ratio of net earnings effects at the national level to net earnings effects at the state level from a shock to labor demand, assumed to be 1.000.
This combines in the following calculation: 0.65 = 3.14 × (0.137 ×
1.407 × 1.073 × 1.000).
This calculation of only 65 cents in earnings benefits per dollar of
business incentives applies to typical business incentives of reasonable
quality, as detailed in Chapters 3 and 5. National benefits would be
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lower for lower quality incentive designs. National benefits would be
higher for higher quality incentive designs.
For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, some customized job training programs have been estimated to be at least 10 times as effective as
average financial incentives to business. This implies that a high-quality
customized job training program might yield $6.50 in national benefits
per dollar of incentives (= a 0.65 effect of typical incentives × 10). As
another example, manufacturing extension services have been estimated
to be nine times as effective as financial incentives. A high-quality manufacturing extension program might have nine times the national economic
development benefits per dollar of program cost, or $5.85 (= 0.65 × 9).
Financial incentives could also be redesigned to increase the $0.65
return to over a dollar. For example, calculations suggest that financial
incentive returns would have national benefits of more than a dollar, for
each dollar of incentives, if the created jobs paid an average wage premium of 20 percent or more. As another example, increasing the multiplier effects of assisted businesses by 54 percent would also increase
the national benefit to more than one dollar per dollar of incentives.
However, the business incentives considered in the baseline simulations are business incentives of reasonable quality. These are the kind
of business incentives that are commonly used. Therefore, the findings suggest that commonly used business incentives return considerably less than $1 in national economic development benefits per dollar
invested. This in turn suggests the need for drastic reforms to current
business incentive practice.
The $0.65 in benefits at the national level, versus $3.14 in benefits
at the state level, suggests that state policymakers’ perspective on business incentives is distorted. It appears that state policymakers’ pursuit
of state interests will lead them to use incentives more than is good for
the nation. Federal policy to discourage such business incentives would
seem warranted. As suggested by Arthur Rolnick and Melvin Burstein
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, federal taxes and grants
could discourage business incentives (Rolnick and Burstein 1994). The
federal government could tax businesses receiving incentives at higher
rates. The federal government could deny some federal aid to states
providing large business incentives.
In addition, it would appear that the typical incentive does not make
any sense for the federal government to pursue. National economic
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development benefits are less than two-thirds of the cost of a typical
business incentive. It would seem that federal business incentive programs can only be justified if they are significantly above average in
quality.
These conclusions about the need for a federal policy stance against
business incentives will be analyzed further below.

NATIONAL VERSUS STATE BENEFITS OF EARLY
CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS
To sustain America’s economic strength, community leaders,
business leaders, policymakers, and parents must make providing access to high-quality early childhood education a top priority
across the country.
—Jim Rohr (2009), chairman and CEO of PNC Bank

Thus far, this book has focused on the benefits of early childhood
programs from a state perspective. But is there also a national stake in
early childhood programs, as Jim Rohr contends in the above quotation?
For early childhood programs, focusing on the state level means
only including earnings effects for former child participants who remain
in the state financing the programs. Obviously some former child participants will leave the state. Their participation in high-quality early
childhood programs will raise their earnings. From a national perspective, the earnings benefits for those who leave the state should also be
included in economic development benefits.
I resimulated economic development benefits including the earnings benefits of former child participants who leave the state. I also
included any earnings benefits for parents who leave the state.
This resimulation leads to significant increases in economic development benefits. Compared to state economic development benefits,
national economic development benefits for early childhood programs
are increased by more than one-third. Benefits from a national perspective compared to a state perspective increase by the following percentages: pre-K, 36 percent; the Abecedarian program, 35 percent; and the
Nurse-Family Partnership program, 34 percent.
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The percentage increase in benefits due to considering out-migrants
is greater for early childhood programs than for business incentives. In
the previous section, including out-migrants only increased the benefits
of business incentives by about 7 percent.
Why does including out-migrants make more of a difference for
early childhood programs than for business incentives? There are two
reasons. First, early childhood programs’ effects compared to business
incentives are delayed. There is more time for former early childhood
program participants to move out of state before most of the earnings
effects occur. Second, early childhood affects earnings over the entire
work career, whereas business incentives affect earners at a wide range
of different ages. The older workers affected by business incentives are
less mobile than the younger workers affected by early childhood programs. Cross-state mobility tends to be highest for individuals from
their late teens until their late twenties. This high mobility age period
intervenes between early childhood programs and their earnings effects
for former child participants.
Figure 10.1 shows national versus state economic development
benefits for these three early childhood programs. For the sake of comparison, I also show national versus state economic development benefits for business incentives. For each program, I calculate the ratio of
the present value effects on earnings to the present value of costs.
As the figure shows, high-quality business incentives are quite
competitive with high-quality early childhood programs in providing
state benefits. But early childhood programs do far better in providing
national benefits.
The higher rate of return to early childhood programs from a national
perspective than from a state perspective would seem to argue for a
federal role. State policymakers fail to recognize about one-quarter or
more of the total benefits of these programs. Some federal subsidy for
these programs would seem warranted. Whether federal subsidies make
sense will be further discussed later in this chapter.
The spillover benefits of early childhood programs for the national
economy mean there would be net national benefits from adopting these
programs at full scale in all states. These net benefits are sometimes
sizable.
Figure 10.2 shows gross earnings benefits, costs, and net benefits
from full-scale national implementation of each of these three early
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Figure 10.1 Ratio of Economic Development Benefits to Costs, State
versus National Perspective
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NOTE: This figure shows the ratio of the present value of economic development benefits to the present value of program costs. For each program, this ratio is shown both
from a state perspective and from a national perspective. See text for details.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, as detailed in text.

childhood programs. Net national benefits are positive for all three programs. Net national benefits are only truly sizable, however, for universal pre-K and the Abecedarian program. These two programs would
have net national benefits in the range of three-quarters of 1 percent to
1½ percent of national earnings. In contrast, the Nurse-Family Partnership has net national benefits of only around one-tenth of 1 percent of
earnings.
The NFP simply isn’t large enough or intense enough to have large
net benefits, although the NFP has quite healthy rates of return per dollar invested. Universal pre-K and the Abecedarian program are large
enough and intense enough to have sizable net benefits. On the other
hand, the costs of these programs are considerably greater. This is particularly true of the Abecedarian program, which has costs of about
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Figure 10.2 National Economic Development Benefits and Costs for
Full-Scale National Implementation of Three Early
Childhood Programs
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NOTE: The figure shows the effects of full-scale national implementation of each of
these three early childhood programs. Effects are measured from a national perspective. Effects are measured as effects on present value of benefits or costs as a percentage of the present value of national earnings. Net benefits are simply earnings benefits
minus program costs.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

0.75 percent of earnings. Universal pre-K costs about one-third as much
as the Abecedarian program. The Nurse-Family Partnership costs less
than one-tenth as much.
These results suggest that the national economy would benefit from
full national implementation of any one of these three early childhood
programs. Should the federal government implement one or more of
these three programs at full scale as federal programs?3 This important
issue will also be discussed further below.
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MACROECONOMIC BENEFITS OR COSTS FROM
REDISTRIBUTING jOBS
The discussion above of business incentives does not consider how
redistributing jobs might affect the macro economy. Business incentives
in a high unemployment state or local area will redistribute jobs to that
high unemployment local economy, and away from low unemployment
local economies. Business incentives in a low unemployment state or
local area will do the reverse. Redistributing jobs across different local
economies may have macroeconomic consequences.
These macroeconomic consequences will occur if the inflationary effects of job creation are different in different local economies.
For example, evidence suggests that the effects of 1 percent lower
unemployment in increasing wages and prices will be greater in a lowunemployment-rate local economy. If this is so, then redistributing jobs
to high unemployment economies, and away from low unemployment
local economies, will lower inflation. As a result of this redistribution
of jobs, the Federal Reserve and other macroeconomic authorities can
expand the economy more, yet keep inflation under control.
Redistributing jobs to low unemployment local economies, and
away from high unemployment local economies, will increase inflation.
The Federal Reserve and other macroeconomic authorities may need to
restrain economic output to control inflation.
I did calculations of the potential macroeconomic benefits and
costs of such redistribution of jobs.4 For the calculations, I used the
U.S. economy in 2007. In 2007, average U.S. unemployment was 4.6
percent, and inflation was a concern. (In the U.S. economy as of 2009,
when this paragraph was first written, the Federal Reserve might welcome more inflation.) I considered business incentives in a high unemployment state. I used the unemployment rate of the highest unemployment state in 2007—Michigan, at 7.1 percent unemployment. I also
considered business incentives in a low unemployment state. I used the
unemployment rate of the lowest unemployment state in 2007, Utah,
which had 2.7 percent unemployment.
These simulations suggest a modest macroeconomic benefit from
business incentives in high-unemployment-rate states: these business
incentives do reduce inflationary pressures. Lower inflationary pressure
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allows macro policymakers to be more aggressive in lowering overall
U.S. unemployment. Aggregate U.S. earnings are increased. However,
the effects are modest. The present value of the additional earnings
from these macroeconomic effects is only 0.09 of the overall costs of
the business incentives. If national benefits of the business incentives
were 0.65 of costs, they would be increased to 0.74 of costs.
The effects are so modest for several reasons. Business incentives
only affect unemployment rates for a few years in this model. Michigan’s business incentives only slightly increase unemployment rates in
the rest of the United States, and therefore only slightly reduce inflationary pressures.
The simulations suggest significant macroeconomic costs from
business incentives in low-unemployment-rate states such as Utah.
These business incentives increase inflationary pressures, and the
resulting need for macroeconomic restraint is estimated to reduce U.S.
earnings. This reduction is equal to 0.98 of the costs of the business
incentives. If national benefits of the business incentives were 0.65 of
costs, they would be reduced to −0.33 of costs. Business incentives in
a low-unemployment-rate state reduce total U.S. earnings, once macro
policy responses are taken into account.
These effects are larger because the business incentives are lowering unemployment by a great deal in a low unemployment state. In the
model, the effects of lower unemployment on wage and price inflation
go up quite a bit in low-unemployment local economies. Therefore, the
macroeconomic consequences of allowing business incentives in a low
unemployment state are large.
It appears that at times of low unemployment, business incentives
in low unemployment states may be problematic. The gains for the state
are more than outweighed by the macroeconomic costs for the United
States as a whole.

SOCIAL BENEFITS FROM MORE jOBS: GREATER IN
HIGH-UNEMPLOYMENT LOCAL ECONOMIES?
Thus far, this discussion has assumed that earnings effects measure social benefits. Business incentives are close to a zero-sum game
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because most of the earnings benefits in the state adopting the incentives are offset by lower earnings in other states.
However, earnings effects are only an indicator of economic
development benefits. Social benefits will be higher with more earnings effects, all else being equal. However, other factors may affect
the economic development benefits from more jobs. It is theoretically
plausible that the economic development benefits associated with more
jobs are greater in high-unemployment local economies. If this is so,
then redistributing jobs to high-unemployment local economies would
increase social benefits, even if the total number of national jobs is little
affected. However, although this is theoretically plausible, there is scant
empirical evidence that bears on this hypothesis.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are several reasons why more jobs
might provide social benefits. Based on these reasons, it is plausible that
social benefits will be higher in high-unemployment local economies.
One reason that jobs might provide social benefits is that there is
involuntary unemployment. Wages may be above the wages that would
clear the labor market. As a result, not all of those willing to work at
the market wage or below will find a job. Some of the unemployed may
have reservation wages—the lowest wage at which the unemployed
person will accept a job—that are considerably below the market wage.
In such a reservation wage model, the social benefits of hiring an unemployed person are equal to the market wage minus that person’s reservation wage.
It seems likely that the average reservation wages of the unemployed will be lower in a high-unemployment local labor market than
in a low-unemployment local labor market. In a low-unemployment
local labor market, it is relatively easy to find a job. Persons with low
reservation wages have high benefits from getting a job. Therefore, they
are likely to have already obtained one. The remaining unemployed will
be those whose reservation wages are close to the market wage.
In contrast, in a high-unemployment local labor market, even persons with low reservation wages will have great trouble finding a job.
The pool of unemployed will include many persons whose social benefits from obtaining a job are large.
Another social benefit from lower unemployment is the value of
lowering the risk posed by local unemployment. This social value may
partly be a matter of self-interest. Each individual may be concerned
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with how the overall local unemployment rate affects his or her risk of
losing a job or finding a job. Individuals may also be concerned about
how the overall unemployment rate affects the jobs prospects of their
friends, family, and neighbors.
It is plausible that this social benefit from additional jobs may
be higher in high-unemployment local labor markets than in lowunemployment local labor markets. For many an individual, lowering the overall local unemployment rate from 4 percent to 3 percent
would not be perceived as significantly affecting his or her own job
prospects, or those persons he or she knows. When the overall local
unemployment rate is high, a much larger proportion of the population
will consider the unemployment rate to be a serious problem. A higher
percentage of individuals will perceive their own job prospects to be at
risk, or perceive the job prospects of their family and friends as being at
risk. The perceived social benefits from lowering local unemployment
from 10 percent to 9 percent are likely to be great for a relatively high
proportion of the population.
On the other hand, for the unemployed, the social benefits of lowering unemployment may actually be greater in low-unemployment local
labor markets. There is some evidence that the social stigma effects of
unemployment for the unemployed are higher when unemployment is
low (Clark 2003). If one’s unemployment is not shared by others he or
she knows, then it may lead to greater feelings of shame and greater
doubts about self-worth. However, as there are more employed than
unemployed, the employed’s perception of social benefits may dominate the overall social valuation. The social value of lowering unemployment sums its monetary valuation across the entire population, so
the numbers of people in various groups matter, not just the intensity of
effects on individuals.5
Although these arguments are plausible, there is little evidence
available from empirical research. For example, there is no research
showing how the effects of a 1 percent lower local unemployment
rate on overall happiness varies at different starting levels for the local
unemployment rate.6
With respect to reservation wages, the evidence is mixed. One study
finds that each 1 point rise in the local unemployment rate reduces reservation wages by 1.2 to 1.6 percent (Jones 1989). Another study finds
no effects of local unemployment rates on reservation wages (Haurin
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and Sridhar 2003). Several studies find that longer unemployment duration reduces reservation wages (Fishe 1982; Kasper 1969; Kiefer and
Neumann 1979; Stephenson 1976). Higher local unemployment rates
would increase unemployment duration. This suggests that higher local
unemployment rates should reduce reservation wages.
Where does this leave policymakers? Redistributing jobs to highunemployment local labor markets may raise social benefits. However,
empirical evidence on this hypothesis is not definitive. We certainly
have no agreement on the magnitude of increased social benefits from
such job redistribution.
Perhaps this should leave national policymakers somewhat hesitant
to denounce business incentives in high unemployment states or high
unemployment local areas as a zero-sum game. It is possible that such
incentives may produce net national social benefits. On the other hand,
this argument does nothing to advance the case for business incentives
in average-unemployment or low-unemployment local economies.
There also is the issue of whether business incentives tend to be
higher in high unemployment areas. I will consider this issue below.

FEDERALISM AND BUSINESS INCENTIVES: A POLICY
WONK’S PERSPECTIVE
What does this imply for the appropriate federal role in business
incentives and early childhood programs? I will first consider the appropriate federal role in business incentives, before going on to early childhood programs. In considering the appropriate federal role, I will first
imagine the perspective of a policy wonk. This policy wonk is assumed
to have absolute power to design the perfect federal and state policy
to advance economic efficiency and equity. I will then imagine a more
realistic perspective on what to do given what is politically feasible.
It might seem that typical business incentives are inefficient from a
national perspective: national benefits are $0.65 per dollar of program
costs. But state policymakers perceive higher benefits of $3.14 per dollar of costs. Economic efficiency would seem to demand federal efforts
to abolish or curtail typical business incentives, which are dominated
by tax and other financial incentives. Only business incentives with
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significantly above-average efficiency, such as customized job training
and manufacturing extension services, would seem to pass a national
benefit-cost test.
However, from the perspective of a policy wonk who can always
perfectly implement the ideal policy, it is not obvious that federal intervention is needed. If all states perfectly pursue their own self-interest,
competition among states through business incentives may be efficient.
Furthermore, any adverse effects on the income distribution from this
competition can be offset through other policies.
To explain this somewhat startling conclusion, I first note that the
cost of business tax incentives is, from an economist’s perspective,
largely not a true resource cost. Business tax incentives are mostly a
transfer payment from the general taxpayer to businesses. Few real
resources are used up in business tax incentives. There are some labor
costs and materials costs in administering business tax incentives. But
the tax incentive itself is a transfer from the general taxpayer to the
assisted businesses.
Business tax incentives have a corresponding financial benefit to
the assisted business. In an economic efficiency analysis, we must count
equally the benefits and costs to everyone, with no discrimination. The
benefit to assisted businesses is equal to the cost to the general taxpayer.
The net cost is zero.
Business incentives that are services, such as customized job training and manufacturing extension services, do have real resource costs.
These programs require significant use of labor and material resources.
However, if these services are efficient, they have benefits to the assisted businesses that exceed their resource costs.
Thus, our analysis up to now has been incomplete. We have acted
as if benefits to assisted businesses count for nothing. But from an economic efficiency perspective, these benefits should be fully counted.
If the benefits to assisted businesses are counted, this changes our perspective on the net efficiency benefits of business incentives.
Consider an extreme case. Suppose there is some business tax incentive that has zero effects on location decisions. Suppose that this incentive has zero administrative costs. Then the net benefits of this business
incentive are zero. The costs of this business incentive to the general
taxpayer are exactly offset by the benefits to the assisted businesses.
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Who benefits from providing business incentives to the assisted businesses? If nothing else changes, the owners of the assisted businesses
get extra profits. If many businesses throughout the United States are
provided with these incentives, this may have effects on overall prices
or wages. Some of the initial extra profits for assisted businesses may
be transferred to consumers through lower prices, or to workers through
higher wages. How much will be so transferred? We don’t know. Economists have never fully agreed on who bears the burden of the corporate
income tax among shareholders, workers, and consumers. A general
system of business incentives is similar to having reduced corporate
income taxes. It is unlikely that economists will fully agree on the true
economic incidence of widespread business incentives.
So far, this analysis suggests that business incentives may have zero
efficiency benefits (tax incentives) or positive efficiency benefits (services to businesses whose value is greater than costs). However, this
analysis so far has assumed that business incentives have no effect upon
business location decisions. As discussed in Chapter 3, that assumption seems to be empirically incorrect. Business incentives do have significant effects on where businesses locate. These location effects are
not as big as some economic developers like to claim, but the location
effects are not zero.
If business location decisions are affected by business incentives,
then an efficiency analysis needs to consider whether a system of business incentives will make the pattern of business locations more or less
efficient. If there are no “social benefits” of business location decisions—that is, no benefits to parties other than the business itself—then
business incentives can only make location decisions worse from an
efficiency perspective. This argument has often been made by opponents
of business incentives. For example, economist Art Rolnick, director of
research at the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank, has told the following story for why business incentives will lead to inefficiency:
Let us suppose a company chooses to relocate its manufacturing plant from a warm climate state, like Louisiana, to Alaska,
even though its operating costs are substantially higher in a cold
weather climate. I will assume that the company is more than fully
compensated by Alaska for the move and for the additional operating costs. However, it now takes more resources for this company
to produce the same quantity of output in Alaska than it did in
Louisiana. (Rolnick 2007)7
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But his argument assumes that there are no social benefits of business location decisions. One of the key arguments of this book is that
business location decisions, by affecting employment, do create social
benefits for the local unemployed population and local workers. If there
are such social benefits, then it can be potentially economically efficient to induce different location decisions. Consider a world with allpowerful policy wonks in complete control of each state’s policy. These
policy wonks have perfect knowledge of their states’ social benefits.
Accordingly, these policy wonks will tend to adopt business incentives
that will match these social benefits. The system of business incentives
will induce more efficient business location decisions.
The example given by Rolnick is illustrative. Suppose that there are
no social benefits of extra employment in Louisiana. Perhaps Louisiana
has enough jobs for everyone who wants one. But suppose there are
such social benefits in Alaska. Alaska is assumed to not have enough
jobs. Both the unemployed and the working force in Alaska will benefit
from creating additional jobs in that state to lower Alaska’s unemployment rate. As long as the incentives offered by Alaska are equal to or
less than these social benefits of job creation, the relocation of jobs
from Louisiana to Alaska is economically efficient. Yes, production
costs are higher. But the extra social benefits more than outweigh these
higher production costs.
If all-powerful and all-knowing policy wonks are in charge of business incentives in each state, they will always offer business incentives that are equal to or less than the social benefits from additional
jobs. Offering higher incentives than social benefits would not be in the
state’s individual interest. The resulting competition for businesses will
drive up business incentives to be equal to whatever the social benefits
are from additional jobs in each state. Businesses will make location
decisions based on the combination of business incentives and their
own private costs. Because business incentives perfectly reflect social
benefits, this relocation will be economically efficient. Businesses will
not relocate from state X to state Y unless the social benefits from so
doing outweigh the extra production costs.
This system of all-out state competition for businesses via business
incentives will tend to transfer resources from the general taxpayer to
the business sector. Net business taxes after incentives will be lower
than they otherwise would be. As mentioned above, it is uncertain what
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the incidence will be of lower net business taxes. To the extent that lower
net business taxes result in higher profits for owners of businesses, the
benefits from this incentive competition will have a regressive effect
on the income distribution. Ownership of stock in businesses is highly
concentrated in upper income groups.
However, in our perfect policy-wonk world, all-powerful and allknowing policymakers at the federal level can offset any regressive
effects of business incentive competition on the income distribution.
For example, federal policymakers could choose to make the personal
income tax more progressive. A surcharge for high income groups
could offset the extra profits accruing to corporate shareholders. In this
perfect world, this income tax redistribution is preferable to trying to
prevent incentive competition among the states. The incentive competition leads to businesses taking the social benefits of employment into
account in making location choices. It is economically efficient to take
such social benefits into account. Therefore, business incentive competition should not be prohibited.

FEDERALISM AND BUSINESS INCENTIVES: A PRACTICAL
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
A practical politician would regard the policy wonk’s perspective
as unrealistic. Practical politicians must take distributional effects into
account. In an imperfect world, incentives are unlikely to match social
benefits.
State and local policymakers cannot count on any regressive effects
of business incentives being offset by more progressive federal taxes. In
addition, from a state perspective, the “benefits” of business incentives
for business owners largely flow to out-of-state residents. There are
good reasons for state and local policymakers to heavily discount benefits to wealthy out-of-state business owners. It is reasonable for state
and local policymakers to consider business incentives to be largely a
cost. The social benefits from payments to business owners should be
heavily discounted.
Even from a national perspective, federal policymakers cannot
assume that incentive reforms will be offset by tax policy. Expanding
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or contracting business incentives will in part expand or contract the
incomes of business owners. Because business owners are a very upperincome group, the benefits of incentives to business owners should be
heavily discounted. Business incentives should be regarded as largely a
cost, with social benefits (if any) coming in terms of increased earnings.
Competition among states in offering business incentives has not
led to some ideal pattern of net tax rates. Net business tax rates after
incentives are not lowest in state or local areas with the highest unemployment. The best empirical exploration of how incentives affect the
spatial pattern of investment returns is by Fisher and Peters (1998).
They do find that “explicit development incentives,” such as “state tax
credits and . . . local taxes and tax incentives . . . tend to be more favorable in states and cities with higher unemployment” (p. 200). However, these development incentives mostly serve to offset the effects of
overall state tax systems. Basic state business taxes tend to be higher
in states with high unemployment. Basic state tax systems “exhibit a
strong tendency to skew returns on new industrial investment in a perverse direction, producing higher after-tax returns in states with lower
unemployment rates . . . The end result [of the combined effect of the
basic state and local tax system plus incentives] is a spatial pattern of
returns on new investment that has little or no bearing to the spatial
pattern of unemployment among cities” (p. 200). The best that we can
say of incentives is that “incentive competition has produced a neutral
(or random) spatial distribution of returns, which at least is better than
what would have prevailed in the absence of incentives” (p. 200). Furthermore, it is possible that the basic state and local business tax system
would adjust if business financial incentives were reduced. Perhaps the
basic state and local business tax system would adjust toward a more
“neutral” pattern, one that would show similar average tax rates in local
economies that have different unemployment rates.
Therefore, at most it is only possible to give a weak endorsement
of business incentives as helping high-unemployment local economies.
Perhaps business incentives even the playing field a bit. But business
incentives do not clearly favor high unemployment areas.
It is possible to make a practical political case for federal action to
restrict business financial incentives. The case is particularly strong for
restricting business financial incentives offered by low unemployment
states or local economies. The social benefits of such incentives are
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particularly low. They sometimes have adverse effects upon inflation.
And encouragement of business financial incentives tends to worsen the
U.S. income distribution, which has already become more unequal over
the past 30 years.
There is not as strong a case for federal action to restrict business incentives that provide services to business such as customized
job training or manufacturing extension services. Well-run programs
of customized job training or manufacturing extension probably have
sufficient national economic development benefits to justify their costs.
Federal control of business incentives might be modeled after the
procedures used by the European Union to regulate “state aid” (Sinnaeve
2007; Thomas 2000, 2007). State aid is broadly defined by the European Union as including “all advantages [to business] selectively
granted by the state or through state resources that distort competition
or threaten to distort it and affect trade between member states, e.g.,
grants, loans at nonmarket conditions, state guarantees, all types of tax
advantages, and the sale of land at nonmarket conditions” (Sinnaeve
2007, p. 88). The basic principle of the EU’s regulation of state aid is
that state aid is outlawed unless “it promotes other EU objectives, such
as regional development [of distressed regions], R&D, employment,
etc. which outweigh the distortion in a proportional way” (p. 89). The
EU then goes on to define “the conditions under which aid projects can
be authorized for different types of aid, specifically aid for regional
development, promotion of SME [small and medium-sized enterprises],
employment, R&D, environmental protection, training of workers, restructuring of enterprises in difficulties, and provision of risk
capital . . .” (p. 90). Even for the state aid that is allowed, the EU applies
rules for how great the aid can be relative to the project’s overall costs.
The state aid is administered by requiring advance EU approval of state
aid for specific projects. However, EU member states can apply for
blanket approval of some program of state aid (for example, a program
to aid small and medium-sized businesses, or to provide job training
to employees). If the EU has not given prior approval to a particular
state aid project, the EU may then subsequently investigate the legality
of the project, with such an investigation being initiated either by the
EU or in response to complaints by other member states or competing
businesses. If the state aid is found to violate EU rules—i.e., the aid is
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excessive relative to the aid’s overall benefits for the EU—the European Commission can order that the state aid be repaid by the assisted
business, with interest.
The U.S. Constitution would seem to authorize Congress to understate such regulation of business incentives. The Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States” (Article I, Section 8). As argued by Rolnick (2007), this provision was adopted in response to problems under the Articles of Confederation: “Under the Articles, the states had freely engaged in destructive
economic warfare by imposing all types of trade barriers against one
another. To address this, James Madison, the recognized father of the
Constitution, added the Commerce Clause to the Constitution, to help
promote an economic union of the states.”
Of course, wrongheaded federal regulation of business incentives
could do more harm than good. Federal regulation should not discourage cost-effective business incentives such as customized job training
and manufacturing extension programs. Federal regulation should not
discourage states from using business incentives to help distressed local
labor markets.
It would be politically difficult to enact federal regulatory authority
over state and local business incentives. For example, a federal appeals
court in 2004 struck down an Ohio tax incentive as unduly interfering with interstate commerce. Soon after, several bills were introduced
to get around the court’s ruling. Legislation to negate the court’s ruling was endorsed by the National Association of Manufacturers, the
National Governors Association, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors
(Mazerov 2005). The court ruling was eventually overturned by the
U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
If a political coalition is powerful enough to enact federal regulatory
authority over business incentives, then it might be powerful enough
to increase the progressivity of federal income taxes. Suppose the primary national concern about unregulated business incentives is their
redistribution to business interests. Then it could be argued that this
redistributional issue should be more directly addressed. However, the
regulation of business incentives may attract political support beyond
those persons concerned about income distribution. For example, there
are economists such as Rolnick who are concerned that business incen-

304 Bartik

tives may distort market competition. Furthermore, the general public
may be more supportive of restraining business incentives than of redistributing income.
If federal regulation of business incentives proves too politically
difficult, an alternative is to appeal to state policymakers’ own selfinterest. As was reviewed in Chapter 6, there is sufficient uncertainty
about the effectiveness of business financial incentives that policymakers may decide that reining in incentives is in their state’s self-interest.
For example, most business tax incentives could be made nondiscretionary and incorporated into the regular business tax system. Incorporating incentives into the overall business tax system is likely to
encourage greater discussion of their overall revenue cost. In contrast,
discretionary business tax incentives are sometimes promoted as selffinancing, from the increased business activity. Discretionary business
tax incentives are also promoted as being limited to a few cases. However, in practice, once tax incentives are given to a few businesses, the
political pressure to help other businesses is difficult to resist. And, as
was discussed in Chapter 3, the effects of business tax incentives are too
low for the incentives to be self-financing.
The self-interest of states also is promoted by more efficient incentives. The empirical evidence suggests that customized job training and
manufacturing extension services are more cost-effective than business
tax incentives.
In fast-growing localities, as was shown in Chapter 9, the benefits from business incentives are lower than costs from the locality’s
perspective. These fast-growing localities are also likely to have low
unemployment rates. It is in the self-interest of booming localities to
cut back on the business incentives that also impose national macroeconomic costs.
Advocates of restraining business incentives believe that reform
must start with greater transparency (Bartik 2005; LeRoy 2007; Markusen and Nesse 2007). Transparency includes specific information on
what incentives have been offered to what businesses. Such information
will increase political pressure to rein in business incentives. According to LeRoy (2007, p. 185), “Twelve states have already enacted some
sort of economic development subsidy disclosure (Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Washington State, and West Virginia).”
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Another useful reform is more and better evaluation. Even if it is
hard to determine whether a particular tax incentive was decisive, it is
quite feasible to evaluate the likely labor market effects of a particular
business’s location or expansion decision. Such evaluation can even be
required prospectively, as is done, for example, in Michigan’s MEGA
program. Such evaluation puts pressure on business incentives to be
used more in businesses that have higher wages or multiplier effects.
As was discussed in Chapter 6, more rigorous ex-post evaluation
of business incentive programs that provide services to individual businesses can also be done. Such evaluations can be done by matching
assisted to unassisted businesses and comparing their relative performance. Past research suggests that such services to businesses are in
many cases more cost-effective than financial incentives. Therefore,
good evaluations are likely to increase political pressure for reforming
business incentives toward more services and less financial incentives.
Moving the mix of business incentives toward services rather than
tax incentives is likely to be advantageous for three reasons. First, as
was discussed in Chapter 5, the available empirical evidence suggests
such incentives are more cost-effective. Second, business incentives that
are services are likely to be more strictly monitored, because they are
subject to an annual appropriations process. Business tax incentives are
not reviewed through an annual appropriations process. Third, business
demand for such services will only materialize if the services are useful
to businesses. Business tax incentives will be demanded by businesses
even if they have no effect upon location or expansion decisions. Tax
incentives increase profits even if they do not change business behavior.
Improved evaluation of business incentives may be encouraged
from the bottom up. Grassroots political pressure may lead state legislatures to enact evaluation requirements or legislative audit requirements.
Encouraging better evaluation of business incentives may also be
an important federal role. The federal government could fund such
evaluations; such funding is an appropriate federal role. High-quality
evaluations of one state’s business incentives provide useful knowledge
for all states.
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FEDERALISM AND EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS:
A POLICY WONK’S PERSPECTIVE
A policy wonk’s analysis of optimal federal policy toward early
childhood programs is simpler. Three conclusions seem warranted.
First, the spillover effects of early childhood programs are large
enough to justify a considerable federal subsidy. This subsidy in some
cases may be larger than the cost of these programs.
For example, the calculations reported in Figure 10.1 suggest that
the present value for universal pre-K of national economic development benefits is $3.79 per dollar of program costs, compared to state
economic development benefits of $2.78. This means that the spillover
benefits of universal pre-K that accrue in other states are $1.01 (3.79
− 2.78) per dollar of program costs. Other states should be willing to
subsidize the program’s entire costs based on these spillover benefits.
Similar calculations based on Figure 10.1 can be made for other
early childhood programs. The resulting spillover benefits, per dollar of
early program costs, are $0.78 for the Abecedarian program and $0.62
for the Nurse-Family Partnership program. Spillover benefits can justify a federal subsidy of a considerable portion of these programs’ costs.
Second, as was argued in Chapter 4, these programs produce benefits greater than costs from a state perspective. Therefore, if state policymakers are perfectly rational and are maximizing the present value
of benefits, state policymakers should adopt these programs. No federal
subsidy should be needed to get states to adopt these programs.
Third, if, despite their self-interest, states choose not to adopt these
programs, it is in the national interest for the federal government to pay
for these programs. The present value of the national economic development benefits of all these programs considerably exceeds their costs.

FEDERALISM AND EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS:
A PRACTICAL POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
What political problems might there be with a heavy federal subsidy,
or even a federal takeover, of early childhood programs? As discussed
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in Chapter 6, one major issue is that our knowledge of what constitutes
quality in these programs is uncertain. We need to encourage innovation and creativity in early childhood programs. The concern is that too
great a federal role may inhibit the needed innovation and creativity.
As discussed in Chapter 5, Head Start on average seems to be somewhat less effective than some of the better state pre-K programs. Some
analysts have expressed concern that Head Start’s effectiveness may
have been reduced by the way the program has been managed by the
federal government. For example, Rolnick has expressed the following concerns about Head Start: “Another disappointing example of a
large-scale program is Head Start. It is not getting the kind of returns
that we saw in the Perry–High Scope study. I would argue that the disappointing results are partly because Head Start is underfunded relative
to Perry–High Scope. More fundamentally, I think that Head Start [has]
performed well below expectations because [it] approaches the problem of early childhood development from the top down” (Haskins and
Rolnick 2006).
In Head Start’s case, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the problem may
not be too much federal regulation, but rather the wrong kind of federal
regulation. For example, Head Start traditionally has not had strong
educational requirements for lead teachers. This may reflect political
pressure to use the program as a community jobs program.
One possible compromise is to try to circumscribe the federal role.
The federal role should be shaped so that it helps support high quality
in early childhood programs without dictating 100 percent of program
content. For example, one option would be to have heavy federal subsidies for some of the crucial physical capital, human capital, information, and support infrastructure of early childhood programs. The federal government could support building costs, curriculum materials and
instructional supplies costs, costs for testing of children and evaluation
of these programs, costs of staff training, transportation costs, and special student support services costs. The remainder of regular operating
costs would be paid for at the state and local level.
Such a division of federal versus state responsibilities might encourage programs to be of higher quality by encouraging better staff training, curriculum, and evaluation. Better data and evaluation of these programs would have particularly high spillover benefits for other states.
All states can learn from the development of better program models.
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The hope is that because federal aid would not pay for regular operating costs, the federal government would not seek to control all program design and content. Of course, it is possible for the federal government to use its control of these support costs to try to dictate programs.
For example, the federal government could seek to only fund a very
limited number of curriculum approaches. Federally paid-for training
could be restricted to particular training approaches. For this model of
federal support to still encourage innovation and creativity, there would
have to be an understanding that new and different curricula and staff
training approaches could be considered and tested.
Federal support for this physical capital, human capital, and information infrastructure would support a considerable percentage of the
costs of high-quality early childhood programs. For example, for a
three-hour-per-day school year pre-K program, with a class-size ratio
of 20 to 2, the Institute for Women’s Policy Research estimates the following percentages of costs in some of these categories: 11.5 percent
for infrastructure costs, which is mostly the cost of facilities but also
includes quality monitoring and evaluation costs; 16.9 percent for student support services and staff training; 6.5 percent for instructional
supplies; and 4.5 percent for transportation. The total is almost 40 percent of overall costs. Implementing universal pre-K in all states is estimated to cost $14 billion per year. If all states implemented universal
pre-K, and the 40 percent federal cost share was applied to all pre-K
expenditures, then the federal government would pay about $6 billion
for universal pre-K. State and local governments would pay the remaining $8 billion.
Federal support for uniform measurement of quality might be particularly important. As discussed in Chapter 7, good comparable measures of early childhood program quality across state and local areas
might encourage capitalization of these programs’ benefits into housing values. Such capitalization would provide greater up-front benefits
for early childhood programs. These greater up-front benefits would
encourage state adoption of these programs. More voter awareness of
program quality relative to national norms might also increase pressure
by voters for higher program quality.
But federal operating support may also be needed. Without a federal operating subsidy, many states’ investments in early childhood programs may be inadequate. As John Donahue has argued in his book
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on the role of American states, Disunited States, states may skimp on
human capital investments because their benefits are mainly long-term.
I made a similar argument in Chapter 7. The possibility of capitalization
may only be a partial solution to this problem. Donahue (1997, p. 158)
also argues that states may be reluctant to make human capital investments because “education and training policy has a distributional element—an element that becomes more important as economic inequality deepens . . . The political tension inherent in taxing the mobile, the
well-off, and the childless to pay for education spending that matters
most to the less skilled, the less affluent, and those with large families
could quite plausibly lead states to scale back their overall commitment
to human-capital development.”
Just because the federal government is sometimes overly rigid
does not mean that state and local governments will be willing to make
needed investments. We should not naively assume that state and local
policymakers will always be wise and far-sighted.
A larger federal role could certainly be justified if this larger federal
role allowed for needed local flexibility. As mentioned, the spillover
benefits justify full federal funding of universal pre-K. If the federal
government could be induced to allow creativity and experimentation
in early childhood programs, then federal funding for regular operating
costs might be encouraged. Federal funding might be particularly helpful in helping overcome possible bias by state and local governments
against early childhood investments that only pay off in the long run.
One possible model for federal operating funding is as follows. The
federal government could agree to provide states with a certain amount
of early childhood funding for each low or middle income household.
For example, the federal government could agree to provide 80 percent of early childhood education funding up to a $10,000 cap per
low or middle income household. I am here defining low or middle
income households as those belonging to the lower three quintiles in
the household income distribution—i.e., up to $62,000 in annual household income (DeNava-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2008). This approach
would be a compromise between the advocates of targeting and universalism. (See Chapter 8 for more discussion of this issue.) The targeting
advocates would be pleased that the federal funding did not include the
upper two income quintiles, which are thought to have lower benefits
from early childhood programs. The universalism advocates would be
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pleased that the federal funding included 60 percent of all households,
and probably about half of all children.8 The universalism advocates
would argue that these children from middle income households would
gain considerably from early childhood programs.
To reduce stigma and administrative costs, the funding system
might want to avoid collecting income data from every household participating in these federally funded early childhood programs. It would
be quite feasible to base federal funding on the incomes found in a random sample of participating households in each state.
The $10,000 cap would be for total funding per child under age
five. For example, the federal government would be willing to pay up
to $10,000 for a one-year program for a child from a low or middle
income household, or $5,000 per year for a two-year program, or $2,000
per year for a five-year program. How exactly to allocate these funds
across different ages from birth to age five, or across different types of
programs, would be left to state discretion.
The funding process should allow for considerable state discretion.
Some type of state process to monitor and measure program quality
would be required. And, as mentioned above, full federal funding would
be provided for any quality monitoring and staff training. Federal funding would also be provided for a variety of experimental or other rigorous evaluations of these state programs.
Because a wide variety of early childhood programs would be eligible, this would make it more difficult for the federal government to
micromanage the program. In contrast, if the federal government only
funded one type of early childhood program, there would be some
temptation for federal program managers to only fund the “ideal” pre-K
program or “ideal” nurse home visitation program.
With reasonable assumptions about participation, such a program
might cost about $15 billion per year. About half of this funding would
be sufficient to provide funding for about half the participants in an agefour universal pre-K program. The other half could support other early
childhood programs.9
For a variety of reasons, significant new federal funding support for
early childhood programs may be hard to come by. (Among other things,
looming budget deficits and the cost of health care programs pose barriers. The federal government has a lot on its plate.) Furthermore, it is by
no means obvious that any federal support for early childhood programs
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would be enlightened enough to support local flexibility. Advocates for
early childhood programs may need to rely on states taking the lead.10
As pointed out in this chapter and throughout this book, high-quality
early childhood programs cost a state less than what the state gets back
in economic development benefits. But a calculus of benefits exceeding
costs means nothing unless accompanied by political pressure. Better
information and awareness by the voting and home-buying public of
the benefits of high-quality early childhood programs, and the quality
of their states’ current early childhood programs, may help create the
needed state-level political pressures. This book’s concluding chapter,
Chapter 13, further considers the potential for state and local activism
to expand early childhood programs.

CONCLUSION
A national perspective on business incentives and early childhood
programs suggests the potential for federal intervention to improve outcomes for these programs. But wrongheaded federal intervention could
also make matters worse.
Federal intervention is particularly needed for business incentives.
The state perspective on the benefits of these programs differs greatly
from the national perspective. Although state and local governments
have some self-interested reasons to improve business incentive policies on their own, these reasons are likely insufficient to motivate the
needed reforms. The negative national spillovers of wrongheaded state
business incentive policies are potentially large, compared to these policies’ benefits for states.
Federal intervention should discourage business financial incentives
in low unemployment areas, as these lack sufficient national benefits.
But federal intervention should not discourage creative new programs
that effectively promote economic development. Customized job training or manufacturing extension programs should not be discouraged.
In contrast, for early childhood programs, state and local governments have more reason to pursue constructive policies on their own,
without federal intervention. High-quality early childhood programs
have benefits that are considerably greater than costs from a state and
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local perspective. These programs have some national spillover benefits, but these benefits are more modest in size compared to the state’s
own benefits.
Federal support for early childhood programs should encourage
states to make needed investments while encouraging creativity and
experimentation in program delivery. Early childhood programs have
sufficient spillovers and national benefits to justify considerable federal support. But there is enough uncertainty about the best program
approaches that we also need plenty of state and local discretion.
If federal support is provided for operating spending for early childhood programs, a wide variety of state and local program approaches
should be funded. Funding should not be restricted to one supposedly
ideal program design, as this overstates our current knowledge.
Federal support for evaluation and data collection for early childhood programs can provide national benefits for all states. Better information on quality may cause voters and the housing market to put more
pressure on state and local policymakers to make quality improvements.
Federal support for staff training can increase the odds that early childhood programs will be research-based and of high quality.
This policy advice assumes the possible legitimacy of government
intervention in business incentives and early childhood education. The
next chapter will consider the ethical issues raised by such government
intervention.

Notes
1. Appendix 10A presents more detail. This appendix, like all the appendices in this
book, is available from the Upjohn Institute.
2. Appendix 10B discusses why this is a reasonable assumption.
3. This ignores the issue of whether the benefits of each of these three early childhood programs are independent of each other. It is possible that implementing one
of these programs (e.g., the Abecedarian program) may decrease or increase the
net benefits of the other programs (e.g., Universal pre-K).
4. The model details are reported in Appendix 10C.
5. For example, in DiTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald’s (2001) evaluation of the
social cost of unemployment, 90 percent of the loss in happiness due to higher
unemployment is that of the employed. In Blanchflower’s (2007) estimates,
three-fourths of the loss in happiness due to higher unemployment is that of the
employed. When one person becomes unemployed, the monetary value of that
individual’s loss of happiness is higher than the monetary value of the resulting

The National Perspective 313

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

loss of happiness (due to a higher unemployment rate) of an individual employed
person. But the sum of the monetary value of the loss of happiness of all the
employed is greater than the monetary value of the loss of happiness to the individual who becomes unemployed.
DiTella, MacCulloch, and Oswald’s (2001) research found no significant influence of national unemployment squared in regressions explaining differences in
happiness for a particular country and year in a panel data analysis. If the nation
is considered the relevant labor market, this implies that the marginal benefits of
lowering unemployment do not vary significantly with the unemployment rate.
However, trying to detect nonlinearities in a limited number of countries and years
is quite difficult.
Rolnick’s testimony also makes two other arguments for the inefficiency of business incentives. One argument is that competing via business incentives erodes
the local tax base and leads to economically inefficient underproduction of public
goods. This argument is only valid if state and local governments are forced to
rely on business capital taxes for all or a fixed percentage of public good costs.
If other taxes are available, this result does not hold (Oates and Schwab 1988). A
second argument is that business incentives lead to variations across businesses in
tax rates that inefficiently reallocate capital. However, as argued in the text of this
chapter, if these business incentive differentials are related to the social benefits
provided by the business, then this capital reallocation will not be inefficient.
The assertion that the bottom 60 percent of all households include about half of all
children is consistent with the calculations in Appendix 8A. It is also consistent
with the on-line statistic, from the Census Bureau’s data files for the 2008 Annual
Social and Economic Supplement to the CPS, that the bottom three income quintiles include 49.7 percent of all family households (U.S. Census Bureau 2008).
I base this calculation on year 2008 data on persons by age in the United States
from the Census Bureau. I update these data to 2011 by assuming 0.3 percent
growth per year at all age levels. I assume that 49.7 percent of all children are eligible for this federal funding. Among those eligible, I assume 70 percent participation. The funded program is assumed to provide $5,000 in funding for an age four
program. This federal support would be 80 percent of total spending, with total
spending at $6,250 per four-year-old. Such funding would be sufficient to support
a high-quality pre-K program, based on data from the Institute for Women’s Policy
Research (2008). The remaining $5,000 in federal funding would arbitrarily be
allocated at $1,250 per year across the four years from age zero to age three.
Again, since this funding is at 80 percent, it would support spending $1,563 per
year for these four years. Alternatively, the $5,000 would be sufficient to fund
about half the cost of the Nurse-Family Partnership for each child. (The funding
would still be only a tiny percentage of the total cost of an Abecedarian program
for each child, which would cost over $60,000 per child.)
One point to note is that state and local governments face incentives, due to capitalization effects, to value the long-run effects of universal pre-K. At the national
level, universal pre-K is unlikely to lead to capitalization effects, as capitalization
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effects depend upon the attractiveness of a local area affecting in-migration and
out-migration. Therefore, the federal government does not have incentives from
capitalization to value the long-run effects of universal pre-K. We are depending
upon the federal government deciding to expand early childhood programs in the
right way because it is the right thing to do.

11
The Ethics of Early Childhood
Programs and Business Incentives
Early childhood education and business incentives can be discussed
from many perspectives. Thus far, I have focused on these programs’
consequences. Empirical evidence has been presented on these programs’ benefits and costs.
But early childhood education and business incentives can also be
discussed from a philosophical perspective. Do these programs violate
or promote any ethical principles? Do these programs violate any principles about the appropriate role of government? An ethical perspective
would also include a consideration of these programs’ consequences.
But do ethical principles suggest that these programs are likely to promote or detract from what is best for our society? Do ethical principles
suggest worrying about additional consequences of these programs?
Ethical principles can provide a useful guide amidst conflicting empirical evidence.
In this chapter, I first consider philosophical arguments against early
childhood education programs. I then consider philosophical arguments
against business incentive programs. I discuss some common elements
of these arguments.
I then respond to these philosophical arguments. This response is
in part that early childhood education and business incentive programs
can promote legitimate public purposes. But the response also argues
that good program design can avoid transgressing ethical boundaries.
The right design of early childhood programs can avoid unduly interfering with the family. The right design of business incentives can avoid
unduly interfering in the business marketplace.
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT AGAINST EARLY
CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS
Abecedarian and CPC [Chicago Child-Parent Centers] . . . provide pretty good evidence that the right kinds of interventions—
if it’s intense enough, if it’s done well, in certain situations, with
certain children . . . can change outcomes. That is not surprising.
The Abecedarian program took these children when they were
infants. The average age was four months old, not four years old.
So, you’re talking about, in essence [the] creation of a home away
from home. And you can bet that creating a different home away
from home can change a child’s outcomes.
The question, then, for policymakers . . . is whether that is a level of
intervention that parents are comfortable with and, certainly, that
is one of the reasons that I believe the state needs to stay far away
from this. It reminds me a little bit of Brave New World, where
babies are assigned to different categories and they know they can
produce certain outcomes. You can do that. But that is a level of
social engineering that most people are not comfortable with, and
so participating in these programs voluntarily is important. Making sure that they’re not government-directed and government-run
is critically important. You can change outcomes, but who should
be in the position of determining what those outcomes should be
and who need[s] to be changed?
—Darcy Olsen, from Olsen and Rolnick (2005, p. 10)
My progressive friends berate the Bush Administration for their
dictatorial stands on moral issues, telling us all how to live our
lives. But somehow now it’s okay for some liberals to tell all parents that early development is about getting three- and four-yearolds ready for standardized testing.
I urge you to consider what the evidence has to say, and whether
central government should be advancing a one-size-fits-all institution for young children.
—Bruce Fuller (2006a)

The main philosophical argument against early childhood programs
is that they infringe too much on the family. These programs may violate parents’ rights. They may take over parental responsibilities.
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Effective early childhood programs can be argued to require too
much government intrusion. Effective programs may involve the government requiring that children achieve specific standardized outcomes.
These standardized outcomes may be defined by centralized government authority. This centralized government authority may dictate
outcomes that could be bad for an individual child. Good child development may be more likely if individual families define their own child
outcomes and means of achieving those outcomes.
Philosophers have long noted a possible conflict between the family and social justice. Plato outlined a society in The Republic in which
children were raised communally. In John Rawls’s famous 1971 book, A
Theory of Justice, the late Harvard philosopher noted the following argument against the family: “It seems that even when fair opportunity . . .
is satisfied, the family will lead to unequal chances between individuals. . . . Is the family to be abolished then? Taken by itself and given a
certain primacy, the idea of equal opportunity inclines in this direction”
(Rawls [1971], quoted in Brighouse and Swift [2009, p. 45]).
We know that family environment makes a major difference in child
outcomes. For example, Professors Betty Hart and Todd Risley have
studied how parents from different socioeconomic backgrounds differ
in verbal interactions with their children. They focused on interactions
from 7–9 months of age up to three years old. Hart and Risley found
that “simply in words heard, the average child on welfare was having
half as much experience per hour . . . as the average working-class child
. . . and less than one-third that of the average child in a professional
family . . .” (Hart and Risley 2003). Hart and Risley found a widening
gap from infancy to age three in children’s vocabulary. For example,
by age three, children from professional families on average used twice
as many different words per hour as children from families on welfare. These age three differences are significant predictors of children’s
school performance at ages nine and ten.
Equal opportunity can be argued to be unattainable without significant interventions in the family. Darcy Olsen, president and CEO of
the Goldwater Institute, argues in the quote that led off this section that
truly changing child outcomes requires dramatic changes in the child’s
environment. The Abecedarian program certainly is a major intervention. Full-time, full-year child care, starting at the age of 6 to 12 weeks
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and continuing to age five, is a major change. Some Americans will
hesitate before promoting such interventions.
A weakening of parental relationships with the child can sometimes
damage child development. Jane Waldfogel, a professor at Columbia
who is a well-known expert in child policy, concludes that “maternal
sensitivity [to the child] is the most important predictor of child social
and emotional development—more important than parental employment, child care, or other child and family factors” (Waldfogel 2006, p.
62). In addition, Waldfogel concludes that “children do tend to do worse
if their mothers work full-time in the first year of life. Negative effects
are found on health, cognitive development, and externalizing behavior
problems. Part-time work in the first year or [full-time] work in the second and third years does not have the same effects” (pp. 61–62).
It is certainly possible to wonder about the extent to which early
childhood programs can substitute for the family. Jennifer Roback
Morse, an economist who has promoted traditional marriage and family structures, argues that “we [cannot] replace the family with a series
of government programs . . . The government is no substitute for the
family” (Morse 2008).
Too much government intrusion into the family may also potentially interfere with parental rights. Philosopher Harry Brighouse has
argued that an important part of well-being and meaning for many persons is the right as a parent to raise one’s children.
Even if alternative arrangements (such as state child-rearing institutions) could serve children’s interests better (which we doubt),
they could not be justified because parents also have an interest
in being able to have intimate relationships with their children in
which they are the main agents responsible for meeting their children’s needs. The institution of the family allows adults to have
a relationship of a kind that cannot be substituted for by relationships with other adults; they enjoy an intimate relationship with
a dependent who spontaneously loves them, and a good deal of
discretion over the specific means by which that relationship
develops. Parents have a special duty to promote their children’s
interests (including the interest most have in becoming eventually
someone who has no need of the parent’s care), but they also have
a non-fiduciary interest in being able to play a fiduciary role; it is
valuable for their children that they play it well, but playing it is
also valuable for them. The family is justified partly by the fact
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that it is the institution for raising children that provides this good
to adults. (Brighouse 2007)

An extreme view is that parents have the right to provide their
children with advantages. For example, the well-known conservative
author Dinesh D’Souza has argued that it is illegitimate for government
to provide help to children whose parents have not done as much to help
them succeed.
I have a five-year-old daughter. Since she was born—actually,
since she was conceived—my wife and I have gone to great
lengths in the Great Yuppie Parenting Race . . . Why are we doing
these things? We are, of course, trying to develop her abilities so
that she can get the most out of life. The practical effect of our
actions, however, is that we are working to give our daughter an
edge—that is, a better chance to succeed than everybody else’s
children . . .
Now, to enforce equal opportunity, the government could do one
of two things: it could try to pull my daughter down, or it could
work to raise other people’s children up. The first is clearly destructive and immoral, but the second is also unfair. The government is
obliged to treat all citizens equally. Why should it work to undo
the benefits that my wife and I have labored so hard to provide?
Why should it offer more to children whose parents have not taken
the trouble?1

Another concern is that early childhood programs run by centralized government authority may be insufficiently responsive to community needs. Bruce Fuller, professor of education and public policy at
the University of California, Berkeley, has expressed concern, in the
quotation at the beginning of this section and elsewhere, that some universal pre-K proposals give too much power to the public education
system. He believes that community-based pre-K education programs
may be more responsive to diverse needs. These community-based preK programs may use more diverse curricula and employ teachers from
more diverse backgrounds. “One reason I became so involved in questioning elements of the Reiner initiative in California [a 2006 ballot
initiative for universal pre-K that badly failed] was that his caucus was
so eager to win at any cost—including a willingness to risk sacrificing
community-based programs, some of which started in the 1920s and
many more that sprung up with the community action movement in the
1960s” (Fuller 2006b).2
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A final philosophical objection is to a strong federal role in early
childhood education. To some conservatives, any significant federal
role in early childhood education goes beyond the federal government’s
constitutional powers. For example, Olsen (1999) argues that “the provision or funding for early education programs by the federal government cannot be squared with the notion of a national government whose
powers are enumerated and thus limited by the Constitution.”
These philosophical arguments are made against a version of early
childhood education that is a straw man. I consider later whether early
childhood education usually or necessarily leads to excessive intrusion
in the family.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT AGAINST
BUSINESS INCENTIVES
The central philosophical argument against business incentives is
that the government should not be “picking winners.” The government
should not be selecting particular businesses for government assistance.
This assistance increases these selected businesses’ chances of success.
Which businesses “win” should be based on the merits of the business,
as judged by the market. By picking business winners, the government,
it is argued, is unduly intruding on the proper role of the competitive
market.
Business incentives to selected businesses use public funds to
increase private profits. The “winners” benefit at the expense of the
public. William Greider, a well-known left-of-center political journalist, makes the following argument on principle against business incentives: “Here is a simple proposition to consider as we absorb the facts
of the scam: public money should be devoted to public purposes . . .
The subsidy system in American governance has now become so distorted—actually deranged—that it largely amounts to a corrupt pork
barrel of private favors at public expense” (Greider 2005, pp. x, xi).
Aiding “winning” businesses is argued to be unfair to “losing” businesses. The libertarian Cato Institute argues that “by aiding some businesses, corporate subsidies put other businesses without political connections at an unfair disadvantage” (Cato Institute 2009, p. 281).
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Tax incentives to businesses have the further problem that they are
often not very visible. According to Greg LeRoy of the advocacy group
Good Jobs First, which argues against business incentive programs,
“The tax breaks . . . granted by states . . . are the least visible, least
accountable, and most corrosive means by which states fund job creation” (LeRoy 2005, p. 2). Tax incentives to businesses are typically
not regularly reviewed by state legislatures. Agencies that hand out tax
incentives in many cases do not provide adequate data on costs and
effects of tax incentives. Accountability is more difficult because there
are insufficient data on which to judge these programs. Accountability
is also more difficult because of the lack of regular review.
Business incentives can be argued to be prone to corruption. This
corruption may not take the form of outright bribes. I know of little evidence of explicit bribes. But corruption may also occur by businesses
lobbying and making campaign contributions. This political pressure
may promote business incentives that increase business profits. Business incentives provide large increases in profits to relatively few businesses. Costs are spread across many taxpayers. As a result, incentive
proponents find it easier to politically organize than opponents. Steven
Slivinski, former director of budget policy at the Cato Institute, makes
the following argument:
Subsidies are usually given to a few recipients at the expense of
many taxpayers. Because there are such a large number of taxpayers—and each corporate subsidy may cost each taxpayer only a
few cents or a few dollars—most individual citizens don’t have
an interest in lobbying against subsidies since the cost of doing
so far outweighs simply paying the taxes. However, the recipients
of those subsidies have a substantial interest in making sure they
protect the flow of money to them. That leads to a great deal of
lobbying by special interests but very little lobbying on behalf of
taxpayers. (Slivinski 2007, p. 5)

The possibility of business incentives may divert businesses’ attention away from improving the quality of their businesses. Instead, businesses may spend more time lobbying for incentives. Slivinski (2007,
pp. 5–6) makes the following argument: “Subsidies create a perverse
incentive for businesses: if an entrepreneur’s competitors are receiving help from the government, it may appear to be in his or her interest to try to get some of that help, too. That incentive serves only to
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turn many businesspeople into lobbyists, sidetracking them from their
role as entrepreneurs. That, in turn, leads to an overallocation of private
resources to pursuing and protecting government subsidies.”
Business incentives may also divert the attention of government
policymakers from policies that would be more effective in creating
jobs. LeRoy (2005) argues that policymakers who question incentives
are labeled as being “against jobs”: “Those [policymakers] who would
dare to ask an impertinent question are quickly singled out for ridicule
and isolation: they must be against jobs” (p. 4).
Finally, it can be argued that business incentives violate federal and
state constitutional standards. At the least, business incentives could be
argued to violate these standards’ spirit. Slivinski argues that “direct
corporate subsidies fall outside the limited enumerated functions of
the federal government” (p. 6). As was mentioned in Chapter 10, Art
Rolnick of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank has argued that the
federal Constitution’s Commerce Clause, which gives the U.S. Congress exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce, was enacted to
prevent the states from engaging in “destructive economic warfare”
against each other. At the time of the U.S. Constitutional Convention,
this “economic warfare” was in the form of state trade barriers. State
business incentives can be seen as a modern form of such economic
warfare.
State constitutions and state court precedents also can be viewed as
questioning business incentives. This is a theoretical question, as state
courts have rarely overturned business incentives. State constitutions
often require that public funds or credit should only be used for “public purposes.” According to Ferdinand Schoettle, a law professor at the
University of Minnesota, “even if a state constitution does not expressly
require that taxes be levied and collected for public purposes only,
courts will generally find the public purpose doctrine implicit either in
other constitutional provisions or in general doctrines and principles”
(Schoettle 2003, p. 33). Many of the state constitutional provisions
against use of public funds and credit for private purposes developed in
the late nineteenth century. According to Schoettle,
These doctrines had their development, if not their genesis, in the
second half of the nineteenth century when the public became concerned about the activities of governments in financing internal
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improvements. As the nation’s population expanded westward
between 1820 and 1840 . . . the anticipated rewards from such
improvements led to partnerships between states and private enterprise through which the states financed the construction of privately
or jointly owned canals, railroads, turnpikes and toll roads . . .
State officials were particularly inspired by the great success of
New York’s Erie Canal . . . Other states followed New York’s lead
in incurring large debts in order to grant aid to private corporations
. . . However, other state projects were not as successful as the Erie
Canal. By 1837, some internal improvement projects lacked funds
to complete their project . . . State residents then began to show
displeasure at the state’s mismanagement of internal commerce . . .
The judiciary also took note of popular discontent with governmental assistance to private industry . . . (pp. 28–29)

It could be argued that today’s business incentives have some similarity to this aggressive state government promotion of economic development in the early nineteenth century. Perhaps business incentives too
should be subject to greater legal restrictions.
These arguments against business incentives also argue against a
straw man. I will consider below whether business incentives necessarily or usually lead to unwarranted interference with the business
marketplace.

COMMON ELEMENTS TO THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST
THESE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
These arguments against early childhood programs and business
incentives have many differences. But they also have some elements in
common. In both cases, the argument is that some government program
is substituting its decision-making for some existing entity or process.
For early childhood programs, the existing entity and process is the
family. For business incentives, the existing entity and process is the
business competing in the marketplace.
The argument is that this substitution of government for the existing
entity (the family or business competition) is a bad idea in principle.
The existing entity and process will as a general principle do better if
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left on its own. The existing entity has a right to be left on its own. The
presumption is that government interference will be a poor substitute.
The burden of proof is argued to be on proponents of government interference to demonstrate its efficacy.
This entire book can be seen as a response to these arguments. The
book has offered specific empirical evidence on the benefits and costs
of early childhood programs and business incentives. If the benefits
exceed the costs from these government programs, then these programs
can be argued to have overcome the presumption against government
intervention in the family or business marketplace. This empirical evidence suggests that such government intervention is warranted.
But there is a long-standing joke in economics: “So it’s true in practice; is it also true in theory?” Are there theoretical or conceptual reasons for thinking that early childhood programs and business incentives
might work? A conceptual argument for these programs might augment
the specific empirical evidence.
I give a conceptual rationale for each of these two programs below.
The conceptual rationales for these two programs have some elements
in common. There are some reasons in principle to think that these
existing entities (the family or business competition) will fail to bring
about socially desirable outcomes. Government interference may help.
Government interference may even help strengthen the family or business competition.
As we will see, this debate also suggests some design principles
for these programs. Even if concern about government interference in
the family or the business marketplace is overstated, undue interference may be undesirable. The right design of these programs may avoid
some of the concerns of those opposed to such government intervention.

THE CONCEPTUAL CASE FOR EARLY
CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS
The conceptual case for early childhood programs is this: many
families on their own may not obtain sufficient services of the type
provided by early childhood programs. The services the family obtains
on its own may be insufficient from two perspectives. Services may be
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insufficient from the family’s own perspective, in that the family may
not obtain services that maximize the overall long-term well-being of
all family members. Services may also be insufficient from a social
perspective: the services that the family obtains on its own may provide
too few social benefits for various groups outside the family.
Even if early childhood programs provide benefits exceeding costs,
many families may be unable to afford these services. If a family’s
resources are scarce, the family may rationally choose to spend more on
goods and services that yield short-term returns, squeezing out services
that will only yield a return in the long term. This is so even if the longterm return to these early childhood services far exceeds costs.
Some economists might argue that in theory even low-income families may be able to afford early childhood programs by borrowing.
Suppose these programs’ future earnings benefits for the child exceed
their costs. If capital markets were perfect, then a family should be able
to borrow against the value of the child’s future earnings. In practice,
capital markets do not work that way. Lenders are more reluctant to
lend when the collateral is harder to repossess and sell. Houses and
business machinery can be repossessed. But a person’s increased skills
as an adult that result from an early childhood program are impossible
to repossess. As a result, loans for programs that help enhance human
skills are more limited than would be socially desirable.
Another issue is that families may not fully understand the future
value of early childhood programs. Markets work more efficiently when
consumers have better information. It is easier to have good consumer
information on a good or service that is immediately consumed. How
much a particular new variety of apple is worth is something a consumer can easily find out by eating that apple. Goods or services whose
value only becomes readily apparent in the future are more difficult for
consumers to evaluate. Early childhood programs have long-delayed
benefits. These delayed benefits may be downweighted by consumers in
favor of immediate benefits from other goods and services.
Even if families understand the future benefits of early childhood
programs, they may undervalue the future. Families may place a lower
value on future benefits now than they later would find to be desirable.
Part of the issue is that parents are making decisions on behalf of
their child. From the viewpoint of the future adult that the child could
potentially have grown into had there been more early investment, the
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family may underinvest in child development. There is no effective way
that the demand of this potential future adult can be reflected in the family’s decision-making today.
Investment in early childhood programs may also have social benefits that spill over outside the child’s family. Higher future skills may
increase overall social productivity beyond the increase in earnings for
the individual. For example, there is significant evidence that an individual’s wage rate depends not only on his or her own education, but
also is positively affected by higher average education levels (Moretti
2003, 2004). This can be explained in several ways. The productivity of
teams may depend on the education of all members. Businesses deciding whether to introduce new technology may believe the success of the
innovation depends on the typical education of the workforce. A more
educated workforce may also contribute more ideas for innovation.
In addition, increased future earnings of former child participants
in early childhood programs will increase future tax revenues. The
increased employment and earnings may also reduce involvement in
welfare. Both of these effects provide fiscal benefits for the average
taxpayer.
Former child participants in early childhood programs may be less
likely to become involved in crime. There is some evidence of anticrime effects from the Perry Preschool program, the Chicago ChildParent Center program, and the Nurse-Family Partnership program.3
Many of the benefits of lower crime accrue to taxpayers, who save some
costs in the criminal justice system. Other benefits of lower crime go to
those who escaped being victims of crime because some crimes were
never committed that otherwise would have been.
Early childhood programs may also raise civic participation. For
example, we know that more-educated persons are more likely to vote
and to volunteer (Baum and Ma 2007).
All these points apply equally well to public schools. The argument
is that without public funding for K–12 education, many families would
not obtain sufficient quantity or quality of K–12 educational services.
The conceptual case for early childhood programs is the same as the
conceptual case for public schools.
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ARE EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS REALLY OPPOSED
TO FAMILY RIGHTS?
But there still is the issue of whether early childhood programs
infringe on the rights and functions of the family. How serious a concern is this in actuality? Are there ways to minimize any unproductive
conflict between early childhood programs and the family?
Family rights are not absolute. As argued above, parents have the
right to develop a mutually enriching relationship with their child that
involves helping shape their child’s values. But the right to such a relationship does not extend to denying opportunities for other children.
Consider Dinesh D’Souza’s comments above. It is unclear how the government is denying his family’s rights by helping enhance the future
development of some other child. What about children’s rights? Aren’t
they enhanced if more children have greater opportunities?
In practice, it is unclear whether early childhood programs significantly interfere with family rights. Consider Goldwater Institute CEO
Darcy Olsen’s comments above, comparing early childhood programs
to Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New World. Early childhood programs
have little in common with forcible assignment of children to predetermined social roles—the policy practiced in Brave New World. The preK program with the highest return appears to be a half-day school-year
program at age four. Such a program does not signal the start of a totalitarian society. The Nurse-Family Partnership program has a limited
number of nurse visits from the prenatal period to age two. Contrary to
Darcy Olsen’s comment, we do not need to “creat[e] a different home
away from home” to make significant and meaningful improvements in
child outcomes.
Even the Abecedarian program does not necessarily weaken the
family. The program is full-time, full-year child care from infancy
through age five. But many of these parents would have used some type
of full-time child care anyway. The issue in many cases is the quality of
that care, not child care versus family care.
Many of these programs may strengthen the family. The NurseFamily Partnership seeks to improve the parent’s interactions with the
child. High-quality pre-K programs and child care programs include
some outreach to parents. More importantly, high-quality pre-K pro-
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grams and child care programs help promote goals that the parent has
for the child. The parent-child relationship is not just an end in itself; it
is also a means to better child development.
Program design can minimize infringements on parental and family
rights. All of these early childhood programs are voluntary. Parents can
opt out.
I have argued previously in this book that we want considerable
state and local discretion in how early childhood programs are operated.
I argued that state and local flexibility leads to more innovation. It also
may allow parents more options for different types of early childhood
programs.
Within a given state or local area, early childhood program design
can also allow for considerable parental choice. Programs can be
designed so that a variety of different program types are available. Programs can be delivered by a variety of institutions. For example, preK programs do not need to be delivered or controlled by the public
schools; there is an existing infrastructure of private pre-K programs.
Many but not all are of high quality. Many of those that are not of high
quality could be improved. It seems sensible to work to improve rather
than replace that infrastructure. Public policies can honor a diversity of
program approaches while encouraging quality improvements. This can
be a difficult balancing act, but one that is possible to pull off.
State and local areas in which voters highly value parental choice
may opt for a system that funds a variety of public and private providers. Funding a variety of providers may also make sense in state
and local areas in which there are many existing private providers of
high quality. In other state and local settings, private providers of high
quality may not be as widespread. The local political culture may be
more supportive of a pre-K system that largely works through the public schools.

THE CONCEPTUAL CASE FOR BUSINESS INCENTIVES
The main argument for business incentives has already been made
in Chapter 2. The process of business competition, left to its own devices,
does not recognize some social benefits. The pure free market does not
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recognize the social benefit of greater employment. Business incentives
can be justified as a way to promote employment expansions that have
large social benefits.4
Some of the more effective economic development services also
address other failings of a pure private market. Manufacturing extension
services and customized job training programs may reflect problems of
markets in dealing with imperfect information. Businesses, particularly
small and medium-sized businesses, may have imperfect information
about what they can do to improve their productivity.
Information can be purchased. But if one lacks information, it is
difficult to ascertain whether the information one is buying is accurate,
or to ascertain its worth. Therefore, in a pure free market, there may not
be sufficient trade in high-quality information and training to improve
business productivity.
Manufacturing extension services and customized job training may
improve matters by providing more reliably high-quality information
and services to improve productivity. Some evidence that these services correct a market failure is provided by the estimated high value
of these services relative to the costs. If high-quality information and
training were already easily and reliably available to businesses, then
government programs should find it more difficult to provide valuable
services.
If these economic development services have a value to businesses
that exceeds their costs, why shouldn’t such services be priced at full
cost? There are two reasons. First, these services are being provided
to promote employment and earnings creation. This is better accomplished by providing services below costs.
Second, many of the small and medium-sized businesses being
helped may be insufficiently financed because of financial market failures. Financial markets may not always optimally finance different
activities. As we have seen recently, sometimes excessively risky loans
and investments are financed. Other times, sound business projects are
not financed. There are many small and medium-sized businesses that
could viably expand if they could get financing. Free or low-cost extension services or customized job training may be an indirect way of providing financial support.
Thus, economic development services to businesses can be seen as
addressing multiple market failures. Providing such services free or at
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a low price helps overcome the failure of markets to achieve socially
beneficial employment and earnings expansions, while also addressing
failures in information and financial markets for small and mediumsized businesses.
What about the charge that business incentives are unfair to the
business that does not receive incentives? In theory, if business incentive programs are run optimally, this criticism is invalid. Economic
development policymakers would not be arbitrarily “picking winners” by providing some businesses with greater incentives. Greater
incentives would be provided to businesses whose expansions yielded
greater social benefits. For example, greater incentives might be provided to businesses in a more distressed local labor market. Or greater
incentives might be provided to businesses that paid a higher wage premium. The differentials in incentives would be related to social benefits. If incentive differentials are related to social benefits, the charge
of unfairness loses force.
So in theory, optimal business incentives can be seen as correcting
for market failures. But is this true in practice? As discussed in Chapter
10, there is some sign that business incentives are quite large even in
low-unemployment areas, where the social benefits of incentives are
lower. This suggests that politics may play a role in business incentive
policy: even when social benefits are low, the business beneficiaries
will lobby for continued large incentives. As discussed previously in
this chapter, it may be easy for businesses that benefit from incentives
to politically out-organize the opponents to incentives.
As mentioned in Chapter 10, one way to control such political
pressures is to incorporate business tax incentives into the regular tax
code. Currently, business tax incentives are often handed out in a discretionary manner. Making such incentives part of the regular tax code
would provide greater potential for control and monitoring. Legislative
agencies and administrative agencies would cost out the implications
of these tax incentives for state and local revenues, so that there would
be more of a potential for a balanced discussion of these tax incentives’
benefits and costs.
Economic development services are more under control, because
they are politically overseen as part of the legislative authorization and
appropriations process. In addition, the demand for economic develop-
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ment services is more politically limited. There is no limit to the business demand for cash. Once state and local governments start handing
out business incentives as tax reductions or other types of cash, there
is unlimited business demand for expanding such assistance. However,
services are only demanded by businesses that need such services, and
only if the services are of some significant value.
Therefore, another way to encourage more efficient use of business
incentives is to shift more incentives from tax and financial incentives
toward services. Such a shift of emphasis may limit the potential for
political pressure to inordinately expand incentives.
As mentioned in Chapter 10, transparency and federal regulation
of incentives may also promote greater efficiency. Full public awareness of the magnitude and effects of incentives may restrain the worst
abuses. Federal regulation may restrain incentives that do not promote
overall national purposes.
If business incentives are run reasonably well, they may enhance
the process of market competition. Business employment may expand
to provide greater social benefits. Services that increase business productivity may enhance business competition.

CONCLUSION
There are philosophical reasons to be concerned about early childhood programs and business incentives. However, well-run and highquality versions of early childhood programs and business incentives
can deal with these concerns. The purposes of the family and of business competition can be enhanced rather than diminished by the right
program design.
The next chapter turns to extending the economic development analysis of early childhood programs to other human capital improvements.
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Notes
1. This quotation from Dinesh D’Souza is from a discussion by Slate writer Timothy
Noah of D’Souza’s 2000 book, The Virtue of Prosperity (Noah 2000).
2. See also Fuller’s more extended discussion of these issues in his 2007 book, Standardized Childhood, coauthored with Margaret Bridges and Seeta Pai.
3. For a good recent review, see Julia Isaacs’s 2008 paper for First Focus and
Brookings.
4. A more extensive discussion of market failures justifying economic development
is in my 1990 paper on market failures and economic development.

12
Extending Economic Development
Analysis to Other Human
Development Programs
Education, Public Health, Crime Reduction
Early childhood programs are just one type of human development
program. The economic development analysis that I have applied to early
childhood programs can be applied to other programs than enhance
human capital. Any program that increases the quantity or quality of
human capital will stimulate earnings creation in a state economy.
In this chapter, I illustrate how this economic development analysis
can be extended to other human development programs. I consider the
following types of human development policies:
• Policies to improve K–12 test scores;
• Policies to improve educational attainment (high school graduation, college graduation);
• Policies to improve public health; and
• Policies to reduce crime rates.
This book does not consider the details of additional policies—
beyond early childhood programs—that could improve human capital
in these policy areas. Instead, I estimate the economic development
benefits for state economies of improving key human development
outcomes. These outcomes include education test scores, educational
attainment, crime, and public health indicators. Future studies could
match up these estimates with estimates of the costs of achieving these
outcomes. This matching would allow comparing economic development benefits to costs of human development policies.
Previous studies have considered the economic effects of improving
these human development outcomes. For example, there are many studies by research organizations, interest groups, and academics of the eco-
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nomic effects of improving K–12 education (Belfield and Levin 2007a;
Hungerford and Wassmer 2004; Levin and Belfield 2007; McKinsey
and Company 2009; National Education Association 2007). For postsecondary education, studies by the College Board, individual universities, and academics have considered the economic effects of improving college education (Bartik and Erickcek 2008; Baum and Ma 2007;
Siegfried, Sanderson, and McHenry 2006). Studies by think tanks and
academics have considered the economic benefits of reducing crime
(Greenwood et al. 1998; Holzer, Offner, and Sorensen 2005; Raphael
2007). Studies have estimated the economic effects of improvements
to public health and medical care (Aos et al. 2006; Bartik and Erickcek
2008; Currie et al. 2009).
Such economic analysis is sometimes meant to promote more funding for these human development programs. For example, in recent
years, the National Education Association (NEA) has supported an initiative with the acronym TEF (Tax Structures, Economic Development,
and Funding for Education). Under TEF, NEA and its state affiliates
present information on the high costs of tax incentives for promoting
economic development, and the potential economic development benefits of better K–12 education. According to NEA (2007), the TEF initiative is meant to promote the following argument: “Investing in education pays—always. But now more than ever . . . in the new knowledgebased global economy, investing in public education—in our human
capital—provides a greater return to our economic prosperity investment than tax cuts and subsidies.”
What this book does differently is to focus on how these human
development outcomes offer economic development benefits at the state
level. This focus on state-level effects means that I adjust downward
for participants in these programs who move out-of-state. The focus
on economic development benefits means that I adjust downward for
displacement effects. I want to estimate the net effects of human development programs on state economies, not just effects on individuals.
Policies targeting human development have been justified on the
basis of economic development benefits. For example, the “Kalamazoo
Promise” program was apparently intended by its anonymous donors
to promote the economic development of Kalamazoo (Miller-Adams
2009). The Kalamazoo Promise, begun in 2005, provides graduates of
Kalamazoo Public Schools with up to 100 percent subsidies for college
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tuition. The Kalamazoo Promise is in part intended to increase high
school and college graduation rates. But in so doing, the donors apparently believe that the Promise will attract households and businesses to
Kalamazoo. Households will be attracted by the tuition benefit for their
children. Businesses will be attracted because households are attracted,
and because of the Promise’s effects on educational attainment.
The focus of this chapter is somewhat different from Richard
Florida’s well-known focus on the role of the so-called creative class
in regional development (Florida 2002). Florida’s work has focused
on how overall regional growth is affected by attracting or retaining
highly creative persons. Thus, Florida’s focus is on growth in the size
of the overall local economy, whereas I focus on the earnings per capita
of the original local residents. In other words, Florida focuses more
(although not exclusively) on affecting the geographic migration of talent, whereas I focus on the effects of a local economy’s developing its
own talent.

METHODOLOGY
My estimates of the state-level economic development benefits of
better human development outcomes follow a similar methodology. I
summarize this methodology here.1 The discussion of estimates of specific outcomes indicates exceptions to this methodology.
For each outcome, I derive from various sources estimates of the
effects of some changes in human development outcomes on earnings
for an individual at different ages. The program initiating the changes in
human development outcomes is assumed to occur at some earlier age.
From these gross effects on some individual’s earnings, I calculate
net effects on state earnings. This is done by adjusting the gross earnings downward to account for mortality, out-migration from the state,
and displacement effects.
For some human development interventions, as indicated below, I
also adjust upward for positive peer effects. These positive peer effects
are assumed to occur in elementary school. Higher human development
outcomes for one individual or group are assumed to help improve academic achievement in elementary school for that person’s or group’s
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classroom peers. These positive peer effects are restricted to human
development interventions that intervene at early enough ages to affect
elementary school acheivement.
I then calculate the present value of these state earnings effects from
improving human development outcomes for one individual. This represents the economic development benefits for the state from a program that would make such an improvement for one individual. These
benefits could be compared with costs: what does it cost to improve
human development outcomes by this amount for one individual? Of
course, this is not a complete benefit-cost analysis. However, it does
indicate whether the state economic development benefits would justify
the intervention’s costs.
I also then calculate the effects on earnings from a permanent program that will make this change in human development outcomes for
many individuals in the state. For each human development outcome
below, I present my assumption about whether this change in human
development outcomes takes place for the entire population or some
smaller group. Such assumptions about how the program is scaled are
arbitrary. Without cost figures for achieving these human development
outcomes, the scaling of these various human development outcomes
cannot be compared.
I then calculate the net percentage effect on state earnings from this
permanent program. This permanent program is assumed to be initiated in the year 2011. I calculate the percentage effect of this program
from 2011 until the percentage effect stabilizes. The percentage effect
stabilizes when all cohorts in the labor market have been affected by the
permanent program.
I report the peak percentage effect on state earnings from the program. I also calculate the net present value of the earnings effect of the
permanent program, as a percentage of the net present value of future
state earnings. This percentage net present value calculation averages
in early years of program effects with later years. In the early years,
the program has few or no effects because few cohorts affected by the
program are yet in the labor market.
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K–12 TEST SCORES
For K–12 education quality, I analyze the state economic development benefits of improvements in early elementary test scores and secondary test scores. Improving such test scores is a key goal of school
reformers.
For these test score improvements, I consider the economic development benefits from improving that outcome, along with subsequent
educational attainment increases associated with that outcome. For
example, the economic development benefits of improving elementary
or secondary test scores include the higher high school graduation
rates and college graduation rates that may result from these higher
test scores. Higher test scores do have effects beyond their effects upon
educational attainment. For example, research by Murnane et al. (2000)
concludes that for men, only one-third of the effects of higher secondary test scores are due to the effects of these higher test scores on educational attainment.2
Elementary Test Scores
To estimate the economic development effects of higher elementary
test scores, I use techniques similar to what I used to estimate the effects
of lower K–3 class size in Chapter 7. I used evidence on how test scores
affected employment rates and wage rates at ages 23 and 33 to extrapolate earnings effects to other ages.3
I assumed the change in early elementary test scores was initiated
at age seven. I assumed that this change in outcomes for one individual
or a group has positive peer effects.
For these estimates, I considered the economic development effects
of increasing early elementary test scores in both reading and math by
an “effect size” of 0.1. An effect size of 0.1 is defined as one-tenth of the
standard deviation in test scores among the students in early elementary
school. Such an increase in test scores is a relatively small effect. It corresponds to moving a student up from 50 percent to 54 percent in his
or her percentile ranking on reading and math test scores. A one-tenth
effect-size increase in test scores in early elementary school is equal to
what students in early elementary school typically learn in about one
month of school (Hill et al. 2007).
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For comparison’s sake, Camilli et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis of
early childhood education studies suggests that the “average-quality”
intervention increases elementary test scores by an effect size of 0.18.
More effective early childhood education programs increase elementary test scores by an effect size of up to 0.58.4 Of course, pre-K education may have effects on adult earnings and other outcomes beyond
those predicted by its effects on elementary test scores. Based on the
Tennessee Class Size Study, lowering class sizes in grades K–3 by 7 or
8 students (from averages of 22–24 students to 15–16 students) is estimated to increase early elementary test scores by effect sizes that range
from 0.14 to 0.19 (Schanzenbach 2007).
Consider the economic development effects of increasing by a 0.1
effect size the early elementary test scores of one student. I estimate
that the state economic development benefits of doing so have a present
value of $8,312.5, 6
Eight thousand dollars is a considerable economic development
benefit from such a modest educational improvement for one student.
From a state economic development perspective, such a large benefit
could justify considerable efforts in summer school or tutoring for that
student.
What if we succeeded in improving early elementary test scores
by an effect size of 0.1 for all students in a state? In the long run, this
improvement in early elementary test scores would boost state residents’ income by a little over 1 percent (to be exact, the long-run boost
is 1.08 percent). The present value of the future boost in state earnings,
as a percentage of the present value of total future state earnings, is estimated to be about three-fifths of 1 percent (0.63 percent).7
Why does such a small improvement in early elementary test scores
have such large state economic development benefits? These large benefits reflect in part the large effects of educational achievement on the
earnings potential of individuals throughout their future work lives.
These large benefits also reflect the assumption that the state achieves
these higher outcomes for all students.
It should be kept in mind that these economic development benefits
of higher elementary test scores include the effects of all the improvements these higher test scores bring about. This includes later educational improvements such as higher secondary test scores and higher
high school graduation rates. These early education improvements are
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valued in part because these early improvements lead to higher secondary test scores and higher graduation rates.
Secondary Test Scores
To estimate the economic development benefits of improving secondary test scores, I rely on a recent literature survey by Brooks-Gunn,
Magnuson, and Waldfogel (2009) on how secondary test scores affect
later earnings.8
I again considered the economic development benefits from an
improvement in test scores of 0.1 in effect-size units. This is a much
larger improvement at the secondary level than it is at the elementary
level. Children vary more in academic achievement levels in secondary
school than they do in elementary school. Therefore, a given effect-size
change in secondary school describes a much bigger improvement in
academic achievement than it does in elementary school. For example,
at age 17, an improvement in test scores of 0.1 effect-size units is equivalent to about how much the average student learns in half an academic
year, or five months. At age seven, an improvement in test scores of
0.1 effect-size units corresponds to what a student learns in one month.
The same change in effect-size units corresponds to about five times as
much of a gain in academic achievement at the secondary level as at the
elementary level. Is it therefore five times as difficult or costly to make
such a change at the secondary level? We don’t know. However, it does
seem likely that improving secondary test scores by 0.1 effect-size units
will be more difficult.
I estimate the state economic development benefits from a 0.1
effect-size improvement in secondary test scores for one student. I estimate that the present value of the economic development benefits from
this improvement is $7,050. This is the net increase in state residents’
earnings from this one student’s test score improvement.
I also estimate the state economic development benefits of a 0.1
increase in secondary test scores for all the state’s students.9 These economic development benefits occur sooner than they do for improvements in all students’ elementary test scores. Secondary students enter
the labor market sooner than elementary students. However, the longrun economic development benefits are slightly less for secondary students than for the previously considered improvement in elementary
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test scores. The long-run economic development benefit for state residents’ earnings is estimated to max out at a little more than four-fifths of
1 percent (more precisely, 0.83 percent). However, the present value of
the economic development benefits as a percentage of earnings is about
the same, at around three-fifths of 1 percent (or more precisely, 0.57
percent), because the benefits occur sooner.
The improvement in secondary test scores has about the same economic development benefits as the improvement in elementary test
scores. However, the secondary improvement is probably harder to
accomplish and corresponds to a greater improvement in months of
achievement. What explains this pattern of effects? In part, this pattern
reflects my assumption that elementary test score improvements have
peer-effect spillovers, whereas secondary test score improvements do
not. But this pattern also reflects the estimates I use that relate test scores
to earnings. I use estimates that find similar correlations of elementary
and secondary test scores with adult earnings. Because the improvements in early elementary test scores are probably easier to make, this
provides an argument for earlier investments in K–12 quality.10

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
I now consider increases in educational attainment. Specifically, I
consider the effects of increasing the numbers of persons with a high
school degree, a four-year college degree, and an associate’s degree.
In interpreting the below results, the following should be kept in
mind: inducing one person to get any one of these degrees is a much
more difficult improvement than increasing either elementary or secondary test scores by an effect size of 0.1. A program might increase
the average test scores of some group of students by an effect size of
0.1. But even the best of programs is highly unlikely to be able to take
a group of persons, all of whom would not have obtained a degree but
for the intervention, and induce 100 percent of that group to obtain a
particular degree.
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Reducing High School Dropouts
To analyze the economic development benefits from reducing high
school dropouts, I use data on the earnings of high school dropouts
versus those who get a high school degree. I assume that the marginal
student whom we convert from a dropout to a high school graduate is
less likely than the average high school graduate to complete postsecondary education. Based on estimates by Belfield and Levin (2007b), I
assume that this additional high school graduate will have the following
postsecondary experience: four-fifths will have no further education, 14
percent will attend college but will not get a bachelor’s degree, and 6
percent will get a bachelor’s degree.11
Based on these procedures, I estimate that converting one high
school dropout to a high school graduate will have economic development benefits for a state’s economy with a present value of $175,234.12
I also estimate the effects of reducing the high school dropout rate
by 1 percentage point out of all students. (A 1-percentage-point reduction would mean a change from the average national high school dropout rate of 23 percent [Heckman and LaFontaine 2007] to 22 percent.)
Such a change in educational outcomes begins to have some economic
effects almost immediately. The long-run estimated effect is to boost
state earnings by 0.21 percent. The net present value of the earnings
benefits for the state, as a percentage of the present value of state earnings, is 0.14 percent.13
Bachelor’s Degree
I do analysis similar to the high school dropout analysis for college
graduation. First, I consider the economic development benefits if we
succeeded in switching one person from being a high school graduate
without a bachelor’s degree to one having a bachelor’s degree.
This analysis is based on comparing earnings of persons with
a bachelor’s or higher degree to the earnings of persons with a high
school degree but without a bachelor’s degree. The group of persons
with a high school degree but without a bachelor’s degree includes persons with some college or with an associate’s degree.14
Based on this analysis, I estimate that the state economic development benefits from one additional bachelor’s degree have a present
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value of $375,912.15 Economic development benefits justify a significant investment to increase the number of bachelor’s degree holders
even by one person.
I also consider the state economic development benefits of increasing the percentage of a state’s population with a bachelor’s degree by
1 percent of the population. As of March 2008, among 25- to 29-yearolds, 30.8 percent had a bachelor’s degree (Digest of Education Statistics 2010). This 1-percentage-point increase would increase this percentage to 31.8 percent. I estimate that a 1-percentage-point increase
in the college graduation rate would in the long run provide state economic development benefits of 0.45 percent of state earnings. The net
present value of these economic development benefits, divided by the
net present value of expected future state earnings, is 0.31 percent.
Associate’s Degree
I also considered the economic development benefits from having
more community college graduates. Estimates are based on comparing
the earnings of those persons having an associate’s degree, but not a
bachelor’s degree, to the earnings of high school graduates who did not
have any postsecondary degree but might have some college.16
This analysis is similar to the high-school-degree and bachelor’sdegree analyses, with one exception: inducing an associate’s degree is
assumed to not lead to any subsequent changes in educational attainment, whereas inducing a high school degree or bachelor’s degree is
allowed to lead to subsequent degrees. I judged it unclear what effect
should reasonably be assumed for how an associate’s degree affects
subsequent educational attainment. If a reader believes that an associate’s degree increases the probability of obtaining a bachelor’s degree
by x percent, then x percent of the estimated bachelor’s degree effects
can be added to the below effects for an associate’s degree alone.
Based on this analysis, getting a single person to earn an associate’s
degree provides state economic development benefits whose present
value is $126,995.
I also consider increasing the percentage of a state’s population
with an associate’s degree by 1 percent of the population. As of 2008,
the percentage of 25- to 29-year-olds with an associate’s degree but
no higher degree is 9.0 percent (Digest of Education Statistics 2010).
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An increase of 1 percentage point would move this percentage to 10
percent. I estimate that the long-run state economic development benefits from this change would be 0.15 percent of state earnings. The net
present value of the state earnings benefits from a 1-percentage-point
increase in associate’s degree holders, as a percentage of the present
value of expected future state earnings, is 0.10 percent.

PUBLIC HEALTH
In the area of public health, I estimate the state economic development benefits of improving child health and adult health. The child
health outcomes considered are a reduction in the incidence of low birth
weight among babies and a reduction in attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder and related conduct disorders (ADHD). The adult health outcomes considered are a reduction in the severity of mental illness and
drug and alcohol abuse.
In interpreting the below per-person estimates, it should be kept in
mind that eliminating these problems for one person is a large change.
In general, interventions would reduce the probability of these problems’ occurring, but would not take that probability from 100 percent
all the way down to 0 percent. In other words, interventions would not
change the probability of persons’ having these problems from being
certain to being nonexistent.
Reducing Low Birth Weight
Low birth weight is thought to lower adult earnings in two ways.
First, low birth weight lowers educational attainment. Second, low birth
weight has direct effects on cognitive ability beyond its effects on educational attainment.
I estimate the state economic development benefits of turning one
low-weight birth into a normal-weight birth. I also estimate the economic development benefits of reducing the incidence of low birth
weight by 1 percent of overall births. The current percentage of lowbirth-weight babies in the United States is 8.3 percent (Martin et al.
2009).
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Estimated economic development benefits from reducing lowbirth-weight incidence are based on research by Rucker Johnson and
Robert Schoeni. Johnson and Schoeni (2007) compare the earnings of
brothers in families where one or more brothers fall into both the lowbirth-weight and normal-birth-weight groups.17 I assume these percentage earnings penalties apply to both men and women over their working
lives.18
Based on this analysis, the state economic development benefits
from switching one low-weight birth to a normal-weight birth have
a net present value of $135,631.19 This justifies considerable costs in
converting one low-weight birth to a normal-weight birth. The state
economic development benefits of reducing the incidence of low birth
weights by 1 percent of all births would in the long run increase state
earnings by 0.17 percent. The net present value of the state economic
development benefits from this reduction in low-birth-weight incidence, as a percentage of the net present value of state earnings, is 0.09
percent.
Reducing Recurrence of ADHD/Conduct Disorders
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorders (ADHD) and related conduct disorders during youth may affect state economic development by
affecting adult earnings capacity. These effects on adult earnings capacity may take place directly or through affecting educational attainment.
I base my estimated economic development effects on research by
Currie et al. (2009). They examine how occurrences of ADHD/conduct
disorders at various ages affect secondary test scores. I combine these
estimates with estimates of how secondary test scores affect adult earnings, as described previously in this chapter. Thus, the estimated effects
of child ADHD on adult earnings are only the effects that are manifested in secondary test scores. There probably are additional effects of
child ADHD on adult earnings that are not manifested in secondary test
scores. Therefore, the estimates here probably understate the effects of
child ADHD on adult earnings.
In Currie et al.’s research, they have data on whether ADHD/conduct
disorders occur for a young person during each of four age periods: 0–3,
4–8, 9–13, and 14–18. Their model explains secondary test scores as a
function of ADHD/conduct disorders occurring during just one of these
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age periods, and of ADHD/conduct disorders occurring during more
than one of these age periods. These estimates control for whether the
birth was low weight, as well as for other factors.
For my estimates, I focused on the effects of reducing the incidence
of multiple-period ADHD/conduct disorders. This seems more feasible to do than reducing the incidence of single-period ADHD/conduct
disorders. After ADHD/conduct disorders have been diagnosed during a given age period, interventions might reduce future incidence of
ADHD.20
I estimate that reducing one case of multiple-age-period ADHD has
state economic development benefits with a present value of $31,123.
I also consider reducing the incidence of multiple-age-period
ADHD by 1 percent of the overall population. In Currie et al.’s sample,
the overall incidence of multiple-age-period ADHD is 2.7 percent. The
incidence of ADHD during any of these age periods is 10.2 percent.
Therefore, about one quarter of children diagnosed with ADHD during
one period are diagnosed with ADHD for more than one period (Currie
et al. 2009, Table 2). I estimate that a 1-percentage-point reduction in
children with multiple-period ADHD would have economic development benefits that in the long run exceed 0.04 percent of state earnings.
The net present value of these economic development benefits, as a
percentage of the net present value of state earnings, is 0.03 percent.
Reducing Problems with Severe Mental Illness, Alcohol Abuse,
and Drug Abuse
I base estimates of the economic development benefits from reducing these problems on a meta-analysis by Aos et al. (2006). They estimate that about 3.8 percent of the adult population has a serious mental
illness. About 7.6 percent of the adult population has a clinically significant alcohol or drug disorder. Their summary of the research literature
suggests that each one of these disorders has similar effects on earnings:
about a 15 percent reduction in earnings.
In estimating state economic development benefits from reducing
these adult health problems, I followed a somewhat different procedure than for the other human development outcomes. In the case of
adult mental illness, or drug or alcohol problems, it is unclear when
the intervention will take place. Therefore, in doing these calculations,
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I assume that we are reducing these problems for state residents at all
ages. Therefore, I do not adjust for out-migration or survival. I do adjust
downward for displacement effects in the state economy. Better mental
health treatment or alcohol or drug treatment will add labor supply to
the state economy. This added labor supply will have some displacement effects.
I estimate the state economic development benefits from eliminating the 15 percent earnings penalty for one person suffering from serious mental illness or alcohol or drug problems. I assume this person
lives from ages 16 to 79 and stays in the state. These state economic
development benefits have a net present value of $91,394.
I also estimate the state economic development benefits if we can
reduce the incidence of mental illness or alcohol or drug problems by 1
percent of the entire population. This could be due to totally eliminating
this earnings penalty for 1 percent of the population. Alternatively, this
could be from some reduction in severity of problems that is equivalent
to totally eliminating the earnings penalty for 1 percent of the population. (For example, we could cut the earnings penalty in half for 2 percent of the population.) The estimated state economic developments are
0.10 percent of state earnings.21

REDUCING CRIME
I also estimate the state economic development benefits from policies to reduce crime rates. Specifically, I estimate the state economic
development benefits from some policy that could intervene with one
or all 16-year-olds in a state and lower all future crimes they commit
by 10 percent.
Reduced crime has economic development benefits through several
avenues. First, it reduces the population in prison or jail at any time.
Because prisoners are not part of the regular labor force, a reduction in
prison population will increase state labor supply.
Second, lower crime reduces the number of state residents with a
criminal record. A criminal record has been shown to reduce employment rates and wage rates (Holzer, Offner, and Sorensen 2005; Western
2002). These lower employment rates and wages are due in part to
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employers’ reluctance to hire ex-offenders. In addition, time spent in
prison means that ex-offenders have accumulated less job experience.
To determine the potential earnings benefits of lower crime, I consider data on earnings that are weighted to reflect the typical educational mix of prisoners. Prisoners tend on average to have lower educational attainment. This lowers somewhat the potential earnings benefits
of reducing crime.22
To estimate the forgone earnings from being imprisoned, I used
data on the proportion of persons of each gender in prison or jail at different ages.23 I also obtained estimates of the proportion of each gender
at different ages that will have a prison record if current trends in first
incarceration rates continue.24
Being in prison is assumed to lower the employment rate to zero.
Having a prison record is assumed to reduce the person’s subsequent
employment rate by 21 percent, based on research by Holzer, Offner,
and Sorensen (2005).25 Having a prison record is assumed to lower
wages by 16 percent, based on research by Western (2002).
I then simulate what happens if we intervene with 16-year-olds to
lower their future crime by 10 percent. This will lower the number of
prisoners at each age by 10 percent. It will also lower the number of
persons with a prison record at each age by 10 percent. In addition to
aggregate impacts, we can consider the effects for a single 16-yearold. We lower the probabilities of this 16-year-old’s engaging in future
criminal activity by 10 percent. This lowers the probability that this person will be in prison or have a prison record at each age by 10 percent.
I estimate that lowering a single person’s propensity to engage in
crime by 10 percent has state economic development benefits of $1,189.
Lowering crime overall by 10 percent would in the long run have state
economic development benefits equal to 0.124 of state earnings. The
present value of the state economic development benefits of 10 percent
lower crime, as a percentage of the present value of state earnings, is
0.10 percent.
These state economic development benefits justify considerable
efforts in crime prevention. However, these benefits are modest enough
that major anticrime spending would require also considering other
benefits, such as benefits to crime victims or lower justice system costs.
Why aren’t these economic development benefits greater? First,
only a small percentage of the population, 0.7 percent, is in prison at
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any point in time. Second, although eventually 6.6 percent of the population is expected to have a prison record, this percentage is lower
at earlier ages (Bonczar 2003). Furthermore, a prison record does not
lower employment rates to zero. Third, although a reduction in crime
adds to the labor force, the added labor force is predominantly persons
with low educational attainment. This means potential earnings effects
are smaller.

CONCLUSION
Table 12.1 summarizes this chapter’s estimates. Without cost information for achieving these outcomes, this table should not be used to
rank the desirability of achieving these outcomes. Some outcomes with
modest effects may be sufficiently cheap to offer higher net benefits.
The main point of this chapter is that state economic development
benefits can be calculated for many outcomes of human development
programs. Early childhood programs happen to have some of the best
estimates of the costs of achieving human development outcomes.
The chapter also suggests that many human capital improvements
can have large economic development benefits. Sizable and costly programs can be justified to achieve some of these improvements in the
quality of a state’s human capital.
Chapter 13 summarizes the importance of the local economic development argument for early childhood programs.

Notes
1. This methodology is detailed in Appendix 12A, which, like all of this book’s
appendices, is available from the Upjohn Institute.
2. For women, the proportion of the effects of higher secondary test scores that were
due to higher educational attainment varied from 40 to 80 percent in different
specifications (Murnane et al. 2000).
3. The estimated earnings effects at ages 23 and 33 were based on a study by Currie
and Thomas (1999). I assumed no effects before age 23. I interpolated between
ages 23 and 33 to get in-between effects. Beyond age 33, I assumed that percentage effect on male or female employment rates and wage rates stayed the same for
the remainder of their lives. The estimated effects derived from this procedure are

Table 12.1 Summary of State Economic Development Benefits of Possible Outcomes of Human Development Programs
Present value of
effect on earnings
(in dollars)
8,312
7,050
175,234
375,912

Associate’s degree

HS grad to associate’s degree

126,995

Low birth weight

Improve one low-birth-weight
baby to normal weight
ADHD
Prevent one case of multiple-ageperiod ADHD
Mental illness, drug or Prevent negative earnings effects
alcohol problems
from one case of severe mental
illness, or serious alcohol and
drug problems
Crime
Reduce probability of crime
and imprisonment by 10%

135,631
31,123
91,394

1,189

Societal change considered
All students increase by 0.1 effect size
All students increase by 0.1 effect size
Increase HS grads by 1% of population
Increase bachelor’s degrees by 1% of
population
Increase associate’s degrees by 1% of
population
Reduce incidence of low-birth-weight
babies by 1% of population
Reduce incidence of multiple-age-period
ADHD by 1% of population
Reduce negative earnings effects of
mental illness, or serious alcohol or drug
problems, by 1% of population
Reduce crime and imprisonment by 10%

Long-run
effects as % of
state earnings
1.08
0.83
0.21
0.45
0.15
0.17
0.04
0.10

0.14

NOTE: This table focuses on state economic development benefits of specific changes in different human development outcomes, either
for one person or for the aggregate population. All estimates are net effects on state residents’ earnings. The dollar effects of changes
for one person are the resulting net increase in earnings in this state associated with that one person’s changed outcomes, calculated in
present value terms using a discount rate of 3%, and discounted back to the age at which the change was initiated. The percentage effects
of a society-wide change in outcomes are long-run percentage effects on state residents’ earnings. All estimates adjust for mortality, outmigration, and displacement effects. Where plausible, estimates also adjust for positive peer effects.
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Area
Elementary test scores
Secondary test scores
High school dropout
Bachelor’s degree

Change considered
for one person
Increase by 0.1 effect size
Increase by 0.1 effect size
HS dropout to grad
HS grad to bachelor’s degree
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.

11.

12.
13.
14.

quite similar to those estimated in a recent study by Chetty et al. (2010). Chetty
et al. estimate that a one standard deviation increase in kindergarten test scores
will increase earnings by 14.8 percent when individuals are around age 27. I am
considering a test score increase of one-tenth as much, an increase of 0.1 in “effect
size units.” At age 27, the estimates used from Currie and Thomas imply an earnings increase of 0.9 percent for men and 1.6 percent for women. These age 27
effects then increase until age 33, after which the percentage effects are assumed
to remain stable. These long-run effects are 1.5 percent for men and 1.7 percent
for women.
These estimates use the nonlinear specification for scenarios 4 and 6 in their
Table 7.
This is in 2007 dollars, as are all figures in this book unless otherwise indicated.
This represents the net increase in state residents’ earnings, after considering outmigration and displacement, of this improvement in early elementary education
quality for one student.
Appendix 12A presents the detailed economic development benefits by year.
Specifically, I rely on Brooks-Gunn, Magnuson, and Waldfogel’s (2009) estimate
that a one standard deviation increase in test scores during late adolescence in
high school increased earnings by 10 to 20 percent. I used the midpoint of the
range they estimated, 15 percent. I used the same percentage figure for both men
and women because the studies seem to get various results for whether effects are
higher for men or women (Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2001; Murnane et al.
2000; Neal and Johnson 1996).
Appendix 12A shows the year-by-year state economic development benefits.
My results are similar to estimates of Brooks-Gunn, Magnuson, and Waldfogel
(2009) when they don’t assume much tail-off in early elementary test scores. But
their results are quite different when they require that all the effects of early elementary test scores occur through secondary test scores. I agree with them that
early elementary test score improvements tail off at the secondary level. However,
I think it likely that early elementary test scores affect earnings through mechanisms other than secondary test scores. Higher elementary test scores may be correlated with other changes in the student’s behavior and self-confidence.
More specifically, I used estimates from the 2007 CPS-ORG on employment rates,
wage rates, and weekly hours for high school dropouts and for the three high
school graduate groups (high school education only, some college but no BA, and
BA and above), weighted based on Belfield and Levin’s (2007b) assumptions.
Calculations are done separately for males and females. The actual weights also
are somewhat different for men and women, based on Levin and Belfield. I take
Levin and Belfield’s figures on different ethnic groups and use weights for each
ethnic group to calculate overall average percentages in each educational category
for men and women separately.
Age 17 is assumed to be the age that future earnings benefits are discounted back
to. The intervention is initiated in 2011.
Appendix 12A presents the detailed year-by-year numbers.
Unlike the high school dropout analysis, I restrict the bachelor’s versus non-
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15.
16.

17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.

bachelor’s comparison to being zero for ages prior to age 22. There are some
observed positive differentials prior to age 22, but obtaining such earnings benefits
would not be typical for the average bachelor’s degree recipient. I should also note
that I do not include any local economy spillover benefits of having more college
graduates. These spillover benefits were included in my pre-K analysis. However,
the spillover effects of college graduates proved to be very small in this analysis.
Present value is calculated as of age 18.
Persons with an associate’s degree included both those with an occupational vocational associate’s degree and those with an academic program associate’s degree. I
set earnings differences between associate’s degree holders and nonholders to zero
prior to age 21, even though there were some positive differentials before then.
My estimates are based upon the raw differences Johnson and Schoeni (2007)
report in their Table 3. Using their figures, I calculate the percentage earnings
penalty, as a percentage of non-low-birth-weight earnings, for men in three age
brackets: ages 18–26, 27–36, and 37–52. I assume that these percentage changes
apply to the midpoints of these three age brackets. I interpolate the percentage
effects to individual years of age from 16 to 52. Percentage effects beyond age
52 are assumed to be the same as at age 52. Johnson and Schoeni’s figures imply
a percentage earnings penalty of 10 percent for ages 18–26, 25 percent for ages
27–36, and 26 percent for ages 37–52. The estimated numbers imply a percentage effect of close to zero at age 16. This grows fairly steadily to 25 percent at
age 32 and doesn’t change much thereafter. Johnson and Schoeni also do some
multivariate analysis. This multivariate analysis seems roughly consistent overall
with this simple comparison. However, the functional forms chosen for how age
alters the effects of low birth weights imply implausible earnings effects at older
and younger ages.
I adjust upward for positive peer effects during school of reduced incidence of low
birth weight. Positive peer effects seem plausible, as there is evidence that birth
weight affects school performance (Johnson and Schoeni 2007).
This present value is calculated as of birth.
Perhaps some prior interventions would reduce the incidence of ADHD in any
period. But these interventions might be interventions in prenatal care rather than
interventions providing public health treatment directly for ADHD.
These benefits are 1 percent of the 15 percent per person penalty, reduced by onethird because of displacement effects.
Based on Harlow (2003, Table 1), I assumed that the educational mix of prisoners
was 41 percent high school dropouts, 46 percent high school graduates but no college (this includes GEDs), 10 percent some college but not a bachelor’s degree,
and 3 percent a bachelor’s degree. I used these weights to estimate annual earnings
by age for males and females separately.
West and Sabol (2009), Table 19. West and Sabol only give data on certain age
ranges. To get other ages, I interpolated and extrapolated based on their data.
Bonczar (2003). I used the Excel spreadsheets that back up Figures 4 and 5 in
Bonczar’s paper.
I took Holzer’s estimate that having a criminal record lowered the employment
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rate of black males by 17.5 percent. I assumed that this estimate applied to black
males at age 40. The 21 percent is the proportion that 17.5 percentage points is of
the black male age 40 employment rate. I assumed this downward effect on the
employment rate was the same percentage of baseline employment rates for all
groups.

13
Thinking and Acting Locally
What Potential Is There for Local Support for
High-Quality Early Childhood Programs?
While working on this book, I have also been involved in efforts
to implement universal pre-K education in my home community, Kalamazoo, Michigan. A local interfaith community organizing group,
ISAAC, adopted early childhood education as an issue. (ISAAC is
affiliated with the Gamaliel Foundation, whose most famous former
community organizer is Barack Obama.) ISAAC members decided on
universal pre-K education as a key “ask” for which they would solicit
the support of community leaders. The ISAAC effort led to formation
of a Kalamazoo County committee, with representation from United
Way, local school superintendents, many pre-K programs and child care
centers, parents, local political leaders, and local business leaders. This
committee has been drawing up a plan for universal pre-K education
in Kalamazoo County: how many additional slots would be needed,
how many years and hours of pre-K education would be provided to
children under the program, who would provide pre-K education, the
role of existing providers, how quality would be determined, and other
aspects. The plan is now (2010) at the early stages of seeking funding
from various sources. If it is funded, it will not be fully implemented
until at least 2013–2014.1
Such local efforts face a fundamental issue: Do they make any
sense? Does it make sense to think of early childhood education as a
policy that can be locally pursued? Does universal pre-K really provide
any “local” benefits? The answer this book has given is “Yes.” Universal pre-K, and other early childhood programs, can provide significant
local economic development benefits. Local benefits justify the potential for local activism.
The remainder of this chapter gives more context for both the potential for and the need for local activism for early childhood programs. In
the process of providing the context, I emphasize some of the important
findings of this book.
353
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EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: HOW DO THEY FIT INTO THE BIG ISSUES?
Is the effect of early childhood programs on local economic development a big issue? Obviously the United States and the world face
many major challenges. There are major environmental challenges such
as climate change. There are problems with lagging development in
much of the Third World. There are issues of improving global financial
regulation and macroeconomic stability. There is religious and cultural
strife. There are issues of the quality of culture and family life around
the world.
Within the United States, a major issue is how to make sure the
gains from economic growth are shared more fully with the bottom and
middle of the income distribution. Over the last three decades, real earnings have grown sluggishly for most U.S. households. For example, in
calculations I did with my colleague Susan Houseman, we found that
from 1979 to 2006, real wage growth for 90 percent of all U.S. workers
lagged behind the growth in labor productivity of the U.S. economy.
If wages below the ninetieth percentile had grown as fast as overall
U.S. productivity growth from 1979 to 2006, earnings for these workers
would have been over $700 billion higher in 2006. These higher earnings would equal about 12 percent of all U.S. wage and salary income
(Bartik and Houseman 2008).
Sluggish earnings growth for most U.S. households has many
costs. The economic costs are the most obvious. But, as Harvard economics professor Benjamin Friedman (2005) argues in his book The
Moral Consequences of Economic Growth, a U.S. society with sluggish
growth for most households is likely to be mean-spirited in many ways.
Sluggish growth reduces support for stronger environmental protection.
It reduces support for engaging generously with the rest of the world.
Sluggish growth increases the appeal of simple answers, even authoritarian answers. Global progress as well as U.S. progress is likely to be
impeded by a United States in which the broad middle class fears it is
losing ground.2
We need to figure out how to increase the earnings of the lower
and middle portions of the U.S. income distribution. As this book has
argued in Chapter 2, these earnings gains are particularly valuable if
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they are provided in one’s home region. Such higher earnings in a home
region, which I have labeled “local economic development benefits,”
are of great importance to many U.S. households.
Many policies must be addressed to deal with this U.S. labor market
problem. Better access to affordable health care for all Americans will
help. (The 2010 passage of a health care reform bill is just a first step
in a long process.) Better assistance for workers displaced because of
increases in imports or other economic changes would also help.
But responses to sluggish U.S. earnings growth for most workers must include efforts to improve the human capital development of
all U.S. workers. As this book has argued, consistent with most labor
economists’ views, the labor market will respond to a greater supply of
more productive workers by creating additional job slots and additional
earnings. “If you supply the labor, the jobs will come” is not perfectly
true. But it is true to a large extent.
Among human capital development programs, perhaps the most
rigorous empirical evidence for effectiveness is for high-quality early
childhood programs. K–12 reforms, changes in higher education financing and design, and a better job training system are also needed. But
how to expand early childhood programs, while ensuring high quality,
is a key component of any overall U.S. human capital development
strategy.

WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE LOCALLY?
To what extent can and should these various issues be dealt with at
the state and local level, versus the federal or international level? For
many of these issues, state and local governments cannot lead, but must
follow. Climate change policy must be set at a global and national level.
Financial regulation is largely a national and global issue.
Even as regards U.S. living standards for typical households, many
of the policies must be instituted at the national level. For example,
health care reform is clearly a national issue.
But early childhood education is one issue where a strong state and
local role makes sense. Consider Harvard professor John Donahue’s
criteria for when governmental authority and responsibility should
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devolve from the federal government to U.S. states: “Do Devolve—
Where It Makes Sense . . . Where states vary greatly in circumstances or
goals, where external impacts are minor or manageable, where the payoff from innovation exceeds the advantages of uniformity, and where
competition boosts efficiency instead of inspiring destructive strategies,
the central government should stand clear” (Donahue 1997, p. 165).
As discussed throughout this book, these criteria are to a large
extent met by early childhood programs.
“Where states vary greatly in circumstances or goals . . . ” Early
childhood education can be delivered in a quality way through a variety of institutions, including public schools and private pre-K programs
(Chapter 5). State and local areas may differ in the extent and quality
of such institutions. The culture of different states or local areas may
demand more or less parental choice in pre-K programs (Chapter 11).
“ . . . where external impacts are minor or manageable . . . ” The
state-level economic development benefits of early childhood programs
are two-thirds to three-quarters of their national economic development
benefits (Chapter 10). Local economic development benefits are not
much below state economic development benefits (Chapter 9). One can
argue that the glass is one-quarter to one-third empty. The spillover economic development benefits of early childhood programs are sufficient
to rationalize very large federal subsidies for the costs of these programs (Chapter 10). But one can also argue that the glass is two-thirds
to three-quarters full. The state or local economic development benefits
of high-quality early childhood programs are more than enough to rationalize vigorous state or local support for these programs. In this they
contrast with, for example, policies to control global warming, in which
spillover benefits are so large compared to local benefits that state or
local efforts to control global warming can only be justified as a way to
encourage more effective global action.
“ . . . where the payoff from innovation exceeds the advantages
of uniformity . . . ” We know something about what policies lead to
higher-quality pre-K programs, such as smaller class sizes (Chapter 5).
But there are many uncertainties (Chapter 6). We need more knowledge
about what early childhood programs and program designs will be most
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effective for what children. State and local flexibility in program design
is one way to encourage early childhood programs to be innovative
(Chapter 10).
“ . . . where competition boosts efficiency instead of inspiring
destructive strategies . . . ” When offering financial incentives to businesses, state and local governments engage in competition that leads to
incentive levels that excessively redistribute income toward the rich and
produces only limited national economic development benefits (Chapter 10). But for early childhood programs, competition may provide an
incentive to come up with better program approaches. For example, the
prospect of higher property values may spur state and local competition
to improve pre-K access and quality (Chapter 7).
There is a strong need for federal involvement to evaluate the results
of early childhood programs. Innovation’s benefits accrue throughout
the nation, and perhaps even to other countries. Innovation without
evaluation has no proof of effectiveness. Because most of the benefits
of evaluating innovations spill over into other states around the nation,
state and local areas have an incentive to underinvest in evaluating
innovations. Federal funding can increase evaluation to a more socially
beneficial level.
States were famously referred to by Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis as “laboratories of democracy.” However, if no one bothers to
rigorously measure results in these laboratories, the learning from such
laboratories will be too limited.
There is also a strong need for federal involvement to measure early
childhood program quality. State and local political leaders and bureaucrats may have some incentive to claim success regardless of reality.
Voters and home buyers would benefit from outside objective information on program quality. The availability of such outside objective
information may even be essential in allowing property value effects to
occur from better program quality (Chapter 7). The possible capitalization of better program quality provides incentives for state and local
competition to promote higher program quality.
There is also a more pragmatic political case for federal involvement in early childhood education. There are both local and national
economic development benefits from fostering more and better-quality
early childhood programs. If state and local governments fail to act, for
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whatever reason, there is still a rationale for federal involvement. The
national interest is served by expanding high-quality early childhood
programs. Such federal involvement should respect the need for innovation and flexibility in early childhood programs (Chapter 10).

IS LOCAL ACTION REALLY POLITICALLY FEASIBLE?
Of course, there are barriers to the efforts of local activists to expand
high-quality early childhood programs. These programs’ short-run costs
are high relative to their benefits (Chapters 4 and 7). (This assumes that
there is no capitalization of greater access to higher-quality early childhood programs into higher property values, and that early childhood
programs are not coupled with complementary programs of adult training that have short-term benefits. See Chapter 7 for discussion of these
possibilities.) Short-sighted local political leaders may be hesitant to
incur short-term costs whose largest benefits are long-term.
The distribution of benefits from early childhood programs may
also be a political problem. For example, pre-K’s dollar benefits per
household in the lowest income quintile are three times the dollar benefits for the median income household (Chapter 8). Tax costs of universal
pre-K or targeted pre-K exceed benefits for the upper two income quintiles (Chapter 8). If upper income households have disproportionately
large political influence compared to lower income households in state
and local politics, then the tax costs of upper income households may
politically outweigh the benefits for lower income households.
However, one common critique of state and local action on human
capital investments does not seem to be sufficiently empirically valid.
For example, John Donahue (1997), in his book on U.S. states, makes
the following argument for why states may inadequately invest in education: “Mobility . . . dilutes the incentives of states to invest in education. Workers educated at the expense of one state can move away
and apply their productive skills elsewhere . . . The mobility of human
capital clouds confident predictions that development-minded states
will emphasize education” (p. 158). Donahue’s argument would seem
to apply with even more force to early childhood programs, which
take place earlier, with more time for persons to move out of state.
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However, the empirical evidence suggests that there is considerably
less out-of-state mobility from one’s childhood state than some might
expect (Chapter 2). Over three-fifths of Americans spend the bulk of
their working career in their childhood state. Out-of-state mobility does
reduce the state-level economic development benefits of early childhood programs. But the remaining state-level economic development
benefits of early childhood programs still far exceed costs, by ratios of
two to one and more (Chapter 4).
Transferring the debate over early childhood programs to the federal
level does not solve the problems of politicians’ favoring a short-term
perspective or favoring the rich. The U.S. Congress’s actions on budget
deficits or climate change legislation do not suggest an enthusiasm for a
long-term perspective. Furthermore, as political scientist Larry Bartels
contends in his book Unequal Democracy, U.S. senators are much less
responsive to the political views of their low income constituents than
they are to the views of their middle income and upper income constituents (Bartels 2008, Chap. 9).
If the problem is that state and local leaders, as well as federal leaders, do not pay attention to the long-term or the needs of the poor, then
the most direct solution would seem to be political pressure. Organizations and campaigns should pressure political leaders to adopt a longterm perspective that considers the needs of all households. Effective
political pressure on behalf of the poor is certainly a goal of community organizing. Sometimes such community organizing groups are
quite politically effective. (See, for example, Paul Osterman’s [2003]
description of the many successful organizing efforts of the Industrial
Areas Foundation, the community organizing group founded by Saul
Alinsky.) The efforts of Pew Charitable Trusts and its affiliated organizations to build a business case for pre-K education also can be seen as
an effort to change the political climate.
Successful grassroots efforts to expand education have U.S. historical precedents. The common school movement of the nineteenth
century successfully advocated for free public elementary education
through grade eight. The high school movement of the early twentieth century dramatically expanded public high schools and public high
school enrollment from 1910 to 1940.
These successful education expansions seem to have stemmed
from grassroots pressure as well as pressure from business groups and
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educated elites. For example, according to Harvard professors Claudia
Goldin and Lawrence Katz in their book The Race between Education
and Technology, the common school movement of the nineteenth century benefited from a wide range of supporters.
Across much of America, mass education was a truly grassroots
movement. Its popular base is clear from the referenda in many
states that led to the passage of constitutional amendments, constitutions, and legislative statutes providing for taxation and free
public education. It is also clear from the role of migration of New
Englanders into the western lands and the institutions they brought
with them. Yet it is also the case that public education was championed by energetic and persuasive school men such as Horace
Mann, and that some manufacturers and property owners, particularly in the wake of the large migration of the Irish to New England, wanted to create Protestant Americans out of newly arrived
Catholics . . . (Goldin and Katz 2008, p. 148)

In the early twentieth century, in Goldin and Katz’s view, the high
school movement was also a “grassroots movement. It sprung from the
people and was not forced upon them by a top-down campaign” (p.
245).
As an example of how these movements promoted educational
investments, consider the following statement from the Iowa Department of Public Instruction in 1914:
The landlord who lives in town . . . may well be reminded that when
he offers his farm for sale it will be to his advantage to advertise,
“free transportation to a good graded school.” Those who have no
children to attend school . . . should be interested in securing to the
children of the whole community the best educational advantages
possible . . . if they live out their years with no children to depend
upon in old age, they must of necessity rely upon someone, they
know not whom, who is today in the public schools. Their only
safeguard lies in giving the best advantages possible to all. (Quoted
in Goldin and Katz [2008], p. 193)

The case made in 1914 by the Iowa Department of Public Instruction for “a good graded school” is similar in spirit to today’s “business
case” for high-quality early childhood programs. Both make an appeal
to economic self-interest as well as the broad public interest.
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A key point is that the common school movement and the high
school movement were not federal initiatives. These dramatic increases
in educational access were won by state and local activism.
It is certainly conceivable that a new national norm of universal
access to high quality early childhood programs might be established by
grassroots campaigns at the state and local level. Whether this occurs is
up to political choices and the political activism of many groups, from
citizen activists to business groups.

NEW THINKING ABOUT EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS
AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Like most economists, and perhaps most academics interested in
government policy, I would like to believe (but often doubt!) that John
Maynard Keynes was right when he famously stated, at the end of The
General Theory, his confidence in the power of ideas: “The ideas of
economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world is ruled by little else . . . Soon or late, it is ideas, not
vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil” (Keynes 1936,
p. 383).
Local economic development policy does not have the national
prominence of macroeconomics. But it is the preeminent goal of state
and local governments in the United States. Achieving better state and
local economic development is the direct goal of many state and local
programs. All other state and local policies are influenced by their perceived effects on local economic development.
As this book has argued, we need to rethink local economic development. Local economic development should not be thought of as
simply growth in local output or employment. Rather, local economic
development should be thought of as growth in employment and earnings per capita.
When thought of in this way, local economic development gains
social significance. It provides the great social benefit of helping persons to obtain a good job while allowing them to retain valuable ties to
their home region.
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If local economic development increases local earnings per capita,
then it becomes an important class of labor market benefit. It then
becomes apparent that such labor market benefits can be affected by
labor market policies on both sides of the labor market: the demand side
and the supply side.
The labor demand side, incentives to business, has traditionally
been emphasized by state and local economic development policy. But
this tradition is not backed up by empirical evidence. At least as important to local economic development is what state and local public policies do on the labor supply side, in enhancing the quantity and quality
of the human capital of local residents.
Early childhood programs can play a key role in such local human
capital policies. We know enough to say that such programs, if run
in a high-quality way at sufficient scale, can play a significant role in
enhancing local economic development. We also know enough to say
that we need to continue learning how to more effectively design and
implement these programs. Continued public as well as private innovation is an important part of local economic development.
The idea of early childhood programs as a spur to state and local
economic development is a powerful idea. The empirical evidence supports this idea. Will this idea become accepted by the public, the business community, and political leaders? If so, this new way of thinking about economic development may encourage the political support
needed to make early childhood programs more broadly available to
American children.

Notes
1. Among other activities, I have written a paper that applies some of this book’s
analysis to the particular case of universal pre-K in Kalamazoo County (Bartik
2009a).
2. I hasten to add that for environmental reasons, policies to promote growth need to
be accompanied by policies that will over time sufficiently reduce CO2 emissions
(and other environmental damage) per dollar of global output, and control population, so that total CO2 emissions and other environmental damage will decline
even as global output per person expands.
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About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employmentrelated problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications. Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists;
2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal
research program by providing financial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in
the field; and 4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment and training programs in the
local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.
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